

PROSPECTS

quarterly review of
comparative education

ISSUE NUMBER NINETY-FIVE

VIEWPOINTS/CONTROVERSIES

OPEN FILE:

Integration and segregation
of young people in
a changing world:
the consequences for education

TRENDS/CASES

PROFILES OF FAMOUS EDUCATORS:

Malcolm Adiseshiah (1910-94)



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EDITORIAL

Youth and education are social aspects that are becoming more and more closely linked. The expansion of schooling—one of the most typical social phenomena of the present time and most widespread in its repercussions—has enabled us to enrol more children and young people in schools for longer periods of time. This enrolment, however, does not have the same meaning today as it had in the past when education was only able to include a small number of children from the lower socio-economic levels. In this context, the empirical evidence available to us indicates that the expansion of the school has been accompanied by a progressive loss of its socializing and integrating capacity. The traditional mechanisms by which the school set out to compensate for this decline were, amongst others, an increase in the number of years of study to achieve the same level of learning, a devaluation in certificates and diplomas in the job market and the internal division of educational supply.

The rapid social, cultural and economic changes which modern society is experiencing have deteriorated these mechanisms. The present crisis no longer consists uniquely in a decline in socially acceptable objectives. The problem, above all, means difficulty in identifying the objectives that we are attempting to reach. This new situation affects educational institutions directly since they are working on the basis of a clear idea of what should be transmitted to new generations.

This edition of *Prospects* is devoted to analysing in what way, in different social, cultural and economic contexts, cultural changes, profound modifications in productive processes, mutations in the family and new patterns on the political scene have brought about significant alterations in the socializing and integrating role of education. Exclusion has become the most important social phenomenon in the present phase of historical development. This means that the socializing and integrating function of education has taken on a particular importance compared to the past. By simplifying the parameters of the problem, it is possible to support the idea that, if during previous stages of social development integration through socialization at school had a strong conservative basis, at the present time it has, on the contrary, a strong progressive content. When exclusion is the dominant

phenomenon, promoting integration and processes intended to strengthen the opportunities of living together and of avoiding breakdowns in the social fabric represent not only an ethical requirement, but also one of the ways in which social development takes on a sustainable character.

Introducing this global dimension into the analysis of educational policies and practices is a task that cannot be delayed. The collection of articles brought together in this issue of *Prospects* therefore covers a theoretical analysis of global significance carried out by S.N. Eisenstadt together with empirical studies drawn from very different social, political and economic contexts. The introduction by René Bendit and Wolfgang Gaiser, the guest editors for this issue of *Prospects*, explains clearly and precisely the general guidelines of the articles and the internal logic which resulted in their selection. We express our gratitude to them and to the Deutsches Jugendinstitut for such an important contribution.

This issue also contains two articles, one dealing with the problem of the transition from monoculturalism to multiculturalism in Finland and the other with equality of education for young people in Zimbabwe, which illustrate trends and cases that, alongside their specific content, demonstrate a significance that goes beyond the purely national context in which they were undertaken.

JUAN CARLOS TEDESCO

VIEWPOINTS/CONTROVERSIES

MODERNIZATION

AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS

OF YOUTH AND GENERATIONS

S. N. Eisenstadt

Introduction

Modernity has two closely related, but not identical, connotations. The first connotation is structural or organizational, fully epitomized in continually growing structural differentiation and in the concomitant tendency to confine structural and institutional change. The second connotation is that of a specific cultural programme or programmes—which usually also entail a strong emphasis on change—epitomized in such meanings as progress or ‘evolution’.¹

The combination of these connotations of modernity has given rise in all modern societies not only to continuous structural change, but also to the potential for change in the cultural definition of different areas of life and social categories. The expression of this potential can be readily seen in the changes in the conceptions and intergenerational relations of youth as they have developed in the evolution of modern societies.

Continuous institutional and structural changes have intensified the trend towards generational confrontations. At the same time, these developments, in conjunction with cultural shifts, could also generate new conceptions of youth and generation as cultural categories.

In the following paper I shall analyze some of these developments.

S.N. Eisenstadt (Israel)

Rose Isaacs Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A member of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Foreign Honorary Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Foreign Member of the American Philosophical Society, Foreign Associate of the National Academy of Sciences, and Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics. Honorary degrees from Helsinki and Harvard Universities and has been awarded many prestigious awards. Recent publications include *Patterns of modernity*, vols. I & II (1987), *Order and transcendence: the role of utopias in the dynamics of civilizations* (1988) and *Power, trust and meaning* (1995).

Youth formation in modern societies

THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

The starting point of my analysis is the fact that in the last twenty years, after the great students' revolt of the late 1960s, some new tendencies have appeared on the scene with respect to what one could call in old parlance 'the youth problem' in modern societies. One very interesting characteristic of this new scene is that people tend now to talk much less about the 'youth problem'. There are concrete problems affecting different youth groups or sectors: problems of socialization, adolescence, vocational guidance and the like. But the talk about 'the youth problem', which was quite central for some time in the social sciences and in general public discourse during the inter-war period and also after the Second World War, has become much weaker. This is connected with the fact that the dramatic confrontations between generations, which we witnessed frequently in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up until the students' revolt, have recently become weakened in many ways. They may come back but, at least for the time being, they have waned. It would be interesting to understand the reasons for this new development.

In order to present some very tentative hypotheses about the reasons for this development, I want to put these phenomena in a somewhat broader framework: namely the framework of different modes of youth formation in modern societies, and to ask what are the social forces which have been continuously influencing the constellations of youth problems in modern societies. I want to analyze what has been changing in these forces and how such changes are affecting the contemporary scene. By the nature of my presentation I will emphasize, at the end at least, the new developments. But this does not mean that the old forces have disappeared. It only means that somehow their place in the overall framework has changed.

