

With an article
by **Herbert Gintis**
on school choice

PROSPECTS

quarterly review of
comparative education

ISSUE NUMBER **100** ONE HUNDRED

OPEN FILE

Citizenship and education: towards meaningful practice

GUEST EDITOR : LUIS ALBALA-BERTRAND



INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF EDUCATION

Vol. XXVI, no. 4, December 1996

PROSPECTS

quarterly review of comparative education

Editor: Juan Carlos Tedesco

This journal is available in the following languages:

ARABIC

مستقبلات

المجلة الفصلية للتربية المقارنة

ISSN: 0254-119-X

CHINESE

教育展望

国际比较教育季刊

ISSN: 0254-8682

ENGLISH

PROSPECTS

quarterly review of comparative education

ISSN: 0033-1538

FRENCH

PERSPECTIVES

revue trimestrielle d'éducation comparée

ISSN: 0304-3045

RUSSIAN

перспективы

ежеквартальный журнал сравнительных исследований в области образования

ISSN: 0207-8953

SPANISH

PERSPECTIVAS

revista trimestral de educación comparada

ISSN: 0304-3053

The annual subscription rates for *Prospects* are printed on the order form at the end of this issue. Subscription requests for the different language editions can be:

- either sent to the national distributor of UNESCO publications in your country (see list at the end of this issue);
- or sent to Subscription Service, Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi 202, 1060 Brussels, Belgium (see order form).

NUMBER ONE HUNDRED

P R O S P E C T S

quarterly review of comparative education

Vol. XXVI, no. 4, December 1996

Editorial

Juan Carlos Tedesco 625**VIEWPOINTS/CONTROVERSIES**

School choice: the issues and the options

Herbert Gintis 631**OPEN FILE: CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION:
TOWARDS MEANINGFUL PRACTICE**

Introduction to the open file

Luis Albala-Bertrand 645

CITIZENSHIP CONTEXTS AND OUTLOOK IN THE WORLD TODAY

Generational shifts in citizenship behaviours:

the role of education and economic security in

the declining respect for authority in industrial society *Ronald Inglehart* 653

What knowledge for a reinforced citizenship

Richard G. Niemi

in the United States of America ?

and Jane Junn 663

Education in a world in transition:

between post-communism and post-modernism

César Birzea 673

Citizenship, national integration and education:

ideology and consensus in Latin America

Manuel Antonio Garretón 683

What universality for human rights?

Willem Doise 695

For a sociogenetic constructivist

didactics of citizenship

Luis Albala-Bertrand 705

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN PRACTICE

Building up a new citizen in a post-totalitarian society :

an educational approach in the Czech Republic

Petr Pitha 749

Education for citizenship and reconciliation in Nicaragua

Terencio García 757

Citizenship and productive education

in the Central African Republic

Abel Koulaninga 763

Interactive citizenship projects for

school-age young people in northern Europe

Ruud Veldhuis 769

Index to volume XXVI

779

Authors are responsible for the choice and presentation of the facts contained in this publication and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNESCO:IBE and do not commit the Organization. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in *Prospects* do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO:IBE concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Please address all editorial correspondence to: Juan Carlos Tedesco, Editor, Prospects, International Bureau of Education, P.O. Box 199, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.
Email: J.TEDESCO@unesco.org

To find out more about the International Bureau of Education, its programmes, activities and publications, see the IBE's home page on Internet:
<http://www.unicc.org/ibe>

All correspondence concerning subscriptions should be addressed to: Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi 202, 1060 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: jean.de.lannoy@infoboard.be
(See order form at the end of this volume.)

Published in 1996 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France.

Printed by SADAG, Bellegarde, France.

ISSN: 0033-1538

© UNESCO 1996

EDITORIAL

The role of education in training for citizenship is at present undergoing a profound revision. This revision affects two distinct areas: *content*, defined in terms of the skills citizenship training should develop; and *methods*, understood as educational and teaching strategies in order to achieve this development. Both aspects are closely linked, particularly at this time when educational content is tending to be defined more in terms of skills and aptitudes and no longer in terms of information or knowledge to be acquired.

The need to revise the *content* of training for citizenship has been brought about by the profound changes that society is undergoing, from the political as well as from the economic and cultural angles. The crisis of the nation-State, the globalization of the economy, the major changes in production methods and the increasing multiculturalism of our societies are, among other events, phenomena that oblige us to look again at the content of training for modern citizenship. Beyond specific discussions about each one of these changes and its impact on education, it would seem necessary to draw attention to the most interesting feature of present changes: the narrowing of the conventional divide between being trained for the role of citizen and being trained for the role of worker.

Here, it is useful to note that according to traditional capitalism there was an enormous contrast between training for citizenship and training for work from the content aspect. While the role of citizen required the development of the ability to adopt a critical attitude, to unite and to take responsibility for decisions, what was expected of the worker, in the majority of production jobs, was a high degree of adaptability to repetitive work routines and the ability to obey orders.

In the new scenarios of intensive capitalist production of knowledge, the gulf in content is tending to narrow. The productive role requires a less complete personal sacrifice, and it is now necessary to benefit from a solid cognitive and emotional background, with a highly developed capacity to work as part of a team, to be creative and to overcome problems. We therefore find ourselves faced with the possibility of bridging the traditional dichotomy between educational ideals and the

practical demands of the world of work. In this way, educational ideals will lose their abstract nature and productive work could take on more humanist characteristics.

However, in contrast to a better cohesion within the individual in terms of skills and aptitudes, changes in the world of production are bringing about a considerable widening of the gulf between those who work in intensive knowledge industries and those involved in traditional occupations or, even more so, those excluded from the work market. It is not by chance that, for them, at the same time as the charisma raised by the new technologies is growing and personal liberty and creativity are enlarging, there appear again on the agenda of public and private concerns all those themes that have been given the title of 'social problems': unemployment, poverty and various forms of social exclusion linked with violence and intolerance.

To sum up, while today the productive role and the citizenship role seem to require similar skills and aptitudes, the key issue is that the productive role requires them only for a core of key workers—*'the symbolic analysts'*—while the citizenship role—if it is to maintain its democratic nature—requires that everybody has them. We are therefore faced with the challenge of establishing new forms of social cohesion which will guarantee our ability to live together. While this challenge must be faced by the whole of society and not simply by education and educators, the role of education has acquired fundamental importance at this time.

On this point, a large amount of current literature can be classified into two main groups. The first one of them forecasts a breakdown in social integrity. This breakdown could lead to a 'dual' society, the existence of 'networks' bringing individuals and groups together in a transnational way, but entirely excluding those not forming part of the network, belongingness and forms of *reproduction* based on particular attitudes or interests and, as a result, a significant weakening of all forms of communal expression. Social relationships would not be, as in the case of traditional capitalism, those of exploitation. Exclusion or, as suggested by Robert Castel,¹ the 'de-affiliation' of society affecting large parts of the population, will be the immediate consequence of this type of social structure. Those on the outside will be virtually 'useless' from the social and economic points of view and, thus, will not be involved in society. Finding themselves always in delicate or unstable circumstances, they will develop attitudes and cultural patterns based on the difficulty of controlling the future. Their 'day-to-day' strategies for survival will give rise to what Castel calls 'the culture of the haphazard'. In contrast to typical workers, the problem represented by these sectors is their mere presence, but not their plans. This 'de-affiliation' could be conceived not only in terms of the complete absence of links or relationships, but also as the absence of participation in structures which have any meaning in society. From the political point of view, such high levels of exclusion could only be maintained with equally high levels of authoritarianism. In such a situation, the very meaning of citizenship and of democratic procedures could be profoundly affected.

The second approach is, on the other hand, based on the definition of strategies to uphold social cohesion. The main argument of these proposals is to avoid work being appropriated by a social elite. Distributing work therefore becomes a key element in this alternative. However, in order to distribute it in this way everyone will have to be trained in the skills required by productive work. The assumption upon which this approach to social development is based consists of maintaining universal access to the skills required for the role of citizen as well as access to the skills required for involvement in the key sectors of the economy.

These changes in social requirements, together with a certain general dissatisfaction concerning the outcomes of educational activities, will also lead to a revision of the teaching methods used in training for citizenship. Here, the particularity of the present time consists precisely in understanding the importance of the individual in constructing one's cultural, political and professional identity. Compared to earlier historical periods, identities are no longer entirely imposed from outside, since each person is expected to create his or her own.

The greater involvement of people in creating their own personalities forms part of the process of individual liberties. While there are considerable differences between cultures, it is possible to state that we are witnessing a process of expansion in individual liberties. This process has evolved in different stages. In the first stage, typical of traditional societies, the freedom of individual choice was remarkably small. In the second phase, first appearing in the West in the nineteenth century, the ideals of liberty and of individual choice advanced considerably in the political and economic worlds. Universal suffrage and a free market were typical of this concept of the individual. This expansion of political and economic liberty was accompanied by the maintenance of strong restrictions on private life-styles. People did not choose a particular life, but rather they were obliged to adopt an already existing and accepted model of behaviour, which would determine the most important aspects of their daily life.²

Compared with the nineteenth century, modern individuality contains wider spheres of action and influences everything concerned by 'a life-style'. This growth of individual liberty is, however, the source of new tensions. While, on the one hand, we accept the collapse of frontiers established by beliefs, prejudices and preconceived ideas of life, on the other, individuals lose the protection that was traditionally granted by the meaning of a fixed identity, where the responsibility for the development of behaviour was determined elsewhere. This paradox of the modern human condition represents one of the most important sources of contemporary philosophical and educational reflection.

The open file in this issue of *Prospects* deals with the complex issue of citizenship today. It tries to identify some of the foremost characteristics that are influencing the emergence of different images and practices of democratic citizenship throughout the world, and suggests that there is no single social strategy to build up democracy. Thus, no definitive set of educational contents may be promoted. Within this perspective, the open file also deals with the question of educational

strategies to develop a more relevant and efficient citizenship education. The proposed approach—constructivism—has already been tried out in the context of the didactics of science, mainly centred on an individual psychological perspective. Here, the problem of the construction of knowledge is applied to the learning of social objectives, such as citizenship, and is considered from a psycho-sociological perspective, using as a basis of evidence the initial outcomes of the research project ‘What education for what citizenship?’ conducted by the IBE.³

JUAN CARLOS TEDESCO
DIRECTOR

Notes

1. Robert Castel, *Les metamorphoses de la question sociale: une chronique du salariat* [The metamorphosis of the social issue: the story of the wage-earning classes], Paris, Fayard, 1995.
2. Lawrence Friedman, *The republic of choice: law, authority and culture*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990.
3. The International Project ‘What education for what citizenship?’, designed during the last half of 1993 and launched in January 1994, is an attempt to help improve educational strategies for citizenship education sustained by empirical cross-cultural evidence about the images of a democratic citizenship and the educational approaches and practices currently utilized for that purpose in different countries. Within the framework of this project, a *first phase* of activities, consisting mainly of a comparative survey conducted in thirty-six countries utilizing representative samples of students and teachers at the secondary education level, is currently being completed. In 1996, the *second phase* of the project was launched aimed at experimenting and evaluating the most striking findings of the survey in actual school situations, with a view to developing effective and adapted curriculum and pedagogical strategies for citizenship education in different countries. The *third phase* of the project, devoted to the dissemination of knowledge and information in the field of citizenship education, has also been initiated with the creation of an international forum on the topic, available through Internet, and the construction of an expert system providing increased accessibility to research-based expertise on citizenship education throughout the world.

VIEWPOINTS/CONTROVERSIES

SCHOOL CHOICE:

THE ISSUES AND THE OPTIONS

Herbert Gintis

Introduction

Primary and secondary education have traditionally been publicly financed and publicly produced. The version of 'school choice' that I shall defend here is an alternative framework for delivering educational services with the following characteristics: first, parents choose the schools that their children will attend; second, any individual or group, including private firms, public institutions, associations of teachers and local community organizations, are entitled to compete in setting up schools and attracting students; third, accredited schools are financed from public funds at a fixed rate per eligible student per year, the amount being adjusted for such educationally relevant characteristics as grade level and special learning needs, as well as such economic factors as the local price level and rental rates; fourth, participating schools are fully funded by the public sector, and they are prohibited from supplementing their budgets by receiving additional tuition funds from parents; fifth, schools receiving public funds must meet acceptable standards concerning physical premises, staffing, curriculum, admissions and financing; and, finally, quantitative measures of the performance of participating schools must be maintained and disseminated to the public, as an aid to parents and communities in assessing the quality of the services their children are receiving.

Original language: English

Herbert Gintis (United States of America)

Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He has jointly authored *Democracy and market: participation, accountability and efficiency* (with Samuel Bowles and Bo Gustafsson, 1993). He is editor of *Macroeconomic policy after the conservative era: studies in investment, savings and finance* (1995) and has written numerous journal articles. He is currently co-chair with Paul Romer of the MacArthur Foundation research project on 'The human side of economic analysis: economic environments and the evolution of norms and preferences'.

While much of the support in the United States for school choice in recent years is based on the observed superiority of private schools over public schools (Coleman, Hoffer & Kilgore, 1982; Gaffney, 1989; Chubb & Moe, 1990), it would be a mistake to think of a national policy of school choice as a *laissez-faire* market system. In fact, a well-run system of school choice is likely to be as carefully regulated as are health-care systems, financial services, transportation and communication sectors in the advanced industrialized nations.

The basic argument for school choice is extremely simple. First, competition among providers of goods and services benefits consumers by disciplining producers to operate efficiently, innovate technologically and offer an optimal mix of outputs. Producers of educational services in a traditional school system are virtual monopolies that are sheltered from such competitive forces, and therefore have little incentive to operate efficiently. Second, the ability to choose one's providers is valuable in itself, since it is a form of personal power that adds to the dignity and self-respect of individuals and families.¹

But why retain the public financing of education, rather than allowing, or requiring, parents to finance their children's education privately? The basic answer is that public financing of education generates relatively few inefficiencies, and equal access to educational resources for children can be an egalitarian force offsetting the natural tendency of market economies to generate morally unacceptable levels of economic inequality.

Competition in supplying educational services: problems and pitfalls

Economists generally recognize that only under certain conditions will a competitive product delivery system approximate a social optimum. In this section, I shall discuss how likely it is that these conditions will be met in the case of educational services.²

I will assume that children themselves are the ultimate beneficiaries of educational services, and that parents are generally the agents best able and most willing to make educational decisions on behalf of their children. This 'student centred' assumption is controversial, and there exist at least three plausible alternatives. One is the 'society centred' notion that some social body, such as the State or the community, is the ultimate beneficiary. Those who hold the 'society centred' view of education will reject school choice *tout court*. Another alternative is the 'parent centred' view inasmuch as parents are the consumers of the educational services of their children, in the sense that parents have the right to determine the upbringing of their children according to their personal beliefs and desires. If parents' personal preferences are deemed appropriate to determine the educational environment to which their children are exposed, then the school choice requirements that the education system be publicly funded and subjected to State regulation would naturally be rejected, and a *laissez-faire* education system would be the preferred alternative. A third alternative holds that children

themselves are the ultimate beneficiaries of educational services, but that parents are not generally the agents best capable of representing the interests of their children, either through judgmental incapacity or lack of interest in their children's welfare.³

Under the 'student centred' assumption taken here, what are the conditions for an effective system of school choice?

First, competition is effective only if there are several alternative suppliers available to a significant proportion of families. Educational services do not exhibit great economies of scale, so communities may well support many small schools. However, in the case of education, the consumer (the student) must travel to the producer (the school), so the effective demand for a given school is spatially limited. Thus, the assumption that there are multiple suppliers available to all families is not reasonable under conditions in which it is only economical to have at most one or two schools within reasonable commuting distance of each student.

In rural regions with a low population density school choice will not be effective without considerable care in promoting entry and reducing economies of scale. The minimum number of schools in a community required for effective competition and consumer choice is probably greater than two, and may be as large as four or five. It is unlikely that this number would be attained by a free market, except perhaps in communities with high population density and efficient transportation. Where these conditions are absent, competition must be encouraged by public policy. One possibility is to enlarge the potential clientele of schools by subsidizing student transportation costs. Another is to lower start-up costs for schools by offering low-interest loans to new schools, as well as by purchasing educational premises and making them available to schools on a rental basis. Finally, schools can be required to share physical premises, such as classrooms, athletic facilities and specialized instruction resources, thereby decreasing minimum feasible school size.

Even in regions of low population density, school choice gives communities a degree of control over the quality of education that is unattainable in a system with a government monopoly, since a properly implemented system of school choice allows local communities to enter into short-term contracts with educational suppliers, much as they do now to deal with public transportation, school transportation, refuse removal, cable television and other social amenities.

Second, competition is effective only if consumers can accurately assess the quality of the goods and services they purchase. Many of the services provided by schools are directly observable, including the quality of the school facilities, ancillary programmes, transportation services, food quality, average class size, teacher availability and the children's attitudes towards their educational experiences. Other more technical aspects of school quality, such as teacher quality and quantitative academic performance, may be provided by the reputation a school develops over time, as well as by the statistical performance measures collected by public agencies. Some important school characteristics will not be available unless

standardized measures of school performance, such as achievement scores, student retention rates, the proportion of the student body going on the higher education and the like, are maintained and available to the public. Such areas as teacher accreditation, adherence to building and other safety codes, and the use of appropriate instructional techniques can be subject to more or less detailed specification. The more stringent the requirements are for a school to be accredited as a public tuition recipient, the more perfectly will parents know school quality. The opposite side of this argument, of course, is that the more stringent are the requirements, the less real choice will be involved, the higher will be the administrative overhead costs, and the greater will be the latitude for political malfeasance and influence-seeking in the setting of the requirements.

Third, competition is effective only if consumers are the best judge of their needs and these needs are reflected in their preferences and choices. Since education is a very technical process, how can we expect parents not to be misled by self-interested and unscrupulous promoters with little interest in meeting students' needs? Many educators doubt that parents possess the required expertise, and are unhappy at the prospect of schools being run by profit-making institutions, of educational entrepreneurs plying an uncritical and indifferent public with 'get educated quick' schemes, and offering modish blandishments incompatible with educational excellence. Many also argue that poor and uneducated families are especially unprepared for making informed choices, so a system of school choice would exacerbate educational inequality.

School choice supporters, by contrast, tend to minimize the problem of uninformed parents, arguing that mistrust of the consumer reveals a paternalistic attitude towards parents that is unwarranted in the light of the widely recognized ability of people to choose intelligently in other areas of their lives. They argue, moreover, that the idea that there will be an 'underclass' of parents who habitually support inferior schools is unlikely, since it is difficult to point to other areas where people so consistently make poor choices concerning their own welfare that the right to choose would best be placed in other hands. Finally, proponents of school choice point out that we would expect even the 'poor and uneducated' to follow the lead of prominent community groups—political, cultural and religious—in making choices for their children. If this is generally the case, instances of parental incompetence or malfeasance are not likely to be systematically related to the demographic or social characteristics of families.

I think the evidence supports the latter position. Here, an analogy with a universal health care system may be useful. Health care is certainly more complex and difficult to assess for the layperson than education. Yet, there are highly successful health-care systems in which patients have the right to choose their own health-care providers, subject to 'accreditation by public agencies'. Similarly, in education, a system of accreditation, truth in advertising and objective performance ratings would be likely to afford parents a wide range of choice, while limiting malfeasance and poor parental choice to manageable levels.

Indeed, economic theory shows that appropriate regulation of complex

goods and services increases the effectiveness of consumer choice by lowering the cost of acquiring the information needed to make informed choices. Financial institutions, for instance, are regulated in virtually all economies, because individual investors cannot be expected to make exhaustive investigations of each insurance company, mutual fund, pension plan or bank with which they do business. Similarly, the deregulation of the airlines in the United States did not leave air safety to the marketplace, depending on the public's ability to use air safety records as a guide to the choice of carriers. Rather, safety standards are federally mandated.

We would expect similar considerations to apply to education. Moreover, where parents are deemed legally incapable of making considered choices for their children, guardians may be empowered to exercise the school-choice decision. Unscrupulous schools that are found to mislead gullible parents may be pursued legally, as is currently the case in the delivery of financial and insurance services. The extent to which parents have the right to exercise highly idiosyncratic choices is a hotly contested issue, but it is probably not difficult or costly to limit parental choice in whatever manner is decided through the political and judicial process, by the appropriate accreditation of teachers, teaching methods, curriculum content and educational practices. Finally, schools can be prohibited from pandering to the selfish interests of parents (e.g. by prohibiting kickbacks to parents).

Moreover, we would expect a system of school choice to lead to improved parental knowledge over time, as the experience of making meaningful educational choices has its effect on the development of parental capacities. Under current conditions, only wealthy families have this capacity, since they can choose private education for their children. Under school choice, many families are likely to gain opportunities now limited only to the wealthy, and hence the assumption that parents are the agents best able to make educational decisions on the part of their children would have greater impact on social outcomes. Thus, they must be more solidly founded, than in the case of the current education system.

Fourth, a competitive system is socially efficient only if the good or service involved is a 'private good,' the positive and negative effects of which fall exclusively on the consumers. If there are positive external effects of consuming a good, private markets will systematically undersupply the good, and if there are negative external effects, private markets will systematically oversupply the good. In the case of education, there are several plausible external effects of a student's consumption of educational services. For one, schooling affects the social behaviour of the student both in youth and adulthood, and hence there is an impact on society by influencing the extent to which the student contributes to a common social purpose. In addition, students influence fellow students by affecting their pace of learning, their physical safety, their enjoyment of the educational experience, and their tolerance of cultural, racial and other forms of social diversity. Educational services thus may have significant external effects.

Suppose, for example, that the social good involves teaching students to sac-

rice their own needs to that of society under some conditions, while the private good is to have your children taught how to make optimal use of the self-sacrificing predilections of others. Teaching self-sacrifice is then a 'positive externality', the benefits of which are not limited to the students so taught, but to all members of society who may deal with these students in the future. A system of school choice will not automatically lead to the teaching of social norms of this type, unless they happen to be in the best (private) interest of the students themselves. Similarly, social interaction in a diverse society may be better served when students learn in schools that are heterogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity and social class. These social benefits may, however, be purchased at the cost of lower educational achievement or fewer educational amenities for some or all of the heterogeneous groups involved. A system of school choice might then result in a socially undesirable lack of cultural diversity.

In addition, the presence of one student in a school may have an 'external effect' on other students, either positive or negative. Students with high achievement levels, with well developed social skills, with a commitment to co-operative behaviour, and with parents who are willing to contribute time, effort and money to the school, will benefit other students and their families. Such students and their families will then prefer to associate with one another rather than with others who have less to offer them in return.

We can ameliorate such external effects by proper State regulation. Schools can be accredited to receive public funds only if their curriculum reflects 'appropriate' social values. There could be a set of national guidelines specifying specific educational practices prohibited and mandated in accredited schools. Similarly, if ethnic and racial diversity is a social goal, schools can be offered bonuses or subsidies for having a diverse student body, or can be taxed or otherwise penalized for having an excessively homogeneous student body.

Can the government properly regulate a system of school choice?

Many proponents of school choice base their argument for privatization on the general inefficiency of the government sector. If they were correct, we could not expect government to regulate a system of school choice in a manner conducive to serving the public interest. I have not argued this position. Rather I have based the superiority of school choice on its capacity to foster competition, compared to the State-run system's position as a monopoly. Indeed, it is possible that even a State-run system could be efficient and innovative if it allowed real competition among public schools.⁴

The idea that the economic regulation is inefficient and pernicious is belied by the historical evidence. There is, in fact, *no example* of an advanced economic system without a strong regulatory State sector. Experience indicates that democratically accountable governments can effectively regulate the competitive delivery of goods and services where necessary. Of course, the political dynamic

leading to effective regulation is often volatile, imprecise and slow to converge to a stable set of policies. Moreover, a system of regulation, once stabilized, is costly to maintain, is subject to continual pressure by groups who stand to gain from regulatory changes (rent seeking), is systematically sub-optimal due to the political influence of groups that stand to lose from the implementation of more efficient policies, and is slow to accommodate technical innovation, changes in consumer preferences and new social priorities. But the benefits of regulation often outweigh the costs by a considerable margin.

In sum, the inability of the public sector to produce efficiently is not due to the inherent deficiencies of government intervention. Rather, public sector control of an industry is generally ineffective because State-run firms are not subject to the forces of competition. No degree of democratic accountability of government can induce State-run monopolies to produce efficiently, for the following important reason: *only the competitive interaction of firms generates the information necessary to judge firm performance. Hence competition is necessary to render firms accountable to agents outside the firm.*⁵

School choice and social inequality

Will school choice exacerbate or ameliorate social inequality? We must distinguish between the *financing* and the *delivery* of educational services. A competitive private delivery system can be financed in an egalitarian manner. In our model, an equal distribution of services can be achieved by ensuring that children receive tuition vouchers, of equal value for all similarly situated students, redeemable at an accredited school of their parents' choice. Students with special needs that require costly treatment (e.g. handicapped or learning-impaired students) can be accorded increased tuition vouchers in this system.

Of course, if schools were allowed to supplement public tuition with private fees, political pressures would likely lead to a lowering of the size of the public tuition contribution to the point where severe resource inequality re-emerged, with middle class parents supplementing public tuition vouchers and poor families using schools that get by on public tuition alone. To avoid this inegalitarian dynamic, schools receiving public tuition vouchers must be categorically denied the right to charge additional tuition fees, except for certain purposes (e.g. for special recreational events) and in a strictly limited amount. Similar provisions are common in health-care finance, where insurers not only do not pay, but also do not allow patients to pay, more than a prescribed amount for a particular service. An alternative (and less egalitarian) plan would allow accredited schools to levy additional fees, but only on a means-tested basis, and would prohibit a school from rejecting a student who cannot pay such fees.

Yet, it is possible that school choice exacerbates existing inequalities of social class and race, despite egalitarian funding.⁶ It has been argued, for instance, that if schools have elective admissions policies, there will be a tendency for schools to become stratified according to ability, with the higher achievers having

the advantage of a superior learning environment, as well as more able and committed teachers.

However, it is plausible that allowing elective admissions policies would help *all* ability levels, since each school could then tailor instruction to the particular needs of its clientele. This apparently occurs in American post-secondary education, where elective admissions is rarely accused of being unfair or inefficient. It might be thought that such a stratified system would exacerbate inequality by inducing lower aspirations in less successful students. This is not a plausible argument. It is certainly reasonable to think that schools dedicated to serving students of a given range of ability levels could instil self-confidence and high aspirations in these students.⁷

Could not ethnic and racial segregation be exacerbated through elective admissions? Racial and ethnic discrimination is already illegal in the United States, and in most other countries, so explicit discrimination is probably a problem that could be routinely and effectively handled by the judicial system. *De facto* discrimination on the basis of academic performance will doubtless occur, but it is unlikely to be more extensive than *de facto* segregation on the basis of residential community, as is the case in current education systems. Moreover, a school choice system would offer disadvantaged and minority communities the resources to form schools catering directly to the needs of their particular constituencies. Such local initiative could be a potent force for improving the educational opportunities of disadvantaged and minority communities.

Not surprisingly, spokespersons for minority groups in the United States have often recognized the potential benefits of school choice. For example, see Chavis (1994) and Williams (1994).

Finally, as we have seen, if student body diversity is deemed a sufficiently important social value, accreditation could require schools to meet specific diversity requirements, or schools could receive bonuses for meeting diversity goals. As in other cases of government intervention in the private economy, however, regulations favouring diversity are vulnerable to attack for violating the principle of equal treatment.

The fate of cultural communality under school choice

Would not a pervasive system of school choice undermine the common cultural heritage of a nation? Markets support diversity by tolerating the disparate preferences of consumers. Subject to minimum start-up costs for firms, and subject to the consumer's ability to pay, a market can satisfy whatever pattern of wants—common and arcane, base and refined, solemn and frivolous—that the consuming public happens to exhibit. Indeed, this capacity to support diversity is considered to be among the more attractive features of market allocation: rather than fighting over what we are to consume in common, markets allow us all to get our own way.

Is it then not possible that an unregulated system of school choice could lead to progressive breakdown in a shared cultural heritage, as groups of parents form educational environments conducive to promoting their distinct beliefs, practices and conceptions of the good? Of course, our current education system *allows* parents to act in this manner, but does not *facilitate* this practice by subsidizing it, thus ensuring that it has a relatively limited impact on social life. School choice could lead to an explosion of alternative school cultures.

Multiculturalists will likely applaud such a situation, and might be expected to be among the strongest supporters of school choice. Others will demur, however, on the basis of one of at least two grounds. First, many continue to believe that a harmonious and cohesive community must be based on shared values, and that extreme cultural heterogeneity would degrade community life. Second, there is no assurance that aggregating *individual* choices through the marketplace produces a result as socially desirable as the *collective* choices people make through the political process.

This problem can be handled by requiring accredited educational institutions to share a common core of basic curricular material, to adhere to a code of ethics in treating students and to foster values consistent with a pluralist democracy. National guidelines could also prohibit accredited schools from engaging in such divisive practices as inculcating racial intolerance, teaching 'creationist' biology and espousing intolerant religious beliefs.

Indeed, there is nothing in the concept of competitive educational delivery systems that prevents the government from specifying exactly which books are used for which courses, and which pedagogical techniques are used under which conditions. I would not endorse such extensive government intervention, of course; my point is merely that such measures are compatible with competitive delivery.

Implementing school choice

There is a danger that the political compromises that are required to achieve a system of school choice in a democratic polity might substantially undermine its egalitarian functioning. One example of a 'fatal compromise' would be partial—as opposed to total—public funding, essentially turning school choice into a system for subsidizing the education of the children of the rich and the middle classes, to the detriment of the less well-off in society.

On the other hand, this fear may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If educators refuse to develop and diffuse a reasonable model of school choice on grounds that the actual implementation will be inadequate, then, if and when school choice is implemented it very likely *will* be inadequate. It is incumbent upon educators to make clear that there are prerequisites to an efficient and egalitarian choice system, and to specify exactly what these prerequisites are. Where agreement among educators is impossible, the public should know whether disagreements are political, ethical or scientific, and if the latter, the source of the disagreement and the

empirical evidence upon which the disagreement could be resolved, or at least upon which the range of disagreement could be significantly narrowed.

Another cost is the loss that school choice would impose on public school-teachers. It is well known that teachers' unions are virtually unanimous in opposing school choice. How might a private educational delivery system injure teachers? Teachers' unions are likely to be harmed, since the per-member costs of union organization decline as the size of the bargaining unit increases. Under school choice, the average size of private educational providers may well be smaller than currently. Thus, unless labour legislation is initiated, for instance obliging accredited schools to form regional associations for the purposes of bargaining with teachers, the current union structure would likely decline.

Furthermore, in a competitive system, teachers may be obliged to work longer hours, and their job security would certainly be compromised. It is unclear whether wages would rise or fall. Many consider a move towards school choice that excessively weakens the status of teachers to be unfair. To prevent this, a set of 'teachers' rights' could be implemented as part of a comprehensive school choice system capable of adjudicating between the needs of teachers and the consumers of education.⁸

Also, in moving to school choice, serious legal issues arise concerning civil rights and the separation of church and State. These issues include the saying of prayers in schools, placing students in classes according to ability, dress codes, single-gender classrooms, choice of textbooks and the like. Doubtless the courts will face these problems when the time comes, but help from policy analysts who deal with legal issues surrounding education would be useful.

Conclusion

I would like to close with a plea for more research on the effects of competition and choice on the functioning of the education system. Despite the large proportion of national budgets devoted to education, the issue is only very rarely addressed. One important exception to this rule is Hoxby (1994). This paper uses instrumental variable econometric techniques to determine the independent effect of the existence of choice among public schools on per-pupil expenditure, educational productivity, average student performance, student educational attainment and post-graduation wages.

Hoxby found strong evidence that increased parental choice availability led to improvement on each of these measures of educational performance. Hoxby also found that the existence of choice among public schools leads to more mixing of students by social class, race and ethnicity. This mixing, she found, did not hurt the scholastic performance of any group, but improved the performance of several groups, including white non-Hispanic males, and students of parents with at least a high school degree.

Notes

1. For a broader defence of competition among goods and service providers as the source of consumer power, see Gintis (1989).
2. For a historical analysis of school choice, see Coulson (1996) and the references therein. This paper has an excellent bibliography, from which I have greatly benefited.
3. For statements of this view, see Carnegie Foundation (1992), Payne (1993), Kozol (1992) and Wells & Crain (1992). On the other hand, studies indicate that even parents with little education choose schools wisely. See, for instance, Fossey (1994), Martinez & Kemerer (1995) and United States Department of Education (1995).
4. There may, in fact, be powerful political forces operative within the public sector acting to de-activate competition within the public sector, since potential losers in a competitive struggle, by their proximity to public sector decision-makers, may have the means to lessen competitive pressures.
5. For a non-technical defence of this statement, see Gintis (1991 and 1992). More generally, see Hölmstrom (1979), Hölmstrom & Tirole (1988), Bowles & Gintis (1993a) and Bowles & Gintis (1993b).
6. For arguments to this effect, see Cookson (1994) and Kozol (1992).
7. Lieberman (1991) shows, for instance, that the largest category of for-profit schools actually serve disabled, rather than easy-to-educate children. Blum (1985) suggests that numerous private schools are dedicated to teaching children with disciplinary problems in the inner cities, and perform relatively well at the task.
8. Note that, in a system of school choice, teachers can set up schools themselves, organized as worker-owned firms. I believe the potential success of such firms, given some initial government support in the form of access to credit, is quite high. For some arguments along this line, see Bonin & Putterman (1987), Putterman (1984), Bowles & Gintis (1993a and 1993b).

References

- Blum, V.C. 1985. Private elementary education in the inner city. *Phi delta kappan* (Bloomington, IN), vol. 66, no. 9, p. 645ff.
- Bonin, J.P.; Putterman, L. 1987. *Economics of co-operation and the labor-managed economy*. New York, Harwood.
- Bowles, S.; Gintis, H. 1993a. The democratic firm: an agency-theoretic evaluation. In: Bowles, S.; Gintis, H.; Gustafsson, B., eds. *Markets and democracy: participation accountability and efficiency*. Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.
- . 1993b. An economic and political case for the democratic firm. In: Copp, D.; Hampton, J.; Roemer, J., eds. *The idea of democracy*, p. 375–99. Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.
- Carnegie Foundation. 1992. *School choice*. Princeton, NJ, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Chavis, B. 1994. A native American perspective on choice. In: Billingsley, K.L., ed. *Voices on choice*. San Francisco, CA, Pacific Research Institute on Public Policy.
- Chubb, J.E.; Moe, T.M. 1990. *Politics, markets, and America's schools*. Washington, DC,

- The Brookings Institution.
- Coleman, J.; Hoffer, T.; Kilgore, S. 1982. *High school achievement: public, Catholic and private schools compared*. New York, Basic Books.
- Cookson, P.W. 1994. *School choice: the struggle for the soul of American education*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Coulson, A. 1996. Markets versus monopolies in education: the historical evidence. *Educational evaluation and policy analysis* (Washington, DC), vol. 4, no. 9, June.
- Fossey, R. 1994. Open enrollment in Massachusetts: why families choose. *Educational evaluation and policy analysis* (Washington, DC), vol. 16, no. 3, p. 320–34.
- Gaffney, E.M. 1989. *Private schools and the public good: policy alternatives for the eighties*. Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press.
- Gintis, H. 1989. The power to switch: on the political economy of consumer sovereignty. In: Bowles, S.; Edwards, R.C.; Shepherd, W.G., eds. *Unconventional wisdom: essays in honor of John Kenneth Galbraith*, p. 65–80. New York, Houghton-Mifflin.
- . 1991. Where did Schumpeter go wrong? Understanding capitalism, socialism, and democracy. *Challenge* (Armonk, NY), vol. 34, no. 1, January-February, p. 27–33.
- . 1992. New economic rules of the game. *Challenge* (Armonk, NY), vol. 35, no. 5, September-October, p. 47–53.
- Hölmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. *Bell journal of economics* (Santa Monica, CA), vol. 10, no. 1, Spring, p. 74–91. (Now *Rand journal of economics*.)
- Hölmstrom, B.; Tirole, J. 1988. The theory of the firm. In: Schmalensee, R.; Willig, R., eds. *Handbook of industrial organization*. Amsterdam, North-Holland.
- Hoxby, C.M. 1994. *Does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers?* Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research. (Working paper, no. 4979.)
- Kozol, J. 1992. Flaming folly. *The executive educator* (Alexandria, VA), vol. 14, no. 6, p. 14–19.
- Lieberman, M. 1991. Profit-seeking schools. In: Boaz, D., ed. *Liberating schools*. Washington, DC, Cato Institute.
- Martinez, V.K.T.; Kemerer, F.R. 1995. Who chooses and why: a look at five school choice plans. *Phi delta kappan* (Bloomington, IN), vol. 75, no. 9, p. 678–81.
- Payne, R. 1993. Poverty limits school choice in urban settings. *Urban education* (Thousand Oaks, CA), vol. 28, no. 3, p. 281–99.
- Putterman, L. 1984. On some recent explanations of why capital hires labor. *Economic inquiry* (Huntington Beach, CA), vol. 22, p. 171–87.
- United States. Department of Education. 1995. *Use of school choice, education policy issues: statistical perspectives*. Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Wells, A.S.; Crain, R.L. 1992. Do parents choose school quality or school status? A sociological theory of free market education. In: Cookson, P.W., ed. *The choice controversy*. Newbury Park, Corwin Press.
- Williams, P. 1994. School choice promotes excellence in the African American community. In: Billingsley, K.L., ed. *Voices on choice*. San Francisco, Pacific Research Institute on Public Policy.

OPEN FILE

CITIZENSHIP
AND EDUCATION:
TOWARDS
MEANINGFUL PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION

TO THE OPEN FILE

Luis Albala-Bertrand

In the world today, two major universalizing trends are at work: the generalization of the free market economy and political transitions towards the establishment of democratic regimes. These mutations are provoking profound and unprecedented changes at the cultural level that have an effect in various ways on individual and collective behaviours. In almost every situation, cultural changes are lagging behind institutional evolution, with the consequence that there is a deficit in social norms which could be at the origin of tensions, disorder and conflict. Within such a context, and faced with the sometimes dramatic social costs, there is a need to reinforce social control. This cannot, however, be equated, for reasons of either effectiveness or cost, with a simple strengthening of public enforcing mechanisms, but rather with the building of an enhanced sense and a renewed practice of citizenship.

Most educators believe that social adaptation ought to be carried out through education and, in particular, through formal education. This would assume that the teaching process does have an influence on students' civic and political socialization, and that the role of the school in shaping one's political personality may be of practical importance. Unfortunately, looking at the effec-

Luis Albala-Bertrand (Chile)

Doctoral degree in sociology from Sorbonne University, Paris, 1972. At present, directing the international cross-cultural project 'What education for what citizenship?'; formerly responsible for research activities in environmental education and the social sciences (1975-92) at UNESCO. Author or editor of several books and articles on education and sociology, translated into numerous languages. Recent publications include: *Democratic culture and governance: Latin America on the threshold of the third millenium* (1992); and *Reshaping education: towards sustainable development* (1992). He has undertaken lectures, training courses and project development at university and governmental levels on environmental education and citizenship in over seventy countries throughout the world.

tiveness of citizenship education today, things do not seem to be so apparent. Empirical assessment of school impact on the political socialization of pre-adults shows that, while official curricula do have a significant influence on the transmission of instrumental knowledge and skills, its role in the political orientation of students seems less evident. On the one hand, the influence of school factors is faced with what is taking place in society and culture, which are rarely taken into account by the official curriculum. On the other hand, various educational agents, such as the family and the media, seem to have a determining socializing influence, sometimes greater than that of the school.

It appears then as a central issue for educational policy formulation to devise strategies that may ensure a real impact for education, and particularly for formal education, which is, among other socializing agents, the most intentional and well-structured mechanism for moulding the civic and political character of young people. The efficient pursuit of this broad aim implies achieving a difficult balance between two main criteria, which may seem upon a first analysis to involve contradictory perspectives. The first is to devise appropriate approaches contributing to the learning of citizenship. Or, in other terms, to define what learning processes and educational messages may favour the emergence, or consolidate the existence, on the one hand, of convergent social representations of citizenship necessary for the stability and political efficiency of democratic regimes; while, on the other hand, it leads to the building and expression of autonomous personalities, which will be a source of enrichment and creativity, and, in the final analysis, the most efficient guarantee of freedom. The second condition involves putting into practice what common sense would suggest, i.e. that the conceptions, institutions and orientations at the basis of democratic citizenship are not the same everywhere. Therefore, educational practice should adapt to changing national contexts, and even to changing conditions within the same society, taking care, however, to build up a citizenship open to the world, a concept that corresponds to the evolving nature of life in the world today.

Fulfilling these conditions assumes that an attempt has been made to understand the actual structural roots of citizenship in each society and each community, so as to understand learning as a socio-genetic process. This represents quite a challenge, since most educational practices remain firmly attached to general standardized curricula, where the only source of variation is the necessary, but insufficient, psycho-genetic development.

Within the framework of the above context, this 'open file' is divided into two parts.

* * *

The first part intends to reveal some major structural or contextual problems which are evident in different settings, and which, furthermore, cannot be neglected by any relevant and efficient educational constructionist attempt to build up democratic citizenship today.