What are the major social and cultural forces which have influenced different youth formations—there were always many different formations of youth and youth problems—in modern societies? The first and the most obvious one (and in some ways the seemingly simplest to analyze) is the division of labour as it developed in modern societies and its consequences. Among these consequences, the most important are the growing specialization of different institutional arenas (occupational, economic and educational), the increasing specialization of different social roles, the diminishing role of the family in the occupational scene, the growth of formal education, and the growth of transitional periods in which young people are neither within the family nor yet fully in the society. These processes have been going on continuously, changing in their concrete constellations and they have become more complicated and diversified. Such diversification is a very crucial aspect of the contemporary scene. The outcomes of these processes have been studied for many years. I emphasized this problem many years ago in my book *From generation to generation*.² In it I explained how, as a result of the grow-

ing complexity of the division of labour, the diminution of the place of the family and the like, there has emerged in modern societies a great variety of youth cultures or sub-cultures. Some of these sub-cultures were organized by youth groups themselves, some by different socializing agencies, and others in a combination of the two, in very great variety of ways. The multiplicity of youth cultures and sub-cultures has been a continuous fact in modern societies—and will continue to be, unless the modern (or what is now called post-modern) society changes so dramatically that the reasons for the emergence of these sub-cultures, as generated by the social division of labour, will disappear—a possibility which seems to me to be rather doubtful.

SOCIAL ROLES

The second social process is the mode of the contrast of cultural definition in social roles; of the relations between social roles and different social life-spaces as they have developed in modern societies. As far as I know, this has not been emphasized enough in the literature as a force shaping the formation of different types of youth sub-cultures and youth phenomena in modern societies.

Among the most important aspects of modern society, as they developed until about the 1960s and 1970s, was a strong tendency to construct a very clear demarcation between different social categories and a clear categorization of different life-spaces.

Indeed, one of the basic characteristics of so-called 'modern' societies (as distinct especially from 'post-modern' societies) has been a very peculiar combination of semantic and ideological distinctions between different arenas of life, together with the development of very specific symbolic, institutional and organizational linkages between them. Among such major semantic distinctions were those between: family and occupation; work and culture; the public and private realms; between different age-spans; between the sexes; and different social classes within each of which the former distinctions were elaborated in different ways.

At the same time, these different arenas were connected symbolically, organizationally and institutionally in several distinct ways. On the personal level, these arenas were connected through a very clear structuring of life-spans, patterns of life careers of different strata of the population and of different sectors within them.

On the macro-societal level, these different semantic arenas were closely related by the connection between, on the one hand, a strong emphasis on economic-industrial development and on technological-economic creativity with, on the other hand, the creation of the new types of major socio-political centres as the major arenas in which the charismatic dimension of the ontological and social visions prevalent in these societies should be implemented.

While, needless to say, this vision of modern and industrial society—as portrayed in both scholarly literature and in more general discourse—was certainly not accepted within all sectors of modern societies, there can be no doubt that it

has been for a very long period of time the most predominant and hegemonic one. Even those who opposed it—the romanticists, the prophets of *Entzauberung* like Nietzsche, or Max Weber with his image of the iron cage of modernity—opposed *this* specific structure of modern society and cannot be understood except in terms of their references to it.

The very category 'youth' is one illustration of such a categorization. It is the specific category 'youth'—not just the acknowledgement that there are young people, not even the acknowledgement of age-differences or of age-groups, but the development of the very category 'youth' as a distinct social category—that is important here. It has probably arisen for the first time in modern society. There are some possible beginnings of such a category in ancient Greece and Rome, there are kernels of this in other civilizations, but such a distinct, overarching category has appeared only in modern societies.³

Interestingly enough, until recently this has been the only category in modern societies which is based on age-differentials. Only lately is the same beginning to be true of old people. Yet, 'adult' is not the counterpart of 'youth'. It is a different dimension or category. No 'adult movement' has ever developed in modern societies. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, youth has had a very distinct category in modern societies, a very central social category. It seems to me that such sharp categorization of youth may be weakening now. But youth was not, of course, the only such category. All the major roles—occupational, gender and political—in all of the major life-spaces have been clearly defined with relatively fixed boundaries.

This mode of definition of different roles, life-spaces and of interconnections between them is not necessarily connected with a high level of differentiation or of social division of labour. For instance, in Japanese society there is a highly complex social division of labour which is not connected with the same mode of characterization of life-spaces. Life-spaces are organized in different ways, the boundaries are not so rigid, the transitions between boundaries are not so clear as in modern Western societies. In Western societies, some of these traditions may have been very confrontational ones. Others may be peaceful transitions, but the clear categorization of boundaries denotes a rather clear mode of transition between such categories.

These definitions have shaped many of the patterns of behaviour, self-perception and self-definition of large sectors of modern Western societies. Such demarcation became synonymous with what somewhat later was called the 'bourgeois revolution', but it is not necessarily related to 'bourgeois' in the economic class sense because it affected the lives of other strata. For example, it was very forceful in other sectors of the population—such as the working class. It continued to be even more forceful in some places like, at least until lately, the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and to some degree in the mature phases of the Kibbutz.

A very important aspect of such distinction was, of course, divisions between social strata or classes. Each class had its own social space, which was more or less clearly defined and the transition between them was not easy. Even social move-

ments such as socialism—which aimed to improve the place of a certain social category in overall social life, political standing and economic standing—did not necessarily aim to do away with the clear boundary differences between different social categories. Yet, they did not necessarily deny the existence of such boundaries.

Modern education and the modern school system served as one of the major carriers of this mode of definition of life-space. This fact has greatly influenced the shaping of the perception and definition of youth problems in modern societies.

One of the most interesting aspects of this process was the fact that youth was seen by itself—i.e., by young people, adolescents, older would-be adolescents and to some degree also by other groups—as a potential carrier of the charismatic, pure virtues which became lost through the development of the modern division of labour. This was due to the fact that youth was seemingly the major category that was not *within* the division of labour. Of course, it was strongly influenced by the division of labour, but it was highly constrained by it and basically beyond it. Because a very large part of the aspirations of modern social movements and ideologies has been oriented against the alienating aspects of the social division of labour and aimed to overcome them, youth could easily become the carrier of those pristine, charismatic virtues which one would like to see ‘re-crystallized’ in the rather mechanized modern world. Thus, youth has become not only the clear category based on age differences, but also a distinct category imbued also with many antinomian, confrontational and distinctive potentialities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The full impact of these potentialities can only be understood in connection with the third major factor which has greatly influenced the formation of youth in modern societies: the basic characteristics of the major social movements. The major characteristic of the ‘classical’ modern social movements was the attempt to reconstruct the centres of society. It was the centres of society—the new national centres, the centres of new nation-states and of class-societies, that have been the major foci of the classical social movements such as national or class-based movements.