What is the meaning of the antipathy for politics which characterizes democratic practice in most industrialized countries? Is this just a problem of a profound mistrust in the authorities as a result of the present mix of circumstances, which may be overcome through reinforcing education on political functioning? Or does it correspond to deeper phenomena implying a major cultural shift, which education has not even begun to think about. Basing himself on the most recent analysis of the World Values Survey (1993), *Ronald Inglehart* confirms his thesis of a progressive cultural shift in industrial societies from materialistic, security-centred orientations, toward post-materialistic, rather affective and expressive orientations towards others. In his article, he points out a crucial aspect of this shift for democratic citizenship: the decline in respect for authority, which suggests another way of practicing democratic politics and, hence, raises a new civic and political challenge for education.

What civic and political knowledge is important in the new cultural context? Is there some basic foundation upon which knowledge necessary for a new image of citizenship may be built? On the basis of a recent survey (1988), *Richard Niemi* and *Jane Junn* show what kind of civic and political knowledge is now familiar and less familiar to secondary students in the United States of America and, utilizing longitudinal data, they show what changes have affected civic perception and awareness over the last thirty years. They stress three major future guidelines for a citizenship education more instrumental and liable to generate interest in politics: to overcome the aseptic view of politics mostly given by schools, so allowing students to understand it as a real-life process involving the defence of interests, conflicts and their resolution; locating their own political action in the field of possibilities, so as to understand and appraise the values and principles underlying their own institutions; finally, to learn how to read information, in particular iconic and quantitative data about civic life. These orientations, associated with an education based on aspects of government of direct interest to the students, could contribute to instil a greater commitment to civic and political life.

What kind of society is being constructed in former socialist countries? What is, in this context, the profound sense of citizenship or, in other terms, what functions may education play in order to avoid a simple reproduction of the former totalitarian thinking in a new political context? Basing himself on his lengthy experience as researcher in Romania, *César Birzea* draws an overall panorama of the main present—and future—transitional problems characterizing former socialist countries, which will be evolving, he affirms, between post-communism and post-modernism. Believing that education may play a major role in this transitional context, Birzea proposes some guidelines, at different levels, in order to develop a renewed and better-adapted education to tackle citizenship anomie.

How can developing countries build citizenship that goes beyond the images of a society ruled by the neo-liberal fracturing values of profit and competitiveness? In other words, a society bringing together the attitudes of social solidarity and cosmopolitan openness. In this connection, *Manuel Antonio Garretón* dis-

cusses the notion of modernism, alleging that modernization, the route followed by the original industrial societies, is just one model and concludes that there is no single path to modernity that should be followed by all countries. As a mould for recasting the meaning of modernity, he draws attention to the change that has been going on during the last decade in the concept of education, due to a renewed educational ideology grounded in major international events, such as the Jomtien Conference on Education for All, the Jacques Delors' report, and other major political reflection originating in Latin America. On this basis, he puts forward the idea that social cohesion needs a renewed image of citizenship which is not based simply on economic considerations and on a narrow conception of the nation-State, but embodies the meaning and spirit of socio-economic equity and cosmopolitan solidarity.

If worldwide trends towards a culture of peace and democracy are, in the ultimate analysis, the result of a shared universal ethic inspired by human rights, how can we overcome the ethnocentric views which still prevail on these matters, in spite of a plethora of educational undertakings? Utilizing the data from various recent research reports, conducted by himself and other social psychologists, *Willem Doise* analyses the structure of human rights representations—which seems very stable throughout societies—and shows the major inter-individual and inter-group variations of perceptions which are the result of group filtering and anchoring. He also shows that there is an ethnocentric view of human rights: violations in one's own country are played down and those committed in other countries, particularly those considered remote from the cultural pattern of the observer's country, are systematically exaggerated. This situation, says Doise, introduces an important psycho-social nuance to the normative belief in the universality of human rights, which only a constructivist education may handle.

What kind of teaching/learning approaches and practices—what education?—may seem to be efficient in dealing with the various and changing citizenship images existing today across countries and even among groups and categories within the same societies? How may education provide an answer to the need to help construct a deeply-rooted and shared meaning of citizenship within individuals and groups, but, nevertheless, preserve the autonomy of individuals and group identities? Considering that problems of civic and political socialization may not be reduced to a simple spontaneous acquisition through social interaction, but that education may have a role to play in developing the citizen's character, *the writer* proposes some elements for a constructivist socio-genetic didactics of citizenship. Based upon preliminary results of the transcultural survey 'What education for what citizenship' conducted by UNESCO:IBE in thirty-four countries, we try to identify the social representations that direct civic-political cognition and interactions, and the major socio-cultural values and institutions which model individual and group political positioning and behaviour. In this connection, a general constructivist approach is proposed which citizenship education may follow to handle the complex issue

of participating in the formation of the civic and political personalities of young people.

* * *

The second part of this file presents some concrete and innovative attempts to deal with citizenship education in various regions and socio-cultural settings. These experiences involve as much the intentional formal curriculum as other kinds of school and out-of-school activities having a formative impact on democratic participatory citizenship.

In this context, the former Minister of Education of Czechoslovakia, *Petr Pitha*, makes an alert analysis of the difficulties of cultural transition from totalitarianism in his country and proposes an original model—that has already been applied—for developing a renewed civic education. A most interesting methodological aspect stressed by this model is that, while civic education is viewed as a theme to be integrated into almost all conventional school subject-matter, the synthesis of the various elements of the civic education puzzle should not be simply left for spontaneous integration by students, but should also be articulated by a bridging discipline, such as civic education. Both approaches—cross-subject and single subject—are strategic and fulfil complementary functions.

What precautions are needed in the construction of democratic citizenship in a society recently coming out of a civil war? This is the main purpose of the article by *Terencio García*. Analyzing the experiences of his country, Nicaragua, he stresses the importance of a multi-level and multi-sectoral negotiation of the new educational curriculum as the only way to overcome historical mistrust. In this connection, he also warns the authorities about the need for coherence and accessibility, both at the lower levels—school administrators and teachers—and up to the level of national decision-making. He shows the efforts already accomplished in building up a new citizenship programme and feels optimistic about the changing trends in civic values and attitudes.

Citizenship is not just a political practice, but should also be associated with civil life and particularly—as Marshall proposed—with economic life. In this connection, two crucial orientations for citizenship education in developing countries are pointed out in the article by *Abel Koulaninga*. Analyzing curricula in vocational and professional schools in the Central African Republic, he shows, first, how training related to agricultural management may be associated with the practice of social solidarity; and second, that democratic decision-making may also be employed in management. Both of these practices contribute to involving students in active and responsible participation in civic life.

Finally, practical experience of situations in which the youngsters have to evaluate means to solve problems, decide about the best options and influence others to adopt their course of action may be of a highly formative value in any field of learning and an effective complement to the formal intentional curriculum. Learning by doing in interactive situations—the essence of the open

civic/political debates presented by *Ruud Veldhuis*, which have been organized in various northern European countries by the Dutch Centre for Civic Education—seems to be particularly efficient as a didactic and pedagogical approach in complex situations, such as those represented by citizenship building.

* * *

Thus, stimulating thinking and producing empirical knowledge on the meanings given to citizenship throughout cultures, and on various possible educational answers to citizenship building, is what this open file, entitled *Citizenship and education: towards meaningful practice*, has attempted to do. What seemed important here is to apprehend the very fact that there is not a unique answer to the issue of citizenship; this is not so much because political wills are different but is due rather to differences in the various social and cultural contexts explaining what is happening with citizenship and the meaning given to this issue by the individuals concerned.

It would be naïve to believe that possessing empirical evidence or rational explanations on any situation or understanding the motives that cause individuals to behave in such or such a way constitute a sufficient basis for decision-making. Political or subjective logic takes precedence most of the time, and most of the time also for legitimate reasons. However, it is important to keep in mind that whenever efforts are aimed at increasing efficacy and relevance in educational practice, it would be useful that decision-making bases itself on solid reflection and evidence about reality.

Reactions and comments on this open file may be addressed to:

L. Albala-Bertrand—IBE

Email: unesco_1@gatekeeper.unicc.org

Fax: +41.22-791.01.54

A FORUM ON CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION

Aimed at sharing knowledge and experience
among scholars and practitioners concerned by citizenship.

Apply for a subscription to: cited-ibe@unesco.org

PART I

CITIZENSHIP CONTEXTS AND OUTLOOK IN THE WORLD TODAY

GENERATIONAL SHIFTS

IN CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOURS:

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION

AND ECONOMIC SECURITY IN

THE DECLINING RESPECT

FOR AUTHORITY

IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Ronald Inglehart

The publics of rich, stable and democratic advanced industrial societies do not show higher levels of satisfaction with their political systems than do the publics of relatively poor, authoritarian countries. Instead, astonishing as it may seem, they show significantly less confidence in their leaders and political institutions than do their counterparts in developing countries.

This phenomenon seems to be a long-term consequence of economic development. Because industrialization requires an increasingly well-educated work force, it gives rise to increasingly critical publics who evaluate their leaders by relatively demanding standards. And in so far as it produces relatively high levels

Original Language: English

Ronald Inglehart (United States of America)

Professor of political science and programme director in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Global co-ordinator for the World Values Surveys. His most recent book is *Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic and political change in forty-three societies* (1997).

of security, economic development weakens the tendency for mass publics to defer to authority. The reverse of this phenomenon is well known: severe insecurity encourages mass publics to seek strong, authoritarian leaders. High levels of education and economic security have the opposite effect, making mass publics less deferential to both political and economic authority.

It is well known that industrialization brings with it rising educational levels: a technologically advanced economy requires an increasingly specialized and highly educated work force. It is virtually impossible to attain high levels of economic development without a highly educated population.

Though it is less obvious, economic development also brings gradual intergenerational changes in basic values. When most people can take physical survival for granted, significant numbers of post-materialists begin to emerge (Inglehart, 1977, 1990).

The economic miracles and the welfare States that emerged after the Second World War led to a shift in basic value priorities. The post-war birth cohorts in these societies grew up under conditions fundamentally different from those that shaped previous generations of human beings in two respects. First, the post-war economic miracles produced unprecedented levels of prosperity. Real per capita income in most industrial societies rose to levels several times as high as had ever been experienced before the war, and in some cases (such as Japan) to levels thirty times higher than ever before. The economic pie became much bigger, encouraging a greater sense of economic security.

This interacted with a second factor: the emergence of the modern welfare State. The pie was not only much bigger than ever before, but it was distributed more evenly and more reliably than before. For the first time in history, a majority of the public grew up with the feeling that survival could be taken for granted.

This set in motion an intergenerational value change that is gradually transforming the politics and cultural norms of advanced industrial societies. The best documented aspect of this process is the shift from giving top priority to economic and physical security to giving it to self-expression and the quality of life. This shift from materialist to post-materialist priorities has been measured annually since 1970 in surveys carried out in a number of Western societies.¹ A massive body of evidence is now available demonstrating that an intergenerational shift has been taking place in the predicted direction.

Post-materialists evaluate politics by more demanding standards than those people with other values. Though they live in the same political systems as materialists, and are more able to make these systems respond to their preferences (since they are more active and articulate), post-materialists do not register higher levels of satisfaction with politics. Quite the reverse; they are much more likely to participate in protest movements, with goals ranging from environmental protection to equal opportunities for women.

The rise of post-materialist values is one symptom of a broader post-modern shift that is transforming the standards by which the publics of advanced industrial societies evaluate governmental performance. It brings new, more demanding

standards to the evaluation of political life; and confronts political leaders with more active, articulate citizens. The position of elites has become more difficult in advanced industrial society. Mass publics are becoming increasingly critical of their political leaders, and increasingly likely to engage in elite-challenging activities.

A declining emphasis on authority

One of the most significant changes linked with rising educational levels and the attainment of a sense of economic security is a declining deference to political, economic and even scientific authority. This article examines this shift, utilizing empirical measures of culture from the 1981–83 and 1990–93 World Values Surveys, which were carried out in more than forty societies around the world containing 70% of the world's population.²

In each of these surveys, representative national samples of the publics were asked: 'Here is a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me, for each one, if you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?' Among the possible changes listed was the option, 'Greater respect for authority'. Across these more than forty societies, 58% of those interviewed said they thought that this would be a good thing. But the desirability of this goal varied tremendously across the societies included in these surveys, as Table 1 demonstrates.

Greater respect for authority was endorsed most strongly in Nigeria and South Africa, where 91% and 88% of the respective publics said that it would be a good thing. At the other end of the spectrum, in the Republic of Korea and Japan, only 14% and 6% of the respective publics said that a change toward greater respect for authority would be a good thing. This pattern shows considerable geographic coherence. There were only two African societies included in this survey and they received the two highest-rankings on this variable; and all three of the Confucian-influenced East Asian societies ranked at the opposite pole. The latter finding runs counter to the stereotype that, traditionally, Confucian societies place a heavy emphasis on respect for authority. Traditionally, this may have been true—but today, the Chinese, Korean and Japanese publics seem to have moved away from this position (possibly because of a feeling that respect for authority received far too much emphasis in the past).

Another clear finding is the fact that the publics of rich countries are much less likely to endorse the goal of 'more respect for authority' than are the publics of poorer societies. There are some deviant cases. On one hand, the United States of America is a rich society that ranks relatively high on this variable; and China deviates in the opposite direction—it is a low-income society that gives very little emphasis to 'more respect for authority.' But overall, there is a strong correlation between a society's GNP/capita and its emphasis on this goal: $r=.56$, significant at the .0000 level.

All of the societies in which less than half of the public emphasizes 'more

TABLE 1: Cross-national differences in respect for authority presented in hierarchical order (percentage of sample saying 'greater respect for authority would be a good thing')

Nigeria	91	Hungary	61
South Africa	88	France	59
Ireland	83	German Democratic Republic	57
Northern Ireland	82	India	54
Brazil	81	Lithuania	53
Chile	80	Netherlands	51
Bulgaria	78	Belgium	50
United States of America	78	Italy	49
Portugal	74	Austria	47
Poland	73	Switzerland	46
United Kingdom	72	Iceland	42
Belarus	71	Denmark	35
Argentina	69	Norway	32
Spain	69	Federal Republic of Germany	30
Russian Federation	68	Finland	26
Slovenia	66	China	24
Turkey	65	Sweden	22
Czechoslovakia	65	Republic of Korea	14
Mexico	65	Japan	6
Canada	64		

Source: 1990 World Values Survey.

1. It should be noted that several countries appearing in this survey have changed their name since 1990.

respect for authority' are either high-income societies (with per capita GNP over US\$15,000) or traditionally Confucian societies, or both—with Japan, the sole high-income Confucian-influenced society having distinctly the least emphasis on this goal.

The correlation between economic development level and emphasis on respect for authority is not coincidental. It reflects the fact that when a country reaches a high level of economic development, it begins to experience a gradual intergenerational shift that de-emphasizes respect for authority.

Cross-sectional analysis of the data supports this interpretation, which implies that we should find less emphasis on respect for authority among the younger age groups in advanced industrial societies—but not in low-income societies.

This is precisely what we find in an analysis of the World Values Surveys, as Table 2 demonstrates. Our sample includes three societies that the World Bank classifies as 'low-income' societies: India, China and Nigeria, which have per capita incomes of less than US\$400 annually. Among the publics of these three societies, there is very little tendency for the young to place less emphasis on authority than

TABLE 2: Age-related differences in respect for authority (percentage of sample saying 'greater respect for authority would be a good thing')

Age	Low-income societies (India, China and Nigeria)	Advanced industrial societies ¹
50 +	58%	60
30-49	57	44
16-29	55	39

Source: 1990 World Values Survey.

1. Includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. See note 1 to Table 1.

do the old, with only a three-point percentage difference between the 16 to 29 year old group and those aged 55 and over. But in the seventeen advanced industrial societies included in this survey (countries with per capita incomes over US\$14,500 per year), we consistently find large age-related differences in emphasis on respect for authority. These differences range from highs of thirty-one points in Western Germany and Spain, to a low of eleven points in the United States (Japan shows virtually no difference between young and old, but this simply reflects the fact the no one places much emphasis on this goal in that country). Across the seventeen advanced industrial societies, 60% of those aged 55 and over say that 'more respect for authority' would be a good thing; among those under 30 years of age, only 39% take this view.

TABLE 3: Education and respect for authority (percentage of sample saying 'greater respect for authority would be a good thing')

Educational level	Low-income societies (India, China and Nigeria)	Advanced industrial societies ¹
Lower	54%	57
Middle	58	45
Higher	57	37

Source: 1990 World Values Survey.

1. Includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. See note 1 to Table 1.

We also find large differences in endorsement of 'more respect for authority' according to educational level in advanced industrial societies—but not in low-income societies, as Table 3 demonstrates. In India, China and Nigeria, the more educated are only a trifle less likely to emphasize authority than are the less educated; but we find substantial differences in virtually all advanced industrial societies, ranging from highs of twenty-eight and thirty points in France and Spain, respectively, to a low of eight points in the United States of America (Japan shows no difference across educational levels, since only 6% of the public endorses this goal in the country as a whole, leaving virtually no room for variation). Across seventeen advanced industrial societies, 57% of the more educated respondents say that more respect for authority would be a good thing; while only 37% of those with tertiary level education take this position.

TABLE 4: Materialist/post-materialist values and respect for authority (percentage of sample saying 'greater respect for authority would be a good thing')

Value type	Low-income societies (India, China and Nigeria)	Advanced industrial societies ¹
Materialist	59	63
Mixed	57	52
Post-materialist	51	32

Source: 1990 World Values Survey.

1. Includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. See note 1 to Table 1.

We have argued that these differences in outlook reflect the degree to which a given people feel a sense of existential security, as well as the level of education they have reached. If so, then we would expect to find that those with post-materialist values would be significantly less likely to favour more respect for authority than would those with materialist or mixed value priorities: in theory, the post-materialists have their distinctive values precisely because they have experienced relatively high levels of security during their formative years. As Table 4 demonstrates, this expectation is confirmed. Post-materialists are very rare in the low-income societies; constituting only about 5% of the public, if we assume that there is no error in measurement. In the low-income societies, the post-materialists are less likely to endorse more respect for authority than are the materialists, but the difference is modest (only eight percentage points). In advanced industrial societies, the difference associated with value priorities is much larger, with 63% of the materialists emphasizing more respect for authority, and only 32% of the post-materialists doing so. Here again, the finding holds true across virtually all advanced industrial societies: post-materialists place less emphasis on authority

everywhere except in Japan (for the usual reason). The size of this difference ranges from as little as twelve points in the United States of America to as high as forty-three points in Spain and Germany, with a maximum spread of forty-eight points in Austria.

Changing emphasis on authority: the 1980s versus the 1990s


Now let us examine some actual changes that were predicted and observed in the first two waves of the World Values Surveys. In the 1981–83 survey we found that, throughout advanced industrial society, support for ‘more respect for authority’ was closely linked with age, education and post-materialist values in the ways we have just described. Consequently, we predicted a gradual shift towards less emphasis on respect for authority (Inglehart, 1990).

Figure 1 tests this prediction. It shows that from the 1981–83 survey to the 1990–93 survey emphasis on greater respect for authority became less widespread in seventeen of the twenty-one countries for which we have data from both surveys. The absolute levels of support for authority, and the size of the changes from 1981 to 1990, vary a good deal from country to country. But emphasis on respect for authority declined in most countries. Argentina, South Africa, Ireland and the Republic of Korea were the only exceptions to this trend. We suspect that this pervasive decline in respect for authority has contributed to the erosion of institutional authority. The tendency to idealize national leaders has been growing weaker, and their performance is being evaluated with a more critical eye.

Our prediction that this shift would occur is based on a simple population replacement model: as the younger, more post-materialist birth cohorts replace the older, more materialist cohorts in the adult population, we should see a shift towards the post-modern orientation. Moreover, since the size of the respective cohorts is known from demographic data, and since we have survey data on the attitudes of the various birth cohorts, we can also estimate the size of the attitudinal shift that population replacement should produce over a ten-year period. We do this by simply removing the oldest ten-year cohort from our sample and replacing it with a new ten-year cohort at the youngest end. In creating this new cohort, we assume that it will have values similar to those of the youngest cohort in the sample—a conservative assumption, since younger cohorts usually show more post-modern values than older ones (for a more detailed discussion of how to estimate the effects of population replacement on mass attitudes, see Abramson & Inglehart, 1995).

When we perform this calculation it indicates that, for most of these countries, we would expect to find a decline of only four or five points in the percentage favouring greater respect for authority. This is a small shift. If we found it in only one case, it would be an unimpressive finding: a difference between samples of this size is statistically significant at only about the .05 level. But, if we observed several such consecutive shifts over thirty or forty years, the

FIGURE 1: Predicted shifts and observed shifts in 1981 compared to 1990 in twenty-one countries (percentage of the sample saying that 'more respect for authority would be a good thing')¹



1. Some countries appearing in this figure have changed their name since 1990.

Source: 1981 and 1990 World Values Surveys.

finding would be highly significant, both statistically and substantively: over that time it could convert a 60:40 division of attitudes into a 40:60 split.

The same principle applies to a pattern of cross-cultural findings. Such a finding from only one country would hardly be worth mentioning. But if we had data from three or four countries and they all showed shifts of this size in the predicted direction, it would be highly significant. And if we found that the predicted shifts in values or attitudes generally held true across a score of societies, the probability of it being a random event would dwindle to the vanishing point. Inglehart (1997) examines the shifts found with forty variables, across twenty-one societies. Though the amount of change observed is usually small in any one case, the overall pattern is compelling and statistically significant at an enormously high level.

With attitudes toward authority, our theory predicts a shift of only four or five percentage points per country during this nine-year period. This is modest. In the short run, the impact of current economic or political events (or even sampling error) could easily swamp it in a given society. Thus, it would be astonishing if our predictions did hold up in every case. They do not: instead we find that in some countries, attitudes concerning authority moved as predicted, while in others they did not. Moreover, some countries show shifts in the predicted direction which are too large to be due to population replacement alone: in these cases, situation-specific factors are probably adding to the results of population replacement, exaggerating the shift.

We can predict only one component of what is shaping mass attitudes, whereas we know that a number of factors are relevant. Consequently, we cannot predict precisely what will happen in every country. Nevertheless, because we do have information about one component of the process, our predictive power across many societies should be considerably better than random. And since there is a good chance that, situation-specific factors or period effects will cancel each other out, in the long run, over many countries, our predictions should point in the right direction. When examined empirically, it turns out that they actually do.

Prospects

Rising levels of education and economic security seem to be producing a gradual intergenerational shift toward placing less emphasis on respect for authority. This shift may make the task of governing increasingly difficult for the ruling elite—but it may also tend to increase mass demands for responsive and democratic institutions. In this context, citizenship education has also a new and more complex role to play, i.e. accompanying the building of a more autonomous personality for citizens who are also involved in and with political action. Declining respect for authority may be considered a functional trend if it leads to a critical involvement in public life. If, on the contrary, it means political apathy and civic indifference, it may lead not only to a decline of practical individual

freedoms, but also to an erosion of the ethical and normative grounds of the regime.

Notes

1. These surveys measured materialist/post-materialist value priorities by asking the respondents in a number of different societies a series of questions that began as follows: 'There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On the card below are listed some of the goals to which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which one would be the next most important?'

Twelve goals were rated, but in order to reduce the task to manageable proportions, they were presented in three groups of four items; each set of four goals contained two items designed to tap materialist priorities, and two designed to tap post-materialist priorities. These goals were:

- A. Maintaining a high level of economic growth.
- B. Making sure this country has strong defence forces.
- C. Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.
- E. Maintaining order in the nation.
- F. Giving people more say in important government decisions.
- G. Fighting rising prices.
- H. Protecting freedom of speech.
- I. A stable economy.
- J. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.
- K. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.
- L. The fight against crime.

Scores on the post-materialist values index range from 0 to 5, depending on how many of items C, F, H, J and K are chosen as either first or second priority in their group.

2. This analysis draws on material from my forthcoming book, *Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic and political change in forty-three societies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997.

References

- Abramson, P.R.; Inglehart, R. 1995. *Value change in global perspective*. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press.
- Inglehart, R. 1977. *The silent revolution: changing values and skills in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- . 1990. *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Jennings, M.K.; Niemi, R.G. 1981. *Generations and politics*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

WHAT KNOWLEDGE FOR A REINFORCED CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?

Richard G. Niemi and Jane Junn

Works about American education in the past decade have largely emphasized the low achievement levels of American students. No subject has been spared. In our own area—civics—the latest national assessment put it rather blandly, but the criticism was nonetheless evident: ‘It is disappointing that fewer than half of the twelfth-grade students reached this level of competence [an understanding of specific governmental structures and functions]’ (Anderson et al., 1990, p. 38). In a more recent study of the related field of history, the results were even more discouraging—‘achievement levels indicate that more than half (57%) of twelfth graders are performing below the *basic* level’ (Williams et al., 1995, p. 12).

In contrast, our recent study emphasizes what students do know as well as what they do not know. We have found that there are topics about which students appear quite well informed in addition to those about which they know little. Besides simply identifying the topics about which students are knowledge-

Original language: English

Richard G. Niemi (United States of America)

Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, New York. Primary research interests in political socialization, voting and public opinion, legislative districting. Author, co-author or editor of numerous books and articles, including *Comparing democracies: elections and voting in global perspective* (1996). Author (with Jane Junn) of a forthcoming book on the extent and sources of civics knowledge among high-school students in the United States: *Educating emerging citizens: the civics knowledge of high school seniors*.

Jane Junn (United States of America)

Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey. Research interests in political participation and public opinion. She has co-authored *Education and democratic citizenship in America* (1996).

able, we have tried to discover their common characteristics so that we might determine how best to extend those high degrees of learning to other domains. Here we offer a brief overview of some of what we have found.

What students know and do not know

Let us begin by seeing what it is that students know well. To do so, we draw on the 1988 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in civics. NAEP is a representative, nationwide study of 4th, 8th, and 12th graders. We limited our study to the 12th graders (i.e. in their last year of high school) because at this age (typically 17 or 18 years old) students can distinguish political from non-political topics and most have by then followed a course in civics or American government. The students were asked 150 multiple-choice questions about (a) democratic principles and the purpose of government; (b) political institutions; (c) political processes; and (d) rights, responsibilities and the law. In practice, there was much greater emphasis on some topics than on others—e.g. a great deal on governmental structures and on rights and responsibilities, but very little on political parties. We grouped the items into nine different categories. Here we report only the mean score for each category. In our forthcoming book, *Educating emerging citizens: the civics knowledge of American high school seniors* (Yale University Press), we provide results for each item individually.

The two categories about which American students know a good deal both involve citizens' rights. (All categories and the average percentage answering correctly are shown in Table 1.) The first focuses heavily on criminal and civil justice, while the second inquires about general rights of citizens. In each case, more than 80% of the students, on average, answer the questions correctly. More than 90% knew certain facts, for example that 'the right to counsel' means the right to be represented by a lawyer, that Americans have the right to know what they are accused of, that they have the right to a lawyer, that the first ten amendments of the United States Constitution deal with individual rights, and so on. Even on somewhat more detailed matters—such as invoking the Fifth Amendment means avoiding self-incrimination, that Congress cannot establish a national church, that there are some limits to free speech (yelling 'fire' in a crowded auditorium is not permissible), and so on—three-quarters or more answered correctly. Of course, some students may have learned these facts from sources other than the school—especially from television programmes. But our analysis shows that schools do have an impact on students' knowledge. And in any event, whatever the source, there is information that students learn relatively well.

A second area in which students received quite high marks is that of state and local government. In a multi-level system, such as that of the United States, citizens need to know what happens at each level. By age 18, students have developed a relatively good sense of which level is responsible for which activity. More than 90% answered correctly when asked which level of government makes treaties and which regulates automobile licensing; more than 80% answered cor-

rectly when asked which branch prints money or which is the highest level of local government in most states, and so on. The average in this category is lowered somewhat by a few items that many older adults would probably find difficult for (e.g. whether local governments license lawyers, and the meaning of referendum and recall, which apply to only some of the states). But on the basics, students were quite knowledgeable.

In contrast to these areas of high knowledge, students know relatively little about political theory (as best we can tell from the few questions asked about this subject). For example, only about one-third could pick out a definition of bicameralism, and barely a quarter could identify a statement as reflecting the theory of a social contract. One might argue that these ideas are not taught in most high school classes and that they are not the kind of information that one would encounter in day-to-day life. But knowledge is also relatively low when it comes to political parties. Students are relatively uninformed (about 40% correct) about how the United States President is nominated or even that the procedure is established by the parties, and many are not aware (45% correct) that only registered voters with a party affiliation may vote in what is called a 'closed' primary election. On a related matter, students are aware that lobbying is legal (which helps raise the average score to more than 60% correct), but they appear not to be well-informed about who lobbyists are and what they do. For example, only one-third knew that political action committees (PACs), which have been a prominent player in United States partisan politics for the past twenty years, are set up by special interests to raise money for candidates.

Whether high school seniors have much appreciation of the history of United States race relations or of the past or present history of women in politics is hard to determine. Only a small number of relevant questions was asked, although we can learn a little more by drawing on the 1988 NAEP history test. Judging by what is available, it would appear that students' knowledge is 'spotty' at best. For example, more than 80% of the students could identify two prominent African-Americans: Rosa Parks (famous for a 1950s bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama) and Martin Luther King, Jr. (the most prominent civil rights leader in the 1960s, assassinated in 1968). Similarly, 70–80% were able to connect a number of women with the movements with which they were associated—e.g. Harriet Tubman (nineteenth-century abolitionist) and Susan B. Anthony (late nineteenth-century suffragette). Yet in other instances, students were surprisingly ignorant. Only a fifth, for example, could identify Reconstruction (the period after the Civil War), and less than two-thirds knew that certain nineteenth-century laws were adopted to violate the civil rights of former slaves (thinking instead that they were intended to protect them). Likewise, only two-thirds of the students could identify the first, and until recently only, woman to serve on the United States Supreme Court (a 1981 appointee who still serves), and many confused certain nineteenth-century women with leaders of the women's movement in the 1970s.

Some of the questions on the civics assessment went beyond asking students

to recall specific facts. The students' ability to answer these questions is quite variable, higher than one might have expected given the limited emphasis on logical reasoning and quantitative analysis in high school, but certainly less than one would hope. One question, for example, presented a dialogue between two people, with one saying things like: 'I think it's important that governments maintain order'; and the other saying: 'I think it's important that people let their opinions be known.' The students had to identify the conflict in this dialogue as involving the maintenance of order and freedom of speech. About three-quarters of the students answered it correctly. Though there are only a few questions of each type, it seems as if students are somewhat better equipped to deal with textual rather than with tabular or pictorial material.

Finally, the residual category in Table 1 contains a large set of items asking for details about the structure of the United States Government and the way in which it operates. Some of these questions were answered well (e.g. over 80% knew that the Secretary of Defense is appointed, not elected) and others very poorly (e.g. little more than one-third knew that the Department of State deals with foreign affairs). There is little room to differentiate among these items.

TABLE 1: Knowledge of high school seniors (17–18 years old) in the United States, by subject matter of question

Subject matter	Average percentage correct
Criminal and civil justice	82
General rights of citizens	80
State and local government	66
Theoretical perspectives	43
Political parties	55
Lobbying	63
Women and minorities	68
Inferences from text, tables, charts	71
Structure and functioning of United States government	59

Source: National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1988 Civics Study.

Sources of student knowledge

In the 1960s and 1970s there was a stream of works in political science concerning the political knowledge and values of pre-adults. One of the strongest conclusions derived from this was that 'political socialization' work is also one of the most puzzling—namely, that civics courses in American high schools have virtually no effect on high school students' knowledge of government and politics. The conclusion was based largely on an article by Langton and Jennings (1968), in

which it was found that knowledge levels were almost identical for students who had had no civics classes and for those who had had one or more such classes.

In our study, in contrast, we find that civics classes do have an effect on student knowledge. When considered in a bivariate fashion—i.e. looking only at course work and civics knowledge—we found that students with more recent civics course work scored more highly on the knowledge test. But this result alone could be explained in any number of ways; it might have been, for example, that these students were simply more interested in this type of course work and therefore studied harder. To test competing hypotheses, we controlled for a variety of individual characteristics and home factors that could have served as alternative explanations for varying levels of student knowledge. We also divided the sample into groups by gender and by race and ethnicity (whites, African-Americans, Hispanics) and divided the items into several large categories (much as above). In all of the analyses, school factors remained significant. Combined with the large number of knowledge items in the test, our findings seem very compelling.

Yet we can go a step further in supporting our conclusion. Breaking down the questions by subject matter yielded insight into why the Langton and Jennings' study found that course work had no effect. We found that civics courses had a greater effect on students' knowledge for some types of items and less effect for others. In particular, the greatest effect was observed for the 'structures and functions' category noted above. The study in the 1960s was based on only a small number of knowledge questions and, as it turned out, it included only two items of this type. Thus, one might say that the earlier study was not looking in the right place, having almost no questions of the sort that we found to be most affected by schoolwork.

The effect that the size of the school has must be judged in comparison with that of other characteristics of the individual and the home environment. From this perspective, the impact seems to be meaningful even though course work, like any other single factor, does not dramatically change students' knowledge scores. It is, therefore, time to revise the conclusion that high school civics course work in the United States has no effect on students. Some kinds of students are more affected than others, some kinds of knowledge are more effectively taught, and so on, but the overall conclusion is inescapably that students do learn about government and politics in such courses.

The potential for reform

Our citing of the positive effects of the civics curriculum as a primary message of our work should not be taken to mean that improvements are impossible or unnecessary. We cite two important lessons that can be drawn about how to improve civics education. First, we suggest a number of content areas that deserve greater emphasis in the classroom. Second, we suggest an overall approach that might better engage student interest and understanding of civics lessons.

COVERAGE

The first topic that deserves more emphasis relates to the long-standing concern that students receive too little information about how government and politics operate in practice, especially through political parties and interest groups. We inferred, from the questions asked as well as from the percentage of correct answers, that high school courses contain little about these subjects. The reason for this gap is undoubtedly the desire of teachers and of authors of textbooks to stay away from partisan politics because of their controversial nature.

The motivation is understandable, but the result is unfortunate. When we say that students have a 'textbook' knowledge of how the government operates, we mean a naïve view that glosses over the fact that politics is all about disagreements and the peaceful, orderly (hopefully satisfactory) settlement of them. We believe that it is a disservice to students to allow them to think that government ideally operates without conflict, as if it could enact and administer laws that benefit everyone and harm no one, even in the short run. The cynicism that adults develop about politics stems, in part, from the naïve view of politics that is fostered by the avoidance of most references to partisan and other differences of opinion, and to the rough-and-tumble ways in which those differences are resolved. If students understand that parties and interest groups form to promote and protect legitimate differences in points of view—sometimes to the benefit of large numbers of people, sometimes to the benefit of narrow interests—they will be in a much better position to understand, appreciate and participate in the political process.

A second area in which there should be more emphasis is in teaching theoretical perspectives (and perhaps some comparative perspectives). What we have in mind here are topics and perspectives that will help students understand politics—much as we suggested above that students should learn that politics involves conflict and its resolution. Students should know about concepts such as limited and unlimited government, civic versus private life, federalism, representative government, and so on. It would be helpful if they learned about alternative ways of organizing governments, including presidential and parliamentary systems, two-party and multiparty systems, coalition governments and so on. Likewise, they should learn about the values and principles underlying their own political system and the way in which these ideas have developed and changed.

This is not to say that students should become experts on political theory or comparative government. In any case, it would be impossible to accomplish this, given the length of most civics courses and the interests of students and teachers. Rather, a modicum of knowledge about the theoretical foundations of government and about the multiple ways of organizing and managing them would give students a far better understanding and appreciation of their own governmental system. An awareness of the values and principles underlying one's own system might instill a greater commitment to them.

A third area in which there could be improvement is in teaching certain skills relevant to the understanding of politics—specifically, low-level quantitative skills such as are involved in reading charts and tables. Even though the graphics and questions were very simple, many students failed to pick out correct answers. Still, we noted a degree of optimism here. It appeared to us that students' abilities were fairly good despite the severely limited attention in civics course work to data presentation and interpretation. With only a small infusion of increased attention, considerable advancement could take place.

APPROACH

Concerning an improved approach to many civics lessons, we begin by pointing out that students seemed to have learned aspects of civics that were familiar to them or that were meaningful in some immediate sense. Thus, almost all students learned which level of government issues drivers' licenses (which, for most students, become available at age 16) but far fewer learned which branch regulates marriages (which often does not occur until several years after high school). Nearly all students knew about their individual rights, whereas far fewer understood how the President is nominated. A high proportion knew that the government does not guarantee everyone a job; considerably fewer knew that the government helps people buy homes.

To some extent, of course, this point is obvious. We all learn things when we have to, and we learn those things much more easily. Still, this elementary fact suggests ways in which civics instruction might be improved. It suggests, for example, that students would learn most effectively if instruction focused heavily, or at least initially, on those aspects of government that are of direct relevance to them. Local government, and issues such as street repair, building and zoning rules, trash disposal and capital construction (for schools, among other things) are less grandiose and exciting than national government and issues such as care for the elderly (social security and medical care), not to mention defense spending and confrontations with foreign powers. But students can relate to local issues in ways that they cannot relate to national and international affairs (except perhaps during wartime, when students just out of high school are among those who do the fighting).

Perhaps the greater ease of associating with local government is especially true if one thinks about government in a broad sense rather than concentrating exclusively on the chief executive. At the national level, the President is highly visible, and students can readily learn who he is and what he does on a day-to-day basis. But Congress, as an institution, is more abstract and, in any event, less covered by the media. The federal court system, especially beyond the Supreme Court, receives little attention. The bureaucracy is hard to visualize, let alone understand in detail. At the local level, some of the same factors apply. It is easier, for example, to learn about a mayor or other local executive than about a city council or zoning board. Yet the findings we have reviewed suggest that students

learn more readily about things they can deal with directly, and local institutions, even bureaucracies, can be seen and heard directly.

When talking about their own towns and cities, for example, students can be shown the actual plot of land that the zoning board is studying. They can talk directly to individuals who regulate trash removal. They often have direct access to local officials, some of whom will turn out to be parents of students in their school. And they can certainly observe legislative bodies, including the boards that run local schools in the United States. While perhaps obvious when posed in this fashion, the point that seems to be confirmed by the NAEP results is that students can learn about and understand local government much more easily than they can learn about the federal government. Indeed, it is likely that students could generalize from local-level experiences to the state and national levels much more easily than the other way around.

Most civics courses, nonetheless, stress the federal level. The centerpiece of most courses is the United States Constitution, which presents a fair amount of detail about the structure and responsibilities of the national government and then says, as an afterthought in the Tenth Amendment, that everything else is left to the states or to 'the people'. State and local governments, when treated, are often dealt with as a package, even though local governments typically deal with much smaller geographic areas and, in many instances, with quite manageable numbers of individuals.

Not that the Constitution can or should be ignored. But understanding the Constitution, and government in general, might better be done if the students were first to learn about it by dealing with problems that are 'real' in their own minds. Knowing why it can be so difficult to re-pave one street or re-zone one piece of land, and understanding all of the individuals and interests affected, might make it much easier for students to understand how politics works at all levels and why there is a need for executive (including bureaucratic), legislative and judicial components, and even why and how organized groups operate.

Dealing with 'real', smaller-scale problems might also teach students some of the skills that appeared to be lacking in the NAEP assessment. Having to study local maps, to read local laws and to examine local budgets might leave students with a knowledge of how to find and interpret government documents that is difficult to achieve when one begins at the national level. Not that learning about local systems will allow one to go immediately to other levels, as anyone who has seen the multi-volume United States Budget (weighing several kilogrammes) can attest to. Nonetheless, working with original documents and meaningful records and data on a more manageable level might impart skills that are too often lacking.

When Easton and Dennis (1969) studied young children in the 1960s, they identified a 'head and tail' effect, with young people viewing the President and the policeman as the most visible symbols of government. Yet while the policeman was connected in their minds with authority and government, young children had almost no sense of *local* government (p. 213–14). They quickly learned that the

policeman does not make the laws (p. 216–17), but they did not replace that disappearing bit of ‘knowledge’ with any real understanding of what local government is like and who is most involved. Indeed, ‘for younger children all government seems to be national in character’ (p. 214). Against this backdrop, the emphasis in high school on the Constitution and the national government can only reinforce the notion that government in general is distant and not closely connected with their day-to-day lives. Children do not ‘automatically’ learn about local government, either because it is thought to be highly visible (in fact, it is not) or because it is close at hand. A conscious effort by civics teachers to relate government and politics to individuals and institutions that are smaller, closer and more approachable than the national government might well be a way to make civics teaching seem less obsessed with stray facts, and thereby convey to students a greater theoretical understanding of why governments exist, how and why they are organized in particular ways, and how they might be influenced. It is likely that such an approach, by providing a firmer foundation about government in general, could ultimately enhance students’ knowledge of government at all levels.

We recognize that there are difficulties in what we are proposing. For one thing, textbooks do not exist about local governments—not even generic local governments, much less each one specifically. Even teachers who have majored in political science in college are unlikely to have encountered courses in which local governments were the centre of interest. So teachers must be more creative and enterprising if they are going to stress the local level. In addition, students in a given school district sometimes live in multiple cities or towns, making the job much more difficult (but also potentially more interesting).

Teaching about local government can also be much more difficult precisely because it is close at hand. The possibility exists, for example, of bringing in local officials to explain what is currently happening in the government. Likewise, the opportunity exists for students to get genuinely involved in local decisions. But these opportunities can introduce complications and controversy. Inviting one council representative can lead parents to ask why another one was not invited. Having students raise questions about local decisions can make it appear as if teachers and principals are taking sides or are straying into the realm of partisan attitudes. Students can raise embarrassing questions of parents. The same things can happen, of course, when dealing with the state and national levels. But higher-level politicians are less often brought into the schools. And issues at the national level—because they are less immediate—may actually be less likely to evoke the kind of strong emotions that come from personal involvement (even though they are in some sense ‘bigger’ issues). And because parents and local governments do not make decisions on most national issues—local governments do not vote on sending arms shipments, for example—they can be talked about in a more abstract way, without ever having to come to a decision and without having one side clearly win something and another clearly lose something.