In the initial stages of the development of modern and industrial societies, most social protest movements revolved around the revolutionary image of broadening the scope of participation and channels of access to the centres; of changing or reconstructing their cultural and social contents; solving the problems of unequal participation; and finding ways to attenuate or overcome, through the policies of the centre, the most important problems arising out of industrialization. It was the reconstruction of the centres of societies that constituted the major goals of most social and national movements in the first period of modernity, and these centres were perceived as embodying the most important charismatic dimension of the modern socio-cultural order. In other words, it was the construction of the socio-political centre, the quest for access to and participation in it, in combination with the vision of economic progress that constituted the major foci of the orienta-

tion of protest movements in early modernity. The fullest illustrations of the aims of such protest movements have been in the attempts to construct 'nation-states' and in the ideology of 'class struggles' as envisaged by the various nationalistic movements and by most revolutionary and reformist societies.

Within these social movements there arose revolutionary, confrontational and ideological youth movements. These movements also took part in the charismatic reconstruction of the centre, especially in periods of great historical change.

In the situations of intensive change which abounded in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, youth movements have become, at least in some continental European countries, an extremely important component of the numerous social movements which attempted, often in a confrontational way, to present a new, charismatic vision of the centre.

The dramatic, charismatic and confrontational youth movement—with its components of generational conflict, based on a strong generational consciousness, a consciousness of distance and difference between generations, a distance expressed in the symbols of youth which constitute a very dramatic and powerful image in social reality—has also become a very powerful image in the study of young people. Quite large parts of the literature on youth movements and on youth problems have been greatly influenced by these movements.

Changes in social roles and life-spaces

The last such movement or movements of this type were the student movements of the late 1960s. These movements exhibited some rather distinct characteristics. First of all, they were much more widespread and international than any of the preceding youth movements. Second, they were characterized by a very strong combination of intellectual antinomianism and intergenerational confrontation. Their aims were seemingly oriented at the transformation of the centre or the creation of a new centre, an entirely new society. But here there emerged a rather complicated picture. On the one hand, they failed in the simple sense that they did not change the centre of society. The centres had become very resilient. The political regimes did not change. On the contrary, they dealt quite efficiently with these movements. No political regime collapsed because of these movements, although there were wide sectors of the public who thought that there was a strong revolutionary potential in them. Paradoxically, the student movements have exerted a very far-reaching influence, or at least indicated some very far-reaching changes in the structure of societies within which they developed. They at least heralded far-reaching changes in the mode of definition of social roles and of social life-spaces in contemporary societies, as well as a great change in the definition, in the place of the political centre in the charismatic vision of society.

First of all, far-reaching changes have taken place in the older semantic and ideological distinctions between the different arenas of social life. Strong tendencies have developed to blur or recombine at least some of these arenas and to crystallize a multiplicity of semantic-ideological connections between such arenas as

public and private, word and culture, occupation and residence, and new types of definition of various life styles have emerged in terms of such connections.

A second strong tendency developed to dissociate most of the major roles from the encompassing society-wide, symbolic and institutional frameworks. Occupational, family, gender and residential roles have become more and more dissociated from class and regional political party frameworks. Such various roles increasingly crystallized into continuously changing clusters with relatively weak orientations, to broad frameworks in general, and to the societal centres in particular.

Third, there has been a redefinition of many roles and role clusters—especially in the occupational sphere. There has been a growing inclusion of community or ‘service’ components in purely professional and occupational activities. Also, there tended to develop a growing dissociation between high occupational strata and ‘conservative’ political and social attitudes, creating generations of executives and professionals with political and cultural ‘leftist views’ and with orientations to participation in some of these new ‘permissive enclaves’ or sub-cultures. In the political sphere, tendencies have developed to redefine the boundaries of collectives; to increasingly dissociate the political centres and the major social and cultural collectives; and to develop new nuclei of cultural and social identities which transcend the existing political and cultural boundaries and, hence, redefine the citizenship role.

Fourth, one of the most important institutional changes connected with those tendencies has been the development of various structural, semi-liminal enclaves within which new cultural orientations (new modes of search for meaning) have evolved. These orientations, often couched in transcendental terms, tend to be developed and upheld partially as counter-cultures, partially as components of a new culture.

These enclaves, in which some people may participate fully while others do so in a more transitory fashion, may serve in some situations as reservoirs of revolutionary activities and groups; but on the whole they tend to serve as loci or starting points of far-reaching changes in roles and cultural orientations.

Lifestyles and struggles

DIFFICULTIES

The combinations of these changes in the semantic definition of different arenas of social life and of structural changes gave rise to a growing diversification of the process of strata formation and to the development of a variety of political, sectional and occupational formations.

Thus, instead of the situation characteristic of the ‘modern’ and ‘industrial’ society, in which different strata had relatively separate cultural traditions with distinct and common political symbols, greater dissociation among the occupational, cultural and political spheres of life have developed continuously. Different

strata no longer have separate, totally different 'cultures'; they tend more and more to participate in common aspects, foci and arenas of culture in general, and mass culture in particular.

These developments have given rise to very complicated differences in lifestyles among different status groups; new status sets, to new patterns of status or class conflict and struggles; new types of status or class consciousness; to the weakening of any overall (especially class or social ideological) orientations, in the crystallization of such consciousness.

Concomitantly, a new and distinct type of status struggle has developed around the various types of welfare benefits distributed by the State. The major focus of these struggles has crystallized around the State as a distributive agency and, to a smaller degree, as a regulative agency. This can be seen in the high incidence of strikes and the struggle around social welfare benefits which aim, to a very large degree, to attain different entitlements in the form of social benefits and the like. By its very nature, this struggle covered many occupations but had little overall ideological or political orientation.

While the concrete 'economic' foci of such status or class struggles have become dispersed between the different types of demands of various occupational groups towards the State, the political and ideological expressions of status consciousness have become decreasingly focused on economic problems and much more, even if on the whole in a rather vague and unfocused way, around the development of distinct styles and patterns of life.