Despite these difficulties, the gains in making government and politics tangi-

ble to students may make the effort worthwhile. It is not simply, or even primarily, that students will learn about the personalities, issues and structures of their local governments. Those are likely to change, and even if they do not, seniors are soon likely to move to different localities. Rather, what may happen is that students understand all governments better and have a greater appreciation of the role of government if they are introduced to the subject in a way that they can understand. Instead of seeing government as distant and as defined by a collection of hard-to-remember rules, they may learn why governments exist and have a greater appreciation of the way in which they go about their business. Ultimately, having a deeper understanding may even make them less cynical about government and more willing and knowledgeable about how to influence it at all levels.

References

- Anderson, L., et al. 1990. *The civics report card*. Princeton, NJ, National Assessment of Educational Progress, Educational Testing Service.
- Easton, D.; Dennis, J. 1969. *Children in the political system*. New York, McGraw-Hill.
- Langton, K.; Jennings, M.K. 1968. Political socialization and the high school civics curriculum in the United States. *American political science review* (Washington, DC), vol. 62, no. 3, p. 862-67.
- Williams, P.L., et al. 1995. *NAEP 1994 United States history: a first look*. Washington, DC, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, United States Department of Education.

CITIZENSHIP CONTEXTS AND OUTLOOK IN THE WORLD TODAY

EDUCATION IN

A WORLD IN TRANSITION:

BETWEEN POST-COMMUNISM

AND POST-MODERNISM

César Birzea

In seeking ways to achieve civic and political socialization—or re-socialization, as the process taking place in central and eastern Europe might be more aptly termed—we must first ask ourselves about the current historical context. It is only by examining the various possible answers to that question that we can lay the foundations for cultural renewal and hence give the proper direction to educational policy.

Which transitions?

The subject of post-communism is as complex as it is varied. It can be examined from three perspectives. The first concerns the so-called moral and political victory of the West. According to Nemo (1993, p. 53), the 1989 revolutions were a result of the moral triumph of the West. The political transformations in eastern Europe led inevitably to the appropriation of western values, which in turn has erased ideological and political differences. We have thus entered a post-ideological era in which everyone adheres to the same system of values, a state of affairs which is tantamount to the end of history.

Original language: French

César Birzea (Romania)

Doctorate in Educational Sciences. Currently Director of the Institute of Educational Sciences in Bucharest. Formerly Programme Co-ordinator at the UNESCO Institute for Education (Hamburg) and expert for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Cameroon and for the Council of Europe in Albania, the Russian Federation and Slovenia.

Even though we do not know what will happen in the long term, it is clear that the seven years of post-communist transition already belie such overly optimistic evaluations. In fact, the transformations in central and eastern Europe have turned out to be much more complicated than a simple moral or ideological victory. In general, analyses of this kind have focused exclusively on institutional transitions, that is, on setting up the three pillars of the new social order: political pluralism, the rule of law and a market economy. These transformations, while significant, cannot stand alone. *Cultural transition*—the changing of mentalities, attitudes, values and social relations—is a more delicate matter. The institutional transition may last five to six years, whereas the cultural transition could take at least a generation.

As everyone knows, we are dealing here with a long-term process, the outcome of which depends not just on the transfer of political models or the more or less successful 'grafting' of institutions. Cultural transition implies a long and sustained educational effort.

A second question of interest—one raised since Durkheim and Parsons—involves establishing accurately the relation between *social stability* and a *shared value system*. According to a well-known hypothesis, a society's degree of stability is proportional to its ability to achieve consensus on certain common values. By that criterion, communist society ought to have been more stable and homogeneous than any previous form of society. Communism was certainly characterized by a high degree of consensus with regard to Marxist-Leninist values: the class struggle, dialectical materialism, the supremacy of the Party, secularism, the superiority of manual labour, socialist internationalism and polytechnic education.

By contrast, as the theory has it, the societies 'in transition' are deeply divided over basic values through the very fact of attempting to replace one social order with another. But this correlation between stability and common values calls for closer scrutiny. Frequently, the façade of consensus constructed out of official language masked a profound moral disaffection among individuals and social groups and in the collective unconscious. It is not unusual for societies to adopt the new values unthinkingly, as though they were political slogans or buzz words, without actually embracing them through a process of genuine consensus. Romania is one example. Yet, paradoxically, in the medium term and especially since 1992, Romania has witnessed a political stability that is unprecedented among the post-communist transition countries.

The third matter of interest is the relationship between post-communism and western post-modernism. Many of the dilemmas facing analysts after the revolutions of 1989 have arisen from the difficulty of using traditional categories to describe conditions in central and eastern Europe. In the past, the situation was or seemed to be clear: the 'Second World' could be distinguished from the 'First World' by ideological criteria, the same ones, in fact, which distinguished it from the 'Third World'. However, when geopolitical and ideological divisions became meaningless, a multitude of other considerations rushed in to fill the gap. Historical and cultural references, for example, came to the fore, but failed to

provide any more useful or legitimate explanations. Leading analysts attempted to understand the post-communist transition from the perspective of *modernity* and, specifically, of *western post-modernity*. Some maintained that communism had been nothing more than an attempt to bypass the western route to modernity. With its three major campaigns for rapid modernization (electrification, collectivization and literacy), the alternative modernist choice offered by the Soviets was designed to close the gap between central and eastern Europe and the West as swiftly as possible. Some analysts view that strategy as largely successful (Augustinos, 1991). The majority, however, see the collapse of the system as proof of the strategy's failure, the result being that the eastern European countries now have to rethink the botched modernism of the Soviet revolution. According to Sztompka (1993, p. 137), communist modernity existed only in a latent form because its actual expression was inhibited by the totalitarian State. That ambiguous situation was characterized by the following elements: a single-track modernity which concentrated exclusively on certain aspects of life in society, in particular the economic sector; the persistence of forms that may be considered pre-modern or almost feudal; and the endorsement of superficial symbolic forms emulating western modernity.

Several analysts have therefore wondered whether post-communism is a belated form of modernism, a particular manifestation of the *post-modern revolution*, or a *distinct cultural reality* with its own system of values (De Soto & Anderson, 1993; Van den Broeck & De Moor, 1994). In Von Kopp's view (1993) the situation is relatively simple: communism achieved *partial modernity* in certain sectors and areas of activity. The task of the post-communist transition is therefore twofold: to modernize the backward sectors and to put the most advanced sectors on a par with the West.

We must bear in mind, too, that western Europe is itself in the process of transition. That, at least, is the view of Inglehart (1990) who believes that western societies have been going through a process of *post-modern transition* since the 1970s. While the post-communist societies, which entered the transition phase in the 1990s, are still grappling with their 'return to the European fold' as a way of catching up with history and resuming the process of modernization cut short by the advent of the totalitarian regimes, western societies have already embarked on a post-industrial phase of their history. If this analysis is correct, the post-communist transition should—in the same way, in fact, as the post-modern transition—give rise to its own culture and system of values.

The post-modern transition typical of western societies has been marked by significant changes in values: on the one hand, *individualist values* (freedom, personal expression) outweigh *collectivist values* (co-operation, membership of a group participation) and, on the other hand, material values have been superseded by the values of belonging, esteem and intellectual satisfaction. According to Inglehart, well-being has given rise to a post-materialistic culture and mindset. The classic values of modernity (efficiency, development, economic rationality) have lost their relevance: what really matters to the individual is less profit for its

own sake than the possibility of expressing oneself and doing meaningful work. The 'scarcity values' that marked the modern stage of history have declined in relative importance. With the increased sense of security in post-modern societies, respect for authority, the cult of money, faith in the welfare State, social homogeneity and trust in knowledge and social progress have gradually given way to the 'post-materialist values' of leisure, independence, interculturalism, tolerance and confidence.

It is argued that this cultural evolution will have significant political consequences. As they gain ground, individualistic and post-materialistic values should help consolidate democracy, in line with Lipset's well-known theory that democracy is more probable in prosperous countries than in poor ones. Inglehart predicts that these shifts will converge at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as post-communist transitions turn into post-modern transitions.

An interregnum culture

This model fails to describe, or describes only very partially, the situation in the countries undergoing a post-communist transition, where collectivist and individualistic values overlap. Materialistic values prevail, for obvious reasons, over post-materialistic values. Must we conclude, then, that these countries have failed to progress beyond the phase of modernity and a civilization of scarcity? These considerations alone will clearly not be sufficient to provide a definitive answer to this question, especially since Inglehart's criterion for distinguishing between societies of scarcity and societies of relative security is the absence of starvation. However dramatic material conditions in the countries in transition may be, people there are not dying of hunger.

The post-communist transition is too complex to be slotted automatically into a modern/post-modern classification. It may be more aptly defined as an 'interregnum culture' in which institutions, values, attitudes and skills coexist, as do old and new structures, often in conflicting forms. The values associated with the post-communist transitions present a somewhat complex picture, the main features of which are described below.

Several elements come into play. *Certain values disappeared* with the break-up of the political system that sustained them (revolutionary militancy, patriotic labour, personal sacrifice, submission to an all-powerful State). Yet, such values may at times resurface as the rallying-cry of those who hanker after a 'paradise lost', or as an example of what psychoanalysts term 'vestigial behaviour', that is, the sudden re-emergence of residual communism as manifested, for instance, by collectivist or egalitarian reactions, the need for a common enemy or unconditional submission to established authority. At the same time, *new values*, unacceptable under the old regime, have emerged: freedom, public accountability, multiple identity, personal initiative, political pluralism, autonomy, a critical spirit, social dialogue, tolerance. In addition, there has been a revival of interest in certain *traditional values* that were prohibited or discouraged under communism:

nationalism, élitism, monarchy, religion, property, community feeling, respect for the environment, private life. Lastly, some values associated with the old system have *persisted* in the new context, but have been modified either by *changes in their content* (especially values relating to equality, work, materialism, well-being, solidarity, citizenship, the State, a sense of belonging) or by *shifts in their relative importance* (loyalty, community, social order, discipline, altruism).

In addition to these general trends, particular aspects of the new 'interregnum' culture are also of some significance.

The gap between official values and actual practice

To take but one example, 90% of those responding to a public opinion poll carried out in 1993 by the newspaper *Moscow news* ranked the family first in a scale of values that also included money, work, love, religion, art and national pride. As pointed out by Nikandrov (1995), from whose work this example is drawn, the family's high standing in the poll contrasts with the dramatic deterioration of family life in practice as demonstrated by the high divorce rate (two divorces for every three marriages in Moscow and Saint Petersburg), the generation gap and the decline in population growth.

Overlapping of individualist and collectivist values

In a 1995 survey of 400 students from Cluj and Timisoara, Gábor and Balog found that their subjects endorsed the following basic values: social order, politeness, national security, peace, respect for tradition, faith in God and harmony with nature. The survey also demonstrated, surprisingly, that collectivist values were predominant (sense of belonging, participation, social mobilization, co-operation) and that they actually stood in the way of individualist values (freedom, independence, critical spirit). According to the authors, this ambivalence can be explained by individuals' lack of awareness of their own importance and of their increased responsibility as the centre of gravity of the new social order.

Pragmatic appropriation of values

After all those years of frustration, is it surprising that young people in central and eastern Europe should be so strongly attracted to the consumer society and the values attaching to it? This is what Kenkmann and Saarnitt (1994, p. 180) have termed 'the pragmatization of values'. These two authors have been able to make some interesting comparisons based on their longitudinal study (1983, 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1992) of a single generation of young Estonians. They have observed a trend towards an emphasis on the materialistic values typical of consumer societies, in reaction to political changes—*perestroika*, the breakdown

of the Soviet Union, the independence of Estonia and its evolving capitalism. Cermáková and Holda (1992) found a similar trend in the Czech Republic. Surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s show clearly that young people accorded high priority to values associated with personal life (family, friendship, intimacy, privacy), which was, in a way, tantamount to a disavowal of collective socialization. By contrast, these authors have found that since 1989 the trend, here again, has been to embrace pragmatic values: what has become important is money, material goods, travel, the mirage of well-paid jobs and leisure time.

Anomie

For individuals, the transition phase has been experienced as a state of insecurity, marked by a loss of certainty and the disappearance of existential guideposts. Without the protector-State and its paternalistic guarantees individuals feel exposed and even threatened. By and large, people have not been taught to take initiatives or genuinely assume responsibility in an environment of competition and social risk. As a result, they dream of living in a capitalist world—but with socialist working conditions. While longing for reform, they are excessively concerned about job security. They demand economic and political rights, but do not know what to do with their new-found freedom. They welcome free elections, but usually vote indiscriminately. Durkheim used the term 'anomie' to describe this state of uncertainty, apathy and moral disorientation. A research team at the Centre for the Study of Romanian Youth Issues applied the Leo Strole scale to a sample of over 1,000 young people from 15 to 29 years of age (cf. 'The condition of Romanian youth', 1994). The survey findings showed that 88% of the subjects were in a state of anomie. Young Romanians are, by and large, in favour of a market economy (70.4%), even associated with inflation (54%); however, they are unwilling to accept speculation and corruption (95.4%), delinquency (94%), poverty (76.2%), inequality of opportunity (69.2%) or unemployment (65.9%). There is a general distrust of power and public institutions (71.3%) and they are far more concerned about the here and now than about the future (53%).

The fragility of democracy

The building of democracy itself is not free of danger or doubt. Hermet (1993) raises a disturbing question in this connection: can we be sure that the post-totalitarian transitions are irreversible? The fact is that, at this point, no one is in a position to give a clear and definitive answer. And yet this question is especially urgent because, in eastern as well as western Europe, the threats to democracy are growing. In this context, Sturzbecher's data (1994, p. 197) concerning the former German Democratic Republic are particularly alarming. In *Land Brandenburg* for example, although foreigners accounted for only 1% of the population (a rate which has no real consequences for the labour market), more than 40% of the young people questioned said that foreigners were responsible for unemployment

in Germany. According to the same survey, 42% of respondents thought that foreigners should be repatriated because 'Germany should be for Germans'. One hardly needs to recall that such attitudes have at times been borne out by events. Against this background, the growing concern of the educational community is only too understandable.

What education for citizenship?

At this point in our analysis, it is legitimate to ask what kinds of knowledge and values are needed to equip the 'socio-nauts' of central and eastern Europe on their voyage of transition; what educational approaches should be adopted in order to help shape a new form of citizenship?

Although there are many possible answers, a number of common trends can be singled out. As a starting-point, it may be useful to look at the findings of a survey (Taylor, 1994) on the dominant values in post-communist countries. The eight countries that participated in the survey ranked their priorities in the following order: citizenship (75%), democracy (63%), national consciousness (50%), international understanding (50%), environmental awareness (38%), peace and tolerance (38%), human rights (25%), intercultural education (25%) and anti-racism (25%).

Other authors (Horváth, 1990; Halász, 1991; Rust, Knost & Wichmann, 1994; Lewowicki, 1994; Nikandrov, 1995) have added different items or changed the order of priorities. By cross-checking the data and analysing them in terms of this author's own observations (Birzea, 1994), six major orientations can be defined:

- *Democracy and democratization*: in the field of educational policy, democracy and democratization are reflected in such measures as decentralization, liberalization of access, diversification of structures, increased freedom for teachers, encouragement of local initiatives and development of private schools.
- *Strengthening of citizenship*: citizenship can be strengthened through educational policy measures and approaches, such as training in the skills required for social participation, learning about shared responsibility, encouragement of political socialization at school, and the promotion of civic rights and duties.
- *Strengthening of humanist values*: such values can be reinforced by a revival of classical studies, the individualization and personalization of teaching methods, the promotion of universal human values and the development of confidence in human progress.
- *Strengthening values associated with nationhood*: national pride can be developed by the affirmation of a national identity, learning of the national language, history and culture, and the rediscovery of traditions and enhancement of their status.
- *Rediscovery of religion*: this can be fostered through the study of the basic religious texts and the promotion of religious tolerance.
- *Reconstruction of the European ideal*: this can be achieved by providing

knowledge about European culture and institutions, the integration of a European dimension into school curricula, the teaching of foreign languages and the promotion of intercultural education.

These orientations have already had an impact, most clearly to be seen in the various educational curricula of the countries concerned. There is, however, a distinct overall trend, several aspects of which may be noted.

In most cases, a new academic subject concerning *citizenship education* has been introduced. This new subject, which goes by different names according to the priorities, traditions and possibilities at hand (social awareness, social studies, civic education, civic culture), is being taught as a separate subject, usually in secondary schools, but in some countries even as part of the primary-school curriculum.

In certain countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine), in addition to its being offered as a separate subject, a cross-curriculum approach to citizenship education has been introduced. This usually involves incorporating thematic units into courses on history, philosophy, psychology, ethics, religion, social sciences, geography and economics. Citizenship education is thus enriched by the contribution of teachers from various disciplines working within a holistic and interdisciplinary framework.

The new subject is usually taught by *social science teachers*, most of whom were trained before 1989. There are very few teachers who were initially trained in civic instruction. The absence of initial training and, especially, of widespread retraining in subjects related to the new citizenship is a serious defect which must be addressed as a matter of priority when educational policies are formulated. Unlike the other western countries where democratic citizenship is so much a part of everyday life that it has become automatic, the post-communist transition countries have little in the way of democratic images or informal pointers to democracy. The first step towards guiding democracy along its way is to know it well. The contribution that education can make to a swifter and more successful cultural transition depends on it.

References

- Augustinos, G., ed. 1991. *Diverse paths to modernity in Southeastern Europe*. New York, Greenwood Press.
- Badrus, N. 1993. La société roumaine à la recherche de la normalité [Romanian society: the search for normality]. *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* (Paris), vol. 45, p. 403–15.
- Birzea, C. 1994. *Educational policies of the countries in transition*. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Press.
- Cermáková, Z.; Holda, D. 1992. Changing values among Czech students: before and after November 1989. *European journal of education* (Paris), vol. 27, no. 3, p. 303–14.
- Cerych, L. 1995. Educational reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. *European journal of education* (Paris), vol. 30, no. 4, p. 423–35.

- De Soto, H.G.; Anderson, D.G., eds. 1993. *The curtain rises: rethinking culture, ideology and the State in Eastern Europe*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press.
- Gábor, K.; Balog, I. 1995. The impact of consumer culture on Eastern and Central European youth. *Educatio* (Budapest), no. 2, p. 311–26.
- Halász, G. 1991. Valeurs modernes et traditionnelles: la politique de l'éducation face aux attentes sociales en Hongrie [Modern and traditional values: educational policy and social expectations in Hungary]. *Education comparée* (Paris), no. 45, p. 59–64.
- Hermet, G. 1993. *Les désenchantements de la liberté: la sortie des dictatures dans les années 90* [The disillusionment of freedom: the end of dictatorship in the 1990s]. Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard.
- Horváth, A. 1990. Tradition and modernization: educational consequences of changes in Hungarian society. *International review of education* (Hamburg), vol. 36, no. 2, p. 207–17.
- Inglehart, R. 1990. *Culture shift in advanced industrial societies*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Kenkmann, P.; Saarnitt, J. 1994. Education and shifts in youth's value orientations in Estonia. In: Rust, V.D.; Knost, P.; Wichmann, J., eds. *Education and value crisis in Central and Eastern Europe*, p. 161–82. Frankfurt-am-Main, Peter Lang.
- Lewowicki, T. 1994. Changes in Polish youth values: between doubt and hope. In: Rust, V.D.; Knost, P.; Wichmann, J., eds., op. cit., p. 267–79.
- Nemo, P. 1993. Le triomphe moral de l'Ouest [The moral triumph of the West]. In: Haarscher, G.; Telò, M., eds. *Après le communisme*, p. 53–73. Brussels, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Nikandrov, N.D. 1995. Russian education after Perestroika: the search for new values. *International review of education* (Hamburg), vol. 41, nos. 1-2, p. 47–57.
- Rust, V.D.; Knost, P.; Wichmann, J., eds. 1994. *Education and value crisis in Central and Eastern Europe*. Frankfurt-am-Main, Peter Lang.
- Starea tineretului roman [The condition of Romanian youth]. 1994. Bucuresti, Centrul de studii cercetri pentru probleme de tineret.
- Sturzbecher, D. 1994. Freedom without chances: value changes of East German youth. In: Rust, V.D.; Knost, P.; Wichmann, J., eds., op. cit., p. 183–204.
- Sztompka, P. 1993. *The sociology of social change*. Oxford, Blackwell.
- Taylor, M. 1994. *Values education in Europe: a comparative overview of a survey of 26 countries in 1993*. Slough, United Kingdom, National Foundation for Educational Research.
- Van den Broeck, A.; De Moor, R. 1994. Eastern Europe after 1989. In: Ester, P.; Halman, L.; De Moor, R., eds. *The individualizing society*, p. 197–228. Tilburg, Tilburg University Press.
- Von Kopp, B. 1993. Global changes and the context of education, democracy and development in Eastern Europe. In: Mitter, W.; Schafer, U., eds. *Upheaval and change in education*, p. 85–98. Frankfurt-am-Main, German Institute for International Educational Research.

CITIZENSHIP, NATIONAL INTEGRATION

AND EDUCATION:

IDEOLOGY AND CONSENSUS

IN LATIN AMERICA

Manuel Antonio Garretón

Consensus and educational ideology

Developing countries appear recently to have adopted a new attitude towards and a paradigm for education, which, despite some significant internal differences, may be said to amount to a new world consensus on education.¹ Such attitudes no doubt point to an advance in the knowledge of education, which will have a positive effect on current educational policies. There is, nevertheless, the risk that they may become an ideology, which will then conceal the new problems and contradictions surfacing precisely as a result of these new attitudes and policies.

All ideologies consist of three basic components: a criticism of the past and of models which are assumed to be superseded; the announcement of 'good news'; and the concealment or unconscious denial of inherent contradictions.

Original language: Spanish

Manuel Antonio Garretón (Chile)

Doctoral degree from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris. Professor and former director of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chile. Adviser for the Chilean Ministry of Education (1990–94) and research professor at FLACSO (1975–95). Invited professor in many European and North and Latin American universities specializing in political sociology, socio-economic development, culture and education. Author or editor of about twenty books and more than 100 articles, translated into many languages. Recent publications include: *La faz sumergida del iceberg: ensayos sobre la transformación cultural* [The hidden face of the iceberg: essays on cultural change] (1994); *Hacia una nueva era política: estudio sobre las democratizaciones* [Towards a new political era: study on democratizations] (1995).

In the case of the new educational paradigms, criticism of the past is directed: at the leading role of the State in educational policies; at the prevailing notion of large-scale access and the lack of quality and diversity as regards educational supply; and at the lack of connections between the education system and the needs of economic and industrial development.

The 'good news' consists in proclaiming knowledge as the new source of the wealth of nations, whence the need to give priority to education in investment policies and public budgets as a fundamental instrument of economic growth, social justice and personal fulfilment. Education looks after the so-called 'cultural codes of modernity', civic training and preparation for the labour market. This amounts to an instrumental view of education which, in the case of developing countries, is justified by the argument that successful economic models are those which have invested in education and in human capital.

The ideological aspect of this outlook resides, on the one hand, in the monolithic, simple definition of its components, whereby: modernity is equated to modernization; education is equated to modernity which is equated to modernization; education is equated to the school system and preparation for the labour market; development is equated to economic growth, training to the acquisition of knowledge, and justice to socio-economic equality and socio-cultural pluralism. On the other hand, there is the assumption of a positive relationship, or virtuous circle, by which all these elements reinforce each other. Empirical observation and historical facts are thus replaced by a normative approach, which disregards the tensions and, at times, the contradictions which arise between all the dimensions referred to above, and which often circumvents them through an inorganic enumeration of conditions and pious wishes.

It has to be recognized that not all fashionable opinions and models comply unreservedly with this new consensus. Some show a leaning for the technocratic or economic dimension, while others take up a more humanistic and cultural position, with a third category remaining more ambiguously divided between these two extremes. There is also no doubt that, in order to analyse ideological risks, we are emphasizing some elements of the approach which are usually much more compactly presented. Lastly, as we mentioned above, we should not overlook the significant impact that this new approach, which is more or less universal and subject to considerable internal variations, has meant in terms of the progress of educational policies.

Underlying any view of educational policy, there is also a view and a diagnosis of the period and society in which we live. Until recently, the dominant assumption as regards society was associated with a republican model of universal education. The notion was that of a homogeneous society, where culture, economics, politics and social organization were interrelated, a situation which was reflected in the relationship between schooling, socialization, juvenile culture and preparation for social and economic activity. Recently, an alternative attitude has tended to take over, introducing the idea of a global society where the transnational market model replaces the national political community, and

extending into the area of educational policy, whose function henceforth is to train for competition.

There is no doubt that the classic notion of society and the educational models related to it no longer carry the same weight, although many of their elements have been preserved in the new approach. This does not mean to say, however, that we really are facing a globalized society, where there is nothing left but to insert education in the productive system as the basis of economic growth. Both dimensions are present, but within the framework of a greater whole in which they are redefined and integrated.

In what follows, we shall be raising queries regarding the ambiguity of the context and we shall be insisting on the multidimensional aspect of the situation, which entails assuming and learning to live with contradictions, rather than attempting to resolve them in the views we express. What we shall try to show is that the various dimensions which appear integrated and harmonized in the views of the new educational consensus are, in fact, disintegrated; that they have their own consistencies and dynamics; that they are mutually contradictory; and that they cannot be reduced to an instrumental view of education based on one of them alone, however important it may be, such as economic and industrial growth.

Changes in the contemporary personality and society

Education has always revolved around two simple basic ideas and the interaction between them: on the one hand, certain assumptions regarding childhood and youth; and, on the other hand, a certain view of the society to which the children and young people belong.

With regard to the definition of childhood and youth as basic features of the subject of educational activity, there have been two main changes. The first is the discrepancy in the rates of development of the different dimensions of the youthful personality. One example of this is the discrepancy in the timing of the life-cycle, with on one side an earlier involvement of young people in the activities and problems of society, and on the other side a prolongation of the period of adolescence. The second change has been the greater autonomy of a more universal type of youth culture, compared with national cultures or individual societies. What we would like to point out is that this idea of childhood and adolescence, with bio-psychic features related to a juvenile culture, where the preparation for the admission of young people into society takes place within the school environment, and which education used as a working assumption in this century, is now being brought into question.

Doubt is also being cast on the idea of society as the place of reference for social action, which has been frequently pointed out in the light of two processes occurring simultaneously: the 'top down' process, in so far as the trend towards globalization is destroying the notion of frontiers and creating an endogenous

decision centre; and the 'bottom upwards' process, in so far as identities and attachments are becoming independent of this decision centre and are setting themselves up as their own basic reference for social action.

The idea of society is thus being replaced by the image of a market or a sum of individuals, or even by the notion of a constant flow of situations and strategies, or ultimately by the coexistence of communities of identity into which culture and society are merged. The notion of society equated with that of the *polis* is falling apart.

The main question, then, is whether or not there is any area of meaning and reference for social action which can mediate between individuals and tribes on the one hand and the globalized world of motorways and different kinds of markets on the other. If there is, then it must be the national *polis*-society or other broader areas built up on the latter. If there is none, then the very concept of society disappears, since neither the global world nor the world of identities constitutes what we traditionally understand by a *polis*. The repeated reference to the 'global village' does nothing to resolve this issue, and merely highlights it with a bad metaphor.

The notion of society and *polis* assumed a certain relationship among a cultural model, an economic system, a social structure and a form of political organization. Nowadays, we are witnessing two basic tendencies in this respect. In the first place, there is no longer any relationship among these dimensions within any given territory. Cultural models, political systems, modes of production and forms of social organization of very different kinds coexist in the same environment and no longer refer to each other either as requisites or as effects. Secondly, none of these dimensions is fundamentally determined by any other; each one has its own dynamic and any form of reciprocal determination remains precarious, partial and transitory. Unlike the arguments put forward by post-modernists, it is nevertheless possible to detect a structural regularity in the relations among those dimensions and even determining factors acting in one direction or the other, except that these are not univocal and do not follow any natural law of history, but are instead a historical-social creation.

The conclusion is that politics and education are the only ones which can, if not unify these dimensions into a single societal model, at least maintain them under tension related to each other, on the understanding that neither of them is circumscribed within the territorial area of any one society. The *polis*-society is the background for the meeting, tensions and interrelationships among these dimensions, which do not appear independent of each other. Education cannot be anything else than a way of training subjects to internalize these connections on a personal basis and to socialize them on a collective basis.

The specificity of Latin America

For Latin America, this theoretical-practical question is crucial. The notion of a society conceived as a unity in which the actors assemble around their historic

memory and around the plans and counterplans concerning that society and its future, is intrinsic to socio-political thought and practice.

The idea of a socio-political matrix or a matrix consisting of (or originating) social actors, conceived as a relationship between the State, as the system of political representation, and the socio-economic and cultural base of actors, organized by the political system, precisely tries to describe the dissociation and the interaction between the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. The basic hypothesis is that we are shifting from a matrix where these components are merged, the so-called *popular-national* or *central-political* matrix, to a situation which offers possibilities of an arrangement and a restoration of the old matrix or of growing autonomy and increasing synergy between its components.

This transformation of the socio-political matrix, which is profoundly altering the functions and contents of education, is occurring in the midst of four processes which are shedding new light on Latin American problems and are independent of each other, namely: the formulation of an actual model of modernity; the construction of political democracies; democratization or social integration; and integration within the world economy. These processes are the operational aspect of the cultural, political, social and economic dimensions to which we were referring earlier. The basic question is what sort of education would be suitable to train individuals and to form actors able to deal with the four problem areas referred to, which are at the same time independent of each other and complementary.

The model of modernity

In its consideration of historical problems, the predominant outlook in Latin America until recently assumed that there was a fundamental type of 'modern' society, with variations of degrees and internal structures, but based on one and the same conceptual matrix and a univocal concept of 'modernization', even though admitting various types and styles. Modernity and modernization were interrelated as structure and process, as goal and path, respectively.

We are at present witnessing a dramatic change in this definition, which might lead one mistakenly to think that, beyond these questions, we are already experiencing the problems of post-modern societies or that we are in the process of moving towards them. Let us state quite clearly that, sociologically speaking, there is no such thing as a post-modern societal type and that this concept is nothing more than a bad metaphor.

There is less ingenuity nowadays regarding any single form of modernity. Sociologically speaking, it is the societal form in which 'subjects' are constituted, not only from the rational point of view, but also through the expansion of subjectivity and of collective identities and memories. In this way, tradition, relieved of its metasocial atavisms, can also become a dimension able to constitute subjects, that is to say, 'modern'. Schematically speaking, the rational aspect includes both an emancipating rational dimension and a purely instrumental dimension.

The subjective aspect has an expressive-affective dimension and an identity-related dimension. Historic memory has a component based on the way in which a certain collectivity has succeeded in combining the different dimensions, as well as a component related to the construction of collective history. Modernization, on the other hand, may appear as a form of secularization, but also as a *radical* expansion of the other dimension. This is why there is no single concept of modernity defined outside the subjects or as a state or goal which has to be attained, but rather as a combination of all the dimensions referred to above within a particular framework which allows for various models and experiences of modernity. Thus, there is no way of 'achieving' modernity, since the latter is constantly being endogenously produced and reproduced. In other words, there is no single societal type which is identified with modernity, such as, for instance, in their time industrial society or capitalist society, nor may real societies be defined in terms of their remoteness from or proximity to this type of society. There are different historic models of modernity.

Nowadays, there is not only a change in the universal perception of what a modern society consists of, but there is also a change in the development and modernization model. This model is no longer related to a univocal view based on the driving force of national States, around which the industrial actors are organized, mainly the social classes, in the struggle for a leading role in the process, for the possession of resources and for the distribution of profits. The central idea is becoming the transnational forces of global markets, so that the crucial problem is now reconstituting society's ability to act on itself, that is, how to rebuild and to strengthen local actors and the political system.

In Latin America, as we come to the end of the period of popular nationalism, this signifies the eclipse of its main actors and the disappearance of the main analytical development paradigms. In their place, we are seeing pragmatic policies of adaptation and correction in relation to structural adjustments, or else precarious and disenchanting rearrangements of social and political actors. On a theoretical plane, the new approach takes the form of the socio-historical level being invaded by views which identify society with a market, the individual with a producer and modernity with modernization, through neo-liberal policies, in their right-wing or left-wing versions, or else the exaltation of the subject's identity, almost invariably of a religious kind.

The two main problem areas of Latin American society now have neither any sure theoretical model nor any historical model to refer to. On the one hand, there is a redefinition of modernity in terms of new dimensions, which open the way to various specific models and experiences of modernity, generating historic perspectives which are different from those familiar so far. On the other hand, there is the transformation of the modernization or development model which has prevailed for the last two centuries. In this vacuum of certainty, the market, the mass media and the identity refuge have temporarily invaded the area previously occupied by the *polis*-society, while technocracy has replaced the confrontation between historic plans and counterplans.

The construction of democratic political systems

The socio-economic, cultural and political changes which have occurred in recent decades and the need for Latin America to be reintegrated within the new world context raise the issue once again of democracy in the region.

At this stage, it is not only a question of a change of political system that will avoid a regression to military authoritarianism, or revolutionary upheavals which lead to more kinds of political authoritarianism. For the time being, there are no alternatives to the democratic system that could be imposed either by force or with internal or external support.

Nevertheless, any erosion of democratic legitimacy due to its weak quality could cause such alternatives to re-emerge or could create a vacuum of legitimacy in any type of system, which would amount more to a form of de-legitimization than to democracy or actual politics. In various situations, instead of authoritarianism, it is war, corruption or constant trivialization and decomposition which are liable to fill this vacuum of legitimacy.

Thus the issue of democracy does not appear to arise in the cycle of authoritarianism and democracy typical of a large part of this century in Latin America, but rather as part of a change of era, where the very idea of the State-society is brought into question and where the main problem is precisely its reconstitution.

On the other hand, we no longer expect of democracy what it cannot give as a system and which should come from other spheres of society; that is to say, democracy is accepted for what it is, namely a *specific dimension* of society and not as a *comprehensive system* or overall type of social organization, although rather more is expected of it as a political system. It should be remembered that in our countries politics was always a form of mobilization in the first place and hardly representative. Nowadays, democracies are expected to fulfil their representative function, although at present this idea is being brought into question as a result of the considerable changes in attitude as to what should be represented in the political sphere.

All this would appear to indicate that setting up or reproducing traditional institutions, though it may be strictly indispensable, is not sufficient, because the two major problems which will constitute a threat to democracies in the future will be the irrelevance of institutions in the face of established national and transnational powers, and the inability to deal with the agenda of social needs owing to the exclusion of vast sectors of society. Looking at it in another way, the creativity of institutions should be applied as much to resolving the problems of who governs society and how, as especially to dealing with the shortcomings of the democratic tradition, particularly in our countries; in other words, the content (the what) of 'good government', which implies but also goes beyond the concept of *accountability*.

By duly insisting on a concept of democracy limited to its nature as a political system, that is, a system of institutional mediation between the State and

society aimed at resolving only problems of government, citizenship and the channelling of conflicts and social demands, one avoids expecting of a political system what no system can resolve. At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind that a political system is not only a collection of institutional mechanisms, even though it cannot dispense with these, but is also founded on deep *societal agreements*, themselves based on specific *ethical principles*. It has been said that in many democracies this agreement was based on the principle of liberty and that the *ethos* of Latin American democracy would be more egalitarian than libertarian, whence the historic institutional, representative (or liberal) shortcomings of Latin American political systems, with respect to popular or non-institutional movements. There is no doubt that the experience of authoritarianism has strengthened the libertarian *ethos*, and that the structural transformations related to a particular view or model of modernity have eroded the integrative or unified, egalitarian *ethos* of Latin American democracies. But there is equally no doubt that there will be no viable democracies unless those two ethical principles are combined and unless they are enshrined in representative and effective institutions.

In the end, the democratic challenge of the times ahead, to which education systems must respond in their own way, is, in addition to completing and consolidating the democratic systems which inevitably succeed the different authoritarian systems, to ensure the relevance and quality of these democracies

Citizenship, exclusion and representation

Citizenship is the claim by a subject to rights and responsibilities with respect to a particular power. A variety of modern trends, which are interrelated, are currently redefining the scope and limits of participation and citizenship as they have been experienced until now by modern societies.

In the first place, as we said above, society has become multidimensional, with growing diversity in the fields of economics, culture, politics and social organization. This implies that the constitution of subjects is approached in different ways in each field. Demands and aspirations have become more complex and are aimed not only at access to but also at the quality of what is aspired to. Politics is losing its central function, shifting from an ideological to a more instrumental type of policy; there is a split between the content of what is 'political' and 'politics', which then becomes a specialized activity, losing its convocational character and becoming instrumental and managerial (occupational).

In the second place, there has been an expansion of citizens' aspirations, in contrast to the absence of institutions to give these aspirations effect. The claims to rights and responsibilities are no longer directed only at the political power or at the central or decentralized State institutions, but also at established powers in the economic field, in gender relations, in communications, the environment, local and regional affairs, in terms of a global citizenship outside the territorial or national level, as suggested in the most advanced ver-

sions of human rights. In each of these fields, the specific problem arises of how to be a citizen.

Thirdly, in the case of Latin America, and more generally speaking of a great part of humankind, these phenomena are affected and redefined by the central fact of the exclusion of large social sectors, which can amount to as much as two-thirds of each society. There are very different forms of exclusion, which find expression both in the traditional areas of citizenship and in the new ones referred to above, on which the models of modernity are based. There are some characteristics, however, which recur in all contemporary forms of exclusion and which co-exist with the traditional forms. On the one hand, they are defined not so much in terms of conflict and domination as in terms of marginality and increasing remoteness, so that those who are excluded are not so much admitted to society as subordinate or oppressed sectors, but are simply not admitted at all or are considered redundant. This means that the duality is not a simple one, but more complex, since the demands of the excluded are not expressed only in terms of access to the minimum levels of what is denied them, but also in terms of quality. In this sense, there is a cultural dimension to modernity which is present in all those who are expelled from it.

Fourthly, as a consequence of the three earlier points, we are seeing doubts regarding traditional forms of political and corporate representation and the traditional institutions through which it used to find expression. The increase in subjectivity (which includes, but should not be confused with—since it goes beyond—individualism), the wider areas of citizenship, the redefinition of politics and its relations with society, and the phenomena of exclusion are giving rise to new demands and aspirations, and to new forms of struggle and conflict. Thus, on the one hand the struggles for liberty and equality are becoming more complex, technical and independent, and on the other, they are being complemented by demands for happiness and self-fulfilment, many of which are not 'representable'.

Lastly, a new pattern of double conflict (where the term conflict itself is ambiguous, since the adversaries are not clearly defined and because it cannot be detached from communication and concentration) is emerging in all areas and is affecting all institutions and organizations, once again raising the issues of participation: on the one hand, the confrontation between the excluded and the included, and, on the other, the conflict which occurs within each area among those who form part of models of modernity and which is concerned with domination of the instruments serving to define those models.

When we talk about education for citizenship, then, we should understand that we are referring to a phenomenon which is no longer limited in scope once and for all and to which it is merely a question of having access, but to an area which is in the process of being constituted, with institutionalized aspects which need to be developed and with aspects whose institutionalization we need to invent.

The model of development and international integration

As we have said, what is changing is not only the nature of modern society, but also the predominant mode of modernization and development.

The traditional model of development in Latin America in this century, based on State intervention, has been relatively successful in terms of economic development and the social integration of certain sectors at different times, but it failed to resolve problems of overall national development or to overcome structural inequalities, and its effect was ambivalent with respect to political democracy. It is most unlikely that, in itself, the so-called new model of transnational development, introducing market mechanisms and increased competitiveness, will necessarily lead to a deepening of political democracy. And there may even be said to be a negative effect of this model in terms of socio-economic equality and on the training and strengthening of social actors. Thus, contrary to an ideology which is widespread in Latin America, economic liberalism, democracy and development are processes which do not follow a linear, cumulative relation, but one full of tensions and contradictions.

The total shift from a generic model of development and modernization occurring through national States to one based on transnational, global market forces has found its visible expression in so-called 'structural adjustments'. Clearly, these adjustments, independently of the political conditions in which they occurred, did partially resolve a short-term economic problem and also contributed to a longer-term problem, such as the strong subordination of economics to politics. Generally speaking, however, adjustments have tended to be confused with a more far-reaching development model and, practically without exception, have entailed an increase in poverty, especially in social inequalities. In actual fact, the adjustments represent more a point of rupture than a coherent model of social organization for the future. The all-embracing claim of neo-liberalism to re-identify modernity with a type of modernization based on adjustments was never, theoretically speaking, a serious proposition and it was very short lived.

The emerging model of development, in which transnational market forces play a central role, has destroyed the material, political and organizational bases of the social actors and has tended to induce their constant debilitation. The crucial question nowadays appears to be that of reconstructing a political system which allows a simultaneous strengthening, both of the State and of the independent ability of actors collectively to define the type of modernity they desire. If this does not happen, there will not only follow economic stagnation in the medium term, but a growing disintegration of society.

The illusion that we are in the presence of a new irreversible model, applicable to all countries through a single formula, leads one to the conclusion that the Latin American economies, especially some countries, have resolved the model of State-led and closed development which has prevailed for most of this century. In

this respect, the function of education would then be to adapt individuals and societies to the new conditions of the world economy and of the growth model.