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

All these developments had, of course, far-reaching impacts on the nature of the new protest movements that developed from the 1960s onwards, starting from the students' rebellions, up to the more recent women's movements, ecological movements or those stressing growing participation in work places, different communal orientations and the like. Instead of the strong conflictual-ideological focus on the centre and its reconstruction which characterized the earlier classical social movements of modern and industrial societies, the new movements were oriented at the extension of the systemic range of social life and participation, of access to the resources and sometimes even the symbols of the centre, without a strong attempt to reconstruct them.⁴

Perhaps the single simplest manifestation of the change in such orientations has been the shift from the emphasis on increasing the 'standard of life' (which was so characteristic of the 1950s as the epitome of continuous technological-economic progress) to that of 'quality of life'—a shift which has been designated in the 1970s as one from materialist to post-materialist values.

Thus, one of the major characteristics of these new social movements in contrast to the classical socialist and national youth movements, is that they do not aim at reconstructing the centre. Instead, they aim to obtain from the centre enough resources to create their own life-spaces in a different way.

These two trends—first, the weakening of the clear boundaries of roles and role clusters, as well as the greater diversification of such different clusters and, second, the development of the tendencies to search for semi-charismatic fulfilment within various different enclaves of quality of lifestyles, in movements which ask for space and life-space, but not for a full reconstruction of the centre—have become very central in the more contemporary societies.

These changes in the nature of political and class struggles became very closely related to a more general tendency which may be called the de-charismatization of the political and political administrative centre. Contrary to the earlier modern period—when, as we have seen, the nation-state and class centres were conceived as the major foci of the charismatic dimension of the social order, as loci of the sacred, and their construction or reconstruction according to some charismatic vision constituted major foci of political struggle—the contemporary political centres, especially in Europe, are not perceived in such a way. The search for the sacred, for some charismatic vision, has moved to other social spaces—above all, to the various structural enclaves referred to above, to different patterns of the quality of life.

This de-charismatization of the centre was also connected with a great shift in the nature of historical consciousness prevalent in contemporary society as compared with classical modern societies. Great historical changes are, of course, taking place in Western societies, but these societies are becoming less historically conscious, and this process is accelerating. In general, there is a much weaker awareness of the conception of history as moving towards some definite goal.

Conclusions

These processes—the restructuring of the boundaries of roles and of life-spaces between the de-charismatization of the political and administrative centre, and the weakening of historical consciousness as a basic component of Western self-identity—are already giving rise to far-reaching changes in the formation of youth-problems in modern societies.

These developments do not, of course, do away with various effects of the growing specialization and differentiation of the division of labour, increasingly specialized education, as well as the weakening of the place of the family in the occupational scene.

Different youth groups and youth formations — spontaneous or organized by others — will continue to develop. These formations will become much more diversified than they used to be because the division of labour itself is continuously becoming much more diversified and also because the former sharp divisions between different classes, occupations, professions and different stages of education have become a bit blurred. Side by side with the growing diversification of youth formations, there will also develop new modes of generational confrontation.

One important indication of such changes is that, as we have indicated at the beginning of our discussion, there is now much less talk about 'the youth problem'. Youth is no longer perceived as a homogeneous category, nor is it necessarily a confrontational category as it used to be in the past. It is not even always a focus or carrier of potential charismatic qualities. We are, it seems to me, witnessing a very interesting, difficult-to-grasp and very important change—perhaps even the decomposition—of the overall category of youth. Again, this does not mean that there will no longer be a youth problem. Neither does it mean that there will be no family confrontations or generational differences. But even generational differences will become different because of the great change in historical consciousness and in the consciousness of historical transition to which I have referred above.

All these are, of course, only very preliminary indications, yet represent very important challenges for all those who study youth and the relationship between youth, generations and the modernity of modernization. Those who attempt to analyze the contemporary scene must take into account, to some degree at least, some of the forces which I have mentioned here.

Notes

1. S.N. Eisenstadt, A reappraisal of theories of social change and modernization, in: H. Haferkamp and N.J. Smelser, eds., *Social change and modernity*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1992, p. 412–29.
2. S.N. Eisenstadt, *From generation to generation*, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1956, p. 19.
3. For greater detail see *From generation to generation*, op. cit.
4. Some observations on 'post-modern' society in Volker Bornschier et al., eds., *Diskontinuität des sozialen Wandels* [The discontinuity of social change], Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1990, p. 287–96.

O P E N F I L E

INTEGRATION AND
SEGREGATION
OF YOUNG PEOPLE
IN A CHANGING WORLD:
THE CONSEQUENCES
FOR EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION TO THE OPEN FILE

René Bendit and Wolfgang Gaiser

It is fifty years since the United Nations was established and ten years since the International Year of Youth was celebrated. During this period ambitious political goals were set, while many hopes for peaceful co-existence in the world, more social justice and a more equitable distribution of wealth were thwarted; nevertheless, certain undeniable consequences have made themselves felt, especially as far as the part youth will play in the future and the opportunities provided by education and training in the preparation of young people so that they are in a position to help create a better world. The extent to which this is in fact taking place—or can take place—within the context of our rapidly changing world, will be discussed in this open file on the basis of a number of selected regional and/or national examples.

René Bendit (Germany)

Senior research officer at the Deutsches Jugendinstitut, Munich. Technical co-ordinator of the eighth German youth report (*Bericht über Bestrebungen und Leistungen der Jugendhilfe*, Bonn, 1990). His special research fields have been educational theories and adult education in Latin America and Europe, labour migrations, vocational training and working with young people from minority groups. This has led to a particular interest in 'youth in Europe' (*Diskurs*, vol. 2, 1992, with W. Gaiser) and the publication in 1993 (co-editor) of *Jugend und Gesellschaft: Deutsch-Französisch Forschungsperspektiven* [Youth and society: research prospects in Germany and France].

Wolfgang Gaiser (Germany)

Ph.D. in social sciences. Senior research officer at the Deutsches Jugendinstitut, Munich. Special interest in the fields of youth unemployment, youth work and social ecology. Joint editor (with R. Bendit) of *Diskurs*, vol. 2, 1992, on 'youth in Europe'. He is particularly interested in social networking and youth policy, and has contributed a chapter on 'the importance of relations between people of the same age when becoming an adult' in *Jugend und Gesellschaft: Deutsch-Französisch Forschungsperspektiven* (1993). Has also written for such periodicals as *The journal of education policy*, *The journal of critical analysis*, *Caderno do Instituto de Ciências Sociais*, and *Jeugd en samenleving*.

Proceeding from the above terms of reference, the central question of this special issue involves the extent to which organized educational processes can—or cannot—exert an integrating effect in a world characterized by the contradiction between increasing globalization through worldwide economic dependencies, and expansion of the communication technologies and the mass media, on the one hand, and new tendencies toward isolation, the forming of blocs and fundamentalism, on the other.

From an educational point of view, the perspective for integration is very broad. One might mention structural aspects and problems related to youth and the community, as well as the social context of the school and its setting; one might refer to substantive concepts like the role of education in the changing constitution of youth in different societies and epochs; or its relevance in the development of equality of opportunities, independently of gender, class and ethnic origin; also its importance in the fostering of interculturalism as a means of promoting inter-ethnic tolerance or racial equality. All of these subjects, directly or indirectly, reflect not only on curricula, specific teaching methods and different avenues leading to the working world, but also on extra-institutional and informal ways of learning, such as the involvement of young people in community work.

The contributions compiled in this special number of *Prospects* refer in different ways and with different accentuations to these topics and problems.

What distinguishes the contributions to this issue is the sociological basis of the arguments. Developments and descriptions of the current situation within the area of youth and education are presented in detail on the basis of empirical data and statistics and large-scale surveys. Their findings can be provisionally resumed even at this stage: first of all, one positive aspect must be underlined, i.e. the fact that levels of participation in education have increased over the last ten years, with the exception of one country, the Russian Federation, which is undergoing a radical social upheaval.

Integration through participation in education has thus been improved. At the same time, however, traditional social distinctions, where segregation reveals itself, continue to exist: the differing social backgrounds and divisions into social classes and strata, with the growing gap between the extremes of rich and poor, despite a certain amount of overall transparency. One constant theme of educational policy has been the improvement in the level of participation by girls and young women in education, and the targeted support of education in rural areas. Success has been achieved in both fields, although serious gender-specific disadvantages can still be discerned in concrete cases and there is a chronic shortage of educational facilities, above all in the rural areas of a number of developing countries. These findings tend to run through all contributions. Examples of specific progressive trends, and also associated problem areas, are illustrated by the analyses of individual countries.

Before describing the reports from the various countries, however, the macro-social, global trends should be briefly outlined, as this framework will allow national and regional situations with regard to youth and education to be better

categorized within the context of the conflicting phenomena of integration or exclusion.

Integration and segregation problems in the context of worldwide globalization and dualization

As mentioned, the phenomena of integration and exclusion and their implications for education must be interpreted within the framework of very complex interrelated factors inducing worldwide tendencies which can be conceptualized as the contradiction between 'globalization' and 'dualization'. The worldwide developments we are talking about can be seen as the expression of fiercer international competition in the neo-liberal world market system, which is forcing the pace of such modernization processes in all societies, on the one hand, while partially or totally excluding large social groups from taking part in and benefiting from these developments, on the other.


Globalization tendencies are resulting from the material circumstances of a worldwide organization of production based on division of labour with corresponding sales markets, and from the necessity to recognize that natural resources are limited. Globalization also results from the influence of the mass media and mass consumption, which promote the developments of a 'world society' oriented toward common consumption styles, structures of meaning and interpretation patterns. For instance, the rapid rise of TV and radio consumption in developing countries between 1970 and 1990 (from 50 to 150 radios and from almost 0 to 50 TVs per 1,000 inhabitants) describes the expansion of the 'cultural industry', as Horkheimer and Adorno (1984) put it. The number of message-minutes in international telephone transmissions grew from an index of 100 in 1985 to an index of more than 300 in 1993. The number of fax machines sold was 15 million by 1992, and that of Internet host computers was more than 2 million by 1993. This clearly shows not only how interdependent the world has become through satellite and electronic communications, but also which technologies and knowledge are already shaping the way large groups of people in industrial and developing countries perform their work, manage their leisure time and organize their personal relationships.

The technological revolution, the opening of markets and communication networking of the world have thus made borders more permeable and transparent. This has produced mobility, but it has also heightened the awareness of differences, between winners and losers in the modernization processes and between traditionalistic orientations and post-modern Western value systems, thereby generating conditions for new cultural conflicts and the selective closing of borders, both physically and ideologically.

Dualization tendencies, e.g. movements toward polarization and segregation, result from existing structural inequalities magnified by the market, not only between developed and underdeveloped macro-regions and countries, but also within the particular regions themselves (Figure 1). Such polarization or dualiza-

tion tendencies manifest themselves not only in differentiation based, for example, on social stratum and class, gender, ethnic group and religion, but also in the existence or nonexistence of opportunities to participate in work processes and of social, health and educational offers.

FIGURE 1: The *Libération* world view: rulers and ruled in the international system



Source: *Libération*, World-Media-Report
(German edition: *Die Tageszeitung*, 24 December 1990)


Growing unemployment on the 'world labour market', with 120 million unemployed at present and six times as many underemployed (the working poor) (Terre des Hommes, 1993), seems to be one of the most problematic effects of such modernization processes. For the rising generation in many regions this means, among other things, that they must increasingly become involved in child labour in their early years, while as young adults they find no jobs to secure their livelihood.

Unemployment has devastating effects, not only on individuals, families and communities. When referring to the link between societal development and coming generations we must also consider the consequences unemployment has on the economies of both rich and poor countries, leaving a considerable part of their human potential underdeveloped and unused. According to data presented by the United Nations' Commission on Global Governance (1995), Western Europe, for instance, has lost what one-tenth of its labour force—especially young adults—could produce, while at the same time supporting the unemployed has put a great strain on national budgets, thereby generating new deficits and problems.

In certain regions of Africa and Latin America and, since the 1990s, in Eastern Europe as well, the policies of open markets, fiscal orientation and privatization have led to a reduced role of the State and to a curtailment of public funds for social affairs and education. This is hitting children and young people from

poor population strata in particular. On the road to adulthood they have few opportunities in terms of adequate nourishment, health services, general education, qualification, work and housing. The widening of the gap between population growth and resources hits this group hardest, generating conditions of extreme poverty (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: The four-class world: prosperity scale measured by economic output per inhabitant in 1993



Over 1,000 million people live in absolute poverty: they lack food and clean water, health care and education. At the same time the gap between poor and rich has become wider. The ratio between the income of the richest 20% of the world population and the poorest 20% rose from 1:30 in 1960 to 1:61 in 1991 (Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, 1994). Poverty and the economic and social phenomena defining it can be differentiated according to region, gender and age distribution. For instance, while chronic undernourishment had dropped to 19% in certain regions of Asia in the late 1980s, it afflicted about one-third of the rapidly growing population in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

Feminization and infantilization of extreme poverty is a widespread phenomenon in various regions of the world. Larger proportions of women than of men are to be found among the undernourished, illiterate and unemployed, and women entering the labour market (generally for low-status tasks) usually receive less remuneration than men for equivalent work, while their unpaid work at home and in the fields continues to go unrecognized. Among the illiterate (one-third of the adult population of all developing countries) two-thirds are women, while girls are behind boys in their access to secondary education in most societies. For instance, girls' enrolment in secondary education was 60% of boys' in the least-

developed countries in 1990. For developing countries as a whole, this figure was 80%, while a certain degree of educational gender equality could be observed only in Western industrialized countries (Commission on Global Governance, 1995) (Figure 3).