On the other hand, what is most likely is that, once the break point with the growth and development model has been passed, there will be a need to reconnect society, politics and economics, while recognizing the independence of each. This means that some elements of the national development model will have to be combined with elements of the transnational model, but that neither can substitute for the other. Education in this respect will not be able to follow either one of them, whether in its function, its structure or its content, which contradicts what the current economic and technocratic educational ideologies are suggesting.

Conclusions

What we are presented with as a new educational consensus for developing countries is based on the statement that education is the main instrument of growth and justice. This rests on the assumption that the world has unified its growth model and that education is the main source for all growth. Desirable as this may be, it is still a fact that natural resources, the power of some societies compared to others, the nature of the distribution of wealth and power, financial capacity, or military power, to mention only a few elements, may be more influential than the quality or justice of education. On the other hand, growth cannot be identified so simply with development, in so far as the production dimension may enter into conflict with the environmental dimension, with civic integration, with social equality and with cultural identity, quite apart from the conflicts which may arise between any of these. The message we would like to convey is that we are faced with processes entailing contradictory options and that we have not yet defined a type of society in which these can be resolved. We are rather in a situation of rupture with the former model, leading to a redefinition of the political and educational models, which are areas where these tensions and contradictions commonly find expression.

At the same time, education itself is facing profound tensions which have accompanied its break with the traditional system. We are witnessing a dissociation between youth culture and the processes of school and family socialization, between the bio-psychic features of childhood and youth and integration in society, between the requirements of personal training and integration in an increasingly complex and interdependent working world, between the transmission of a cultural heritage and the way of producing and reproducing knowledge and skills. Schooling at its different levels cannot at present, as it could in the traditional education system, ensure unity between these elements.

And it is not a question either of returning to the failed ideology of de-schooling which prevailed in the 1960s, since in a certain sense schooling will always be fundamentally indispensable for developing countries. Nor is it possible to maintain that these contradictions may be resolved by the mere expression of wishes or by economic theories which establish unilateral measures for education.

This means that for the future we will need to think in terms of a form of schooling where different education systems co-exist. These will include education for the individual, education for citizenship, education for democracy, education for development, education for the global and media-oriented world, to mention only some of these subsystems to which we referred earlier, all of which will give rise to their own, different institutions, one of which will be the school system (pre-school, primary, secondary and higher), which cannot be replaced but cannot be the only educational institution either. The co-ordination and combination within the same national context of different education systems—and here we do not mean levels but actual systems—will be the major task of educational policy in the future.

Note

1. Although they are very different from each other, the following documents may be considered to be part of the great educational debate of our time: *Final report: World Conference on Education for All* (Jomtien, Thailand, 1990); *Education: the treasure within* (report by the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, Paris, UNESCO, 1996); *Priorities and strategies for education: a World Bank study* (Washington, DC, World Bank, 1996); *Educación y conocimiento: eje de la transformación productiva con equidad* [Education and knowledge: the core of a productive change with equity] (Santiago, ECLAC, 1992).

WHAT UNIVERSALITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?

Willem Doise

One need only read the newspapers and magazines published in Western countries on the occasion of visits by statesmen from non-Western countries or of political summit meetings to realize that the universality of human rights is a problematic issue. What strikes one above all are denunciations of the non-observance of human rights in foreign countries and calls for our relations with them to be dependent on respect for those rights.

These denunciations are no doubt politically motivated. But, as a social psychologist, I suggest that they often reflect an ethnocentric attitude, and thus aggravate the problem of the universality of human rights rather than clarifying it. This universality must rest on a conception of human relations that is based on interdependence.

Forms of interdependence

Much of social psychology consists in describing, classifying and analysing forms of interdependence among individuals. This is true of the work of Sherif (1966), for example, which analyses interdependence among the members of a group carrying out a joint project, and positive or negative interdependence among the projects of different groups.

Original language: French

Willem Doise (Belgium)

Doctoral degree in social psychology, Sorbonne, Paris, 1967. Researcher at the Centre national de recherche scientifique, Paris, from 1967 to 1972. Professor of experimental social psychology at the University of Geneva since 1972. President of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology from 1978 to 1981. Visiting professor at the Universities of Auckland, Belgrano, Bologna, Brussels, Liège, Leuven, Otago, Provence, Rome, Savoy and Tilburg. Main research interests concern intergroup relations, social identity, socio-cognitive development, social representations and explanations in social psychology.

Different forms of interdependence involving the concept of justice are similarly described by Deutsch (1985), for example, who devises a typology of situations using dichotomous classification criteria, such as emphasis on relationships or on production, egalitarian or hierarchical internal relations, formal or informal approaches, emphasis on co-operation or competition. This typology defines, within our own culture, sixteen prototypical situations in which the concept of justice takes different forms. A situation in which a mother is breast-feeding her baby will involve a different conception of rights from a situation in which two businessmen are in competition. But, in both these situations, there are basic rights that must be respected.

Many forms of interdependence are involved in a country's internal and cross-border relations. The spread of disease, trade and the dissemination of ideas are so many links among population groups which make them effectively interdependent and affect their living conditions without giving them a direct understanding of their interdependence. On the contrary, all kinds of institutional mechanisms concentrate attention on a multiplicity of frontiers and barriers without making any mention of their permeability to ideas, economic relations and many other forms of interdependence.

The spread of viral diseases has led to effective genocide when different peoples have come into contact with them for the first time, and the current AIDS pandemic knows no frontiers. Both the spread of a contagious disease and efforts to combat it should create relations based on interdependence at world level. The same is true of many other sectors, in particular that of organized crime, the environment and the monocultural systems imposed by asymmetrical economic relations.

Human rights and contracts based on interdependence

It is on the basis of such considerations that the idea of contracts based on interdependence must be examined. The fact that genes, viruses, economic trends and ideas are continually bringing us into contact with each other and creating structures within which we are all interdependent in a variety of ways means that notions such as *apartheid*, 'splendid isolation' and non-interventionism can be ruled out once and for all, if they ever did have any currency.

Interdependence exists, for better or for worse, and there is now a tendency to 'organize' it. For historical reasons, involving economic, political, military and religious motivations, Western societies have tried to 'standardize' relations not only inside national cultural groupings but also among members of society belonging to different groups.

Human rights are among those standard-setting principles which, in terms of their intentions at least, should form the basis for the organization of a host of interactions. Their aims are universally acknowledged, if only in terms of their formulation. In our interactions with others, regardless of their origin, we must,

according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, respect their physical integrity, allow them access to resources enabling them to live in dignity, and guarantee their integration in a social order that protects them from the arbitrary use of power.

This opens up an immense field of research for the social psychologist. One of the first problems is that of the universality of 'official' definitions of human rights. But another equally important question concerns the nature of the variations in the way these rights are perceived by different individuals and in different contexts.

Universality in representations of human rights

Two research works address this problem as it arises in different countries. In the first (Clémence et al., 1995), we asked 13- to 20-year-old students living in four different countries (Costa Rica, France, Italy and Switzerland) to give their opinion as to whether there had been a violation of human rights in twenty-one situations involving the restriction of certain rights. They were given a choice of four responses: (1) definitely; (2) maybe; (3) not really; (4) certainly not. The results are very similar; there is no doubt that in the four countries, students structure their responses in the same kind of way, using criteria set out more or less explicitly in official texts, such as that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In a second work, still in progress (see Doise et al., 1994, for a description of the method and the results of a pilot study), we reproduced the text of the declaration for students in approximately thirty countries on the five continents. They were asked to assess on a scale of intensity the importance attributed to each article, their personal commitment to the observance of the article and the effectiveness with which they felt the government and political parties were enforcing its observance. The results have now been analysed for about twenty countries and we (Doise, Clémence, Spini, 1996) have found that the replies follow more or less the same pattern in these countries, with rights being placed in categories similar to those used by the drafters of the declaration (individual rights, social rights, socio-economic rights, and the right to an ordered society).

In addition to the findings of these two studies, results relating to smaller population groups—the inhabitants of Geneva—are also available. Unlike the previous studies, this survey by Doise and Herrera (1994) began with open questions inviting the respondents to list and describe human rights. Practically all the rights listed could be linked to those set out in the declaration. In a further survey, whose results have not yet been published, my co-researchers and I studied the concept of human rights held by several hundreds of pupils of different ages attending various types of secondary education in Geneva. Their replies, especially those of older pupils, are also strongly influenced by official definitions.

In our study on perceptions of the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we noted that the positions adopted by any individual on all thirty articles were very much the same. Their belief in and commitment to all rights

were closely linked: the level of their support for one group of articles would be reproduced in their attitude towards the others. These surveys cannot provide definitive conclusions with regard to the issue of the universality of human rights. The population groups considered are in no way representative of humanity in its entirety. The studies are at the most exploratory. But, as Inglehart reports (1995), research on values carried out on more representative samples in forty-three countries (comprising 70% of the world's population) indicates that our approach could be universally applicable. It seems to us that the first conclusion that could be drawn is that one of the procedures to be followed in order to arbitrate in the debate on universality is to question people belonging to different cultures, providing them with the appropriate versions of official documents (which have often been signed by representatives of their governments).

Variations in individual positions

In several research undertakings, in particular in research on violations conducted in four countries (Clémence et al., 1995), we were able to identify patterns for the formation of individual viewpoints. The first two factors relate to opinions on violations that come most clearly within the official field of human rights. The first factor concerns mainly the *violation of personal freedoms and equality of rights* as regards settlement, political expression, information or religion. It is interesting to note that one question (compulsory worship or attendance at mass for children), which was given a low average rating as a violation, comes under this head. The second factor concerns the *violation of the rights of individuals* (the right to subsistence, to legal defence, to health care) and that of *children's right to protection*; these violations are contrasted with the prohibition of smoking, which is excluded from the list of human rights. Factors three to five relate more specifically to *relations among individuals*. Factor three refers mainly to the *violation of equality* among married couples and to a lesser extent to the violation of children's rights by parents. The points most heavily stressed for the fourth factor are questions of the *exercise of power* involving sanctions against deviants or minorities (gypsies, burglars, foreigners suspected of murder and, to a lesser extent, people on low wages, prisoners who fight and . . . smokers). The last factor concerns *socio-economic phenomena* (forced hospitalization and wage inequality) which are considered to be extraneous to the field of human rights and which were contrasted with recognized human rights violations, such as violence against children or the imprisonment of political opponents.

The existence of a single common reference for human rights does not mean that all individuals assess the various rights in the same way, at it comes clearly from a survey of the nature of the variations in the viewpoints of younger Swiss pupils attending various types of education courses in Geneva. The analyses in question concern the answers of 912 pupils to thirteen questions in which they were required to assess the extent to which the various rights listed were good examples of human rights. The first factor identified concerned highly pro-

tototypical *specific rights of a socio-economic nature* (the right to employment, the right to live with one's family, the right to receive medical attention). The key elements of the second factor were all connected with *rights that are considered to be the least prototypical* and which are generally more controversial: the right to refuse to go to school, the right to smoke, the right to refuse to do national service, the right to strike and the right to live in the country of one's choice. Lastly, the third factor mainly involves *rights of a political and legal nature* that are considered to be moderately or very prototypical: the right to elect the government, the right to belong to a trade union, the right to be defended in court by a lawyer and the right to be protected by the police against violence.

What do these various lists show but that opinions of different individuals, even if they belong to the same culture and live in the same region or city, differ in several respects in their appraisal of the different rights. Of course, in most of these studies, the researchers had made a deliberate effort to present highly heterogeneous rights and it is not surprising that they should find that heterogeneity reflected in the configuration of the replies of the groups surveyed. We can now return to the more general issue of human rights: it is certainly true that approaches to human rights differ among the cultures—on the basis of this study of individual variations, one first conclusion which must be drawn is that the viewpoints of individuals regarding official definitions of human rights differ within 'Western' countries as well.

Contextualization of human rights

A range of viewpoints undoubtedly exists within the same culture, and our research has already shown (see, for example, Doise et al., 1994) that individual viewpoints are often based on *different scales of values, different representations of the social environment, and different assessments of the power of institutions*. We consider that it is as important to study these systematic variations within our own cultures as in different cultures. It is possible, however, that intracultural variations might be a response to intercultural variations and that, for example, the link with scales of values within one culture might also occur in comparisons among cultures, with certain values being considered more important than others. We hope to be able to find examples of such analogies in our subsequent work.

Another factor involved in forming individual viewpoints relates to the *inter-group* context: do individuals think the same human rights' observance principles apply to their own countries as to other countries? Moghaddam and Vuksanovic (1990) suggested a procedure we could use to address this question. In their first survey, they asked groups of students in Montreal to indicate the intensity of their support for various human rights measures in Canada, the former Soviet Union and the Third World. Their support was stronger in the last two contexts than in the first. Similarly, in a second survey, situations were presented as occurring in Montreal, Moscow and New Delhi. Three could be considered to involve possible human rights violations: dismissal of a television presenter who refused to change her hair style and the way she dressed; 'inhuman treatment' of a terrorist; and

shoplifting by a mother to feed her children. Replies given on a scale of intensity made it possible to calculate an index for attitudes towards human rights. Attitudes were much more favourable when the situations occurred in Moscow or New Delhi. Furthermore, it was ascertained in a third survey that students in Montreal commit themselves more readily to specific action when the survey concerns human rights violations in the Third World than when similar violations occur in Canada.

It thus looks as if human rights could easily be applied in an ethnocentric way. In two similar, as yet unpublished, experimental works, however, my colleagues did not find the context had such an influence in comments by students from Switzerland on human rights problems in Switzerland, France and Belgium. The general appraisal of the country in question was, however, linked significantly to respect for human rights in these countries. For countries *considered to be relatively close* to the country of origin, no distinction was drawn, even though general stereotypes always come into play. This may be compared with the findings of another experiment in which pupils from Geneva (aged 14 to 15 on average) were presented with various situations in which one person violates the rights of another whose position with regard to the law is not absolutely clear. Their assessment of the character of the 'victim' significantly affected their views of the violation. A much more surprising finding was that explicit reference to human rights in what was presented as a relatively trivial event, in several cases quite markedly softened their judgement. It must be pointed out that several situations were set explicitly in Switzerland. It is therefore possible that the good opinion respondents generally have of their own country and of others similar to it prevents them from believing that serious violations of human rights could occur there.

We should like to draw particular attention to another result of this last survey which presented several scenarios involving persons who are violating certain rights and the victims of those violations. When the respondents were asked to state their position in principle, their level of support for the rights concerned (prohibition of torture, the right to asylum, the right to education, the right to found a family, the right to privacy, the right to life) was practically unconditional. The extent to which they disagreed with specific violations of these rights, however, was much less clear-cut. General support for the principle of human rights may very well go hand in hand with restrictions of those rights and with tolerance of their violation in specific, often complex, situations. When rights are put to the test in specific contexts and are no longer presented in abstract terms, many variations occur. In our view this accounts for the fact that, while the viewpoints of the various respondents on the different articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are very much the same, there are systematic variations between those viewpoints when the same rights are presented in a more specific context. To be more precise, as soon as the victim of a human rights violation is regarded as 'deviant' or 'marginal' (for example, an old person or the child of illegal immigrants), basic rights (such as the right to found a family or to attend school) risk being called into question.

It is not only lay persons who are prepared to restrict rights in specific situations. Human rights defence institutions can also limit the scope of those rights considerably. In particular, they consider respect for certain basic rights to be subordinate to the interests of the State, the protection of law and order and the survival of democracy. Very few rights are thus afforded absolute protection under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. For confirmation, we turned to a legal expert to find out which rights could not be suspended, even temporarily or exceptionally, in any circumstances. 'In the final analysis, only the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment (Article 3), collective expulsion (Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol) and the imposition of punishments or criminal proceedings twice for the same offence (Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol) involve rights that must be afforded absolute protection' (Delmas-Marty, 1989, p. 12). To this list should no doubt be added Article 15, paragraph 2, which prohibits slavery, although hard labour may be tolerated under certain conditions. Under the European Convention, the list of rights to be protected in all circumstances is therefore very short. Thus, the right to life is not absolute, exceptions being provided for in Article 2 of the European Convention (in the event of defence against unlawful violence, to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained, to quell an insurrection), and countries that have abolished the death penalty may reintroduce it in war-time. Torture, however, is never justified. Life is not an absolute right, but the right to a life free of torture or slavery is.

Human rights seen as a contract

Communication always involves a contract with the person with whom one is communicating (Habermas, 1979). Similarly, joint action involves a contract based on interdependence. In the final analysis, all our actions affect others more or less directly, just as we are continuously affected by the actions of other people, whether or not they are personally known to us. We have no way of representing these multiple links of interdependence although they are the object of normative definitions. Human rights' declarations must be considered to be contracts to be adapted to the circumstances of each action that affects another person.

This implies acceptance of the existence of standards applying to social relations, but does not in any way imply that all our actual and potential partners in any interaction share our viewpoints or even agree explicitly to accept these rights. It is not necessarily their problem—it is above all ours. In all logic, to remain credible as citizens, as 'Westerners', we should only engage in relations with other people who respect these principles. Many problems arise, such as the problem of economic conditions imposed on Third World countries, and the problem of unemployment and access to health care in our own countries. Their acknowledgment is essential both for intercultural dialogue on human rights and for the effective conclusion of contracts that organize the many relations of interdependence that link human beings.

Towards a socio-constructive human rights pedagogy

One preambular subparagraph of the declaration states that 'disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.'

Idealized representations of relations among human beings were thus defined in a very comprehensive way in reaction to a particularly extensive and pitiless conflict. Historically, the link between the most universally accepted human rights declaration and a war is indisputable. That declaration is also practically universal.

A clash between views centring more on the individual, upheld by the United States, and views centring more on the community, upheld by the former Soviet Union, marked the emergence of the idea of the indivisibility of the individual, political and socio-economic rights underlying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Different kinds of conflict have thus played an important role in the definition of human rights. In the teaching of human rights, that is to say, in their reconstitution at the level of individuals, neither conflict nor confrontation can be passed over. One hypothesis in social psychology, which ascribes an important role to conflict in forging new ideas, is that of socio-cognitive conflict. This type of conflict arises when different approaches to the same problem are acted out in society and clash openly in social interaction.

Oser (1986, p. 922) sums up all the conditions required for discussion in an educational setting to lead to genuine reflection on moral issues. These conditions are as follows:

- (a) full presentation of subjective truths as they are perceived by the participants in a conflictual situation;
- (b) absence of an authority who would present an outsider's or observer's point of view, corresponding to the 'right' response;
- (c) creation of imbalance through the presentation of different arguments and opinions to stimulate the development of moral reasoning on ever more complex bases;
- (d) co-ordination of interaction among participants in the discussion so that each reacts openly and fairly to the others' points of view; and
- (e) linkage of the principles underlying the arguments to principles of justice.

All these conditions must be respected in human rights education: comparison and co-ordination of points of view, avoidance of connivance, encouragement of new ideas in the search for solutions and, above all, a sustained effort to link these solutions to the general principles of the declaration which is the framework of reference.

Once it has been recognized that no authority, whatever its origins, can now impose 'truth' or moral consensus, we must take the obvious step of joining together to create shared truths and ethical approaches. This process will need to be based on landmarks and principles that can guide joint decisions. For our times, the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights continue to be the most relevant—for the good reason that there are no others.

References

- Clémence, A., et al. 1995. La représentation sociale des droits de l'homme: une recherche internationale sur l'étendue et les limites de l'universalité [Social representation of human rights: international research on the scope and limits of universality]. *International journal of psychology* (Hove, U.K.), no. 30, p. 181–212.
- Delmas-Marty, M. 1989. *Raisonner la raison d'Etat* [Reasoning with national imperatives]. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Deutsch, M. 1985. *Distributive justice*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Diaz-Veizades, J., et al. 1995. The measurement and structure of human rights attitudes. *The journal of social psychology* (Washington, DC), no. 135, p. 313–28.
- Doise, W.; Clémence, A.; Spini, D. 1996. Human rights and social psychology. *Newsletter, Social psychology section* (The British Psychological Society, Leicester, U.K.).
- Doise, W.; Herrera, M. 1994. Déclaration universelle et représentations sociales des droits de l'homme : une étude à Genève [The Universal Declaration and social representations of human rights: a study in Geneva]. *International review of social psychology* (Grenoble), no. 7, p. 87–107.
- Doise, W., et al. 1994. Values and perceived conflicts in the social representations of human rights: feasibility of a cross-national study. *Revue suisse de psychologie/Swiss journal of psychology* (Bern), no. 53, p. 240–51.
- Habermas, J. 1979. *Communication and the evolution of society*. Boston, Beacon Press.
- Inglehart, R. 1995. Changing values, economic development and political change. *Revue internationale des sciences sociales/International social science review* (Toulouse), no. 145, p. 433–60.
- Moghaddam, F.; Vuksanovic, V. 1990. Attitudes and behaviour towards human rights across different contexts: the role of right-wing authoritarianism, political ideology and religiosity. *International journal of psychology* (Hove, U.K.), no. 25, p. 455–74.
- Oser, F.K. 1986. Moral education and values education: the moral discourse perspective. In: Wittrock, M.C., ed. *Handbook of research on teaching, third edition*. New York, Macmillan.
- Sherif, M. 1966. *In common predicament. Social psychology of intergroup conflict and co-operation*. Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin.

CITIZENSHIP CONTEXTS AND OUTLOOK IN THE WORLD TODAY

**FOR A SOCIOGENETIC
CONSTRUCTIVIST DIDACTICS
OF CITIZENSHIP**

Luis Albala-Bertrand

The central idea of socio-genetic constructivist approaches, namely that knowledge is not simply a process of internalizing the objects of the world, but rather of apprehending reality in accordance with highly complex mental references which shape it and give it a meaning within a society or culture, already has a long history (Dilthey, 1911). And yet the subsequent application of this idea by various psychological and educational currents of thought—which hold that children are not empty minds to be moulded by education, and that teaching has to take account of the mental content of the student as a means of improving the relevance and effectiveness of the act of teaching—largely ignored the philosophical roots which underlay the concept. The constructivist approach to teaching then developed almost unopposed for over half a century within the context of a genetic cognitive psychology originating with or inspired by Piaget, which is essentially oriented towards the individual.¹

We shall try to show in this article that, while the socio-genetic constructivist approach to learning provides a unique opportunity to make education more respectful of personal potential, pedagogically more effective and socially more relevant, it should, if it is to achieve its own full potential, abandon some individualistic trends and concentrate more on its original meaning .

The roots of socio-genetic constructivism

The idea that there is a common framework of understanding where symbolic or factual interactions take on meaning is already clearly expressed in Dilthey's

Original language: French

A biographical note about the author appears on page 645.

hermeneutics (1911). It is true that the latter, an exegete of modernism, still considers that the observer's role is to let the true meaning of reality appear through an open approach, free of any bias. His conception is derived in fact from the romantic assumption that the influence of the observer-actor (for instance, an educator) may be controlled through method. It was only the advent of existentialist thought which overthrew the belief of traditional hermeneutics in that there may be a hidden meaning to reality which needs to be uncovered. Gadamer (1975), inspired by Heidegger and Wittgenstein, considers understanding as a confrontation of our preconceptions with reality. The understanding of reality—at least common understanding²—then emerges not from placing the observer-actor and his/her bias, or of the surrounding world in brackets (as postulated by phenomenology), but from a remodeling of reality by the actor's conceptual instruments. This reversal of approach is extremely significant, since from it is derived the notion of an understanding of the world linked to a historical awareness. Understanding does not entail denying or rejecting individual concepts and their historical meta-frameworks, but merging them with reality, giving the latter a new meaning, a constructed meaning.

This hermeneutic interpretation of reality is inherent in the understanding of any phenomenon so that it also concerns the natural sciences. The interpretation of social reality, however, appears doubly complex; according to Giddens (1976), the interpretation of social objects by an observer—for instance, a psychologist or an educator—implies a double hermeneutics. The observer must, in the first place, interpret a world, which has already been pre-interpreted by the actor (for instance, a student), in accordance with his concepts based on a historic meta-consciousness of reality; the observer must also undertake this interpretation using his/her own meanings and his/her own conceptual instruments.

It is the recognition of the double hermeneutics of social reality which provides the basis for a socio-genetic approach to knowledge and from which the essence of the *psychosociology of social representations* and modern constructivist pedagogy are also derived.³ The aims of each are obviously different, just as their levels of analysis are, but both try to identify the *collective-cores-of-meaning*—the 'common meaning models'—which characterize the interpretations of reality by the actors, since even if they may appear illusory or wrong in relation to the scientific or expert observer's criteria, it is in fact the spontaneous knowledge which constitutes the basis of social communication, as well as of the production and reproduction of social behaviours. In fact, as Vygostky saw full well (1981, p. 182), there is no knowledge of the world outside a reality which is of inter-subjective origin; individual knowledge is the result of internalizing the experiences of social interaction.

If, following the hermeneutic tradition and Bourdieu's reflections on *habitus* (1987), we accept that natural knowledge is a merger between, on the one hand, the schemata internalized by the individual, his/her mental representations, enabling him/her to model the perceptions, ideas and actions belonging to a particular culture, and, on the other hand, the object's referents, then the

constructivist heuristics in fact coincides with a comprehensive scientific approach (Weber, 1949). From this point of view, we could say that constructivism is not simply a didactic methodology, but a heuristic approach to truth.⁴

The socio-genetic constructivist bearing

In the last thirty years, many studies have led to advances in the theories of learning, and the Piagetian genetic epistemology has been reformulated and completed with various psycho-social models (Festinger, 1957, Heider, 1958, Moscovici, 1961). As Doise (1992) has clearly shown, these theories, which do not claim to offer a single, all-embracing answer to the functions of culture and to social interaction in the genesis of knowledge, demonstrate considerable explanatory coherence. Among these models, the *theory of social representations* (Moscovici, 1961; Doise, 1992) would seem to constitute the natural basis for a new approach to pedagogical constructivism.

Nowadays, the study of social representations is no longer a confidential activity restricted to the laboratories of pioneers. Since the foundation work of Vygostky (1934) and Moscovici (1961), the analysis of representations has been taken much further, and both the related theory and methodology are constantly evolving.⁵ Besides the work of Bourdieu on 'habitus' and the fields theory (1970), which is more specific in scope, the study of social representations has been mainly the work of social psychology, conducted within a functional approach by Willem Doise at the University of Geneva, and according to a more structural perspective by Jean-Claude Abric and C. Flament at the University of Provence, as well as by Michel Rouquette at the University Paul-Valéry of Montpellier.

At present, social representations are understood to refer to those mental systems made up of spontaneous knowledge, beliefs and shared values, which individuals use to understand, guide themselves, communicate and act upon the world, in relation to a given social object (Moscovici, 1984) (see Table 1).

According to the Geneva school, the study of social representations includes at least three main steps. The first consists in identifying *social objects* (ideas, beliefs, etc.) which are capable of engendering social representations. The various objects of social life are not all organized into social representations. Otherwise, our mind would be an infinite collection of representations of all kinds, which, in fact, would deprive the very notion of representation of any heuristic value.

Moliner (1996, p. 33–35), proposes that the emergence of the social representation of a social object is subject to certain socio-cultural and technical conditions. The author identifies five criteria or conditions which permit qualifying the existence of a social representation. Firstly, the actual existence of a *social object*: there can be no representation without an object. Even so, the object of a representation is not just any object; it is complex, difficult to identify and problematic (Moliner, *ibid.*, p. 37). A second condition is the existence of a group. If, by definition, social representations are collective products (Moscovici, 1961),

TABLE 1. Common characteristics of social representations (SR)

SR structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The social representations of social objects organize: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — the functional systems: ideas, concepts; — the intentional systems: feelings, desires, attitudes, goals; — the normative systems: values, norms, social status behaving as regulators; in relation to the object of representation; • The internal structure of social representations comprises central elements or <i>organizing principles</i> of representations (very stable) and <i>peripheral aspects</i> (more flexible), which are related to the social positioning of individuals or groups.
SR functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligibility of reality (functional relation with reality); • Orienting, marking, filtering (positioning in interactions).¹
Conditions of SR emergence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of a complex social objective, which constitutes a stake for a given group within the framework of a social dynamic.²
SR activators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • States of bio-psycho-sociological unbalance (needs); • Resolution of states of cognitive dissonance;³ • Preservation of collective identity and of prestige and power classifications.
SR stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great stability of <i>cardinal organizing principles</i> (known as 'civilizational themata'), such as the social perception of time and space, or paradigms related to the understanding of the universe (Copernican), evolution (Darwinian), psychism (Freudian); • Moderate stability of central cores, related to particular social universe structures (political system, state of law, market system, etc.); • Great mobility of peripheral aspects of representations related to the subject experiences (functional schemata).
Intentional modification of SR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intentional interventions in relation to the cardinal principles are possible only by early cultural emigration; • Teaching intervention on central and peripheral aspects are possible in situations implying socio-cognitive conflict,⁴ through the use of techniques for reducing cognitive dissonance, taking into account, amongst other things, the didactic potential of the 'normative'⁵ hypothesis, the hypothesis of the 'reversibility of representations'⁶ and the norm of 'internality'.⁷

Notes

1. The representations of reality retain (codify) only part of the properties of perceptions, in accordance with the levels of intelligibility (operational level, other knowledge), but also in accordance with intentional individual operations (Wermus, in Giordan & Girault, 1996, p. 2-85) or the social positioning of individuals (Doise,

1993, p. 128–29). Depending on the intentional or normative properties activated in the context of a social representation, the same piece of information will be distorted, added or deduced differently according to the individuals concerned, leading to reactions which also differ (Jodelet, 1989, p. 53).

2. Moliner, 1996.
 3. The resolution of dissonance does not necessarily imply, as Piaget postulated, the assimilation and accommodation of knowledge within the framework of pre-existing representations, but also the possibility of a more general deconstruction/reconstruction of the structure of representations (Giordan, in Giordan & Girault, 1996, p. 23), according to the central or peripheral aspects of the representation afflicted by dissonance (Abric, in Guimelli, 1994, p. 73–83).
 4. Doise, 1993, p. 131; Giordan, 1995, p. 123–24.
 5. The ‘normative’ hypothesis (Moscovici, 1994, p. 99) supposes that, after a collective debate, the positions of individuals will tend to become more consensual than initially, provided that the group is not fractured with respect to the fundamental classifications of power in society (Lipset, 1960, p. 11).
 6. The hypothesis of ‘reversibility’ (Flament, in Abric, 1994) assumes that individuals will be more prepared to integrate contradictory information within their representations if they believe that the situation is reversible, that is, one which can return to its previous state. The importance of this hypothesis from a didactic point of view in situations characterized by antagonisms between rigid positions is obvious.
 7. The ‘internality norm’ (Dubois, 1987) postulates that individuals will tend to explain the acts of members of the in-group in accordance with properties internal to the individual or the group (for example, *probity*) and the acts of subjects of the out-group according to exogenous causes (for instance, *chance*).
-

then the social group constitutes the basis of their existence. Yet, here too it is not just any social group, but a group with common interests whose object of representation constitutes, at most, a condition of their existence (such as the human body for physicians) or, at least, a temporary aspect of their history (such as sport for students at school); in other words, the object of representation must constitute an interaction stake for the group. If there is no communication between individuals around the object, then no social representation can emerge. As we have already mentioned, another precondition to the emergence of a representation is the existence of a *stake*, that is, ‘something for which it is worth fighting’, related to a given social object, which supplies the motivational basis required for interaction between individuals. Yet, once again, it cannot be just any social stake, but stakes which are related to the group’s identity and cohesion. The representations mould the relations of individuals with their social environment: this is why the definition of their own identity in terms of the group’s representation can only help to strengthen its cohesion (we may think that this is the case in a political party or a religious sect). The existence of a *social dynamic* also constitutes an essential condition for the representational construction of a social object. In fact, an object cannot constitute a stake unless its conceptual or instru-

mental control constitute an asset for a group and an 'object of envy' for other groups (for example, political power). It is in this context that identity functions favouring social integration and differentiation take on their full significance. One last aspect considered by Moliner is the non-existence of a *system of control and regulation* relating to a given social object, which would be accepted by the group (for example, the notion of sickness for physicians, of social classes for a communist party or of the universe for astrophysicists). In such a context, there would be no emergence of representation related to the object, but instead the construction of a *meta-system* of ideological, scientific or technical explanations.

It is worth identifying the conditions which are conducive to the emergence of social representations, since it provides a way of establishing the bounds within which the representations model and hence the models of constructivist didactics can reasonably be applied. Nevertheless, despite the apparent simplicity of the criteria listed above, it has to be admitted that applying them requires profound knowledge of the social field under study, as well as of the social sciences theory; which should exclude any form of mechanical analysis of social representations.

The second problem is defining *the field of the representation*.⁶ This consists in determining, through analytical methods and techniques, the latent structure of social representations, their core meaning.⁷ These core meanings—made up of cognitive, axiological, normative and attitudinal elements—are important because they constitute the most stable aspects of representations (for example, the social representation of human rights, in most societies, comprises among its central elements a perception of individual rights). It follows as a corollary that, when these central elements are modified, the whole of the representation will also change (Abric, in Guimelli, 1994, p. 83–84). Around these core meanings, there are the so-called peripheral elements, more flexible, and hence less stable, which are more a reflection of the results of interactions between individuals and which introduce specific variations in the representation (Abric, 1994). As will be shown below, it is in relation to this inner structuring of representations that social positioning will take place. The third question, which has been studied in particular by the Geneva functional school of representations, consists in identifying the *organizing principles* and the *social anchoring* of the representation. The latter—made up chiefly of norms and values—determines the positioning of individuals and groups in relation to the object of representation and gives rise to variations between individuals and between groups regarding the same social representation. For instance, as we shall see further on, students with more salient cosmopolitan value orientations have a tendency to stress the ethical or legal components of a political system rather than its instrumental functioning norms.

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVIST DIDACTICS

Despite the interest taken by education in constructivist approaches, the relations between educationists and the psychology of social representations has remained marginal, not to say accidental.⁸ Of course, these relations have to be

understood in terms of service. Education being, in principle, in a position of demand, for over half a century now its attention has been almost exclusively drawn to Piagetian genetic epistemology or to its theory of moral regulation. The Piagetian models, apart from their undeniable heuristic value, quickly became very popular, since they contributed useful criteria for the selection and sequencing of the content of school teaching, and especially because they appeared to be very convenient, at least in their simplified versions, since they could be adapted by simple isomorphism to the step-by-step advance of formal education. Furthermore, with their claim to universality, they provided a way of avoiding the complications of a constructivism open to social considerations, and requiring an approach to educational messages not only based on unvarying operational genetics, but also related to socio-cultural attributes which appeared more difficult to identify and the consideration of which, in any case, required more specialized skills.

There are still two major obstacles to the advance of constructivist educational approaches. The first concerns the theory of social representations itself. At the expense of possibly depriving prevalent practices of much of their heuristic and instrumental sense, the theory of social representations should be able to answer certain basic questions: do all social representations have the same heuristic value? do they all offer the same potential for explaining the social processes in which they arise? if not, which social representations matter in a given area of reality, and why? I feel convinced that the study of social representations has reached a point in its development where—after giving rise to many studies on a great variety of problems⁹—some sort of theoretical synthesis has to be worked out, failing which the model will remain a basically methodological and highly technical approach, but with a limited explanatory power. I am not referring here to the already advanced theoretical and methodological developments which consider the notion of social representation as a theoretical-analytic tool of the interface between the individual and society, but to an *empirical theory* of social representations. The cumulative knowledge of social representations and hence the constructivist educational approach will not be able to evolve without substantive theories having coherent heuristic prospects and universalizing predictive potential. It is a question of laying the bases for an intentional, axiomatic cumulation of knowledge.¹⁰ Fifty years on, Merton's proposals (1949) to sociology to devote itself to the development of intermediate-range theories,¹¹ rather than to the search for all-embracing explanations, still remain valid in the field of social representations. This is a complex matter, not only because of the difficulty inherent in constructing any empirical theory, but also because, owing to the very nature of social representations, verification requires a transdisciplinary and cross-cultural approach.

The other obstacle relates to prevailing educational practice. It is a question of overcoming the very dispersed research still associated with opening up education to a renewed constructivist approach, in which learning processes are studied through their social and representational as well as their epistemologi-

cal-genetic properties. In fact, this problem highlights the absence of a didactic model, which might integrate individual psychogenetic aspects with the socio-genetic factors of learning; without an appropriate didactic model, there is no possibility of implementing a true constructivist pedagogy.

Referring to the evidence contributed by the functional school of social representations (Doise), the proposals of the Laboratoire d'epistemologie et de didactique des sciences of the University of Geneva (Giordan), and to the first relevant results of cross-cultural research on education and citizenship conducted by UNESCO-IBE, we shall attempt first of all to draw up the structure of a possible comprehensive teaching model, and then try to outline elements for a theoretical summing up of representational knowledge concerning civic and political life.

AN INTEGRATING DIDACTIC MODEL


In order to understand the development of learning processes at the individual level, we have to be acquainted with the pre-existing cognitive and axiological representational restructuring, which, in the form of values, norms and scenarios, signpost the reasoning and knowledge of reality and help to define individual and collective identities (Jodelet, 1989). Understanding the world—which in the last resort is the crux of the hermeneutic problem—and eventually changing it—which corresponds to the 'raison d'être' of educational constructivism, consists not in splitting reality down into its constituent informational elements, but in *seizing its meaning* within the framework of a society and a culture, or even through cultures.

From this point of view, it would seem difficult to imagine an effective education which would ignore the social regulations of the learning process. In his account of the socio-cognitive dynamic, Doise proposes what is termed a cumulative *spiral causality* approach with a clear heuristic potential: 'At every stage of his development, the individual may, thanks to specific skills, participate in relatively complex social interactions, which can give rise to new individual skills, which can be improved again while participating in social interactions' (Doise, 1993).

Various interactions simply activate some very basic socio-cognitive regulating mechanisms (in the form of categories, scripts, etc.). However, in complex interactions, social representations or other higher-level modeling structures—such as values and social norms—are mobilized. In such cases, lower-level regulating mechanisms appear subordinate to a more complex network of normative and functional meanings structuring the whole individual reasoning. From this point of view, it may be said that, just as psycho-genetic operational development is essential to reasoning, in a similar way social regulations, and social representation in particular, are necessary in order to organize that reasoning.

The functional spiral causality approach to knowledge finds a structural complement in the so-called 'allosteric' didactic model proposed by Giordan (1987). This model follows the classic *stimulus-mediations-responses* plan and, although it is incomplete, does provide a useful starting point to show the main shortcomings of the current constructivist teaching models. In what follows, we shall try to highlight the problems raised by the allosteric model, and to develop a structure and a few trails which might allow the model to evolve further.

FIGURE 1. Mobilization of conceptions according to Giordan



This model clearly identifies several cognitive components of representations—semantic networks, referential cognitions, operational invariants, symbolic objectifications—as well as factors which activate them and trigger intellectual activity (see Figure 1). Some authors (Schaefer, in Giordan & Girault, 1996) have criticized it for giving preference to semantic or logical cognitive elements, to the detriment of associative cognitive elements, which surround representations without apparent logic, and which are the result of the contemporaneity in the subject's experience of different kinds of phenomena, rather than the consequence of the establishment of logical links between perceptions. The associative framework provides the most individualized basis of a representation, in the sense that it may be assumed that the conditions surrounding the perceptions of reality will not plausibly be uniform for all individuals (Abric, in Guimelli, 1994, p. 75). Revealing the associative framework of representations provides a basis for possible intervention in the perspective of *clinical pedagogy*.¹²

Another aspect which does not appear to be very explicit in the allosteric model is the motivational dimension of representations. With a little goodwill, one might assume that it underlies the notion of *problem*, which, according to this model, covers 'all more or less explicit questions which induce or bring about the implementation of a conception [representation]' (Giordan, 1987). Even though *problems* appear to be considered by the model as external stimuli to intellectual activity, given that perceptions of reality are not purely objective

operations, it may be supposed that the perception of a situation as being problematic sets off intricate combinations, which involve environmental stimuli as well as tendencies and attitudes which pre-exist in the individual.

The allosteric model, however, requires a more transparent approach to intentional aspects associated with individual experiences in specific contexts. It would seem essential to study intentional aspects—such as objectives, desires or attitudes—organized within social representations in order to develop effective individualized educational strategies, since the perception of the world's signals is influenced by the intentionality of action.¹³


Yet, the main shortcoming of the allosteric model, which in its defense it may be said to share with all didactic models structured around individual psychology, is its complete disregard for socio-cultural factors, which are collectively shared aspects and the most stable of representations. The intelligibility of social communication and, by definition, the successful achievement of individual interaction strategies in social life, that is to say, their functional or affective instrumentality, depend on them corresponding to the expectations of others. And on this correspondence will in turn depend the sharing of cognitive and axiological frameworks, which engender a culture's characteristic thoughts, perceptions and behaviours. This is the essence of the notion of *habitus* proposed by Bourdieu (1965, p. 21–24) or that of a core or *metasystem* used in the theory of social representations (see Guimelli, 1994, p. 17). Social action activates not only specific individual representations, but also socially based and culturally marked sequences of generic representations.

Most of the current teaching models—including the allosteric model—refer to the problems of the learning of scientific concepts according to an analytical approach centred on individual properties (Giordan, 1987, Giordan & Girault, 1996). The fact that social representations are not even evoked by the models explains why examining the socio-cultural dimensions of learning remains a matter of personal preference and competence.¹⁴ These considerations raise the need for a formalized model which could serve as a guide to constructivist educational practice. The following formulation (see Figure 2) follows closely the one given by Giordan, while trying to fill in some of the gaps.

In the first place, the situations which are referred to in the allosteric model as problems—the intellectual activators—are considered at the same time in our revised proposal in more heuristic and more specific terms as situations of biological, psychological or sociological origin, perceived by the individual as states of unease or anxiety, which activate representations and lead to interaction.

This revised model makes up for the most significant shortcoming of the allosteric model, namely its neglect of the socio-cultural anchoring of representations. These determine social positioning, and the modeling of individual and group actions, and—as we shall see further on in the study of representations about civic and political life—their identification may be of essential heuristic and didactic value, since some social anchors do seem to be universal in their scope. In addition, it seems useful to highlight a further aspect whose understanding is

FIGURE 2: The cognitive dynamic



crucial in any constructivist didactic approach, namely the proposition in the allosteric model for a *framework of analysis*, a kind of decoder of proximate reality, which individuals weave on the basis of their experience at the *time they activate their representations* (Giordan, 1995, p. 119).

In postulating this framework of analysis—which, if it is to act as a decoder of reality, would have to consist of interaction schemes and socio-cultural meanings—the original model assumes, in fact, that socio-cultural factors are independent of representations. They are supposed to be activated by the latter. And yet, the theory of social representations has clearly shown that the socio-cultural principles which organize interaction (particularly norms and values) are not external to but coextensive with representations (Flament, in Jodelet, 1989).

This *exogenic* conception of the cultural world is significant to the extent that it implies important consequences for a constructivist didactic approach and hence for any related educational practice. As Giordan points out, the contributions of the allosteric model are first and foremost pedagogical: the model shows that only learners can learn and that they can do so only through their own mental structures. Learning, however, may be facilitated by the provision of an interactive set of parameters constituting a *didactic environment*, which can be made available to learners (Giordan, 1995, p. 123). Probably as a result of its origin in the teaching of *natural sciences*, the didactic environment proposed by the allosteric model says nothing, however, regarding the treatment of the socio-cultural foundations of knowledge, especially social representations as well as norms and values, as if they had no influence on the burgeoning of the *scientific mind* or in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.

CONSTRUCTIVIST DIDACTICS OF SCIENCES AND GENERAL DIDACTICS

The shortcomings we have referred to are not the result of any oversight in the construction of the model. They are rather related to more general problems. In

fact, the underlying question is whether it may be assumed that scientific knowledge is so specific that it would justify a special didactic approach. It is worth looking into this question in a little more detail in order to try to identify the still significant differences between psychological theories of knowledge and sociogenetic theories. According to the former, there is a specific difference between spontaneous knowledge, acquired in the course of regular social interaction, and knowledge obtained through scientific research or conveyed by formal teaching. Some authors even consider that these differences amount to complete opposition: they hold that common knowledge is implicit, incoherent, ambiguous and emotion-laden, while scholastic knowledge is explicit, clearly defined, predictive, intellectualized, etc. (Roqueplo, 1974; Claxton, 1991). To these differences, other authors add the out-of-context and externalized nature of the cognitive contents of formal education which, as a result of the didactic reconstruction which they undergo, are only remotely related to the real contexts in which scientific communities have produced knowledge.¹⁵ In the light of these arguments, they point out that one has to bear in mind the specific nature of these forms of knowledge, if one is to have a chance of understanding the difficulties that students can encounter in the course of their school learning.

In social practice, however, spontaneous knowledge does not appear to be quite so opposed to scientific knowledge. The former naturally produces instrumental relations between the phenomena of experience, which, even though they cannot claim the same degree of universality or predictive power as scientific regularities, they constitute functional schemes as a guide to interaction. On the other hand, *internalized* scientific knowledge is not as precise, universal and intellectual as could be believed beforehand, but rather culturally filtered, signposted, modulated and culturally anchored. Furthermore, a subject's knowledge in a practical situation will tend to integrate different elements of information independently of the nature of the links (semantic or affective) which exist between them. These links tend to be organized, or reorganized, within the framework of the overall instrumental structure for a given subject, where the reconstruction of knowledge might just as well seek affective satisfaction as functional coherence. It would appear, therefore, that from *the point of view of the subject*, this so-called difference between spontaneous knowledge and scientific knowledge is not so much a matter of nature or form, but more simply of origin.

In order to understand the meaning of this proposition, we have to look more carefully at the notion of social representation, or more specifically at the conditions in which social representations emerge, which we have referred to above. A better understanding of the criteria underlying social representations can shed light on the notions of scientific (or 'expert') knowledge and natural knowledge, and on any differences between them, after which we would be in a better position to tackle the actual didactic problems which arise.

It may be assumed that both the expert knowledge produced by the scientific community and its didactic transposition (formal education), in which it appears

detached from the *locus* and the *ethos* of discovery, can coexist with natural knowledge, being integrated into the conceptual networks of learners in a different way (Martí, 1996, p. 150). This hypothesis should, however, be specified in two senses. In the first place, it is likely that well-trained experts may be able, using scientific methods and to a certain extent, to isolate scientific knowledge from other influences, including axiological and intentional elements in particular, especially if they can refer to a model regulating the meaning of the objects examined (e.g. a formal scientific theory). In addition, it may plausibly be assumed that such independence would be possible provided that the objects considered do not give rise to social representations, since the criteria for the emergence of the latter would not be fulfilled; many scientific objects, outside their specialized communities, would fall into this category.¹⁶ The didactic treatment of these concepts could be simplified. Since they appear less socially anchored, the concepts and images proposed by expert knowledge would probably not trigger, in general, any very deep cognitive reconstruction. For such objects, as we shall see in more detail further on when we look at the analysis of the social representations of civic and political life, provided that they arise in a common 'civilizational' framework, where the main principles organizing perception are shared (such as, for instance, time and space), then simple external regulations of knowledge (see Schaefer, in Giordan & Girault, 1996) would be sufficient to trigger the desired learning.

On the other hand, in the case of the many scientific objects which give rise to social representations, the approach would be somewhat different.¹⁷ In this case, expert knowledge would be structured within the framework of social representations, and may even be reconstructed through the interplay of effects of social positioning, axiological and intentional filtering and sign-posting, which characterize social representations. If so, then it would hardly differ, at least as far as common interactions are concerned, from spontaneous knowledge.¹⁸ The treatment of *representational* scientific knowledge may thus need more complex didactic approaches, such as those dealt with in this study and which are required for the treatment of representational knowledge.

PEDAGOGICAL REGULATIONS AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

For a normal subject, any knowledge, whether spontaneous or scientific in origin, provided that it carries dissonant meanings in relation to pre-existing cognitive structures, will activate well-known mechanisms of functional reduction of the cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Doise, 1993, p. 99–118), leading to a more or less stable cognitive restructuring. In this case, from a didactic point of view, rather than paying too much attention to analytical differences between knowledge of various origins, it would seem worth finding out more about how individuals go about structuring knowledge in their interactions with society, for the purpose of regulating the meanings which give a sense to these interactions.

In the typology of cognitive regulation mechanisms, to which we refer here

freely, Linda Allal (1992) identifies four levels which operate according to increasing degrees of depth. Firstly, at the level of the most explicit externalization, there are the *symbolic-instrumental armatures*, such as written language, iconography, diagrams, etc.; on a more subjective level, there are *conscious linguistic functions*; deeper down, there are regulations which may be made explicit ('objectivated') only on external solicitation, for instance, *mental images*; and lastly, at the deepest level, there are the *latent regulatory functions*, which are not accessible to the subject's consciousness.

In current constructivist practice in formal education, regulations are normally confined to the first two levels. The traditional educational function is then exercised through the formal structuring of scientific contents (Schaefer, in Giordan, 1996, p. 38–51) or through linguistic regulations (reinforcing or inhibiting information). Sometimes, the mental representations of students (level three) are touched on and, generally speaking, are handled in the form of *individual images*. More infrequently still, it is possible to have access to representations of *latent structures of meaning* (the central themata, metasystems or cores of social representations), which constitute the socio-psychological principles by which knowledge is organized. Identifying the latter requires the use of methods employed in analyzing latent structures, which are generally not accessible to conventional school-teaching techniques. A knowledge of this latter level—which we shall be considering further on in relation to the representations of citizenship—is indispensable, however, from the point of view of constructivist pedagogy. It provides a way of understanding the common structures of knowledge which constitute the basis of social consensus and of understanding the socio-cultural anchors which model and epitomize social interactions, explaining the differences of behaviour between individuals and between social groups.

We shall see that characterizing the latent structures of knowledge is a way of identifying deeper social influences, beyond any simple analysis of school interactions.

Civic and political representations: common structure and variations

What are the latent structures of civic and political knowledge? What is the socio-genetics of the social representations of democratic political systems? The empirical evidence used in attempting to answer these questions comes from many experimental studies conducted by social psychology and, more particularly, from a preliminary analysis of the data gathered for the cross-cultural study *What education for what citizenship?*¹⁹ This study, conducted by UNESCO:IBE, is intended, amongst other things, as a means of exploring, in countries with different socio-cultural and economic situations—which are essentially considered as ruled by democratic regimes or moving towards democratic forms of government, in accordance with certain criteria—the degree of coherence between the civic and political socialization of school actors (students and teachers) and the operations of a democratic regime founded on a *rule of law* based on the ideology of human

rights. On that basis, it should be possible, from the point of view of a constructivist pedagogy, to devise more relevant and effective educational actions.

* * *

If it appears acceptable to consider that democracy is not the result of an evolutionary need of mankind, but a socio-historical construction related to a certain ideology of political relationships, it should also be acceptable that the democratic system should not be constructed—by definition—on the basis of any practice or any social aim. It is worth noting in this respect that similar functions may be fulfilled by different socio-cultural elements (forms of knowledge, values, institutions) and therefore that some elements of the *democratic ethos* can vary in different societies. But, whatever the actual institutions and values typical of a given situation, there are certain functioning conditions which pertain specifically to democracy as a political regime and which should be fulfilled. According to this understanding of democracy, as a functional system—in principle independent of contextual specificities—the existence, and then the subsistence of the system ‘presupposes the establishment of a constitutional framework, which defines, on the one hand, the rights of citizens—human rights and liberties—and, on the other hand, the accepted forms which political competition can assume in accessing control of public authority. However, while it is clear that an appropriate juridical framework provides the foundations of the democratic system, it is contingent politics, daily political discussions and debates, which afford a historic sense to laws and enable democracy to evolve and become consolidated’ (Albala-Bertrand, 1992, p. 145). It is from this point of view that the study has tried to highlight the twin objects (functional and legal) of the social representations of a democratic system, as well as some widespread *organizing principles* and *socio-cultural anchors*, which can explain differential inter-individual and inter-groups positioning in relation to democracy.²⁰

Apart from the question of identifying the object of representation, another problem of the analysis consists in identifying the *structure of the representational field* considered (i.e. the meaning of perceptions, beliefs and norms shared by populations with respect to civic and political life).²¹ It is in relation to this general structure that, at a second stage, the inter-individual or inter-group variations, resulting from the socio-cultural rooting of representations, may be appreciated. According to the Doise school, the latent structure of the field of representations, the components of what is shared and their organization, may be revealed using quantitative data-analysis techniques (Doise, 1992).

Within this perspective, we have carried out a *principal components analysis* and a *hierarchical cluster analysis*, applied to a set of thirty-nine indicators (questions), twenty-one of which concerned *functioning norms* of the democratic system and eighteen others *ethical-juridical norms*, involving a great variety of pragmatic situations concerning human rights (such as, ‘being imprisoned without being able to defend oneself’ or ‘in a family, it is enough for the man to

vote'). A first point of interest, which emerges from the hierarchic analysis applied to the whole set of indicators, is the way the civic-political images of respondents are structured, establishing a clear distinction between the political and juridical *normative orders* referred to above. This distinction is important, since (as we shall see when we analyze variations between individuals) it may constitute a turning point between two different types of civic-political personality.

With regard to the first order, the representational structure of the *political regime*, both the principal components analysis and the hierarchic cluster analysis revealed four dimensions (accounting for about 50% of the dispersion). The first, with high internal coherence ($\alpha = .71$), refers to *political functioning norms* of the system, those which define the *actual nature* of the system (universal political participation, open and periodic political competition, universal access to power, open organization of political interests, political control of the exercise of power, submission of the political power to the law); the second dimension, also displaying a good internal coherence ($\alpha = .62$), refers to the *system's technical functioning norms*, those which allow its preservation (non-violent settlement of political conflict, political pluralism and equal rights for all citizens); the third dimension ($\alpha = .44$) refers to *the protection of the rule of law by the political power* (compulsory compliance to the law, threat of constraint and punishment in the event of a violation of the law); lastly, a fourth dimension relates to the *use of legitimate force to preserve the system* (e.g. use of the State police). For all the categories of persons studied, aspects related to the system's political and technical functioning norms are considered more important than aspects relating to its protection; moreover, for all dimensions, the teachers took up clearer positions than the students, perhaps due to the effect of the civic political role played by that professional group in history, which has plausibly become one of the anchors of their general civic political representations.

It is also worth noting the great degree of homogeneity by region in the *field of the representation* of the political system (see Table 2). The three regions covered here (Africa, Latin America and Asia) show very close representational fields, made up almost of the same dimensions; the first two (political norms and technical norms) are present in all regions with the same ranking of attitudinal intensity. There is one interesting difference, however. The Latin American region is the only one which does not recognize the *use of legitimate force* as a dimension of the field of representation of the democratic political regime. It should be pointed out that the countries included in the analyzed regional sample have rid themselves only fairly recently of the oppression of dictatorial systems, or have not long ended a long period of social violence. Thus, the field of representation seems to lag behind the shift in political institutions. This persistence of old values rejecting the use of public force,²² which may be considered as an adapted orientation of civil society faced with a system devoid of political legitimacy, would appear to be functionally unsuited in a democratic context, where refusing to recognize legitimacy to law enforcing could in theory lead the system to a political impasse.

TABLE 2: Functioning norms of the political system

Region	Number of dimensions of the field of representation (factors/clusters)	Organizing principles of the field of representation (decreasing ranking of attitudinal intensity)	Explained variance by the factors (%)
Africa	3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political functioning norms 2. Technical functioning norms 3. Protection of the regime by legitimate force 	≥ 50
Latin America	3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political functioning norms 2. Technical functioning norms 3. Protection of human rights 	≥ 46
Asia	4	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political functioning norms 2. Technical functioning norms 3. Protection of human rights 4. Protection of the regime by legitimate force 	≥ 53

In relation to the ethical-juridical foundations of the system, which have been appreciated through the perception of situations implying violations of human rights,²³ the same type of analysis as before identifies four organizing principles for the representation of human rights (representing 48% of the variance): *individual rights*, based on *security* (right to life, to safety, to defense, to the protection of childhood); *social rights*, based on *equality* (national, ethnic, racial, gender equality); *political rights*, based on *freedom* of expression (political expression and organization); lastly, the *right to work*. All of these clusters show a high internal coherence ($.50 < \alpha < .88$). Just as Doise was able to observe in his own study (Guimelli, 1994), the pragmatic situations proposed in the UNESCO:IBE project are clearly perceived by the populations studied (students and teachers) as situations involving human rights. In this case, two structural tendencies should also be noted: firstly, for all categories, individual and social rights are considered to be more important than economic rights; secondly, the levels of recognition that teachers associate with all of the above dimensions outclass those of students, particularly for the dimension related to political rights. If it seems acceptable to consider that the levels of information of teachers regarding

human rights are, on average, higher than those of students, this trend corresponds well with a statement of the theory of social representations which declares that information is positively related to the complexity of the 'space of meaning' covered by a representation (Moscovici, 1961).

The regional breakdown of the above analysis also shows a certain homogeneity of the representational field of ethical/juridical norms related to the political system, although the interregional variation is more marked here than in the case of the system's functioning norms (see Table 3). The central core common to all regions, which in fact attracts the highest attitudinal intensity, relates to *individual rights*. The right to life and to physical safety seems to be considered everywhere by the studied population as the fundamental ethical or juridical standard to which all political systems should adhere. With different valuations, the dimensions of *political rights* and *economic rights* are present in three of the four regions considered, while *social rights* constitute a central dimension of the representational field in only two regions (Africa and Asia). Generally speaking, it is worth noting that both the dimensions and their positions in the representational field tend to reflect the socio-cultural pattern and the political history of the region concerned. In Africa and in Latin America, regions which have both undergone political upheavals in the last decade, political rights appear to constitute an indispensable ethical dimension of the democratic regime. In Asia and in Africa, regions which are culturally and ethnically very mixed and are aware of this fact, social rights, linked to equity, appear to be very important in the perception of the political system. Economic rights, on the other hand, are naturally stressed in regions which have been recently involved in an economic dynamic (Asia, Latin America and, to a lesser extent, the Arab States).

It is important to note that, in the latter category, it does not seem to be a situation of objective economic deprivation which would explain the emergence of the dimension of economic rights within the ethical/juridical representational field. In fact, as we can see, not all the studied populations coming from regions undergoing difficult economic conditions attach importance to economic rights. The recognition of such rights at the level of ethical/juridical representations of the political regime appear to be more associated with the existence of a significant socio-economic dynamic, whereby economic rights become a stake for social criticism (Moliner, 1996). This trend is to be seen in the light of the well-known generalization of political sociology, which asserts that social criticism does not arise principally from excluded or deprived social sectors, but rather from those who feel that they are part of a social dynamic (Heunks, in Jennings et al., 1990). Social criticism which implies adopting a position in relation to a social object, such as economic rights and, *a fortiori*, endogenous socio-political change, would therefore not be conceivable in the absence of social representations.^{24, 25}

TABLE 3: Ethical-juridical norms of the political system

Region	Number of dimensions of the field of representation (factors/clusters)	Organizing principles of the field of representation (decreasing ranking of attitudinal intensity)	Explained variance by the factors (%)
Africa	3	1. Individual rights 2. Social rights 3. Political rights	≥ 47
Arab States	3	1. Individual rights 2. Economic rights 3. Political rights	≥ 44
Asia	3	1. Individual rights 2. Social rights 3. Political rights	≥ 52
Latin America	3	1. Individual rights 2. Economic rights 3. Political rights	≥ 53

The last question to be considered in any analysis of social representations is the identification of the socio-cultural anchors which regulate the condition under which the representations are activated in specific social contexts. This aspect is extremely important from a constructivist point of view, since it sheds light on how certain social anchors²⁶ influence the positions of individuals or groups related to certain representations, such as, for instance, the political system and the rule of law. This should contribute to producing more effective didactic strategies.

ARE THERE INVARIANT SOCIOCULTURAL ANCHORS OF CIVIC AND POLITICAL LIFE?

While it seems reasonable to accept that some values or paradigms are widespread (Inglehart, 1990), it seems less easy to maintain that there are *global systems* of cultural invariants, which would be equivalent to the operational invariants of knowledge. It is, however, possible to identify functional anchors which reappear regularly in a number of societies, and whose related normative systems significantly affect the symbolic and factual behaviours of individuals and groups.

Two sets of socio-cultural references appear to be widespread and should be systematically explored in any study on civic and political representations, since they appear to be the source of significant inter-individual and inter-group variations. Let us, first, consider the *cardinal organizing principles*, the *themata*²⁷ of representational theory, which regulate the intelligibility of reality. These organizing principles mould the mental spaces of individuals in the same way as the space-coordinates mould physical reality (Moscovici & Doise, 1994, p. 90). They structure the perceptual field, such as social *time*, *space* and *categorization*. The

second set contains anchors regulating social interactions and defining positioning between individuals or social groups within the framework of specific societies, such as relations with the *environment*, with *others*, with *power* and with the *social situation* (see Table 4). The above-mentioned organizing principles and anchors appear—according to the findings of the UNESCO:IBE study—to be most influential in moulding the individual's civic and political orientations.

TABLE 4. Socio-cultural organizing principles of representations in civic and political life¹

Nature	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cardinal principles (themata): social time, space and categorizations; • Interactional anchors: relations with the environment, with others, with power and with the social situation.
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The cardinal principles cover several societies over long periods, such as feudal, agro-pastoral or urban industrial societies; • Interactional anchors concern specific societies and or groups.
Stability over time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great stability of cardinal principles, linked to the dynamic of change (slow progress and rapid breaks) of paradigms of interpreting reality²; little sensitivity to intentional changes (education); • Lower stability of interactional anchors, sensitive to intentional institutional and cultural changes (education, political restructuring).
Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cardinal principles: operate as reference frameworks for decoding reality which influence all social behaviours of a given civilization; great potential for predicting social positionings; • Interactional anchors operate as cultural earmarks and filters, influencing differences between individuals and between groups; strong potential for predicting individual and collective positionings, but in limited social spaces.
Didactical interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diagnosis important for understanding individual and collective orientations, positionings and behaviours in civic and political life; • Development of more effective educational strategies, taking account of socio-cultural anchors.

Notes:

1. In fact, it may plausibly be assumed that the influence of these organizing principles is not restricted to civic and political life, but that they influence other learning processes where social representations appear.
2. Khun, 1970.

CARDINAL ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES

The social representation of time

The representation of time is a general orientation which has a key influence on the structuring of the personality and hence on the understanding of reality and the organization of social action.²⁸ A culture has its own particular conception of time; pre-modern cultures had (or have) a cyclical, concrete conception, which appears affectively connected to the characteristics of the social and natural environment. Time was either good or bad, favourable or fatal. There was a time for religion, a time for rejoicing, a time for work. In its conception of time, the mythological conscience appears related, on the one hand, to natural forces and

cycles, and on the other, through its rituals, to the mythical past which has to be reproduced. Time appears as a link between human generations, which follow each other recurrently, like the seasons (Gurevich, 1976). This awareness of time, without the notion of irreversibility, does not provide a clear distinction between past, present and future, nor any long-term forecasts. The detachment of the concept of time from its circumstantial roots and its nature as an abstract ('pure duration'), sequential, divisible and irreversible notion is a product of modernity. It is this representation of time which lies at the basis of rational thought (and, more specifically, scientific thought), and which allows general causality links to be established between phenomena, and then the forecasting of future events. This representation also leads to the time of teleological logic (related to the projected transforming of reality), which allows for the planning of political will and the use of different socio-economic resources in the pursuit of *non-existent* states. This may only be imagined if one possesses a notion of the future and that of a 'compressed' present, seen as a point continually sliding towards the future. The perception of sequential time implies an opening towards the uncertain, which relates well to the acceptance of change, that is, to strategic change of the *status quo*. The value attached to social change—which is imaginable in the context of a consciousness of a sequential and open time—appears as a central functioning condition of democratic systems, where social change is institutionalized through political competition.

The UNESCO:IBE study shows that there are significant links between, on the one hand, the value attached to *strategic social change* and the *will to innovate*, and, on the other, an awareness of the *functioning norms of the democratic system* (.11).²⁹

Of course, both the representation of time and openness to change are very complex phenomena, which are not directly accessible or modifiable. This makes it all the more necessary to identify them, in order to help in assessing the socio-cultural obstacles which may be hampering civic and political modernity.

The representation of civic and political space

The UNESCO:IBE cross-cultural study has explored this question through the notion of cosmopolitanism, as a value which defines the extent of socio-political space intelligible for individuals. Cosmopolitanism has been assessed using a *cosmopolitan openness index*, ranging among the poles of cosmopolitanism and 'localism', and which is constructed on the basis of thirteen items concerning various aspects of the political domain, all showing a high internal coherence rating ($\alpha = .82$).

Preliminary results show that the cosmopolitan value is significantly related to conceptions of civil and political life which are different from those associated with a more 'localist' view of the social environment. The most striking aspects are the individual's type of integration in civic and political life. In this connection, it appears that the more intensive is the cosmopolitan orientation, the more

acute seems to be the perception of *ethical and normative* aspects which underlie civic and political life, especially the perception of *individual rights* (.10) and *social rights* (.12), and the greater the opening towards *cultural differences* (.12). On the other hand, orientations to local problems are more likely to be associated with the perception of the main functioning aspects of the democratic political regime, particularly the system's *political norms* (.27) and *technical norms* (.28). The latter also show a better perception of equity as a *redistributive social norm* (.12) and a more marked tendency towards the representation of economic practice, more centred on social service than on profit.

Apart from the cosmopolitan or 'localist' positionings which define different perceptions of the civic and political domain, referred to above, it appears that subjects with a cosmopolitan orientation are more prepared to engage in civic life—for instance, in social movements in favour of the *rights of minorities or the protection of the environment* (.19)—and that those who have a 'localist' outlook are more inclined to a *political commitment*, for instance as *militants in political parties* (.14).

The cosmopolitan orientation seems to evolve with aspects of civic and political life which no doubt appear important for the building of citizenship, although it is conceivable that orientations which are too exclusively based on civic morals, underestimating political interest and commitment, would hardly constitute a solid, nor indeed effective, foundation for a practice of democratic citizenship, ensuring long-lasting preservation of the regime.

Identifying value orientations that lead to different perceptions of the civic and political space among young people is undeniably valuable as a way of understanding their behaviour. Further analyses in the framework of the UNESCO:IBE study should shed more light on this question and should highlight the structural and educational factors which appear to be more associated with the origin of these different approaches to civic and political life.

Categorization of the social space

The theory of anticipatory socialization (Merton, 1949, chapter VIII) has shown that the subjective identification of an individual in the framework of a given stratification structure—more than the individual's objective position—is one of the most influential factors in modeling a person's aspirations and expectations. The representation of one's own social position fulfils a basic function in terms of perceiving the social space; by classifying oneself, one classifies others. Bourdieu preferred to put it the other way around, but what we need to note at this point is that classification (whether of oneself or of others), which at an early age tends to reproduce family referents, is a good predictor of future civic and political orientations, opinions and behaviours. The representation of individual places in the framework of a stratification system may be exercised through feelings of proximity towards social and socio-professional groups which are differently positioned *in relation to power*.

Social classification generally introduces sharper resemblances within groups and differences between groups. But classifications are arrived at on the basis of multiple criteria, and individuals are rarely classified uniformly according to all these criteria. In practice, classifications are crossed, so that the same individuals will belong to different categories according to some criteria and to the same category according to others. This means that under certain conditions the cross-combinations between categories tend to offset differential effects (Doise, 1993).

Identifying the classifications which are present in the social representations of individuals may thus be useful when implementing constructivist educational strategies aimed at the civic and political socialization of young people. Some conventional constructivist analyses concerning multicultural problems, following the well-known Piagetian approach (Piaget, 1948, p. 404–11),³⁰ have concluded that it is worth integrating students (of different ethnic or cultural origins) in joint activities, thus providing an organic basis for co-operation. It is expected that this will help to reduce antagonistic perceptions between groups through better mutual acquaintance and by highlighting functional interdependence (Guruvadoo, in Gagliardi, 1996). In fact, such an approach would not necessarily appear to be effective. The UNESCO:IBE study is suggestive in this respect, showing that there is a very strong negative association between the *multi-ethnic* composition of a school's population and attitudes of *civic tolerance* displayed by the students (.63); the multi-ethnic characteristic also appears to be associated with *low participation* by students in group activities in school, such as participation in student councils, in the preparation of certain aspects of curricula, in school charity activities or joint activities between the school and the community, or implying interaction with external actors, etc. (.19). It would seem that representations of ethnic rivalry, which pre-existed the school, tend to prevent attitudes of respect and tolerance emerging among students, and hamper the implementation of joint activities within the universal framework of the school. On the other hand, the same students become involved in *civic life* outside school (.22). It is likely that these are activities originating in their own ethnic communities.

The 'doing-together' educational approach would, in fact, only be effective if certain didactic conditions were met. The first would be a suitable diagnosis of cross-classifications made by the ethnic or cultural groups involved, serving to highlight common nodes and breaking points in their representations related to power. Political science studies have clearly shown that stable societies, with a basis of political and cultural tolerance, are those where the categorization of individuals in relation to power is far removed from underlying social divisions (economic, linguistic, ethnic, religious, etc.) (Lipset, 1960, chapter 1). So long as the educational solutions considered have not taken this basic fact into account, they are likely to have little impact, since it seems unlikely that one would ever learn to tolerate or accept differences in another, in the long term and without any strong coercion, if our own hardship and our own oppression depend on those differences.

According to several recent studies, the basic reasons for modern conflicts are not so much economic or political as cultural. By isomorphism, it is considered that such conflicts should be treated with cultural remedies, so that there has been a plethora of educational programmes tackling these problems according to naïve negative-homology, opposing, for instance, tolerance values to xenophobia or racism, mutual understanding values to aggressive or violent behaviours, or charitable orientations to poverty. While, generally speaking, it would not seem wrong to say that conflicts have cultural origins (in fact, any social interaction is cultural), it appears less certain that they should be appraised and handled according to their semblance. None of the major conflicts occurring at the end of this century appear to be independent of the power struggle, despite the apparent classifications invoked.³¹

The other conditions, of a methodological nature, assume that the chosen educational activities generate socio-cognitive conflicts among the students, which will not be swiftly regulated (squashed) by teachers motivated by intuitive approaches favouring relational understanding.³² The constructivist approach may thus effectively complement conventional educational strategies, enabling them to reach their desired objectives with more plausibility.

Another very important field of social interaction, where a knowledge of classifications may favour the development of more effective educational strategies for the civic and political socialization of youngsters, is the *attribution of personal responsibilities*. Since the work of Heider (1958) on attribution, many studies have shown the existence of a social norm known as the 'internality norm' in the attribution of responsibilities (Dubois, 1987).

In very simplified terms, this means that the desirable behaviours of members of a group (e.g. respect for the law, politeness, etc.) are attributed to *endogenous* (motivational) causes, while *undesirable* behaviours (e.g. unlawful behaviour, racism, aggression, etc.) are attributed to causes *exogenous* to the group, i.e. to factors over which the individuals have no control. Generally speaking, the internality norm encourages individuals to attribute desirable behaviours to endogenous causes when the actor is a member of their *in-group* and to exogenous causes when the actor involved belongs to an *out-group*. These attributions are reversed in the case of undesirable behaviours (Taylor & Jaggi, 1974). Moreover, independently of any material rationale, the social representations which regulate attributions tend to give higher recognition to endogenous explanations, which highlight the 'good nature' of individuals.³³ In conclusion, by attributing the 'good behaviour' by members of the in-group to their 'good will', and good behaviour by members of the out-group to, let us say, 'chance', the internality norm implies a *minus-classification* concerning the values of other groups, which may give rise to feelings which can range from the pride of belonging to a group (e.g. national pride) to racism. Generally speaking, the categories considered as inferior would not be recognized as being able to manage *themselves* or to manage their *own destiny*. It is well known that this type of argument has been, and still is, frequently invoked to justify the most revolting forms of social disdain and

xenophobia. A study conducted by Doise (1996) would seem to confirm the functioning of the internality norm in the perception of human rights. The violations of such rights tend to be played down (treated as simple trivial events) if they are committed by a member of the in-group (e.g. in one's own country) and to be emphasized in other cases. The perception of human rights would therefore be *ethnocentric*.

If the attribution of responsibilities did not vary with the *locus*, that is, if the positive effects of behaviour were invariably attributed to the in-group, any change induced in the attribution process could only result from a change in the whole system of classifications which differentiate social groups. In such a case, there would be little point in looking any further for didactic purposes because change would lie outside the scope of the school. The attributive process, however, appears to be very sensitive to positions (classifications) of relative power between categories within a given society.³⁴ In this connection, the internality norm appears to comply with the following rule: 'the more distant the power positions appear between two groups or categories, the more there is a tendency in the dominant group to attribute success in the dominated categories to external causes'.³⁵ This hypothesis indicates a way to increase the efficacy of constructivist educational interventions in relation to power perceptions.

The UNESCO:IBE study shows that the classification of oneself as being 'on the side of power'³⁶ appears systematically (in all the societies studied) to be associated with more significant feelings about one's *own political efficacy* (or of one's own significance as a citizen) (.20), of a more assertive *political independence* (.10)—which provides the best guarantee against autocratic temptation among the rulers—and, lastly, to frequent *civic commitments* (.11).

Establishing a diagnosis of social representations of classifications in relation to power and prestige made by national, cultural, ethnic or political groups, especially in multicultural societies, can help in the development of educational strategies specifically contributing to reduce the effect of asymmetrical classifications in school. Any educational effort to build the civic and political character of young people should pay particular attention to classificatory representations as a means of strengthening the desired social goals.

ANCHORS RELATED TO SOCIAL INTERACTIONS³⁷

The functional relation with the environment: the rationality complex

We had occasion earlier to note the importance of attributive orientations, which define categorizations such as *ingroup*, *outgroup*, rich, poor, powerful, weak, etc., in the way the individual's or group's social landscape is built up. Together with their attributive orientations, individuals define their relationship with the social and physical environment according to the possibility of using the latter for various purposes; this is a form of instrumental orientation.³⁸ One of the most elaborate forms this orientation can take is the 'rational thinking' which provides

the basis for scientific and technical thinking, as well as the teleological ideologies of economic and political development related to modernity.

What should be stressed here is the fact that the rationalist normative component of social representations offers specific modes of decoding interaction signals which are fairly coherent with the cultural ethos of the 'open' forms of social organization. There is no need to subscribe to the evolutionist approach of Habermas (1979) in order to consider that rational thinking seems to be the only kind leading one to universalizing statements based on arguments accessible to reason. The traditional forms of thinking, which organize social activity around inviolable codes and principles which are not accessible to reasoning, can only reproduce specific or 'culturocentric' perceptions of the world.

We would not like, however, to give the false impression that political practice in a democracy could be equated with scientific behaviour, where the line of thinking is soundly established and open to assessment by all. Notwithstanding, it is also true that democratic consensus is not established on the basis of sacred principles or on power alone. Even majority political decisions tend in general to be rationally argued, highlighting their instrumental potential for solving this or that problem. And this is not just a trick to legitimize those who hold power, but a condition of social control. The ideological support of democracy (in the sense of a conception of political organization for which it is worth sacrificing oneself) constitutes an important aspect in its continuity, but it is not the only one. It would be difficult to obtain broad civic support for measures which often entail sacrifices if they did not appear in some degree *convincing*, especially in cases where societies appear culturally (ethnically, religiously and linguistically) fractured.

These considerations are particularly important from the point of view of a constructivist education for citizenship, since rationality is just as necessary for developing a political line of argument as for understanding it, starting with the argument that it itself underpins democracy.

We shall see, on the basis of the results of the aforementioned UNESCO:IBE study, how the rationalist orientation is related to the complex of the civic and political life in democratic systems. *Rationalist orientations*³⁹ predominate among school actors, even though, as might be expected, they are more marked among teachers (73%) who have received more advanced instrumental training than students (64%). These positions coincide among the latter with a better perception of the *political functioning norms* of the democratic system (.12), and with a more precise awareness of *human rights* (.16), in their *individual* (.11), *political* (.12) and *social* (.14) dimensions. Intentional aspects favourable to pluralist democratic life also appear to be related to rationalist orientations, especially attitudes favouring *political participation open to all* (.13) and an opening to *cultural diversity* (.10). Lastly, there is a link with the orientations underlying the *spirit of enterprise*, including openness to technical change and to the exploration of new situations (.9). Among teachers, the civic and political concomitants of rationality are even more marked than among students. Among the more striking aspects, we might

mention a feeling of *transnational solidarity* (.19), a better perception of *functional aspects* (.14), *institutional aspects* (.23) and the *normative aspects* (human rights) of political democracy (.17). As far as the teacher's working role is concerned, the rationalists see it more as a *professional activity* (.16), than a type of *civil service*.

Relations with others: the complex of social solidarity

Several socio-political ideologies, ranging from Marxism to the Rawlesian approach to justice, assume that the State, apart from its role of ensuring equality before the law for all citizens, should also guarantee equality of opportunities for all. The State should therefore not only be the warrant of a formal juridical democracy, but should institutionalize social solidarity by redistributing collective wealth. While it is true that in most democratic societies social solidarity is essentially a public problem, States by no means all accept such a responsibility or prefer, as is currently the tendency, to transfer their traditional function as an economic regulator to civil society. In this sort of situation, solidarity is no longer merely a governmental problem, but also a civic problem, and there would appear to be a need for a civic ethos which can integrate new self-regulating standards supporting equitable interactions in economic and political practice.

The UNESCO:IBE study has attempted to measure *social solidarity* as a value by means of an index which assesses reactions to different situations of social distress regarding access to education, to health and to work.⁴⁰ Among students, this value varies alongside a feeling of *political efficacy* (.21), which seems fairly coherent, since it seems conceivable that every individual would like his expression of solidarity to be useful. Social solidarity also extends to a feeling of *cosmopolitan solidarity*, that is, associating oneself with situations of distress in other countries (.18), and with an attitude to *civic tolerance* (.17) and *cultural tolerance* (.12), as well as a will to be *actively involved in civic* (.12) and *school* (.13) *life*. The stronger the expression of social solidarity is among students, the stronger is their awareness of the conditions of the *political and technical functioning of the democratic system* (.26) and *human rights* (.24). Solidarity is expressed not only in the civic and political field, but also appears associated with a better perception of the *social purposes of economic activity*, e.g. trade as a function of *public service* (.22) and the *protection of human and natural resources*, required by sustainable development (.13). Lastly, it is interesting to note that the most marked expression of solidarity appears associated with a preference for interaction, in the civic field, with *peer-age groups* (.13). The context for teachers is roughly the same, although in general the associations between the phenomena studied appear even more marked.

The diagnosis of social representations regulating this aspect of social interaction appears to play an important role in defining the civic and political character of young people and should therefore be looked at very carefully in the preparation of educational strategies for citizenship building.

Relationship with the situation: the materialism/post-materialism complex

Inglehart's work has shown that some cultural traits (for instance, religiosity and large families or rationalism and secularity, amongst others) tend to evolve together (Inglehart, 1995). He has also shown that the basic criterion of agglutination and differentiation of cultural traits was a complex representation of reality, which, in its polar manifestations, he called *materialism/post-materialism*. In Inglehart's approach, the terms of this representation reflect 'the tip of the iceberg' of a cultural transition from the modernist decoding paradigm of reality—roughly speaking, the one based on an instrumental and voluntaristic logic—and a rising paradigm, especially in evolved industrial societies, namely post-modernism, revolving around expressive values and giving rise to a new form of 'sensitive reasoning' (Maffesoli, 1996), suited to a society where economic, cultural, political and occupational links (those of Durkheimian organic solidarity) no longer function as a factor of lasting unity.

There is no need at this juncture to discuss the evolutionary sense which may sometimes be attached to these conceptions. It is enough to take account of the fact that the orientation of materialism/post-materialism is a very good predictor of a series of cultural traits, and that those situated at either extreme behave differently in their economic, civic and political interactions.

The cultural anchors of materialist orientations to social reality are located around the values of economic and physical *security*. Several studies show that these values tend to be associated with situations of shortage, economic decline or instability (Inglehart, in Jennings et al., 1990), which generally characterize insufficiently developed societies. For their part, the axiological anchors of post-materialism favour sociability, community sense, environmental quality and a down-valuing of work as a productive activity (Flament, in Abric, 1996). Post-materialist orientations are expected to arise in situations characterized by long periods of prosperity, such as those experienced since the Second World War in industrialized countries.

It should not, however, be understood that there is a direct, mechanical link between economic level and the development of materialistic or post-materialistic values. What is at stake is not so much the objective situation as the perception of the situation by individuals, which will depend very much on the socializing experience of each. However, on the other hand, in spite of this apparent particularism, it may be expected—for reasons of functional coherence—that, on average, perceptions of the situation will tend to agree with their objective reality, and therefore that, on average, the dominant orientations in a given society—whether materialistic or post-materialistic—will tend to correspond to its development dynamics.⁴¹

Some studies conducted in particular in Western countries have shown that a cultural shift has been occurring among generations in favour of post-materialistic values, accompanied by a more active and more informed political participation among individuals sharing these values (Inglehart, 1981; Baker et

al., 1981). This is obviously a fundamental issue for any constructivist pedagogical approach to citizenship.

The UNESCO:IBE study confirmed these conclusions in the selected sample of students and teachers, contributing with some significant new elements. In the first place, it may be noted that the post-materialistic orientation predominates in the school environment. The proportion of students displaying this orientation (53%) is significantly greater than that found among teachers (47%). Both of these groups, however, show much higher post-materialistic orientations than students' parents (29%). This fact, which has already been mentioned in other studies (Inglehart, in Jennings et al., 1990, p. 71), partly reflects the specific character of the actors involved in secondary schooling (students and teachers), in the sense that they represent a relatively prosperous and economically stable section of the overall population. The difference between students and teachers, in the absence of continuous data, may at first sight be attributed to the normal circumstances of life, in so far as young people are less concerned with questions of material or physical security than their elders.

The students who display the most marked post-materialistic orientations are also those who adopt the most tolerant attitudes towards *cultural differences* (.10) and who seem to be the best informed about *human rights*, especially *economic rights* (.11). They are also the ones who *trust political authorities the least* (.15).⁴² Since, at least partly, the development of the civic and political character of young people is the result of a confrontation between the representations of learners and teachers in the course of the educational interaction, it would also seem to be important to identify the civic and political orientations which, among the latter, coexist with their post-materialistic positions. Among teachers, this orientation is associated with an attitude of *civic tolerance* (.13*), *political commitment* (.15*), and a distinct perception of the *political functioning norms* of democratic regimes (.14*), specifically the need to *control the government* (.22) and even the use of various *legal means of protest* (.18).