Due to the fact that poverty is strongly linked to age distribution, we can also speak of the material, social and cultural reproduction of deprivation from one generation to the next. Cultures of poverty and marginalization are developing all over the world, in rich countries as well as poor. In extreme cases they are characterized by high child mortality rates (ten times higher in the least-developed countries than in rich ones: 73 of 1,000 babies born die in their first year of life) and large proportions of children receive no formal education or drop out of school at a very early age, while just 40% of eligible children attend secondary school. The development of survival strategies in the form of 'street cultures' and youth gangs has also become a widespread phenomenon of urban poverty in both developing and developed countries (Figure 4). As the United Nations Commission on Global Governance points out, extreme poverty provides no basis either for maintaining or reproducing traditional society or for any further development.

But what are the macro-economic, political and social contexts in which these developments must be seen, and are there any chances of counteracting them by education?

FIGURE 3: Girls' secondary school enrolment as a percentage of boys', 1990





FIGURE 4: The urbanization of humanity



Source: United Nations 1994

Macro-economic and political determinants of integration and exclusion

In modern societies, rather than traditional ones, integration does not take place only, or primarily, through cultural consensus based on common values, but is also founded on a relatively high level of participation of the majority of the population in a common 'material culture'. The starting point for such a material culture is the participation of people from a great variety of strata, with different convictions and ethno-cultural origins, in a complex system whose legitimization lies in its wealth-increasing efficiency (Brock, 1993). Industrial mass-production of goods and services based on division of labour, which has broadened the access to material wealth, forms the basis for the cohesion of modern society. As the possibilities of access to material culture grow more limited, particularly for the rising generation, such societies lose their integrative power. Discrepancies between winners and losers grow. The relation between economic growth and just distribution of prosperity becomes increasingly unbalanced, the hope of attaining equal opportunities through education becomes increasingly problematic.


Worldwide preconditions for this and related hazardous tendencies can be summed up as follows:

- The breakdown and privatization of the so-called planned economies of the former 'Eastern Bloc' has caused many borders to be opened up for capital, goods, services and people. Despite the positive economic, political and cultural consequences of this liberalization process, poverty at home and the 'prosperity divide' between East and West are driving many East Europeans into migrating to the economically and infrastructurally better-off regions of the West. This is giving rise to the fear of a new 'source' of danger among some Westerners living in the so-called 'pull' regions who are less qualified and thus threatened by modernization processes. They react by sealing themselves off or developing so-called insider/outsider power constellations (Elias & Scotson, 1965).
- The establishment of a world economy on a neo-liberal basis is also leading to the export of capital and jobs to low-wage countries. This is generating new developing impulses in the receiving regions and at the same time threatening the material living conditions, particularly of those directly exposed to this competition in industrialized countries, namely those social strata and people that are ranked below the 'expert threshold'. The discussions in all European Union countries about how attractive the particular nation or region, or Europe as a whole, is as an industrial location, as well as the conflicts in the course of the GATT negotiations over how far the European domestic market can seal itself off from the outside world, are 'external' manifestations of the new fierceness of competition and the struggle for market shares.
- The quality of life and future opportunities for young people depend not only on basic economic conditions, but also increasingly on welfare-state guarantees, the covering of risks and qualification options (Bendit & Gaiser, 1992). Yet neo-conservative criticism of the welfare state is leading to a change in the direction

of social policy in many places, and not only where adjustment programmes are underway. It is thought better to help the strong rather than subsidize the weak at the expense of the strong, as this would indirectly profit the weak as well. From this point of view, social policy becomes an appendage of economic policy. According to a hypothesis by Galbraith (1992), the neo-conservative changeover in social policy in industrialized societies is being made possible by a majority of the wealthy and content. A dualization process is thus also coming about on account of retrograde processes in the area of social policy. The neo-liberal line of politics focuses on low taxes and low inflation, and not on low unemployment. This means that the average risk of poverty is not exploitation—as in the Marxist-style critique of capitalism—but exclusion from the labour market.

- The higher ecological risks of mass production and mass consumption, which are particularly threatening for the future of young people, call for restrictive measures in favour of environmental protection, such as raising petrol prices, introducing energy taxes or passing on waste-disposal costs to consumers. However, such measures hit low-income strata harder than others. Thus, even environmental policy, which is intended to serve an unquestionably common goal, can have a divisive effect in certain ways, instead of making an integrative contribution in a fair cost-benefit balance.

FIGURE 5: Poor South, rich North: the distribution of the world (1993 data)



- Finally, the incapacity of many developing countries' economies to integrate large parts of their fast-growing populations, especially their younger segments, as well as political instabilities and armed conflicts, are generating the conditions for poverty migrations (South-North) (Figure 5). This is also leading to new segregation processes and racist reactions in industrial countries that were thought to have been overcome. They result in part from the expectation of higher competitive pressure on the sections of the labour and housing markets

which are already being thinned out and could previously be drawn on by the lower population strata of so-called 'natives'. New forms of ethno-social differentiation, underclass development and exclusion are thus arising. In Western Europe and North America the absence of international conventions sometimes leads to exploitation and to restrictive, bureaucratic and discriminatory treatment of migrant workers and political refugees, while at the same time governments permitting or encouraging such treatment postulate the necessity of free markets (including labour markets). While the fears and reactions among parts of the industrial countries' population and their governments could reinforce an inward-looking economic approach, public opinion often fails to see the economically and politically motivated migration that is also taking place on a large scale between developing countries (Southern migration), and also generating serious economic and social problems (Figure 6). United Nations data from 1993 show that Africa and Europe (without the former USSR and Yugoslavia) were the two regions of the world with the largest number of non-nationals living within the borders of their various countries (some 20 million in each region, 7 to 8 million of whom were active economically). They were followed by the United States of America (with 17 million), Latin America (12 million), South-East Asia (9 million) and the Arab States (7 million) (Figure 7).

FIGURE 6: Migration





FIGURE 7: How the world population is growing



Challenges for young people and education in a changing world

The above-described developments in the socio-political and economic spheres are endangering the integrative power of various kinds of society, especially those where integration is no longer based on a consensus of traditional values but on participation in material culture. Old and new inequality structures with respect to stratum, gender, education, ethnic group, age and region are disintegrating and leading to cumulative disadvantage. The disintegrative effects of such trends are felt most deeply by adolescents and young adults. Differences in the family of origin are becoming more important again for shaping one's biography. Gender-specific role assignments hamper one's life projects. Education is becoming more elaborate and more expensive. The competition for scarce jobs is increasing. The lack of housing opportunities prevents the build-up of an independent life-perspective. In view of the risk young people face of having fewer chances to participate in the benefits and opportunities of material culture, they all place their hope in education. But can education systems fulfil these expectations? How should they deal with the contradiction between integration and selection? Which old or new models have proved useful?

It is thus obvious that education, like 'youth', must be understood specifically in different regions. Education means something different in modern industrial nations than it does in the Third World, with respect to both priorities and to the possibilities of realizing them.

For the Western model one could speak of the necessary goal of a reflective competence permitting survival through self-limitation: humaneness, tolerance, dependability, peace, solidarity with human beings and nature. While one used to be able to regard education automatically as a motor for progress, today one must give critical consideration to the specific content and forms of progress. 'Preserving rather than consuming', 'being rather than having', are the new projections for the future. It is commonplace to transfer the old Western model to developing countries, but this is becoming increasingly questionable. For example, integration can be attained only to a limited extent through education and training if there is a lack of 'normal jobs'.

Perhaps this actually has the opposite effect: disintegration can be promoted by alienation processes due to the implementation of stocks of knowledge which do not correspond to one's own culture or to the economic circumstances and development goals. Thus education once again faces the contradiction between imparting new stocks of knowledge and behavioural dispositions, and simultaneously needing to preserve valuable elements of traditional material and immaterial cultures.

The question arises of how to develop approaches towards regionalizing education, decentralizing decisions and making educational programmes more group-specific, without losing the link with interculturalism and global intermingling. The limits are surely drawn where regionalization of education would perpetuate or intensify the reproduction of regional and social inequalities and lines of conflict.

As far as educational subject matter is concerned, a contradiction is emerging in many regions and societies between the end of old ideologies and the simultaneous rise of religious and political utopias. However, the 'remembrance' of traditional values could definitely be coupled with models of multi-cultural integration. The tendency toward individualization emanating from Western societies can conflict with traditional, more collective mechanisms of integration. The new ideology of market and private enterprise as a just regulating mechanism can lead to desolidarization.

The analyzed developments show that, although the current and expected problems of socially integrating children, adolescents and young adults, and thus the challenges for educational institutions, are very different in the various regions of the world, they can no longer be thought of or solved solely in their national contexts.

The present special issue of *Prospects* was conceived as a way of approaching this complexity. It combines contributions on the situation of young people and the role of formal and informal education within the context of general globalization, polarization, integration and exclusion tendencies as they occur in regions of the world and societies as different as the United States and the European Union countries Germany and France (selected here as typical examples of post-industrial Western societies), China and the Russian Federation (exemplifying different forms of transition from planned and closed to market and open economies), South Africa (as a special case of transition from a segregated to an integrated soci-

ety), two Maghreb countries and one Latin American country, in which rather traditional societies have undergone accelerated modernization processes in the last few decades. With respect to these regions of the world, specific focuses in terms of the different problems and solutions attempted by education policy will be discussed at the same time.

In the United States and the European Union countries, for instance, the process of the constitution of 'youth' and 'youth problems' and also the relationship between the generations and between young people and society must be re-interpreted against the background of the development from the modern to the post-modern era.

The contribution of D. Briggs focuses, on the one hand, on the fact that the current United States' education system fails to meet current social challenges: the increase in youth problems such as problematic transition to the working world, increasing poverty, teenage pregnancies, drug abuse, intolerance towards minorities, juvenile delinquency and violence are treated as a reflection of the fact that schools no longer have any connection with the real-life world. The article also focuses, however, on positive signs and aspects observed in present-day young people (as for instance their interest in social and political participation), as well as on the potentialities and positive effects that new organizational forms and new technologies can have on formal and informal education.

The German contribution (Ingo Richter)—which traces developments in the German education system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—analyses the strategies prevailing in different periods for coping with problems of integration and segregation of underprivileged groups (like students of different religions or social origins; female, handicapped and foreign students, etc.). The central question is how the goal of reaching a certain degree of equality of educational opportunities changes, becomes operationalized in the course of time and in relation to societal, legal and political changes taking place in Germany during its development from a pre-modern society segregated on the basis of religion, sex, class and origin to a modern form of society in which community, democracy, achievement and quality became the principal ideas behind the way in which the education system is organized. Of central interest in this analysis is the observation that, at the end of this century, e.g. within the context of the post-industrial society, trends toward integration are changing: new religious movements are claiming schools of their own, feminists are questioning the progressive character of co-education and certain defenders of multiculturalism are calling for separate schools as a way of asserting cultural identity. As Richter asks: Plurality instead of equality: separate, unequal and diverse? Are these the main educational concomitances of pluralization and individualization trends in society?

France's example (F. Battagliola) illustrates the fact that, despite more widespread and prolonged participation by young people in education, the proportion of school dropouts has remained constant. The deterioration in labour-market conditions and the associated increase in the importance of formal qualifications for entry into employment mean that young people from under privileged back-

grounds, and especially girls and young women within these groups, are being affected by exclusion processes. It can therefore be seen that this country, where the emancipation of women seems to be farther advanced than in any other country from both the State-regulated and individual point of view, displays a rather discriminatory selection process when it comes to the avenues to money and power that are opened or closed by the education system. The difficult transition to the working world for these groups also has critical effects (with gender-specific variations, however) on the way in which the transition to the adult world takes place, e.g. with respect to leaving home or having a family of one's own.