Representations are slowly woven during adolescence and the early years of adulthood (Jennings & Niemi, 1981, p. 48–76); in so far as they might vary later on, it will not be with the same flexibility. From an educational point of view, it is therefore important to identify the educational processes which can best contribute to the development of post-materialistic values in young learners. The construction of a materialistic or post-materialistic orientation is not the result of an intentional plan, but of social experience. It is not so surprising, then, that exposure to a curriculum with civic connotations does not appear to be associated with the emergence of any particular orientation in the sense studied. On the other hand, some aspects of educational processes, concerning both teaching methods and the structure of relations within the school, which favour or strengthen broader social interactions, coexist systematically with post-materialistic orientations: examples are the use of *active teaching methods* (.35%*) or the openness of teachers to *student participation* in all activities of educational life (.12*).

Relationship with power: the complex of political autonomy

All societies define relations between individuals and civil society on the one hand and political power on the other. The nature of these relations determines the nature of the political regime, which can be more or less open or authoritarian. The democratic regime is characterized by a set of operating norms which are specific to that system and which define the nature of relations between citizens and authorities. The universal participation of individual and collective actors, universal access to power, open organization of political interests, open and periodic political competition, political, judicial and civic regulation concerning the exercise of power, and the peaceful settlement of political conflicts are all operating requirements of democratic systems, independently of the institutional and technical forms they may assume in any given society. Certain values are also associated with these norms and are part of the social representations of the regime, including, for instance, those which favour transactional solutions or autonomy in relation to power.

Piaget (1948) and Kolberg (1972) consider personal psychological autonomy as a necessary outcome of an individual's psycho-genetic development. They believe, roughly, that an individual can only progress from an originally egocentric disposition to one of social openness and commitment by acquiring a degree of autonomy with regard to external authority, represented in this case by the personalities controlling power in the child's perceptual landscape, such as parents and teachers. The significance of political autonomy is essentially the same, although in this case there is no doubt that the terms *heteronomy* or *autonomy* do not belong to any sort of genetic dynamic.

The control of oneself or of another person, or the control over a political entity require a psychological, normative or institutional distancing in relation to the object of that control. In democracy, political control is exercised through a series of positive norms and institutions (through elections, parliamentary debates, judicial proceedings or periodic reports), which regulate the exercise of power. However, as may be seen in the social and political history of everyday events, the existence of institutional autonomy is not sufficient in itself to guarantee effective control over power. Formal political control and, *a fortiori*, a less well-established *civic control* will not be so effective if, while in contact with these institutions, people do not have autonomous orientations in relation to power; an orientation of dependence towards political power—as we have seen clearly in this century—can annul the effect of formally perfect constitutional charters.

The UNESCO:IBE survey attempted to detect the autonomist orientation using a Guttman-type scale ('scalability' coefficient = .75), concerning different types of political and civic means which individuals are prepared to use in order to control power (the scale takes account of voting, demonstrations, use of the press, strikes, etc.). The autonomist orientation (as might be expected) predominates in the very selective environment of secondary schooling, both among teachers (69%) and students (55%). It is interesting to note, however, that among

parents, who are closer to the remainder of the population, those with an independent orientation are a minority (49%). This specific school tendency is, in this case, of undeniable interest, since in a majority of countries the political class and the civil service are still recruited from the ranks of secondary schools.

From the constructivist point of view, with which we are concerned, it is worth noting the variations that appear in the social representations of civic and political life in association with the autonomist orientation, since they might provide a way of forecasting those representations. Among students, the value of autonomy in relation to power is associated with a clearer perception of the *political functioning norms* of the democratic system (.16), and of *political rights* (.13). In the context of civic and political attitudes, autonomy goes together with *cosmopolitan openness* (.10), the perception of equity as a *redistributive norm* (.9), and greater openness in relation to *cultural differences* (.13).

The political autonomist orientation in teachers is clearly associated with a feeling of personal *political efficacy* (.16*) and, as in the case of students, with a perception of the *political functioning norms* of the democratic regime (.14) and *cosmopolitan political openness* (.10). The autonomist orientation also appears among teachers related to a *post-materialistic outlook* (.18), which in turn coincides with high levels of *political commitment* (.12*).

Some factors involved in the development of an autonomist value among students, appear to be the existence of a *school climate* which favours equitable relations between the different school actors (.9), and especially the existence of marked *political involvement among parents* (.17). In the case of both students (.9) and teachers (.12*), it appears that more intensive exposure to the civic and political programmes disseminated by the media is associated with higher levels of political autonomy. It is also worth noting that students' autonomy is clearly associated with a preference for civic and political interactions with persons of *the same generation*, their peers (.16), rather than parents or teachers. This would tend to confirm the hypothesis that autonomy as a value is expressed coherently in a wide range of situations implying asymmetrical relationships.

Outlook for the near future

As we have just seen, it seems clear that the study of the organizing principles and interactional anchors associated with the social representations of civic and political life makes a useful contribution to a constructivist didactic approach to citizenship education. In this connection, it may be worth noting that a rationalized citizenship education strategy may deal with a wide range of the representational, axiological, attitudinal and behavioural outcomes expected, concentrating on the above few elements, with a consequent gain in coherence and profundity.

With a broader scope, it would equally be useful to study to what extent the above elements can also play a significant role in the didactics of science. Several cultural principles, which operate as general organizing principles, including in particular the social perception of time and space and the complexes of rationali-

ty and materialism/post-materialism, appear to have an influence on very different processes of knowledge, and should provide a basis for a general constructivist didactics of the representational knowledge.

More specifically, there are three tasks which need further development. The first consists in developing and formalizing the broader constructivist didactic model, resulting from the integration of the notion of social representation, for which we have only outlined the main problems. The second consists in testing the differentiating and predictive power of the socio-cultural anchors proposed in areas of social reality outside civic and political life. These tasks would require interdisciplinary co-operation between social psychology, sociology, didactics and other disciplines dealing with learning and knowledge. Research would need to be co-ordinated between different laboratories, which is no easy task in itself.⁴³

The third task consists in developing a real constructivist approach to education, that is to say, in integrating constructivist didactics in a teaching/learning educational approach which coherently incorporates the different aspects of educational practice: the development of curricula taking account of the analysis of social representations; the training of teachers in teaching methods allowing for the appropriate use of representations; and especially the training of educational researchers to prepare the raw materials of the constructivist approach, namely the tools required to diagnose, analyze and interpret the *profiles of personal representations and maps of social representations*.⁴⁴ The constructivist approach does not consist only in using summarily identified representations to motivate a class, but rather as a basis for an understanding of the deeper tendencies which shape the cognitive processes and social interactions of learners. Of course, this activity cannot be carried out approximatively (see Table 5). This is true as regards the methodological design of diagnosis tools, but even more so for the analysis of results. As Gardner has stated, with reason (quoted by Doise, 1987, p. 14) with regard to social categorization, which applies also to social representations, 'it is impossible to study social classifications without a theory of categorization, without a profound knowledge of the field categorized, or without an understanding of the philosophical problems raised by the construction of a category'. From this point of view, the teachers need to be offered special training, not in order to take over from researchers, which they cannot do, but in order to learn to interact with the scientific community and to use the considerable resources which science has to offer.

The functions of a socio-genetic constructivist pedagogy

We would like to conclude this article by highlighting some latent functions (not immediately apparent) of the constructivist educational approach, since there is a possibility that it might not suit all socio-political contexts.

In the first place, the constructivist approach gives the *teacher a new role*. By allowing the teacher access to a knowledge of the 'profiles' of the social represen-

TABLE 5: Constructivist practice in education

Characteristics	Prevailing practice	Emerging practice
Didactic objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of spontaneous images within groups of students associated with selected teaching/learning concepts and topics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of personal profiles and mapping of collective structures of meaning which model learning and behaviour in a particular field of social life.
Educational objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivating class dynamics by obtaining students' images of specific concepts; and the utilization of images as tools for identifying some gaps and distortions in learning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving the relevance and effectiveness of pedagogical practice in order to encourage the development of an autonomist personality in the learner. • Motivational and teaching/learning guiding functions.
Instrumental preconditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic knowledge of techniques for identifying students' images. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of human resources with theoretical and methodological skills for analyzing social representations and the field under study
Interpretation value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empirical and circumstantial interpretation of mental contents, on the basis of clinical interviews or surveys of small groups, without formal validation of the information or control of the risk of error in conclusions. • Localist outlook at the institutional and geographical level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpretation oriented by the theory of social representations, making use of scientific research methods. • Outlook oriented towards the production of universalizing knowledge; frequent comparative and cross-cultural studies.
Transferability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Precarious and easily transferable methodology. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scientific methodology implying the use of regular procedures, which are reproducible and open to the evaluation of all; more difficult to apply.
Adaptability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptable to any socio-political context. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot prosper fully outside open and rational communication.

tations of every student, it allows him/her to act better as a *facilitator* in the development of personal aptitudes and sensitivities. The teacher can attenuate the uniformizing pressures of the education system, which, owing to its regulatory ideology, does not really consider processes of individualization. On the other hand, since the scientific basis of constructivist educational practice requires an *ethos* and a normative framework, which are quite different from those associated with political and administrative logic, it strengthens a *professional* conception of the teacher's role. In a constructivist context, this means that the teacher abandons his/her traditional role as the medium of knowledge and values related to social reproduction to become a facilitator in the construction of autonomous persons.

Constructivism also offers *possibilities to learners*. By becoming acquainted with their own choices and deep-rooted expectations (the profile of their representations), learners can better identify their position in the social world and, in particular, in relation to their peers. Just like the appreciation of instrumental performances, which in some circumstances serves to regulate interactions (Doise, 1993, p. 148–51), comparing the profiles of individual representations can (from a certain age) lead to *axiological restructurings* independently of any external authority. In general, these practices should facilitate the emergence of a consensus (for the application of the normative hypothesis, see Moscovici, 1994, p. 99). The constructivist educational approach may thus offer many opportunities for anticipated socialization which are compatible with the requirements of participatory citizenship.

The virtual functions of the constructivist approach are not limited to inter-teacher/learner relations. They are also effective on a *systemic level*. While the knowledge of *individual social representation profiles* provides the raw material of a renewed constructivist educational practice, the 'mapping', made up of individual profiles and their anchors in systems of values and social institutions, constitutes essential references for the formulation of educational policies, and in particular for the planning of transition strategies towards desired social objectives.

Lastly, from a global point of view, the constructivist approach offers a basis of scientific evidence which can be used to identify cross-cultural and transnational communities-of-meaning, which can lead to the construction of communicational and functional links between societies which are not founded only on a matching of governmental political wills, but also on the concrete sharing of civic and political significations.

Constructivism therefore appears to serve the whole educational strategy in several ways: by facilitating educational approaches which are more effective and more respectful of learners' conceptions; by triggering social self-regulation mechanisms in individuals; by providing an opportunity for reasoning and rationalizing educational policies; and, lastly, by facilitating an awareness of communities-of-meaning among societies. As an approach switching between personal interest and the general interest, between national interest and an overall vision, constructivism, by its own internal logic, no longer appears as an instru-

ment of social reproduction, of indoctrination and of ideological regulation (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970; Bernstein, 1975). Thereby, renewed pedagogical constructivism emerges as having the potential of enlivening the emancipating role of education, and thus of inserting educational practice in the ethical framework of modernity.

Notes

1. Ausubel, 1968; Chomsky, 1975; Gagné, 1965; Piaget, 1948, 1965, 1976.
2. In fact, according to Weber (1949) scientific knowledge of social phenomena is not to be reduced to the comprehension of its subjective meaning, but implies also the possibility—and necessity—of a positive explanation; with a similar perspective, Habermas (1987) considers that rational communication transcends historical determination and then enables scientific knowledge to overcome historical relativism.
3. This already indicates the path of the constructivist didactical approach. It does not consist only of identifying the conceptions of the learner, but also those of the teacher. From the constructivist point of view, the act of teaching is not simply a transfer of functional or normative knowledge, but a confrontation of representations between the actors in the educational process.
4. In the sense that Habermas (1987) gave to it, namely the search for a 'rational consensus' based on arguments which admit consideration of all relevant logical evidence, in circumstances such that the evidence and the arguments may be evaluated by all participants.
5. A bibliographical survey carried out by Denise Jodelet (1989) turned up references to over 150 books and more than 300 articles on the subject. Less than seven years later, J.C. Abric, Director of the Laboratory of Social Psychology at the University of Aix-en-Provence, was able to compile over 2,400 publications on the subject (Third Conference on Social Representations, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1996).
6. Moscovici considers that a central aspect in the study of social representations relates to identifying its symbolic 'objectivation'. If this may usefully lead to a categorization of individuals or groups sharing the same images, it could be misleading considering—as will be shown later in relation to the concept of social anchoring—that the identification of a symbolic objectivation throws considerable light on the representation's meaning. Although it requires a more complex procedure, the definition of the *field of the representation* would enable us to qualify the nature of the information utilized by a given group, as well as the inner structure of the representation, that is, its actual meaning.
7. The description of the structure of representations follows the structural views on the matter proposed by the Aix-en-Provence school.
8. A sign of this lack of interaction is the rare occurrence of cross-references in the main publications of the supporters of constructivist education and the psychology of representations. I have looked through more than fifty and have found only one quotation from the work of an educationist in a constructivist psychology publication, and vice versa.
9. These include a study of representations of *groups* or *social categories*, such as peasants, nurses, wage-earners, the disabled, teachers, psychologists, dominated social classes, children, women; of *social institutions*, such as science, justice, divorce, social

- services, primary school, human rights, business; of *social situations*, such as risk, work, genetic engineering, computing, radioactivity, AIDS, culture, bosses, intelligence, time, electrical circuits, violence, mental illnesses, reproduction, digestion, etc.
10. In the sense given to this term by H. Zetterberg (1965).
 11. A theory working with concepts (i) sufficiently specific to allow for verification, (ii) but also sufficiently general to give account of a significant aspect of social reality, (iii) including concepts which are logically interrelated, in such a way as to allow predictions transcending simple extrapolations, (iv) predictions which have to be verifiable, and therefore precise, internally coherent and representative, (v) in order to formulate universalizing regularities (Merton, 1949).
 12. The term is used here in the sense referred to by H. Wallon (1925) or Langevin and Wallon (1946) to describe educational practices intended for learners who do not fit into normal standards.
 13. It is not hard to see that the same information—for instance, the proposition that ‘a change of government is expected’—will activate different reactions in an individual who is in power and in another individual who is waiting for office.
 14. In practice, studies leading to the development of educational strategies according to a constructivist approach are generally conducted by teachers who, at best, have received a few rudiments of genetic psychology, but who are unaware of the theory and relevant methods of sociology and social psychology.
 15. In actual fact, scientific knowledge, as presented in school, is usually rid of the uncertainties and reservations which invariably (in all the sciences) accompany scientific statements; as a result, knowledge is presented as a rational, formalized dogma (Perret-Clermont, 1982).
 16. Some plausible examples would include the concepts of ‘quanta’, ‘electromagnetism’, ‘DNA’, etc.
 17. Some prototypical objects of the ‘representational’ expert-knowledge kind would include notions such as reproduction, ecology, evolution, glaciation, democracy, market, development, human rights, peace, etc.
 18. We are referring here, in particular, to the phenomena of assimilation, adaptation and defalcation, which are the effect of the social anchoring of social representations.
 19. This preliminary analysis is based on representative samples of students in the last years of secondary schooling, taken from twelve countries out of the thirty-five countries covered by the study. They come from the five regions recognized by UNESCO, namely Africa (Central African Republic, Kenya and Senegal), Latin America and the Caribbean (Chile, Colombia and Nicaragua), Asia and the Pacific (India and Philippines), Arab States (Lebanon and Tunisia) and western, central and eastern Europe (Spain and Slovakia). In order to follow the general approach adopted in this review, the analysis presented has been moderated in three areas. In the first place, the subjects and interpretations have mostly privileged psycho-sociological considerations, at the heart of the socio-genetic constructivist didactical approaches. Secondly, the quantitative analysis has been kept generally unsophisticated; while the study of latent structures and commonalities is carried out using the techniques of factorial and hierarchical analysis, the explanatory analyses, almost exclusively based on descriptive or bivariate statistics, have been given a more conventional and *exploratory* character. Multivariate explanatory and predictive statements, as well as modeling are currently being analyzed in more detail. Lastly, this analysis mainly

concerns one of the three categories of the study, namely students, while interactions with teachers and parents are not systematically presented.

20. For this purpose, data collection instruments were pre-tested in thirty-one countries in different regions of the world in order to take better account of possible socio-cultural, semantic and terminological variations.
21. One point which deserves to be discussed in more detail is the difficulty, in cross-cultural studies, of comparing knowledge, despite adaptations, which often refer to very different social environments and institutional frameworks. In order as far as possible to maintain the cross-cultural relevance, the UNESCO:IBE study does not deal with representations or knowledge related to local social institutions (such as the parliament, the president, the constitution, universal suffrage, etc.), but looks at normative functions (such as universal participation, political competition, control of the exercise of power, peaceful settlement of conflicts, etc.), which can be fulfilled by a great variety of institutions in different societies.
22. As Manuel Antonio Garretón (in Albala-Bertrand, 1992, p. 28) clearly stated, in most cases, political transitions tend to be incomplete and allow some institutional nodes inherited from the preceding regime to remain active in the emerging regime.
23. These questions are derived from a questionnaire prepared by Alain Clemence and Willem Doise (Guimelli, 1994).
24. This hypothesis will be verified in more detail in the subsequent analysis of the UNESCO:IBE study.
25. The above analysis provides a strategic orientation for a constructivist approach to citizenship education, which is entrusted with the normative principle of the indivisibility of human rights. Rather than multiplying undifferentiated educational messages which may simply be redundant or have no effect on gaps, it would seem important (i) to identify the human rights dimensions which are missing in the field of the ethical-juridical representations of the regime and (ii) to devise ways for allowing learners to be involved in social dynamics linked to the object of the missing dimensions.
26. Although most of the social anchoring of representations are values, the notion of anchoring also covers elements related to paradigms which play an essential role in understanding reality, an example is the representation of time and space.
27. A set of primary conceptions, of dominant ideas, of deeply rooted archetypes shared by a whole culture (Guimelli, 1994).
28. As has been stressed by Giddens (1990), the separation of the notions of time and space and the resulting disconnection of social relationships from specific local contexts have led to the development of a typical structure of Western modernity, i.e. the prevision of future outcomes involving persons situated in different spaces, and who may even be absent today. This system of thought, which nowadays appears so common in the West and allows us to organize the smallest gestures of our daily lives (such as holidays, but also schooling for children and preventive medicine) is far from being taken for granted in all cultures. Several psycho-sociological studies have shown, for instance, how difficult it is to convey the notions of development or growth, corresponding to the Western perception of linear, sequential and abstract time, in cultures which have a circular perception of time, related to local events.
29. The study has utilized two indicators: one refers to a pragmatic situation where a choice has to be made between strategic change and the maintenance of the *status*

quo, while the other reflects the actor's will to intervene on reality in order to bring about a long-term change. The figures between brackets correspond to bivariate correlation coefficients between the variables under consideration; one asterisk besides the figure indicates that the correlation is significant with an error margin of 5% (*), no asterisk means that the correlation is significant with an error level of 1%.

30. Piaget maintains that the cognitive development of a child can be speeded up through co-operative interactions. He did not, unfortunately, study the social conditioners which shape cognitive processes much further.
31. In fact, the cultural response stays rather underneath the symbolic appearances of the conflict of interests, by helping to build up social representations favourable to a pluralist democracy and to economic solidarity. It should always be remembered that, while expressive and symbolic conditions favourable to democracy do constitute one of the conditions of its survival, they will be insufficient without concrete conditions of political, economic and cultural equity.
32. Not all social interactions lead to cognitive development. As has been shown by many experiments in social psychology, only social interactions giving rise to socio-cognitive conflicts—the simultaneous confrontation of different approaches—will lead to significant cognitive reorganization and development. However, as Doise (1993, p. 131) has shown, the socio-cognitive conflict will only assume its restructuring role if the social interaction is fully played out. Interactions which are limited to relational outcomes—in terms of individual agreement or disagreement—without clarifying the reasons for agreement or disagreement, do not fulfil a function of cognitive development. In other words, from the point of view of a group dynamic (including students in a class), it would not be very effective to prevent conflicting arguments from arising, or to settle them too quickly.
33. Some authors (Sampson, 1987) consider that this particular approach to the attribution of responsibilities is characteristic of Western culture. In fact, what appears to be involved is the perception of the causality and change inherent in modernity, of which Western societies are nowadays typical, but not unique. The enhancement of endogenous factors is in fact related to a central feature of the ethos of modernity: the possibility of the intentional control of the world.
34. A study reported by Doise (1993), comparing success among men and women, clearly showed that the explanations for success in the case of men were attributed to skill (internal cause) and for women to chance (external cause).
35. For the time being, this is only a hypothesis, the universality of which still needs checking on a cross-cultural plane.
36. Measured using an index of 'trust in the political authorities in office'.
37. These are very close to what Doise referred to as 'organizing principles in the field of representation' (Clémence et al., in Guimelli, 1994, p. 1230–31).
38. In a general way, as an orientation for decoding reality, rational thinking corresponds to an explanation of reality by establishing functional links between ends and means. According to this instrumental meaning of rational thinking, there is no overall and unique definition of the rationality of an action, because it depends upon actual situations and the role of the actors involved: sometimes they are trying to achieve the least possible disadvantages, sometimes they are attempting to achieve the greatest possible benefits. In the final analysis, instrumental thinking is defined as a way to achieve objectives through social interaction.

39. The rationalist orientation has been measured by an index indicating a preference for deferring rewards related to an action for the purpose of maximizing them in the future.
40. The questions selected constitute a single cluster belonging to a single factor which represents 47% of dispersion; the Cronbach α is 0.67.
41. We will try to verify this hypothesis in subsequent analysis.
42. Ronald Inglehart (1996) develops this point in detail and reaches the conclusion that there is a generation shift in the sense of a 'loss of respect for authority'.
43. At the third International Conference on Social Representation (Aix-en-Provence, France, 1996), on a proposal by the Laboratory of Social Psychology of the University of Geneva, directed by Willem Doise, and by the IBE, a co-ordinated research programme on these subjects was considered by some twenty laboratories working on the psychology of social representations and constructivist didactics in thirteen countries. This research, which is to be conducted in the framework of the regular programmes of the laboratories taking part, is co-ordinated by the Laboratory of Social Psychology of the University of Geneva. The IBE is making a significant contribution to this initiative by making available its network of experimental projects in education and citizenship established in fifteen countries and its unique expertise in the subject.
44. The UNESCO:IBE study has developed procedures for the diagnosis of civic and political representations which have been validated in thirty-four countries. These methods will be applied during 1997 in experimental educational projects conducted in fifteen countries.

References

- Abric, J.C. 1994. *Pratiques sociales et représentations* [Social practices and representations]. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- , ed. 1996. *Exclusion sociale, insertion et prévention* [Social exclusion, insertion and preventions]. Saint Agne, France, Erès.
- Albala-Bertrand, L. 1992. *Democratic culture and governance*. Baltimore, MD, UNESCO/Hispamerica. 145 p.
- Allal, L., et al. 1992. La métacognition: cadre conceptuel pour l'étude des régulations en situation scolaire [Metacognition: a conceptual framework for the study of regulations in school situations]. *Archives de psychologie* (Geneva), vol. 60, no. 235.
- Ausubel, D.P. 1968. *Educational psychology: a cognitive view*. New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Baker, G., et al. 1981. *Germany transformed: political culture and the new politics*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Berstein, B. 1975. *Langage et classes sociales* [Language and social classes]. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- Bourdieu, P. 1987. *Choses dites* [Sayings]. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- Bourdieu, P.; Boltanski, L.. 1965. *Un art moyen : essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie* [Average art: the social uses of photography]. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- Bourdieu, P.; Darbel, A. 1969. *L'amour de l'art* [The love of art]. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.

- Bourdieu, P.; Passeron, J.-C. 1964. *Les héritiers : les étudiants et la culture* [The heirs: students and culture]. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- ; —. 1970. *La reproduction : éléments pour une théorie du système d'enseignement* [Reproduction: elements for a theory of teaching system]. Paris, Éditions de Minuit.
- Chomsky, N. 1975. *Reflections on language*. New York, Phantom Books.
- Claxton, G. 1991. *Educating the inquiring mind: the challenge for school science*. London, Harvester.
- Clémence, A.; Doise, W. 1994. Prises de positions et principes organisateurs des représentations sociales [Attitudes and organizing principles for social representations]. In: Guimelli, C., ed. *Structures et transformations des représentations sociales*. Neuchâtel, Switzerland; Paris, Delachaux & Niestlé.
- Dilthey, W. 1911. *Théorie des conceptions du monde* [Theory of world views]. Paris, 1946. [Translated from German: *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, 1911.]
- Doise, W. 1992. *Représentations sociales et analyse de données* [Social representations and data analysis]. Grenoble, France, Presses universitaires de Grenoble.
- . 1993. *Logiques sociales dans le raisonnement* [Social logic in reasoning]. Neuchâtel, Switzerland, Delachaux & Niestlé.
- Dubois, N. 1987. *La psychologie du contrôle* [The psychology of control]. Grenoble, France, Presses universitaires de Grenoble.
- Festinger, L. 1957. *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Princeton, NJ, Evanston Row.
- Flament, C. 1994. Structure, dynamique et transformation des représentations sociales [Structure, dynamics and changes in social representations]. In: Abric, J.C., ed. *Pratiques sociales et représentations*. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Gadamer, H.G. 1975. *Truth and method*. Rev. ed. 1993. New York, Continuum.
- Gagné, R.M. 1965. *Les principes fondamentaux de l'apprentissage : application à l'enseignement* [The basic principles of learning: applications for teaching]. Montreal, Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Giordan, A. 1987. *Les origines du savoir* [The origins of knowledge]. Neuchâtel, Switzerland; Paris, Delachaux & Niestlé.
- . 1995. New models for the learning process: beyond constructivism? *Prospects* (Geneva; Paris, UNESCO-IBE), vol. 25, no. 93, p. 101-18.
- Giordan, A.; Girault, Y., eds. 1996. *The new learning models*. Nice, France, Z' Éditions.
- Giordan, A.; Martinand, J.L., eds. 1987. *Modeles et simulation* [Models and simulation]. Chamonix, France, Centre Jean Franco.
- Giddens, A. 1976. *New rules of sociological method: a positive critique of interpretative sociologies*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
- . 1990. *The consequences of modernity*. Oxford, U.K., Polity Press.
- Guimelli, C., ed. 1994. *Structures et transformations des représentations sociales* [Structures and changes in social representations]. Neuchâtel, Switzerland; Paris, Delachaux & Niestlé.
- Gurevich, A. 1976. Time as a problem of cultural history. In: UNESCO. *Cultures and time*, p. 229-45. Paris.
- Guruvadoo, P. 1995. Teachers and multicultural education in Mauritius. In: Gagliardi, R., ed. *Teacher training and multiculturalism: national studies*, p. 160-61. Paris, UNESCO. (IBE Studies in comparative education.)
- Habermas, J. 1987. *Logique des sciences sociales* [The logic of the social sciences]. Paris,

- Presses universitaires de France.
- . 1979. *Communication and the evolution of society*. Boston, MA, Beacon Press.
- Heider, F. 1958. *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York, Wiley.
- Heunks, F. 1990. From personal to political. In: Jennings, K., et al., eds. *Continuities in political action : a longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies*. Berlin; New York, Walter Gruyter.
- Inglehart, R. 1981. Post-materialism in an environment of insecurity. *American political science review* (Washington, D.C.), no. 75.
- . 1990a. *Cultural shift in advanced industrial societies*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- . 1990b. Political value orientations. In: K. Jennings, et al., eds. *Continuities in political action : a longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies*. Berlin; New York, Walter Gruyter.
- . 1995. Changing values: economic development and political change. *International social science journal* (Paris, UNESCO), no. 145.
- . 1996. Generational shifts in citizenship behaviours: the role of education and economic security in the declining respect for authority in industrial society. *Prospects* (Geneva; Paris; UNESCO-IBE), vol. 26, no. 100.
- Jennings, K.; Niemi, R. 1981. *Generations and politics*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Jennings, K.; et al., eds. 1990. *Continuities in political action : a longitudinal study of political orientations in three Western democracies*. Berlin; New York, Walter Gruyter.
- Jodelet, D. 1989. *Les représentations sociales* [Social representations]. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Kolberg, L. 1972. Developmental and educational psychology. *Educational psychologist* (Hillsdale, NJ), vol. 10, no. 1.
- Khun, T.S. 1970. *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press.
- Langevin, P.; Wallon, H. 1946. *Projet de réforme de l'enseignement* [Draft educational reform]. Paris, Ministère de l'éducation nationale.
- Lipset, S.M. 1960. *Political man: the social bases of politics*. New York, Doubleday.
- Maffesoli, M. 1996. *Éloge de la raison sensible* [In praise of sensitive reason]. Paris, Grasset.
- Martí, E. 1996. Piaget and school education: a socio-cultural challenge. *Prospects* (Geneva: Paris, UNESCO-BIE), vol. 26, no. 1, p. 141–58.
- Merton, R.K. 1949. *Social theory and social structure*. Glencoe, IL, The Free Press.
- Moliner, P. 1996. *Images et représentations sociales* [Social images and representations]. Grenoble, France, Presses universitaires de Grenoble.
- Moscovici, S. 1961. *La psychoanalyse, son image et son public* [Psychoanalysis: its image and its public]. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- . 1984. De la science au sens commun [From science to common sense]. In: Moscovici, S.; Hewstone, D., eds. *Psychologie sociale*. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Moscovici, S.; Doise, W. 1994. *Conflict and consensus: a general theory of collective decisions*. London, Sage.
- Perret-Clermont, A.N. 1982. Décontextualisation et recontextualisation du savoir dans l'enseignement des mathématiques à des jeunes élèves [Decontextualization and recontextualization of knowledge in the teaching of mathematics to young students].

Interactions didactiques, Recherches (Paris), no. 1, p. 1–33.

- Piaget J. 1948. *The psychology of intelligence*. Lanham, MD, Littlefield Adams. (Reprinted 1981.)
- . 1965. *The moral judgement of the child*. New York, The Free Press.
- . 1976. *Psychologie et pédagogie* [Psychology and pedagogy]. Paris, Denoel.
- Roqueplo, P. 1974. *Le Partage du savoir* [Sharing knowledge]. Paris, Seuil.
- Sampson, E. 1987. A critical constructionist view of psychology and personhood. In: Stam, H.J., et al., eds. *The analysis of psychological theory*. Washington, DC, Hemisphere Publishing Corp.
- Schaefer, G. 1996. Zigzag learning as method of concept formation. In: Giordan, A.; Girault, Y., eds., op. cit.
- Taylor, D.M.; Jaggi, V. 1974. Ethnocentrism and causal attribution in a South Indian context. *Journal of cross-cultural psychology* (Newbury Park, CA), no. 5.
- Vygotsky, L. 1981. The genesis of higher mental functions. In: Wertsch, J., ed. *The concept of activities in Soviet psychology*. Armonk, NY, Sharpe.
- . 1934. *Thought and language*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Wallon, H. 1925. *L'enfant turbulent* [The disturbed child]. Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
- Weber, M. 1949. *Max Weber on the methodology of the social sciences*. Glencoe, IL, The Free Press.
- Zetterberg, H. 1965. *On theory and verification in sociology*. Totowa, NJ, The Bedminster Press.

PART II

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN PRACTICE

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN PRACTICE

**BUILDING UP A NEW CITIZEN IN
A POST-TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY:
AN EDUCATIONAL APPROACH
IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC¹**

Petr Pitha

Although such concepts as peace, human rights, democracy, etc., might be considered as fixed and widely understood, it has been repeatedly shown that all of them are continually influenced by the context in which they are used. In order to understand the problem of introducing a type of education covering these themes in a country just beginning its convalescence after several decades of a totalitarian regime, it first seems necessary to point out at least the main features of the socio-psychological context in which a renewed civic education is to be built.

Soon after the fall of the communist regime, its harmful influences became apparent at two levels. On the surface level, the brutal crimes connected with the Stalinist period of the 1940s and 1950s became the focus of attention. The stories from prisons and camps will linger forever as shocking facts. This period and the situations it created, like the brutality of Nazism, are not accidental but represent a permanent latent threat. At any time, similar horrors may appear again under different banners—in fact, they have already appeared—and therefore citizens should remain alert.

Original language: English

Petr Pitha (Czech Republic)

Doctoral degree in history and linguistics from Charles University, Prague. Formerly Minister of Education and now head of the civic education department of the teacher training faculty at Charles University. Author of the new programme for primary and secondary schools, based on a new approach to education and its curriculum, which was used in the Czech Republic from 1992 to 1994. He has worked as a visiting researcher at the Netherlands Institute for advanced studies in the Humanities. Author of three books and more than 200 articles.

What seems, however, to be more important is the deeper level of influence of the totalitarian ideology, which shaped mentalities, value ordering and the behaviour of huge numbers of people. In fact, the two or three generations of communist regime resulted in the creation of a particular lifestyle and mentality.²

What appears striking is the dreadful heritage of damage to human behaviour, which is much more insidious than the weakened or collapsing economy. In contrast with other dimensions of social life, such as legislation or economy, which have a rather technical nature and may be changed quite rapidly through more or less revolutionary changes, the mentality of people survives inside them with a strong resilience. Although the institutional structure of a society may have a striking influence on social life, changes in culture take place at a much slower pace. In fact, the full recovery from totalitarian influences on individual behaviour will probably require two or more generations.

Meanwhile, the change in mentalities could evolve through very strange mutations where past qualities are not really modified but only adjusted to a new situation. Many of the attitudes which are now the subject of criticism correspond to old orientations, vital in the past for conducting the totalitarian regime, and which have now been given every chance to disappear. The 'mafias' are a good example: their existence involves patterns typical of prison-like communities, where undercover operations, specific codes of behaviour, chains of friends helping each other to survive or to pursue interests, etc., seem stronger than ever amidst the turmoil of transition.

This is the context which should be considered when devising new values and attitudes for forming a new citizenry. Among a wide variety of prevailing counter-values, the following seem particularly relevant: the negative attitude of citizens toward the State which leads to selfish and careless attitudes towards public property; an overwhelming distrust among people; the lingering hesitation to speak one's mind and to act freely; the need to stress the smallest of differences as a basis for self-identification after having suffered long-term uniformity; the low quality of the work force resulting from uniformity of average pay; and, last but not least, the loss of many sociogenic prerequisites resulting from a life framed in a lie and an ideological fiction, where the very human and positive qualities of trust and honesty and truthfulness had lost not only their prestige but even their very meaning.

A quick survey of these phenomena indicates that it will not be easy to find a proper solution to civic education problems simply by introducing well-tried programmes from Western European or other traditionally democratic States. A half-century of developmental differences are at work. This has unfortunately been confirmed by many unsuccessful attempts by Western experts in the field of civic education. Their brilliant talks in seminars have often remained unintelligible because of their inapplicability to the local situation. In a first analysis, it could be thought that the problem resulted from the evident priority given to the technical part of democracy, to its functioning and to the skills necessary for participating in it. Later, what appeared as more important was the distant (often subconscious) position towards the development of an abstract programme


directed from the top with such democratic notions as structure, functioning or simply the State. Motivation towards this rather indoctrinal approach had been a bitter experience under communism where the goal was to form individuals who would become easily manageable parts of the social-State machinery.

It became clear that to deal with the social specificity of the transitional situation it was necessary introduce a completely new approach to civic education. In a first approximation, the following basic principles appeared meaningful to build the new programme:

- Civic education is an education for individuals aimed at building up a civil and political society. From this it follows that civic education should be oriented towards human values. However, the importance of instrumental democratic education should not be neglected because it gives value-oriented education the possibility of countering a new kind of indoctrination.
- Civic education should deal with elementary principles of human existence and co-existence; for this reason it should not be treated simply as a complex separate subject, but should also be a dimension integrated into other school subjects.
- Civic education subjects should serve as an integrating curriculum bridge helping to create a tissue of knowledge from scattered and fragmentary information arising from within specific subjects in the humanities and natural sciences.
- The locus of a given school in a given community and region should be stressed in order to proceed from the local social roots of its structures and institutions and move from there to its highest point.

With these principles in mind, the civic education programme for the secondary education schools (ages 11 to 15) in the Czech Republic was modeled as follows. Material from various disciplines contributing to the education of a self-confident and responsible citizen was to be organized as a whole in two *structural planes* evolving around *two axes* (see Figure 1). The *horizontal axis*—representing *local tradition and culture*—connects a *starting point* (at the level of the *family* and the *home*) with a target point (at the level of the *country* and the *State*) passing through intermediary notions such as the *municipality*, the *region*, the *European Union* and the *world*. This axis *becomes a plane* by being framed between *two embracing loops*: *economy* on one side and *law* on the other. Both of them are closely related to local historical and cultural patterns. The *vertical axis* starts with the notion of *self* and *growth*, and ends up at the notions of *community* and *society*. This axis exemplifies the way *towards the individual's self-determination* as accomplished by him/her finding a unique and proper role in society. This axis is *made a plane* also by two embracing parameters which represent the *environment* in which personal development takes place. The environment is presented, on one side, by the *ecological* dimension, which corresponds to the interfaces between nature and society; on the other side we find the *society*, which is described in terms of political and socio-logical dimensions. The upward thrust of the central axis shows the growth of responsibility and solidarity from an initial status of egocentrism.

FIGURE 1: Content model of civic education




One might wonder where ethics is in this model? In fact it is embedded in all dimensions; the nucleus of the model is a core of ethics irradiating outward towards the whole model. In fact, it seems that abstract moralizing has little effect, while explanations of real-life situations and evident phenomena may lead to desired goals. From a developmental viewpoint it seems very difficult to deal explicitly with ethics in a period of emotional turbulence. Moral principles in rather black-and-white terms have to be clearly stated, but a more in-depth analysis and learning seems to correspond to a later stage when rational reflection is possible.

The above model defines the orientations to be followed by the teacher, as well as what is desirable as a final achievement by the student. The didactic ordering of elements is, of course, variable. According to the student's age and his/her capability, which undergoes profound changes between the eleventh and fifteenth year of age, simpler parts of all disciplines involved are presented in the first grade of the secondary school and are gradually elaborated in the following grades. In the organization of content, one follows the old rule of didactics formulated by Comenius, that is to proceed from elementary and familiar elements towards complicated, abstract and unknown ones. Thus, the learning process starts with the notion of *home* and *family*, considered from different viewpoints representing the entire axis of the model: so, for instance, we may speak about simple household economics, mentioning legal aspects related to family life, but also

addressing the environmental setting of the home and the child's role in the society. At the beginning of the process, more conceptual material comes from the horizontal plane of the model and later on from the vertical plane.

Generally speaking, the didactic sequencing treatment of the conceptual materials involved in the model appears in Figure 2. The strategy is simple: during the first two years the child's home horizon is broadened; at the age of 13, in accordance with puberty-related changes of interest, individuality is given priority. From the discovery of the 'me-myself', education leads towards the notion of society and the individual's role in it. At the end of the programme, however, all parts are brought together into a final integrated whole (activity represented by the dotted lines in Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: Curriculum strategy for secondary schools



Once the conceptual programme was prepared and ready for experimental implementation, several further considerations appeared necessary to establish coherent democratic education. Firstly, it was evident that the programme for secondary schools required some preparation to have already taken place in the elementary schools; in fact, as it appeared later, what was needed was a rebuilding of the whole elementary school curriculum. Secondly, as a consequence of the scattered structure of secondary education, it appeared necessary to envisage an integrative discipline—civic education—as one school subject, ensuring bridges on this matter for all matters in the programme and curriculum of the secondary school. A third demand consisted of prolonging civic education into the higher

secondary-school level, university and as a lifelong process. The first three demands were answered.³ The fourth, because of the variety of school types at the higher secondary level, is not yet completed.

The basic idea of civic education in the elementary school is not to make it separate as a special subject but to prepare the necessary prerequisites for the secondary school programme. We believe that knowledge and understanding are not based on abstract concepts but rather on bodily-anchored experiences; thus, teaching in elementary school points out the notions everybody knows. Without knowing what *hunger, bread, pain, tears, smile, help* and so on are, it is almost impossible to learn later about *solidarity, international humanitarian assistance* and other rather abstract notions of this nature. The elementary school programme is, in fact, devoted to building basic frames of reference based on cross-cultural symbols and archetypes which should enable teachers, at higher levels of education, to communicate meaningfully about human values, attitudes and interactions.

The main idea of civic education on the third and higher levels of education is that it cannot be maintained as an undivided integrated school subject, but must be given a form of social sciences propedeutics.

Some problems encountered during the implementation of the new programme are worthy of mention. The major one, by far, is that there are only a few teachers able to deal with such a programme. This shortcoming lies not only in the obvious fact that present-day teachers have not been trained for this kind of teaching, but also because they have not mastered a modern 'dialogical' approach to their students. Their problem is much more profound, because their personalities have for a long time been moulded to live in a certain type of world which has suddenly disappeared and now, just like any other members of our society, they must try to find new ways of living. To put it in other words, the whole society—children, adults, old people, students together with teachers and those who are retired—need to learn new ways. This socio-cultural endeavour will take a long time, such a long time, in fact, that the transition period will become for many people a significant part of their life story. All this means that during the transition there will be a period (a generation?) dominated by a certain kind of mentality which is definitely far from what we could consider as a standard or ideal style of living. We must anticipate this.

Another problem concerns parents. After previous experiences with civic education, which in totalitarian regimes always served as an efficient tool for indoctrination, there is a permanent subconscious feeling of rejection towards any such type of subject in the school system. Of course, in such a context, any mistake in policy implementation may cause deep setbacks in any progress.

Another problem might be that vigorous interest groups or movements may attack the balanced core programme because it is not paying enough attention to this or that particular minority or interest. An unsettled social context is difficult terrain for implementing a calm, rational programme.

There are, however, a great deal of opportunities. Starting—in a sense—at

the beginning, we have a chance to concentrate on the important things, basic issues and elementary concepts. We may avoid some pseudo-problems on which Western Europe is wasting time and energy. We may also avoid some of the problems associated with an affluent society. We may be at least partially successful in the struggle against a consumer approach to life, vandalism and drug dependency, because we have the chance to base education on positive and creative values from earliest childhood. Fighting against wrong behaviour is mostly ineffective because of its restrictive and negative style. Instead, if everyday, ordinary life is revealed as having sense, this may create admirable, joyful, broadly satisfying human aspirations.

We want to resuscitate democratic life and we intend to provide people with the human qualities which will enable them to build it.

Notes

1. This is not the place to describe how all these changes took place and to describe in detail the striking differences in life expectations, attitudes and desires resulting from the different experiences of people born in earlier times and who remember pre-war democracy, the Stalin period of the 1950s, the episodes of self-identification, e.g. 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and so on. The duration of the ideological pressure and early-age imprinting seem to be decisive in bringing about differences between generations.
2. The biblical exodus from Egyptian tyranny and the forty years of pilgrimage to the promised land of freedom is an archetypal example of the transition from a slave mentality into a mentality of fully self-determining and free people.
3. The programme for elementary schools described in P. Pitha and Z. Helus, *Navrh Pojeti*, Prague, Obecne skoly, 1993, is already broadly used. The programme for secondary schools described in P. Pitha and Z. Helus, *Navrh Pojeti*, Prague, Obcanske Skoly, 1994, is in the phase of experimental implementation. First results seem very promising. For the real evaluation of these programmes and their further elaboration it is, however, necessary to wait until at least two cohorts have undergone the complete programme and the influence on the next stage of education is known.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP AND RECONCILIATION IN NICARAGUA

Terencio García

Nicaraguan history has been plagued by wars, both national and international, which have prevented the country from ever experiencing long periods of complete peace. It is worth drawing attention to this central fact in our national history, since it lies at the root of a series of values and behaviours which constitute the main challenge to the establishment of a democratic system, rooted not only in political institutions, but also in the mentalities of the citizens.

The focus of education for citizenship thus rests on the eradication of personal, civic and political attitudes, which for a long time have guided public and private behaviour. Although nowadays these attitudes appear to be clearly receding, they are still latent in many social sectors. They include individual and institutionalized corruption, political apathy, ill-treatment of human beings, lack of punctuality, fraud, *machismo*, family irresponsibility, improvisation and short-term approaches, contempt for the law and for authority, the lack of a sense of community, the non-fulfilment of commitments, family preference and nepotism, intolerance and a lack dedication to public service, paternalism and submission to authority, inconstancy and lack of perseverance.

It is important to bear these attitudes in mind, since they directly affect our behaviour by establishing approaches, goals and objectives. This is the reason why society in general and education in particular are trying to develop new values, which will spare future generations from following the same historical, war-ridden course as we have so far.

In this context and in view of these attitudes, education for citizenship is

Original language: Spanish

Terencio García (Nicaragua)

Doctoral degree in legal science from the Loyola University, New Orleans. As a lawyer, he has worked in several governmental and private institutions specializing in international relations. Since 1995, he has been director of the Centro de Educación para la Democracia de Nicaragua, which is devoted to training and to the development of curricula aimed at building democratic citizenship.

hoping to propose other guiding models through school and out-of-school practices, such as racial tolerance, justice, respect and forgiveness, which form the basis of any reconciliation with yesterday's foes.

The functions of education for citizenship

In Nicaragua, the education system's concern for citizenship is only very recent. It started in 1992, when the present administration saw the need to reactivate civic and social training—which had not been taught since 1974—as a means of strengthening the democratic process begun in 1990. The efforts which are being made in this respect are still fragmentary and lacking in the sort of co-ordination which might lead to comprehensive approaches and solutions to the country's educational problems. The system is currently being redesigned with a view to achieving a greater degree of coherence, which has not prevented significant policies from being developed in some of its constituent bodies. Thus, the subsystem of public education is initiating changes in the syllabuses of all primary school subjects. It has also begun to tackle secondary education with the task of conceptually and methodologically redesigning the civic training syllabus, in which the concepts and aims of education for citizenship and active and participatory methods have now been introduced.

As we said above, education in favour of values supporting the principles of human dignity, liberty and justice constitutes a common thread running through the whole of national education. Values such as those contained in civic and social training underlie all the subjects taught to Nicaraguan students. With regard to the conceptual aspects, these are structured around an understanding of democracy as a legal political system, as a civil society which takes shape through the participation by individuals in self-government and in the political and economic processes of society. In addition, democracy is understood as a form of living and co-existing, which affects all the rules and areas of social life. Education for citizenship is looked upon as an education for liberty and for peace, in which students learn the virtues of dialogue and mutual respect.

It was therefore thought desirable to create a place in the educational curriculum where issues responding to these educational policies can be dealt with. It is interesting to note that, as the starting point of a reform of the curriculum based on a search for national reconciliation, representatives of all the various ideological tendencies of the country prepared what was to be a framework document, defining the philosophy and scope of education for citizenship. The official introduction of the subject of civic and social training in the country's secondary school curriculum marks the beginning of the teaching of the principles of education for citizenship in our country's schools.

Initially, the programme was not as well received as had been hoped. In the light of still recent history, many teachers were led to believe that the so-called 'democratic message' was merely another attempt by some covert political party to indoctrinate Nicaraguan students. This negative reaction has deeper roots, however,

which need to be understood. It is the outcome of a culture of mistrust which is present in all the social, political and economic strata of society. Nicaraguans, in general, look upon novelty with scepticism. In the political field, the citizen who has so often been deceived shows even greater mistrust. In the face of this initial response, there was a need to demonstrate the desired principles in practice.

The framework for the curriculum was prepared by a group of personalities drawn from Nicaraguan society, representing all political and ideological sections of the country (left, centre and right). It was first submitted to the civic training teachers in Nicaragua's secondary schools for their comments, which were subsequently incorporated in the final document. Thus, the new curriculum is the outcome of a contribution made both by political personalities and by those who will be using it as a guide in their teaching practice. The teacher trainers at the Centre of Education for Democracy prepared a first draft of the civic and social training curriculum for secondary education, which was used as a working document with civic training teachers meeting at several seminars. Once the points of view of the teachers had been incorporated, the final document—which is currently in use—was circulated to the final recipients, i.e. the actual course teachers.

In the same way, the documents for the student councils of Nicaragua's secondary schools were first prepared in draft form for extensive consultation. The Programme of Student Councils is a new project introduced by the Ministry of Education through the Centre of Education for Democracy, which is intended to provide secondary school students with an opportunity to experience different aspects of the democratic process from an early age, as one way of preparing them for integration in Nicaraguan society. The project consists in setting up a council in every secondary school which would be a replica of the government of the republic. Once the council has been set up, the students practice the principles of democratic life (i.e. student representation and participation, competition for authority, decision-making, negotiated settlement of conflicts of interest, etc.), through their activities carried out in the school and in the surrounding community.

The changing cultural atmosphere within the school

The extended consultation approach has gradually produced a change of attitudes among civic training teachers with regard to the message of democracy and reconciliation. Teachers are constantly putting in requests, during forums, debates, ad hoc activities, seminars, workshops, conferences, etc., for programmes that will give them a more effective opportunity to set about building a democratic culture. This change in attitudes, which has been reflected in a sectoral survey,¹ has spread to other groups within the school, especially school principals and students in general.

The change which has taken place in teachers' mentalities has assumed the form of a greater willingness to engage in dialogue with students, to test new

methods, to submit new study plans to the school authorities, to discuss new curricular and methodological approaches with their colleagues, etc. This more open attitude is probably the outcome of a greater awareness that education can only be strengthened through a common effort. The interaction between teachers working in the same establishment, which appears to be a decisive factor in any successful outcome, is also beginning to be observed in the relations between civics teachers and the school principals. The civics teachers are sharing their new knowledge with the principals. And while at first these principals reacted with mistrust to the ideas put forward by the teachers, this attitude is now also changing. Nevertheless, the principals have been able to observe the effect of the democratic methods on students, resulting in greater participation. Meanwhile, the Centre of Education for Democracy has worked directly with the principals, keeping them informed and supporting the curricular and methodological changes implied by education for citizenship.

What is more striking, however, is that the greatest change has occurred among secondary school students. In Nicaragua, students have been accustomed to the traditional didactic method, whereby a student was merely a depository of the teacher's 'instruction'. Any criticism, creativity or self-management on the part of the students were attitudes and abilities which could not be recognized, or were simply rejected, since students, and therefore future citizens, were expected to be passive subjects. Education for citizenship is aimed at—and has succeeded to a certain extent—training a type of student with a different attitude. Three years after the introduction of the new programme, it may be said that these aims can be achieved, although it should be remembered that developing a democratic culture has to be a medium- to long-term project, which implies in fact developing a new generation of citizens, a process which does not depend only on schooling. Educating for citizenship implies a change of values and of the way society is perceived, a commitment to democratic practice as a form of political life, but also as a form of personal life in family and social relations. This is a social transformation which, alongside the school system, has to involve institutional practices, communication and information, as well as economic activities, which it would not be realistic to expect to happen within a short period of time.

Nevertheless, after three years, it is possible to see some significant signs of the change occurring in secondary school students who have been taught education for citizenship. Perhaps the most striking sign is the opinion expressed by students regarding the importance of democracy, tolerance, community work, etc. Generally speaking, students appear to have understood the message of democracy, even though it is still too early to be sure whether it has been truly integrated mentally as a new way of life. The Centre of Education for Democracy is constantly assessing these changes, from the point of view of their acceptance and depth.

The changes produced by the development of civic and social training programmes may also be observed in the schools themselves. Obviously, if a change has been noted in each of the players in the school system, it may logically be assumed that changes will also be noticeable in the actual establishments. It is

worth pointing out, however, that changes in each of the players individually will not necessarily be translated into a change of the same magnitude at the institutional level. The main reason for this is that changes at the institutional level (in the school establishment) are the product not only of the players of the school system (intrinsic factors), but also of the community, the authorities, the socio-economic situation, etc. (extraneous factors).

Despite the presence of extraneous factors, such as the more open attitudes of local authorities, any changes in the educational institutions are still essentially intrinsic in character. Furthermore, it may be observed that schools are not only experiencing internal changes, but are playing an important role in reactivating community life. Civic training teachers often play a role as the promoters of joint civic projects undertaken by the schools and the community. The result of this activity is that they are perceived as agents of change within their social group.

The development of a democratic social climate: a prospective challenge

It would be very difficult to educate for citizenship or democracy within an education system in which democracy was not applied at the highest levels of the administration. In order to educate for democracy in any authentic or genuine manner, the education system itself has to respond to a series of challenges which can be met to the extent that those in charge are really determined to achieve it. The top authorities responsible for education have to maintain consistency between what they say and what they do.

The democratic convictions of the authorities are reflected and may be measured through certain features that are inherent to any democratic culture. One very important indicator is the extent to which authority remains accessible to the different players of the education subsystem. This accessibility demonstrates the authority's intention to introduce policies with the support of those who will be affected by those policies. Another aspect is the form of treatment prevailing among the players of the education subsystem, which should be permeated by a spirit of egalitarianism. Above all, teachers must be treated with the respect they deserve as the educators of society as a whole. Even though the problem of low salaries is common to teachers in all countries, it is important that at least they should be treated with esteem.

In order to achieve genuine education for citizenship, it is important not only that democratic attitudes should be adopted by the schoolteacher and the higher authorities, but these same principles should also be followed by the middle-level management of the education subsystems. They should not act authoritatively with regard to teachers. Any initiative in terms of democratic education in the formal sector has to take account of what is commonly referred to as the 'cascade' technique, that is to say, the process whereby programmes are invariably initiated by the highest authorities, who tell the intermediate authorities what to do, who finally go about instructing the schoolteachers.

The risk in this 'cascade' of information and authority is that it can take a long time to reach the operational levels of the education system, in other words, the class teachers and students. It therefore appears preferable in any society which is trying—and needs—to consolidate democracy to take action simultaneously at the grassroots level of the system. If this process is to be effective, it requires a special effort of co-ordination, which has been given a deliberate place in our society. It is essential that the work of teachers should be shared with other players in the education system. A considerable amount of work needs to be done, therefore, with regional delegations, with intermediate authorities of the education subsystem, with school principals, etc., in order to ensure that they all understand and accept what the teachers are trying to do with the students. If not, the teachers' work may be frustrated owing to a lack of support in the higher reaches of the education subsystem.

Lastly, the Education for Citizenship Programme should be seen as a long-term project, a project aiming at improvement of the human condition and the full development of a nation. This means that educating for citizenship in Nicaragua has to be envisaged as a political project marshalling all the country's social forces. The school system alone cannot succeed in this task, and its specific contribution will be diminished, or completely negated, if there is not a more committed participation by all the active sectors of regional and national life. Thus, apart from the education system, it is essential to involve the private business sector, trade union organizations, intellectuals, politicians, members of the judiciary, parliament and the international community based in Nicaragua in the process of building democracy. At a time of rapid and widespread communication, it is also essential that the communication and information media should support the cultural democratization programmes in order to ensure that the message is disseminated to all sectors.

While there is no doubt that the economic strength of a country can be measured in terms of a favourable balance of payments and reduced external debt and public sector deficits, unless there is a real creative and operational commitment on the part of all social sectors to the task of building the nation, such as can be engendered by a sound, coherent education system, it would seem difficult to obtain the civic qualities of honesty, solidarity and constructive criticism, or the instrumental abilities required to ensure lasting human development. A national pact for democracy undoubtedly constitutes the most important condition required for the persistence, consolidation and effectiveness of the process as a whole. Thanks to its acquired experience, the education subsystem can play an essential role in this field.

Note

1. These results are quantifiable, as may be observed from the comments of persons connected in one way or another with the 'Roger Rizo' Autonomous National Institute.

**CITIZENSHIP AND
PRODUCTIVE EDUCATION IN
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

Abel Koulaninga

As a general rule, citizenship education is best offered within the framework of the humanities, as part of general education. But is this any reason for offering a lower standard of education for civic and political life in vocational training institutions? In the Central African Republic, the answer to this question tends to be 'no'. There are two reasons for this, and they are complementary. Firstly, from the ethical point of view, all young people should be given the same opportunity to play an effective part in the life of society, in the form of an education in the values of democracy and human rights. Secondly, from the functional viewpoint, those who undertake vocational training will often—particularly in the case of productive training, e.g. agriculture or stock breeding—have a decisive influence on the lives of their fellow citizens. It is therefore vital that their working practices should be guided not just by personal interest but by underlying values based on the ideas of co-operation and service.

The following study was conducted in two technical schools involved in the programme designed to bring vocational training curricula closer to real life. The schools selected were the Rural Development Technical College in Grimari, where the curriculum covers rural engineering and forestry and thus offers a range of practical courses for agricultural specialists; and the Stock-Breeding Technical College, which trains specialists in this area of activity.

Original language: French

Abel Koulaninga (Central African Republic)

Doctoral degree in educational sciences in 1987 from René Descartes University, Paris. Teaches educational psychology and group dynamics at the University of Bangui. Secretary-General of the Commission of the Central African Republic for UNESCO. Among the many books and articles that he has written, particular mention must be made of *La situation de l'intégration socio-éducative des Pygmées en Afrique centrale* [The situation of social and educational integration among the Pygmies of Central Africa] (1995).

Citizens as entrepreneurs

The training provided by both of these centres aims to give future producers the ability to look at a situation and to identify the problems facing a farm or animal breeding centre. It also aims at enabling them to devise solutions, to plan and organize their implementation and to evaluate the results. The vocational training curriculum combines basic general education (mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history, geography and economics) with production and management techniques. As we shall see below, however, in all the practical aspects of the different occupations and during instruction on using the tools associated with them, the school focuses on training citizens as independent producers, enabled by their training to manage any business undertaking in the service of the community.

In the first year, priority is given to practical work, observation and the gathering of information. This information makes it possible to analyse the interactions which occur during combined activities involving work on the farm, in the workshop, in work camps and during the practical working experience organized during the summer holidays.

These activities continue throughout the course and gradually assume their final form through the analysis of the data. In handling the information, the students not only become proficient in processing it and analysing the factors of production but also, and most importantly, learn the ways and means of taking action in that particular environment.

The effect of the students' action on the environment is studied from two angles:

1. From the conventional, technical point of view, students have to concern themselves with action which will enable them to identify the economic and social factors conducive to progress. Future producers must have the knowledge and skills needed to analyse a variety of production situations and find suitable solutions to the problems facing them.
2. Less formally, the students are also able to organize extra-curricular educational activities by forming small student groups or, for example, by organizing information campaigns in different communities to combat AIDS and proposing preventive measures. The students also undertake community development activities, such as providing wells or tapping springs so that the people are provided with a supply of drinking water. Environmental protection is another aspect of this educational action—students encourage the local people to halt the encroachment of the desert, particularly by avoiding bush fires and the uncontrolled depletion of flora and fauna. As a production centre, the school helps destitute children, especially orphans, giving them agricultural produce, fish and animal products. The school thus opens out into the community to assist the local people. Students are thus systematically involved in civic work. Basic principles of civic life, such as self-reliance, concern for others and efficiency are developed in this way.

As we have seen, the vocational training programme teaches basic democratic

principles through civic action in the community, but students also receive lessons in traditional citizenship. The moral education given in both of the schools studied thus makes an effective contribution to inculcating the qualities required by responsible people who have moral attitudes making it possible to live in harmony with their environment (e.g. intellectual integrity, honesty, good human relations, acknowledgement of others as entities having a human value—in a word, respect for human dignity). In addition, other subjects like civic education, philosophy, economics, history and geography provide students with knowledge of their rights and duties. They also teach them about the workings of economic development, with its beneficial and its undesirable side-effects, from the functioning of local micro-economic entities up to macro-economic structures and the world market, where the question of the domination of the weakest by the strongest makes its appearance.

Thus, far from being considered a matter of simple learning, the curricula are designed to pass on democratic values providing a solid foundation for the specialists' vocational training, the aim being to train all-round citizens with a commitment to the fundamental values of free and responsible citizenship. The students are introduced to freedom of speech and opinion, to a spirit of dialogue and tolerance, to power-sharing, to co-operation, to concern for others, to mutual respect, to a concern for justice, to a critical and innovative approach, to integrity and the management of community property. The whole training process helps to increase students' self-reliance and inculcates values that ensure the development of citizenship. The various subjects, organized around common topics, help to promote democratic values, and more especially concern for others, co-operation, peace and human rights, together with civic responsibility, starting with the students' day-to-day relationships within their families and going on to their community, local businesses, their region and country, leading finally to relations with other countries.

These values enable the students to take creative decisions in the jobs they have to do, communicating their ideas and opinions on the various aspects of the management of any activity, individual or collective.

Methods used to provide citizenship education in a working situation

If, as we have seen, it is vital to include education for democratic citizenship and the teaching of values and behaviour patterns as part of vocational training for students who, as a general rule, are interested above all in practical work situations, then the question of teaching methods is crucial. The methods used will make it possible to convey and inculcate ideas by recreating practical situations such as those the students will encounter as citizens and entrepreneurs once their training is over.

The *work experience* method supports citizenship training exactly on these lines. Vocational training in production units provides future specialists with an

opportunity to build up their experience and skills, and to exercise their critical faculties and their creative powers in meetings and discussions where ideas and proposals are put forward. Situations are analysed, attempts are made to solve specific problems, and different cases are considered in small groups, which then compare their conclusions.

A particularly important aspect of these exercises is assessment of the impact of various decisions on the environment, and first and foremost on the local people, especially from the point of view of the benefits or problems that could result from the action being considered. Field surveys are carried out, followed by reports and exchanges of information. A decision is arrived at on joint action to be undertaken, either in the form of a new direction to be given to the production unit or as action to help the community. A critical approach, with all sides showing due consideration for others, is the basis for any action and any idea that is discussed and put into practice.

To give an example, managing the production units set up by both the Rural Development Technical College and by the Stock-Breeding Technical College calls not only for the skills specific to each special field (cattle-raising, fish-farming, agriculture and forestry), but also for the ability to organize the different parts of the production process in a way that takes into account the ideas and knowledge associated with the values with which we are concerned, in a manner that is compatible with a rational, problem-oriented approach likely to improve yields and productivity and foster sound administration.

The future entrepreneurs must be constantly on the look-out for up-to-date information and then apply it. This means that *survey techniques*, guidelines for workshop organization and for conducting meetings, and ways of reducing tensions and ensuring good management must be inculcated quite early on in the training process. This is particularly important in those vocational centres training future producers who will contribute to the economy. These producers, acting as free and informed citizens, will have to assume these responsibilities in any management undertaking, using the vital instruments of knowledge and democratic values with which they have been equipped.

Another approach is based on *partnership*, which brings all those active in the community into contact with vocational training centres, governmental and non-governmental bodies, associations, foundations and organizations working at the local level and having an influence on the development of society. Contributions made in this way establish a synergy and provide an ideal context for the exercise and practice of the values of citizenship.

It should be recognized that the practice of citizenship calls for educational inputs other than the inculcation of values and knowledge. Students receiving vocational training are all individuals with their own biological and emotional make-up, their own motivations, skills and ambitions. The natural tendency towards looking after one's own interests is not conducive to communal living, particularly when there are marked differences of character among the students. In order to encourage communal living and, at the same time, to bring out the skills and aptitudes of each individual, other educational approaches are needed.

Simulations and role play, in many different forms, assist teaching considerably, and are often used in citizenship education courses provided in the vocational training schools involved in the educational renewal programme. Their central premise is the observation that, in group dynamics, taking turns to play different roles leads to adopting different attitudes. For example, one can assume the roles involved in facilitating and co-ordinating a group's efforts in order to define its objectives and the ways of attaining them. In the role play, various situations and functions from real life are reproduced and magnified or singled out. There will be the person who is full of ideas, the co-ordinator, the sceptic, the one who supplies information, the researcher and the secretary. There are also roles relating to the running of community life, e.g. people whose chief concern is for social and emotional well-being and who maintain group morale, those who reduce conflict between different occupational groups, encourage people to express themselves and make everyone feel more secure. The games can also be problem-oriented, for example, countering approaches that are detrimental to productivity and the communal spirit. This method makes it possible to improve self-management and joint management by accumulating knowledge and experience of the different roles, and by gaining insights into the various types of responsibility involved in any business undertaking. Simulation games give participants the opportunity to understand, analyse and propose practical compromises which provide 'experience' of values and human rights. They give students the chance to look at the situation in their own country from both a practical angle and from the point of view of human rights. Dialogue and analysis, which are the instruments of 'simulated interaction', lead students to make an effective commitment to the progress of society through respect for human rights and the practical application of values.

In conclusion, vocational training centres have a role to play as catalysts in democratic life. They should provide opportunities for dialogue and help to encourage a willingness to support the consolidation of values and a commitment of respect for others, solidarity and tolerance, thus giving students a more solid preparation for their work in the socio-economic undertakings in their chosen occupation.

Bibliography

- Central African Republic. Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage. *Programme officiel de formation au Collège technique de développement rural de Grimari*. Bangui, Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage, 1994.
- . *Rapport d'activités du Collège d'élevage de Bouar*. Bangui, Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage, 1992.
- Mucchielli, A. *La psychologie sociale*. Paris, Hachette, 1994.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. *Culture of democracy: a challenge for schools*. Paris, UNESCO, 1995.
- . *Handbook resource and teaching material in conflict resolution, education for human rights, peace and democracy*. Paris, UNESCO, 1994.

INTERACTIVE CITIZENSHIP PROJECTS

FOR SCHOOL-AGE YOUNG PEOPLE

IN NORTHERN EUROPE

*Ruud Veldhuis*¹

Background

Practical experience of situations in which youngsters have to evaluate means to solve problems, decide about the best options and influence others to adopt their course of action may be of a high formative value in any field of learning and an effective complement to the formal intentional curriculum. Learning-by-doing seems to be particularly efficient as a didactic and pedagogical approach in complex situations, such as those represented by the construction of citizenship.

The Dutch Centre for Civic Education has long experience with so-called interactive projects, where the accent lies not so much on the transfer of knowledge as on learning-by-doing. On the following pages, the centre analyses an experience on the utilization of teaching/learning methods based on open inter-school debate among secondary-level students as a means to moulding their democratic orientations and skills.²

The rationale of this kind of interactive projects is many fold:
First, it is important for students to experience the character of the political decision-making process where choices have to be made and where conflicting

Original language: English

Ruud Veldhuis (Netherlands)

Graduated as a political scientist, specialized in international relations, sociology, history and mass psychology. He worked as a teacher of history and social studies in secondary schools. From 1981 until 1994 he worked as lecturer and deputy-director at the Stichting Burgerschapskunde (The Citizenship Foundation). Since 1994, he has managed the European projects of the Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, the Dutch Centre for Civic Education. At present, his activities concentrate on civic and political education projects which support institutions in countries evolving towards democracy. E-mail: international@publiek-politiek.nl

interests are inherent; in the interactive projects students participate in processes where pros and cons have to be weighed against each other. Second, interactive projects enable students to learn to formulate political demands and to think in terms of the public interest. Third, the interactive approach favours student motivation because what they will learn will correspond to their experience and will allow them to better understand their interests and their own personal situation.

The basic project 'Find your way in local politics'

STRUCTURING AND FUNCTIONING

This project has been carried out in the Netherlands and has recently been modified with the aim of adapting it to the educational needs of teachers and students in Estonia, Germany and Lithuania.

The project is carried out by the Youth Department of the Dutch Centre for Civic Education. Every year in the Netherlands about 4,000 students, organized in groups of around sixty persons, coming from fifty to sixty different municipalities participate in this activity. The students targeted are between 10 and 20 years old. The aims of the project are to enable students to learn about local politics, as well as to implement a political action in their direct environment and to increase their political participation. The principle is learning-by-doing for and by youth.

The method employed starts by allocating to each group of students a budget (about US\$1,300) offered by the local council. They have to decide how this budget shall be spent within the framework of a certain theme: for instance, youth policy, sustainable development, safety, minorities and development aid. Examples of issues are an anti-racism poster, facilities for handicapped people, an annual barbecue bringing together youngsters with politicians, sensors in school corridors that activate lights, an experiment with organic fuel in busses, building a roof over the playground. The groups meet each other at the *action day* in the town hall, where they debate all day among themselves and with local politicians.

PROJECT PREPARATION

The Dutch Centre for Civic Education produces a magazine for students and guidelines for teachers. Two or three lessons of fifty minutes are provided in school to the participating students; the project corresponds best to citizenship education, i.e. social studies. The contents of the lessons are an introduction to the meaning of local politics, an introduction to the theme of the action envisaged, and practical preparation of the students for the action day.

SUPPORT AND FACILITIES

During the action day each group of students is supported by a volunteer from a politi-

cally motivated youth organization. These volunteers receive special training organized by the Dutch Centre for Civic Education. They are an important factor in the success of the project, since they are able to motivate the students to take an interest in local politics in a creative and inspired way. During the day spent at the town hall it is essential that there are seven rooms available for group work, with telephone and fax for all groups, computers or typewriters for the 'press', a photocopier, the mayor as chairman for the evening session and the participation of local or regional press. The cost of the action days held in the Netherlands is around US\$3,000.

THE PROGRAMME OF THE ACTION DAY AT THE TOWN HALL

The schematic programme is as follows:

- Arrival at the town hall;
- Group work in 'ice-breaking' games, brainstorming on the theme and formulating questions for politicians;
- Plenary meeting with members of the local authority;
- Group work with the aim of drawing up a project description and budget, and formulating questions for the second plenary session;
- Plenary meeting with civil employees and pressure groups;
- Group work devoted to drawing up the final project description and preparation of the evening meeting; and
- Plenary meeting of the 'Youth Council' in the council chamber with the mayor as chairman. Discussion of and selection of the projects presented by the students groups in the plenary session. Those present in the public galleries of the town hall may also select the best projects by voting.

EVALUATION

After several years of experience with these action days in town halls, the Dutch Centre for Civic Education has felt the need for a thorough evaluation. With the support of the University of Leiden, research has started where the question to be answered, amongst others, is whether these activities have an influence on knowledge of and attitudes towards political decision-making. A questionnaire has been constructed and tested, and a representative group of schoolchildren has been selected. In order to measure whether a change in knowledge and attitudes has occurred, follow-up research some months after the action day will be carried out. The results of this scientific research will be available in late-1996 and will subsequently be published. An announcement may be expected in the *Newsletter: political education towards a European democracy* (available from the Dutch Centre for Civic Education).

Strengthening democracy in the local environment: a pilot project extended to Estonia, Germany and Lithuania

With the support of a grant from the Phare/Tacis Democracy Programme, a pilot project to promote the political participation of youth—'Find your way in local

politics'—was carried out in Estonia, Germany and Lithuania after some adaptation and testing. The project was completed in July 1996.

The objective of the project was to develop the skills of young people (14 to 16 years of age) so as to facilitate their active participation in democratic decision-making and to contribute to the preservation and improvement of the local environment. The expected end-product was a teaching model for use in secondary schools; this model is intended to be the basis for dissemination to other Baltic countries and in Central and Eastern Europe.

This project identified selected pilot schools where teachers employed democratic teaching methods, including 320 students and 17 teachers from Estonia, Germany, Lithuania and the Netherlands. The managerial framework was provided by the Dutch Centre for Civic Education and the staff of the Human Rights Centre in Vilnius.

FUNCTIONAL PLANNING OF THE PROJECT

The preparation of the introductory lessons was performed by the Dutch Centre for Civic Education, which also undertook the training of volunteers in Lithuania, Estonia and Germany. The lessons were given by the local teachers and eight action days were organized in local municipalities from the three countries. Lessons and action days in other schools are to be organized in the aftermath of this pilot project.

THE PEDAGOGICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE PROJECT

The role of the teachers

The teachers' role in particular is to prepare the students for the action day. This means that they will give the preparatory lessons and explain to the students what the action day is about. During the action day the role of the teachers is limited. They take note of the absentees and, keeping a low profile, may be present during the action day. The teachers are expressly not supposed to interfere in the group work or direct the students towards a particular project proposal. The teachers may help the students in the press group, for instance, with layout, with taking photos, etc.

The following are the guidelines provided to teachers involved in the project and in charge of the monitoring the introductory lessons:

Lesson 1 gives an introduction to local politics. It is recommendable to add examples from the local situation (e.g. articles, photographs, information about local political parties). Information about Estonia, Lithuania and Germany may add an international dimension to the material.

Lesson 2 aims at introducing the students to the field of sustainable development. It is very important that the students are able to give a clear definition of sustainable development. It is also recommendable in this lesson that examples

should be found from the local environment. In addition to the lesson material, teachers could invite an environmental specialist to give first-hand information about problems and solutions in the local area.

Lesson 3 prepares the students to participate in the action day. It is most important that the programme of the action day is clear to the students. In this lesson, they should also be told in which group they will participate during the action day. When schools or classes are numerous, students should work in mixed groups.

The role of the volunteers

During the action day, the volunteers are supposed to guide the students, which means that they should see to it that a good project proposal will be ready at the end of the afternoon and that the students are kept motivated throughout the action day. It is also important that the tasks are structured in such a way that all group members have something to do. The volunteers are expressly not supposed to organize meetings with the students prior to the action day. Such meetings will undermine the effect of the action day. However, during the action day, it is important that the volunteers share the ideas originating in the various groups with regard to the project proposals, for it must be avoided that two groups come up with similar project proposals.

An attitudinal baseline

Figure 1 corresponds to an excerpt from the first activity with students during lesson one on local politics; it may also be utilized as a baseline for final evaluation of the effects of the action day.

EXAMPLES OF PROJECT PROPOSALS

What is sustainable development and how can concrete project proposals in this field be developed in the local environment? The following is a selection of past proposals that were developed in previous projects. These are not project proposals from which just the students involved can profit. An essential point is that the benefits of the projects may extend to the entire school and possibly to the neighbourhood of the school.

- The formation of a youth centre at school for activities and information in the field of ecology. The centre gives information about environmental issues in the local environment and develops proposals for concrete projects.
- The construction of a green barrier between the road and the school to improve the students' safety and health by protecting them from noise and exhaust fumes.
- Creating a prize for the most environmentally friendly shop in the town or village. Criteria are: energy consumption, separation of waste, packing material of a product, etc.

INTRODUCTION

In this lesson we will introduce you to the world of local politics. First of all, we would like to know if you have the makings of a real politician. That is why we have prepared a test for you. This test is followed by a text on 'influence'. Furthermore, we will 'arrange' a meeting with your mayor and, last but not least, you will be crossing the border to find out more about (local) politics in Estonia, Germany and Lithuania. Boring? We hope not.

Show your true colours.

Do you have political talent? Answer the following questions and find out!

1. *Do you have your own opinion every now and then?*
 - (a) Only when I have thought it through carefully.
 - (b) The world sucks, huh huh.
 - (c) Only when I haven't thought about it at all.
 - (d) I have a multiple-choice opinion.
 - (e) Certainly, which one do you want to hear?
2. *I find politics interesting when it's about:*
 - (a) myself.
 - (b) seals.
 - (c) issues that are obviously good or bad.
 - (d) chopping down trees.
3. *Politics is for:*
 - (a) people who live in ivory towers.
 - (b) people who are always against something.
 - (c) people who want more power.
 - (d) people who don't know what they want, but want what they know.
 - (e) everybody, so it's also something for me.
4. *Who are or what is left-wing (socialist) and right-wing (liberal) in politics?*
 - (a) Softies and cigar-smoking big guns.
 - (b) Progressive and conservative, or the other way around.
 - (c) The truth is somewhere in the middle.
 - (d) Direction indicators that get you going.
5. *How do you change someone's mind?*
 - (a) By using appropriate force.
 - (b) By showing him or her the facts (my facts).
 - (c) Why should I?
 - (d) By means of well-reasoned arguments.
6. *Politics is lacking:*
 - (a) a sense of humour.
 - (b) thinkers.
 - (c) contact with people.
 - (d) a Ministry of Creativity and Solutions.
 - (e) me !!!

7. *What is more important than school?*
- (a) My girlfriend/boyfriend.
 - (b) Everything.
 - (c) The environment.
 - (d) My career, of course.
 - (e) Politics.
8. *When do you change your opinion?*
- (a) When someone convinces me.
 - (b) When I find out my grandma has the same opinion.
 - (c) When I find myself blushing when asked for my opinion.
 - (d) As soon as I try to put it into words.
 - (e) Every time I change my lifestyle.
9. *When do you come into action?*
- (a) When I am committed to a cause.
 - (b) I'm a member of Greenpeace, does that count?
 - (c) Never and ever.
 - (d) When at last I get pocket money from the government.
 - (e) When it serves my interests and when it shows satisfactory results.

- Placing funny, attractive litter bins in the street to make people really enjoy throwing away their litter.

THE INTERACTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE PROJECT

Chairing the rounds of talks

The rounds of talks with councillors, local government officers and interest groups will be chaired by one of the volunteers. His/her task is to keep the discussion animated for the public. The contributions of the panel members have to be brief and to the point; the chairperson may intervene when the panel members use complex language. At the beginning of the meeting the panel members may introduce themselves briefly, after which the groups, one by one, can ask questions. In order to prevent the last group from having no questions left (because they have already been asked by the other groups), the chairperson may begin by allowing each group to ask two questions at most. It is not recommended to call upon every panel member to answer every question, since this will take too long. It should not be forgotten to thank the panel members at the end of the meeting.

Voting procedure at the last meeting held in the evening

After the project proposals have been presented, they will be summarized by the chairman. Then the public gallery is asked to vote. The group presenting the project proposal that is adopted by a majority of votes will win two seats in the youth council and the group with the second highest score will gain one seat. At the second ballot only the members of the youth council are allowed to vote. This

will be by a show of hands. The students are allowed to vote for their own group; they can only cast their votes once; and they are not allowed to abstain from voting. Usually there is no majority of votes for one particular project proposal, in which case the meeting is adjourned for negotiations. All proposals are still in the running, so no one should be dropped. It is possible, though, that a group withdraws its project proposal if asked to do so or reaches a compromise with another group.

Lobbying

In the first voting round, most groups vote for their own project. In order to reach a majority the groups should therefore lobby with each other. To get a good compromise, it is very important that the groups should think about cooperation with other groups before the committee meeting starts. Students should be aware of the fact that politics is not only about having the power ('winning'), but that the content of a project also has value.

Implementing the winning project proposal

The local authorities are supposed to earmark a sum of money to have the winning project proposal implemented. The intention is that the students will also be involved in the implementation of the project proposal adopted for they are co-responsible for its successful implementation. Participation in the democratic system means that citizens in general and, in this case, young people in particular help put the principles of democracy into practice. Two weeks after the meeting at which the best project proposal was chosen, the youngsters who developed the project proposal will be invited to visit the town hall to discuss the implementation of their project. A schedule will be drawn up so that the youngsters can check for themselves if and how far the implementation of their project proposal has progressed. If the students themselves can contribute to its implementation, they should be given the opportunity to do so. It is important for all parties involved that this phase is brought to the attention of the public. This will highlight the project once again and will show citizens that something is actually done with the people's ideas and proposals. Other students in the participating schools will also see that this project really works.

Evaluation of the three countries' pilot projects

An evaluation of the pilot project was made at the final meeting of the project participants. The results were very promising. All participants from the Baltic countries were very enthusiastic. They felt that the project had taught them and the students new educational methods. The students, school leaders and teaching staff reacted positively to the project. There was an eager willingness of local politicians and those responsible in the town hall to participate. The enthusiasm

to continue with this method of learning about local democracy is also considerable. The co-ordinator in Vilnius is expecting to participate in more action days.

The draft materials for teachers and students are ready for use in different languages. Teachers and volunteers have been trained. The co-ordination in the Baltic region by the Lithuanian Centre for Human Rights is running according to plan. The programme has been carried out in several schools. More schools than anticipated are keen to participate in the project. Politicians, teachers and students are enthusiastic about the model. Municipalities are willing to participate and have granted money to implement the students' plans. They have offered the hospitality of their town halls. Mayors report that this model can be a very important way of involving young people in local politics.

Suggestions for use elsewhere

Without too many changes, the project has been successfully executed for a number of years in the Netherlands and has now been used in Estonia, Germany and Lithuania. A first aspect to be considered in the perspective of replicating the project in other countries is to assess if the social and political context and the education system are suitable for this kind of experience.

The project requires that the teachers have the skills to work with children in different contexts, to train them in discussion techniques, to encourage them to work independently and to show them how to write and produce a newspaper reporting the action day. It assumes that school heads can deviate from the 'normal' school procedure and take the children to the town hall in order to employ different teaching methods.

An important role is played by the volunteers. In countries where political youth parties do not exist, volunteers from other non-governmental organizations may be hired. What is important is their capacity to accompany the schoolchildren without giving too many directives. It is important that the children learn-by-doing how the local political decision-making process works.

Notes

1. The author expresses his gratitude to his colleagues in the Dutch Centre for Civic Studies for their contributions.
2. The origin of these projects lies in the experience of the 'Close-Up Foundation' from the United States. The work of Close-Up began in 1970 with a government studies programme in Washington, DC, for high-school students and teachers. Since then, the foundation's citizenship education outreach activities have expanded to provide civic learning opportunities for an ever-widening circle of citizens of all ages and backgrounds.

References

- Annual Report Close Up Foundation* 1994. Arlington, VA, Close Up Foundation, 1995.
- Audigier, F. *Teaching about society passing on values. Elementary law in civic education*. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Press, 1993.
- Cremer, W. ed. *Politische Bildung für Europa: Die Europäische Dimension in der politischen Bildung der zwölf EG-Staaten* [Political education for Europe: the European dimension in political education in twelve EU States]. Bonn, 1991.
- Dahlgren, P. *Television and the public sphere: citizenship, democracy and the media*. London, Sage, 1995.
- Dekker, H. Europees politiek-psychologisch burgerschap [European political-psychological citizenship]. *International spectator* (Rome), March 1996.
- Dekker, H.; Oostindie, M. Politische Sozialisationseffekte eines internationalen Jugendaustausch-Programms [The impact of political socialization in an international youth exchange programme]. In: Claussen, B., ed. *Politische Sozialisation Jugendlicher in Ost und West*, p. 271–86. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1989.
- Dekker, H.; Portengen, R. *National and European citizenship: conceptions, institutionalizations, and competences. Case: the Netherlands*. Leiden, 1996. (Unpublished manuscript.)
- Dekker, P., ed. *Civil society. Verkenningen van een perspectief op vrijwilligerswerk* [A first impression of the work of volunteers]. Rijswijk, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1994.
- Eurobarometer: public opinion in the European Union*. Brussels, European Commission, n.d. (A series of research surveys.)
- Farnen, R., ed. *Reconceptualizing politics, socialisation and education*. Oldenburg, Bis, 1993.
- Gunsteren, H. van; Andeweg, R. *Het grote ongenoegen. Over de kloof tussen burger en politiek* [The big deception: the gap between citizen and politics]. Bloemendaal, Netherlands, Aramith, 1994.
- Hartman, I. Op zoek naar consensus over politieke competentie. *Namens*, 5e jrg. nr. 7, September 1990.
- Ploeg, T.J. van der; Sap, W. *Rethinking the balance: government and non-governmental organizations in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam, Free University, 1995.
- Steenbergen, B. van, ed. *The condition of citizenship*. London, Sage, 1994.
- Timmer, J.; Veldhuis, R. *Political education towards a European democracy. Report of a European conference*. Amsterdam, Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek; Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1996.
- Wittebrood, K. *Politieke Socialisatie in Nederland* [Political socialization in the Netherlands]. Amsterdam, 1995. (Dissertation.)
- Zinnicker, J.; Fischer, A. Jugendstudie '92. In: Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, ed. *Jugend 92*. Opladen, Shell, 1993.

INDEX

Volume XXVI, 1996

No. 1, 1996, p. 3-222

No. 2, 1996, p. 227-431

No. 3, 1996, p. 435-621

No. 4, 1996, p. 624-782


- ALBALA-BERTRAND, L. Introduction to the open file, 645
- ALBALA-BERTRAND, L. For a sociogenetic constructivist didactics of citizenship, 705
- ATTALI J. School the day after tomorrow, 443
- BALÁN, J.; TROMBETTA, A.M. An agenda of problems, policies and debates on higher education in Latin America, 387
- BIRZEA, C. Education in a world in transition: between post-communism and post-modernism, 673
- BRUN, J.; SAADA-ROBERT, M. Transformations of school knowledge: contributions and extensions of genetic psychology, 25
- BURKE, A. Professionalism: its relevance for teachers and teacher educators in developing countries, 531
- CRAHAY, M. Learning to think or learning to memorize? A constructivist reformulation of an old dilemma, 55
- DOISE, W. What universality for human rights? 695
- DUSSEL, I. Víctor Mercante (1870-1934), 415
- EL-HASSAN, K.A. Grade retention practices in public and private schools in Lebanon, 197
- INGLEHART, R. Generational shifts in citizenship behaviours: the role of education and economic security in the declining respect for authority in industrial society, 653
- FERREIRO, E. The acquisition of cultural objects: the case of written language, 131
- FERRER, F. Teachers and school management in European education systems, 543
- FRASER, W.J.; MEIER, C.; POTTER, C.S.; SEKGOBELA, E.; POORE, A. Reflections on the causes and manifestations of violence in South African schools, 249
- GARCÍA, T. Education for citizenship and reconciliation in Nicaragua, 757
- GARRETÓN, M.A. Citizenship, national integration and education: ideology and consensus in Latin America, 683
- GINTIS, H. School choice: the issues and the options, 631
- GÖTTELMANN-DURET, G.; HOGAN, J. The utilization, deployment and management of primary teachers in Africa South of the Sahara, 559
- GUIMARÃES, E. The school under seige: the relationship between urban environment and the education system in Rio de Janeiro, 279
- HOGAN, J.; GÖTTELMANN-DURET, G. The utilization, deployment and management of primary teachers in Africa South of the Sahara, 559
- JUNN, J.; NIEMI, R.G. What knowledge for a reinforced citizenship in the United States of America? 663

- KAMII, C. Piaget's theory and the teaching of arithmetic, 99
- KOULANINGA, A. Citizenship and productive education in the Central African Republic, 763
- LAHLOU, M. Piaget, education and intercultural perspectives, 121
- LEMOYNE, G. Mathematics teaching from the standpoint of genetic epistemology, 159
- LESOURNE, J. Education and employment, 9
- MANSOUR, S. The Intifada generation in the schoolroom, 293
- MARTÍ, E. Piaget and school education: a socio-cultural challenge, 141
- MARTÍN ORTEGA, E. Education reform in Spain: five years on, 589
- MASEMANN, V.L. Standardization and diversity in curriculum design: the case of Ontario, 577
- MEIER, C.; FRASER, W.J.; POTTER, C.S.; SEKGOBELA, E.; POORE, A. Reflections on the causes and manifestations of violence in South African schools, 249
- MORITA, Y. Bullying as a contemporary behaviour problem in the context of increasing 'societal privatization' in Japan, 311
- MUGLIONI, J. Auguste Comte (1798-1857), 209
- NIEMI, R.G.; JUNN, J. What knowledge for a reinforced citizenship in the United States of America? 663
- OBUKHOVA, L.F. Learning - the driving force of development, 85
- OHSAKO, T. Introduction to the open file, 243
- OLWEUS, D. Bully/victim problems in school, 331
- OTTONE, E. Globalization and educational change: modernism and citizenship, 231
- PÉREZ GÓMEZ, A. Practical training and the professional socialization of future teachers in Andalusia, 493
- PERRENOUD, P. The teaching profession between proletarianization and professionalization: two models of change, 509
- PITHA, P. Building up a new citizen in the Czech Republic: an educational approach, 749
- POORE, A.; FRASER, W.J.; MEIER, C.; POTTER, C.S.; SEKGOBELA, E. Reflections on the causes and manifestations of violence in South African schools, 249
- POTTER, C.S.; FRASER, W.J.; MEIER, C.; SEKGOBELA, E.; POORE, A. Reflections on the causes and manifestations of violence in South African schools, 249
- REIMERS, F.; VILLEGAS-REIMERS, E. Where are 60 million teachers? The missing voice in educational reforms around the world, 469
- RESNICK, L.B. Situated rationalism: the biological and cultural foundations for learning, 37
- RUPP, H.F. Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), 661
- SAADA-ROBERT, M. Foreword, 21
- SAADA-ROBERT, M.; BRUN, J. Transformations of school knowledge: contributions and extensions of genetic psychology, 25
- SEKGOBELA, E.; FRASER, W.J.; MEIER, C.; POTTER, C.S.; POORE, A. Reflections on the causes and manifestations of violence in South African schools, 249
- STROMQUIST, N.P.; VIGIL, J.D. Violence in schools in the United States of America: trends, causes and responses, 361
- TAKIZAWA, T. The expansion and influence of Piagetian theory on education in Japan, 113
- TORRES, R.M. Without the reform of teacher education there will be no reform of education, 447
- TROMBETTA, A.M.; BALÁN, J. An agenda of problems, policies and debates on higher education in Latin America, 387
- VELDUIS, R. Interactive citizenship projects for school-age young people in northern Europe, 769
- VERGNAUD, G. Some of Piaget's fundamental ideas concerning didactics, 183

- | | |
|--|---|
| VIGIL, J.D.; STROMQUIST, N.P. Violence in schools in the United States of America: trends, causes and responses, 361 | VILLEGAS-REIMERS, E.; REIMERS, F. Where are 60 million teachers? The missing voice in educational reforms around the world, 469 |
|--|---|



FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADULT EDUCATION (CONFINTEA)



**ADULT LEARNING:
A KEY FOR THE
21st CENTURY**

**Hamburg, Germany
14-18 July 1997**

A UNESCO Conference in co-operation with international partners

For further information please contact:

UNESCO Institute for Education
CONFINTEA '97
Feldbrunnenstr. 58
20148 Hamburg
Germany

Tel.: (+49 40) 44 80 41 0

Fax : (+49 40) 410 77 23

e-mail: info.confintea@unesco.org.

CONFINTEA homepage: [http\\www.education.unesco.org/educnews/confintea](http://www.education.unesco.org/educnews/confintea)

To place your subscription to **PROSPECTS**

To place your subscription to Prospects' Arabic, English, French or Spanish editions, complete one of the order forms below. Post it, with a cheque or money order in your national currency, to your national distributor, who is listed at the end of this review. (For the subscription price in your currency, consult your national distributor.)

You may also send the order form to: Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi, 202, 1060 Brussels, Belgium, accompanied by payment in the form of: (a) a cheque in French francs made out to UNESCO; (b) an international money order in French francs made out to UNESCO, Subscription Service; or (c) UNESCO international book coupons for the equivalent amount.

To my national distributor (or Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi, 202, 1060 Brussels, Belgium). Please enter my subscription (4 numbers per year) to *Prospects, quarterly review of comparative education*.

- ☐ Arabic edition
- ☐ English edition
- ☐ French edition
- ☐ Spanish edition

Annual subscription rates:

- ☐ Institutions: 150 FF
- ☐ Institutions with discount (agents, libraries, UN, etc.): 112,50 FF
- ☐ Individuals: 112,50 FF
- ☐ Institutions in developing countries: 90 FF
- ☐ Individuals in developing countries: 90 FF

The sum of _____ is enclosed in payment.

(For the price in your national currency, consult your national distributor.)

Name _____

Address _____

(Please type or print clearly)

Signature

To my national distributor (or Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi, 202, 1060 Brussels, Belgium). Please enter my subscription (4 numbers per year) to *Prospects, quarterly review of comparative education*.

- ☐ Arabic edition
- ☐ English edition
- ☐ French edition
- ☐ Spanish edition

Annual subscription rates:

- ☐ Institutions: 150 FF
- ☐ Institutions with discount (agents, libraries, UN, etc.): 112,50 FF
- ☐ Individuals: 112,50 FF
- ☐ Institutions in developing countries: 90 FF
- ☐ Individuals in developing countries: 90 FF

The sum of _____ is enclosed in payment.

(For the price in your national currency, consult your national distributor.)

Name _____

Address _____

(Please type or print clearly)

Signature

The international quarterly review of comparative education **P R O S P E C T S**

Edited by the International Bureau of Education, P.O. Box 199, CH-1211 Geneva 20
The most recent contents page of *Prospects* can be consulted on Internet: <http://www.unicc.org/ibe>

'Open files' for PROSPECTS in 1997—Volume XXVII

- **No. 1, March 1997: *Economic globalization and educational policies***
- **No. 2, June 1997: *Educational technology—I***
- **No. 3, September 1997: *Educational technology—II***
- **No. 4, December 1997: *The educational decision-making process***

Annual subscription rates to *Prospects* are as follows:

- Full subscription price: 150 French francs;
- Agents, libraries, UN organizations, etc.: 112.50 French francs;
- Individuals in developed countries: 112.50 French francs;
- Institutions in developing countries: 90 French francs;
- Individuals in developing countries: 90 French francs;
- Single issues: 48 French francs.

All correspondence concerning subscriptions to the English, French and Spanish editions of *Prospects* should be addressed to: Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi 202, 1060 Brussels, Belgium.

E-mail: jean.de.lannoy@infoboard.be

Prospects is also published in Chinese and Russian. Inquiries to the IBE.

National distributors of UNESCO publications

ALBANIA: 'Ndermarria e perhapjes se librit', Tirana.

ANGOLA: Distribuidora Livros e Publicações, Caixa postal 2848, Luanda.

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: National Commission of Antigua and Barbuda, c/o Ministry of Education, Church Street, St Johns, Antigua.

ARGENTINA: Librería "El Correo de la UNESCO", EDILYR S.R.L., Tucumán 1685, 1050 Buenos Aires, tel.: (541) 371 81 94, (541) 371 05 12, fax: (541) 956 1985.

AUSTRALIA: Educational Supplies Pty Ltd, P.O. Box 33, Brookvale 2100, N.S.W., fax: (612) 905 52 09; **Hunter Publications**, 58A Gipps Street, Collingwood, Victoria 3066, tel.: (613) 417 53 61, fax: (3) 419 71 54; **Gray International Booksellers**, 3/12 Sir Thomas Mitchell Road, Bondi Beach, New South Wales 2026, tel./fax: (61-2) 30 41 16. *For scientific maps and atlases:* **Australian Mineral Foundation Inc.**, 63 Conyngham Street, Glenside, South Australia 5065, tel.: (618) 379 04 44, fax: (618) 379 46 34.

AUSTRIA: Gerold & Co., Graben 31, A-1011 Wien, tel.: 55 35 01 40, fax: 512 47 31 29.

BAHRAIN: United Schools International, P.O. Box 726, Bahrain, tel.: (973) 23 25 76, fax: (973) 27 22 52.

BANGLADESH: Karim International, G.P.O. Box 2141, 64/1 Monipuri Para, Tejgaon, Farmgate, Dhaka 1215, tel.: 32 97 05, fax: (880-2) 81 61 69.

BARBADOS: University of the West Indies Bookshop, Cave Hill Campus, P.O. Box 64, Bridgetown, tel.: 424 54 76, fax: (809) 425 13 27.

BELGIUM: Jean De Lannoy, Avenue du Roi 202, 1060 Bruxelles, tel.: 538 51 69, 538 43 08, fax: 538 08 41.

BOTSWANA: Botswana Book Centre, P.O. Box 91, Gaborone.

BRAZIL: Fundação Get'lio Vargas, Editora, Diviso de Vendas, Praia de Botafogo 190 - 6º andar, 22.253-900 Rio de Janeiro (RJ), tel.: (21) 551 52 45, fax: (5521) 551 78 01; **Books International Livros Comércio Exterior Ltda**, Rua Peixoto Gomide nº 996, Conj. 501, Jardim Paulista, 01409-900 Sao Paulo, SP, tel.: (55-11) 283 58 40, fax: (55-11) 287 13 31.

CAMEROON: Commission nationale de la République du Cameroun pour l'UNESCO, B.P. 1600, Yaoundé; Librairie des Éditions Clé, B.P. 1501, Yaoundé.

CANADA: Renouf Publishing Company Ltd, 1294 Algoma Road, Ottawa, Ont. K1B 3W8, tel.: (613) 741-4333, fax: (613) 741-5439, Internet: <http://FOX.NSPN.CA/Renouf/>. *Bookshops:* 711/2 Sparks Street, Ottawa, tel.: (613) 238 89 85, fax: (613) 238 60 41 and 12 Adelaide Street West, Toronto, Ontario M5H 1L6, tel.: (416) 363 31 71, fax: (416) 363 59 63; **Les Éditions La Liberté Inc.**, 3020, chemin Sainte-Foy, Sainte Foy, Québec G1X3V6, tel./fax: (418) 658 37 63; **Le Groupe Guérin International**, 4501, rue Drolet, Montréal, Québec H212G2, tel.: (514) 812 34 81, fax: (514) 842 49 23, and from all the Guérin bookshops in Montreal.

CHINA: China National Publications Import and Export Corporation, 16 Gongti E. Road, Chaoyang District, P.O. Box 88, Beijing, 100704, tel.: (01) 506 6688, fax: (861) 506 3101.

CROATIA: Mladost, Ilica 30/11, Zagreb.

CYPRUS: 'MAM', Archbishop Makarios 3rd Avenue, P.O. Box 1722, Nicosia.

CZECH REPUBLIC: SNTL, Spalena 51, 113-02 Praha 1; **Artia Pegas Press Ltd**, Palac Metro, Narodni trida 25, 110-00 Praha 1; **INTES-PRAHA**, Slavy Hornika 1021, 15006 Praha 5, tel.: (422) 522 449, fax: (422) 522 449, 522 443.

DENMARK: Munksgaard Book and Subscription Service, P.O. Box 2148, DK-1016, København K, tel.: 33 12 85 70, fax: 33 12 93 87.

EGYPT: UNESCO Publications Centre, 1 Talaat Harb Street, Cairo, fax: (202) 392 25 66; **Al-Ahram Distribution Agency**, Marketing Dept., Al-Ahram New Building, Galaa Street, Cairo, tel.: 578 60 69, fax: (20-2) 578 60 23, 578 68 33, and Al-Ahram Bookshops: Opera Square, Cairo, Al-Bustan Center, Bab El-Look, Cairo; **The Middle East Observer (for the Middle East)**, 41 Sherif St., Cairo, tel.: (20-2) 3939-732, 3926-919, fax: (20-2) 3939-732, 3606-804.

EL SALVADOR: Clásicos Roxsil, 4a. Av. Sur 2-3, Santa Tecla, tel.: (50-3) 28 12 12, 28 18 32, fax: (50-3) 228 12 12.

ETHIOPIA: Ethiopian National Agency for UNESCO, P.O. Box 2996, Addis Ababa.

FINLAND: Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, Keskuskatu 1, SF-00101 Helsinki 10, tel.: (358) 01 21 41, fax: (358) 01 21 44 41; **Suomalainen Kirjakauppa OY**, Koivuvaarankuja 2, SF-01640 Vantaa 64, tel.: (358) 08 52 751, fax: (358) 085-27888.

FRANCE: University bookshops and UNESCO Bookshop, UNESCO, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, tel.: (1) 45 68 22 22. Mail orders: Promotion and Sales Division, UNESCO Publishing, UNESCO, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, fax: (1) 42 73 30 07, telex: 204461 Paris. For periodicals: Subscription Service, UNESCO, 1, rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, tel.: (1) 45 68 45 64/65/66, fax: (1) 42 73 30 07, telex: 204461 Paris.

GERMANY: UNO-Verlag Vertriebs-und Verlags GmbH, Dag-Hammarskjöld-Haus, Poppeldorfer Allee 55, D-53115 Bonn 1, tel.: (0228) 21 29 40, fax: (0228) 21 74 92; **S. Karger GmbH**, Abt. Buchhandlung, Lörracher Strasse 16A, D-W 7800 Freiburg, tel.: (0761) 45 20 70, fax: (0761) 452 07 14; **LKG mbH**, Abt. Internationaler Fachbuchversand, Prager Strasse 16, D-O 7010 Leipzig. For scientific maps: Internationales Landkartenhaus GeoCenter, Schockenriedstr. 44, Postfach 800830, D-70565 Stuttgart, tel.: (0711) 788 93 40, fax: (0711) 788 93 54. For 'The UNESCO Courier': Deutscher UNESCO-Vertrieb, Basaltstrasse 57, D-W 5300 Bonn 3.

GHANA: Presbyterian Bookshop Depot Ltd, P.O. Box 195, Accra; Ghana Book Suppliers Ltd, P.O. Box 7869, Accra; The University Bookshop of Ghana, Accra; The University Bookshop of Cape Coast; The University Bookshop of Legon, P.O. Box 1, Legon.

GREECE: Eleftheroudakis, Nikkis Street 4, Athens, tel.: (01) 3222-255, fax: (01) 323 98 21; **H. Kauffmann**, 28 rue du Stade, Athens, tel.: (03) 322 21 60, (03) 325 53 21, (03) 323 25 45; Greek National Commission for UNESCO, 3 Akadimias Street, Athens; **John Mihalopoulos & Son S.A.**, 75 Hermou Street, P.O. Box 73, Thessaloniki, tel.: (01) 3222-255, fax: (01) 323 98 21.

GUINEA-BISSAU: Instituto Nacional do Livro e do Disco, Conselho Nacional da Cultura, Avenida Domingos Ramos n.º 10-A, B.P. 104, Bissau.

HONG KONG: Swindon Book Co., 13-15 Lock Road, Kowloon, tel.: 366 80 01, 367 87 89, fax: (852) 739 49 75.

HUNGARY: Librorade KFT, Buchimport, Pesti ut. 237, H 1173 Budapest, tel.: (36-1) 277 77 77, tel./fax: (36-1) 257 74 72.

ICELAND: Bokabud, Mals & Menningar, Laugavegi 18, 101 Reykjavik, tel.: (354-1) 242 42, fax: (354-1) 62 35 23.

INDIA: UNESCO Regional Office, 8, Poorvi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi 110057, tel.: (91-11) 67 73 10, 67 63 08, fax: (91-11) 68 73 51; Oxford Book & Stationery Co., Scindia House, New Delhi 110001, tel.: (91-11) 331 58 96, 331 53 08, fax: (91-11) 332 26 39; **UBS Publishers Distributors Ltd**, 5 Ansari Road, P.O. Box 7015, New Delhi 110002, fax: (91-11) 327

65 93; **The Bookpoint (India) Limited**, 3-6-272, Himayatnagar, Hyderabad 500 029, AP, tel.: 23 21 38, fax: (91-40) 24 03 93, and **The Bookpoint (India) Limited**, Kamani Marg, Ballard Estate, Bombay 400 038, Maharashtra, tel.: 261 19 72.

INDONESIA: PT Bhratara Niaga Media, Jalan. Oto Iskandardinata III/29, Jakarta 13340, tel./fax: (6221) 81 91 858; **Indira P.T.**, P.O. Box 181, Jl. Dr Sam Ratulangi 37, Jakarta Pusat, tel./fax: (6221) 629 77 42.

IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF: Iranian National Commission for UNESCO, Shahid Eslamieh Bldg, 1188 Enghelab Avenue, P.O. Box 11365-4498, Tehran 13158, tel.: (9821) 640 83 55, fax: (9821) 646 83 67.

IRELAND: TDC Publishers, 28 Hardwicke Street, Dublin 1, tel.: 74 48 35, 72 62 21, fax: 74 84 16; **Educational Company of Ireland Ltd**, P.O. Box 43A, Walkinstown, Dublin 12.

ISRAEL: Steimatzky Ltd, 11 Hakishon Street, P.O. Box 1444, Bnei Brak 51114, tel.: (972-3) 579 45 79, fax: (9723) 579 45 67; **R.O.Y. International**, 17, Shimon Hatarssi Street, Tel Aviv (postal address: P.O. Box 13056, Tel Aviv 61130), tel.: (972-3) 546 14 23, fax: (972-3) 546 14 42, Email: royil@Netvision.net.il;

NEIGHBORING TERRITORIES AND COUNTRIES: INDEX Information Services, P.O.B. 19502 Jerusalem, tel.: (972-2) 27 12 19, fax: (972-2) 27 16 34.

ITALY: LICOSA (Libreria Commissionaria Sansoni S.p.A.), via Duca di Calabria, 1/1, 50125 Firenze, tel.: (055) 64 54 15, fax: (055) 64 12 57; via Bartolini 29, 20155 Milano; **FAO Bookshop**, via delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Roma, tel.: 57 97 46 08, fax: 57 82 10; **ILO Bookshop**, Corso Unità d'Italia 125, 10127 Torino, tel.: (011) 69 361, fax: (011) 63 88 42.

JAMAICA: University of the West Indies Bookshop, Mona, Kingston 7, tel.: (809) 927 16 60-9, ext. 2269 and 2325, fax: (809) 997 40 32.

JAPAN: Eastern Book Service Inc., 3-13 Hongo 3-chome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, tel.: (03) 3818-0861, fax: (03) 3818-0864.

JORDAN: Jordan Distribution Agency, P.O. Box 375, Amman, tel.: 63 01 91, fax: (9626) 63 51 52; **Jordan Book Centre Co. Ltd**, P.O. Box 301, Al-Jubeiha, Amman, tel.: 67 68 82, 60 68 82, fax: (9626) 60 20 16.

KENYA: Africa Book Services Ltd, Quran House, Mfangano Street, P.O. Box 45245, Nairobi; Inter-Africa Book Distributors Ltd, Kencom House, 1st Floor, Moi Avenue, P.O. Box 73580, Nairobi.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, P.O. Box Central 64, 100-600 Seoul, tel.: 776 39 50/47 54, fax: (822) 568 74 54; street address: Sung Won Building, 10th Floor, 141, SamSung-Dong, KangNam-Ku, 135-090 Seoul.

KUWAIT: The Kuwait Bookshop Co. Ltd, Al Muthanna Complex, Fahed El-Salem Street, P.O. Box 2942, Safat 13030, Kuwait, tel.: (965) 242 42 66, 242 46 87, fax: (965) 242 05 58.

LESOTHO: Mazenod Book Centre, P.O. Box 39, Mazenod 160.

LIBERIA: National Bookstore, Mechlin and Carey Streets, P.O. Box 590, Monrovia; Cole & Yancy Bookshops Ltd, P.O. Box 286, Monrovia.

MALAWI: Malawi Book Service, Head Office, P.O. Box 30044, Chichiri, Blantyre 3.

MALAYSIA: University of Malaya Co-operative Bookshop, P.O. Box 1127, Jalan Pantai Bahru, 59700 Kuala Lumpur, fax: (603) 755 44 24; Mawaddah Enterprise Sdr. Brd., 75, Jalan Kapitan Tam Yeong, Seremban 7000, N. Sembilan, tel.: (606) 71 10 62, fax: (606) 73 30 62.

MALDIVES: Asrafee Bookshop, 1/49 Orchid Magu, Malé.

MALTA: L. Sapienza & Sons Ltd, 26 Republic Street, Valletta.

MAURITIUS: Nalanda Co. Ltd, 30 Bourbon Street, Port-Louis.

MEXICO: Correo de la UNESCO S.A., Guanajuato n.º 72, Col. Roma, C.P. 06700, Deleg. Cuauhtémoc, México D.F., tel.: 574 75 79, fax: (525) 264 09 19; Librería Secur, Av. Carlos Pellicer Cámara s/n, Zona CICOM, 86090 Villahermosa, Tabasco, tel.: (93) 12 39 66, fax: (5293) 12 74 80/13 47 65.

MOZAMBIQUE: Instituto Nacional do Livro e do Disco (INLD), Avenida 24 de Julho, n.º 1927, r/c, and n.º 1921, 1.º andar, Maputo.

MYANMAR: Trade Corporation No. (9), 550-552 Merchant Street, Rangoon.

NEPAL: Sajha Prakashan, Pulchowk, Kathmandu.

NETHERLANDS: Roodvelt Import b.v., Brouwersgracht 288, 1013 HG Amsterdam, tel.: (020) 622 80 35, fax: (020) 625 54 93; INOR Publikaties, M. A. de Ruyterstraat 20 a, Postbus 202, 7480 AE Haaksbergen, tel.: (315) 42 74 00 04, fax: (315) 42 72 92 96. *For periodicals:* Faxon-Europe, Postbus 197, 1000 AD Amsterdam; Kooyker Booksellers, P.O. Box 24, 2300 AA Leiden, tel.: (071) 16 05 60, fax: (071) 14 44 39; TOOL Publications, Sarphatistraat 650, 1010 AV Amsterdam, tel.: (31-20) 626 44 09, fax: (31-20) 627 74 89.

NEW ZEALAND: GP Legislation Services, Bowen State Building, Bowen Street, P.O. Box 12418, Wellington, tel.: 496 56 55, fax: (644) 496 56 98. *Retail bookshops:* Housing Corporation Bldg, 25 Rutland Street, P.O. Box 5513 Wellesley Street, Auckland, tel.: (09) 309 53 61, fax: (649) 307 21 37; 147 Hereford Street, Private Bag, Christchurch, tel.: (03) 79 71

42, fax: (643) 77 25 29; Cargill House, 123 Princes Street, P.O. Box 1104, Dunedin, tel.: (03) 477 82 94, fax: (643) 477 78 69; 33 King Street, P.O. Box 857, Hamilton, tel.: (07) 846 06 06, fax: (647) 846 65 66; 38-42 Broadway Ave., P.O. Box 138, Palmerston North.

NIGERIA: UNESCO Sub-Regional Office, 9 Bankole Oki Road, Off. Mobolaji Johnson Avenue, Ikoyi, P.O. Box 2823, Lagos, tel.: 68 30 87, 68 40 37, fax: (234-1) 269 37 58; Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife; The University Bookshop of Ibadan, P.O. Box 286, Ibadan; The University Bookshop of Nsukka; The University Bookshop of Lagos; The Ahmadu Bello University Bookshop of Zaria.

NORWAY: Akademika A/S, Universitetsbokhandel, P.O. Box 84, Blindern 0314, Oslo 3, tel.: 22 85 30 00, fax: 22 85 30 53; NIC Info A/S, P.O. Box 6125, Etterstad, N-0602 Oslo, tel.: (47) 22 57 33 00, fax: (47) 22 68 19 01.

PAKISTAN: Mirza Book Agency, 65 Shahrah Quaid-E-Azam, P.O. Box 729, Lahore 54000, tel.: 66839, telex: 4886 ubplk; UNESCO Publications Centre, Regional Office for Book Development in Asia and the Pacific, P.O. Box 2034A, Islamabad, tel.: 82 20 71/9, fax: (9251) 21 39 59, 82 27 96.

PHILIPPINES: International Book Center (Philippines), Suite 1703, Cityland 10, Condominium Tower 1, Ayala Ave., corner H.V. Dela Costa Ext., Makati, Metro Manila, tel.: 817 96 76, fax: (632) 817 17 41.

POLAND: ORPAN-Import, Palac Kultury, 00-901 Warszawa; Ars Polona-Ruch, Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7, 00-068 Warszawa; A. B. E. Marketing, Plac Grzybowski 10/31A, 00-104 Warszawa, tel.: (482) 638 25 60, fax: (482) 666 88 60.

QATAR: UNESCO Regional Office in the Arab States of the Gulf, P.O. Box 3945, Doha, tel.: 86 77 07/08, fax: (974) 86 76 44.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga, Ul. Dimitrova 39, Moskva 113095.

SEYCHELLES: National Bookshop, P.O. Box 48, Mahé.

SINGAPORE: Chopmen Publishers, 865 Mountbatten Road, No. 05-28/29, Katong Shopping Centre, Singapore 1543, fax: (65) 344 01 80; Select Books Pte Ltd, 19 Tanglin Road No. 3-15, Tanglin Shopping Centre, Singapore 1024, tel.: 732 15 15, fax: (65) 736 08 55.

SLOVAKIA: Alfa Verlag, Hurbanovo nam. 6, 893-31 Bratislava.

SLOVENIA: Cancarjeva Zalozba, Kopitarjeva 2, P.O. Box 201-IV, 61001 Ljubljana.

SOMALIA: Modern Book Shop and General, P.O. Box 951, Mogadiscio.

SOUTH AFRICA: David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd, Cape Town Head Office, 208 -Werdmuller Centre, Newry Street Claremont 7700, tel.: (021) 6441 36, fax: (021) 64 33 58; **Praesidium Books (South Africa)**, 801, 4th Street, Wynberg 2090, Johannesburg, tel.: (011) 887 59 94, fax: (011) 887 81 38.

SRI LANKA: Lake House Bookshop, 100 Sir Chittampalam Gardiner Mawata, P.O. Box 244, Colombo 2, fax: (94-1) 43 21 04.

SWEDEN: Fritzes InformationCenter and Bookshop, Regeringsgatan 12, Stockholm (postal address: Fritzes Customer Service, S-106 47 Stockholm), tel.: (468) 690 90 90, fax: (468) 20 50 21. *For periodicals:* Wennergren-Williams Informationsservice, Box 1305, S-171 25 Solna, tel.: 468-705 97 50, fax: 468-27 00 71; Tidskriftscentralen, Subscription Services, Norrtullsgatan 15, S-102 32 Stockholm, tel.: 468-31 20 90, fax: 468-30 13 35.

SWITZERLAND: ADECO, Case postale 465, CH-1211 Genève 19, tel.: (021) 943 26 73, fax: (021) 943 36 05; Europa Verlag, Rämistrasse 5, CH-8024 Zürich, tel.: 261 16 29; United Nations Bookshop (counter service only), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Genève 10, tel.: 740 09 21, fax: (4122) 917 00 27. *For periodicals:* Naville S.A., 7, rue Lévrier, CH-1201 Genève.

THAILAND: UNESCO Principal Regional Office in Asia and the Pacific (PROAP), Prakanong Post Office, Box 967, Bangkok 10110, tel.: 391 08 80, fax: (662) 391 08 66; Suksapan Panit, Mansion 9, Rajdamnern Avenue, Bangkok 14, tel.: 281 65 53, 282 78 22, fax: (662) 281 49 47; Nibondh & Co. Ltd, 40-42 Charoen Krung Road, Siyaeg Phaya Sri, P.O. Box 402, Bangkok G.P.O., tel.: 221 26 11, fax: 224 68 89; Suksit Siam Company, 113-115 Fuang Nakhon Road, opp. Wat Rajbopith, Bangkok 10200, fax: (662) 222 51 88.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: Trinidad and Tobago National Commission for UNESCO, Ministry of Education, 8 Elizabeth Street, St Clair, Port of Spain, tel./fax: (1809) 622 09 39.

TURKEY: Haset Kitapevi A.S., Istiklâl Caddesi No. 469, Posta Kutusu 219, Beyoglu, Istanbul.

UGANDA: Uganda Bookshop, P.O. Box 7145, Kampala.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Al Mutanabbi Bookshop, P.O. Box 71946, Abu Dhabi, tel.: 32 59 20, 34 03 19, fax: (9712) 31 77 06; Al Batra Bookshop, P.O. Box 21235, Sharjah, tel.: (971-6) 54 72 25.

UNITED KINGDOM: HMSO Publications Centre, P.O. Box 276, London SW8 5DT, fax: 0171-873 2000; *telephone orders only:* 0171-873 9090; *general inquiries:* 0171-873 0011 (queuing system in operation). HMSO bookshops: 49 High Holborn, London WC1V 6HB, tel. 0171-873 0011 (counter service only);

71 Lothian Road, Edinburgh EH3 9AZ, tel. 0131-228 4181; 16 Arthur Street, Belfast BT1 4GD, tel. 0123-223 8451; 9-21 Princess Street, Albert Square, Manchester M60 8AS, tel. 0161-834 7201; 258 Broad Street, Birmingham B1 2HE, tel. 0121-643 3740; Southey House, Wine Street, Bristol BS1 2BQ, tel. 0117-926 4306. *For scientific maps:* McCarta Ltd, 15 Highbury Place, London N5 1QP; GeoPubs (Geoscience Publications Services), 43 Lamma Way, Ampthill, MK45 2TR, tel.: 01525-40 58 14, fax: 01525-40 53 76.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA: Dar es Salaam Bookshop, P.O. Box 9030, Dar es Salaam.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-4391, tel. toll-free: 1-800-274-4888, fax: (301) 459-0056; United Nations Bookshop, New York, NY 10017, tel.: (212) 963-7680, fax: (212) 963-4970; UNESCO Office, Two United Nations Plaza, DC2-Room 920, New York, NY 10017, tél.: (212) 963 59 78, fax: (212) 963 80 14..

VENEZUELA: Oficina de la UNESCO en Caracas, Av. Los Chorros Cruce c/ Acueducto, Edificio Asovincar, Altos de Sebuacán, Caracas, tel.: (2) 286 21 56, fax: (58-2) 286 03 26; Librería del Este, Av. Francisco de Miranda 52, Edificio Galipán, Apartado 60337, Caracas 1060-A; Editorial Ateneo de Caracas, Apartado 662, Caracas 10010; Fundación Kuai-Mare del Libro Venezolano, Calle Hípica con Avenida La Guairita, Edificio Kuai-Mare, Las Mercedes, Caracas, tel.: (02) 92 05 46, 91 94 01, fax: (582) 92 65 34.

YUGOSLAVIA: Nolit, Terazije 13/VIII, 11000 Beograd.

ZAMBIA: National Educational Distribution Co. of Zambia Ltd, P.O. Box 2664, Lusaka.

ZIMBABWE: Textbook Sales (Pvt) Ltd, 67 Union Avenue, Harare; Grassroots Books (Pvt) Ltd, Box A267, Harare.

A complete list of all the national distributors can be obtained on request from: Promotion and Sales Division, UNESCO Publishing, UNESCO, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France, fax: (1) 42 73 30 07, telex: 204461 Paris.

UNESCO BOOK COUPONS can be used to purchase all books and periodicals of an educational, scientific or cultural character. For full information, please write to: UNESCO Coupon Office, UNESCO, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP (France).

JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

Editor : Jandhyala B.G. Tilak

Volume X

Number 2

April 1996

CONTENTS

- JACQUES MORISSET and CESAR REVOREDO: Savings and Education: 97
A Life Cycle Model Applied to a Panel of 74 Countries
MANABI MAJUMDAR: Exclusion in Education: Evidence from Indian 121
States
M KHAJAPPEER: Democratisation of Higher Education in India with special 143
Reference to Weaker Sections, Minorities and Women
JEEMOL UNNI: Returns to Education by Gender Among Wage Employees 153
in Urban India

Research Notes/Communications

- K.K. SRIVASTAVA, D.K. NAURIYAL and T. SRIVASTAVA: Occupa- 173
tional Structure and Education Status of Tribals
B. SARVESWARA RAO: Academic Staff Colleges and Development of 179
Higher Education
B.K. PASSI and R. PAL: Inservice Teacher Education Programmes and UEE 185

Book Reviews

- JACOB AIKARA: Education and Knowledge (ECLAC-UNESCO); A.R. 193
RAJAGOPALA RAO: Human Resource Management (J. Bratton and J.
Gold); V. LOGANATHAN: Managing the Industrial Labour Relations
Process in Higher Education (D.J. Julius, ed.); DISHA NAWANI:
Multi-Grade Teaching (A. Little); RAMESH CHANDRA: Population
Education Programme in India (M.V. Lakshmi Reddy); R.P. SINGH:
Educating Teachers for Leadership and Change (M.J. O'Hari and S.J. Odell,
eds.); SUSHILA SINGHAL: Teacher Evaluation (K.D. Peterson); P.
ARUMUGAM: The Meaning of Mass Higher Education (P.Scott); Malathy
Duraismay: The Great Transformation in Higher Education (C. Kerr); ILA
PATEL: The Gender Gap in Higher Education (L.S. Stiver et al); A.R.
RAJAGOPALA RAO: Planning for a Wage-Goods Economy (P.R.
Brahmananda); JANDHYALA B.G. TILAK: Investment in Women's Human
Capital (T.P. Schultz, ed.)



National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration
17-B, Sri Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi 110016 (India)

Phone: 91-11-661938, 665135, 6962120; Fax: 91-11-6853041

***For the first time on CD-ROM:
a systematic presentation of data
on national education systems
provided by the countries themselves***

WORLD DATA ON EDUCATION, 1993–1994

**The databank contains ninety-eight reports on
the development of education
presented to the forty-fourth session of
the International Conference on Education
(Geneva, September 1994)**

**and twelve from the forty-third session (1992),
as presented by the participating countries themselves.**

**The full text of these reports has now been made available on
CD-ROM and offers a unique instrument for accessing information
describing education systems provided by
the Member States of UNESCO.**

**This CD-ROM is available free of charge from the IBE;
you are, however, asked to participate in mailing costs
by sending a cheque for US\$10 made out to 'UNESCO-IBE'
payable in a United States' bank for each copy ordered.**

**SEND YOUR REQUEST TO:
DOCUMENTATION UNIT, IBE, P.O. BOX 199, 1211 GENEVA 20, SWITZERLAND**

PROSPECTS CORRESPONDENTS

ARGENTINA

Mr Daniel Filmus
Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
(FLACSO)

AUSTRALIA

Professor Phillip Hughes
Australian National University, Canberra

AUSTRALIA

Dr Phillip Jones
University of Sydney

BELGIUM

Professor Gilbert De Landsheere
University of Liège

BOLIVIA

Mr Luis Enrique López
Programa de Formación en Educación
Intercultural Bilingüe par la Región
Andina, Cochabamba

BOTSWANA

Ms Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo
University of Botswana

BRAZIL

Mr Walter E. García
UNESCO Brasilia Office

BRAZIL

Mr Jorge Wertheim
UNESCO Brasilia Office

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Mr Abel Koulaninga
Secretary-General of the National Commission
for UNESCO

CHILE

Mr Ernesto Schiefelbein
Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación

CHINA

Dr Zhou Nanzhao
China National Institute for Educational Research

COLOMBIA

Mr Rodrigo Parra Sandoval
Fundación FES

COSTA RICA

Mrs Yolanda Rojas
University of Costa Rica

EGYPT

Professor Dr. Abdel-Fattah Galal
National Center for Educational Research and
Development

FRANCE

Mr Gérard Wormser
Centre national de documentation pédagogique

GERMANY

Professor Wolfgang Mitter
Deutsches Institut für Internationale
Pädagogische Forschung

HUNGARY

Dr. Tamas Kozma
Hungarian Institute for Educational Research

MEXICO

Dr María de Ibarrola
Patronato del Sindicato Nacional de
Trabajadores de la Educación para
la Cultura del Maestro Mexicano A.C.

MOZAMBIQUE

Mr Luis Tiburcio
UNESCO Maputo Office

POLAND

Professor Andrzej Janowski
Polish Commission for UNESCO

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Dr Kyung-Chul Huh
Korean Educational Development Institute

ROMANIA

Dr Cesar Birzea
Institute for Educational Sciences

SPAIN

Mr Alejandro Tiana Ferrer
Faculty of Education, University of Madrid

SWEDEN

Professor Torsten Husén
Stockholm University

SWITZERLAND

Mr Michel Carton
Graduate Institute of Development Studies

THAILAND

Mr Vichai Tunsiri
Secretary-General of the National Education
Commission

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Mr Lawrence Carrington
University of the West Indies

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr Raymond Ryba
University of Manchester

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr Fernando Reimers
The World Bank

Editorial

Juan Carlos Tedesco

VIEWPOINTS/CONTROVERSIES

School choice: the issues and the options

Herbert Gintis

OPEN FILE: CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION: TOWARDS MEANINGFUL PRACTICE

Introduction to the open file

Luis Albala-Bertrand

CITIZENSHIP CONTEXTS AND OUTLOOK IN THE WORLD TODAY

Generational shifts in citizenship behaviours:

the role of education and economic security
in the declining respect for authority
in industrial society

Ronald Inglehart

What knowledge for a reinforced citizenship
in the United States of America?

Richard G. Niemi
and Jane Junn

Education in a world in transition:

between post-communism and post-modernism

César Birzea

Citizenship, national integration and
education: ideology and consensus
in Latin America

Manuel Antonio Garretón

What universality for human rights?

Willem Doise

For a sociogenetic constructivist didactics
of citizenship

Luis Albala-Bertrand

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN PRACTICE

Building up a new citizen in a post-totalitarian society:
an educational approach

Petr Pitha

Education for citizenship and reconciliation
in Nicaragua

Terencio García

Citizenship and productive education in
the Central African Republic

Abel Koulaninga

Interactive citizenship projects for school-age
young people in northern Europe

Ruud Veldhuis

Index du volume XXVI

ISSN 0033-1538

Vol. XXVI, no. 4, December 1996