In contrast to these problems and issues arising in Western industrial nations, the social transformation processes taking place in China and the Russian Federation provide a completely different context for the analysis of the links between young people and society or the role played by education in the integration of young people in society. The contributions of S. Su, S. Aleshenok and V. Chuprov allow us to gain more insight into the manifold problems and tasks that young people themselves and the education system as an institution must overcome against the backdrop of differing trends in social transformation processes.

The challenges for young people and educational institutions vary to some extent in a large country like China with its huge population, a country now characterized by a rapid burst of economic development and gigantic divides between pre-industrial production and high-tech plants as well as between central and peripheral regions. The article contributed by S. Su focuses above all on integration into the professional world in this country, which has been undergoing a dramatic social upheaval in recent times. Educational and sociological research is now increasingly oriented to global needs, future demands and the requirements of modernization. The situation for young people in China is difficult and it will take some time for new social norms and a future-oriented education system to be established. Great efforts have been made in the field of vocational and technical education and it seems that young people are adapting to the new economic and social situation. China's young people now display a more differentiated approach to job selection and evaluation, vocational mobility and professional flexibility. Vocational and technical education is providing young people with more opportunities for adapting to new jobs, promotion and the obtaining of skilled qualifications, which, in turn, has enhanced their vocational awareness.

Young people in Russia are not only confronted with the transformation process from a centrally planned to a neo-liberal economy, but also with a process of liberalization and democratization introduced from above that does not always achieve its postulated programmatic goals. Within the context of strong centrifugal tendencies threatening to dismantle the unity of the Russian Federation, young people and education are also confronted with outbursts of nationalism, ethnic conflicts and with the concomitant repressive reactions of the central powers. Furthermore, instead of being presented with State-supported life-patterns, young people today can and must shape their biographies themselves. They are thereby experiencing the social contradictions between *nouveau riche* and pauperization

and must cope with the reduced supply of welfare-state benefits. Against this background, the fact that the social upheaval in Russia has undermined traditional education, and also that access to money and power takes place via other resources than qualifications, is underlined. Marginalization of the school as an institution is, for instance, currently discernible. It is not yet clear whether this is a short-term phenomenon, i.e. the result of a difficult transition process to a new social order, or a long-term pattern now establishing itself.

Important goals for young people and educational policy in South Africa in the transition process from an ethnically separate to a leveling society relate to qualification, participation and the shaping of perspectives for the future. Basic requirements like the overcoming of conflicts and of disease and malnutrition are also decisive here.

The example of South Africa (David Everatt) provides insight into the problems of disadvantage and exclusion resulting from dropping out of the education system. One consequence could be drawn and also generalized to apply to other countries, too: apart from establishing an education policy that provides an equal opportunity structure, a disadvantage policy should also be established that offers dropouts targeted assistance for education and qualifications specifically for young people, but also in relation to life-long learning. This will have important consequences not only for individual-level integration but also for integration at the level of the society. To this extent the question of education no longer concerns youth as a charismatic group in a new and better society, but instead raises issues relating to the pragmatic survival of young people as individuals and the survival of global society into the next millennium in the form of peaceful, or at least conflict-driven, co-existence.

The contradiction between modernity and tradition as well as the conflict between Western values or Western-style education and the orientation to tradition and the rise of fundamentalist currents in the context of economic and political crisis provides the framework for the discussion of integration and exclusion processes in the Maghreb. In this connection, the contributions of A. Chabchoub (Tunisia) and Haddiya el Mostafa (Morocco) illustrate the difficulty of an educational campaign that has to tackle many problems at once: conflicts between town and country, between the sexes and between old and new cultures.

Finally, in Latin America, neo-liberal adjustment and modernization processes, sometimes even social transformation processes from a State protectionist and populist model to a liberal, capitalistic one, also provide the framework for considering not only integration and marginalization processes for young people in society today, but also educational reforms initiated or already carried out. The contribution of Tiramonti, Dussel and Hermo takes the example of Argentina to demonstrate the problematic tendencies that emerge. Despite clearly recognizable progress with respect to participation in education, schools have unofficially ceased to be educational institutions and have become social-welfare institutions instead, since they are faced with the aggravated social distress of their pupils resulting from the economic crisis and adjustment processes. This contribution

also draws attention to the fact that, despite attempts at modernization, within the education system there is a lack of awareness of the need to incorporate the everyday problems, interests and sub-cultural phenomena of the young people's world into the school curricula. This not only acts as a barrier to social learning for young people attending school institutions but also has a demotivating and debarring effect.

From the various contributions collected in this issue the reader might expect answers—or at least partial answers—to some central topics that challenge not only young people today but also societies in general and educational policies in particular. Such open questions can be summed up as follows:

- Throughout history people have always had great hopes that future generations would live in a better world. But today the rising generations seem to be threatened more than ever by a complex of factors, such as environmental destruction, widespread unemployment and social exclusion, and in many regions by extreme poverty, hunger, unhealthy living conditions, deep social and ethnic conflicts and war. Where do we see changes being achieved through education that could justify the hope that humanity will live in a better world 'from one generation to the next'?
- Taking into account the fact that, since the 1980s, research results systematically reveal that in various kinds of societies institutions like work and a profession have been losing their integrative power, can we expect a revival of family values, or should we anticipate, on the contrary, that the family will continue to lose its functional importance as an institution?
- We perceive that complex technological and social modernization processes are taking place worldwide, e.g. transformations in working technologies, modernization of social structures such as changes in intra-family and gender relationships and new life concepts among young educated females, etc. Considering these changes, as well as the impact of worldwide interrelated mass media communications, is it not necessary to assess the relationship between generations in new terms?
- Social movements and youth culture have played an important part in the social construction of modern young people. What educational significance can we attribute to these factors today in different kinds of societies?
- Gender inequality plays an important part in segregation and discrimination. Western societies pride themselves on having taken big steps toward greater gender equality through education, and they have even exported this model all over the world. Considering the lack of jobs and the increasing importance of fundamentalist ideologies, is it possible that a backlash could occur in this area, even in Western industrial societies? How should educational institutions react in this respect?
- Tendencies toward ethnocentric regression and social exclusion can be observed. Especially susceptible to xenophobia are social groups threatened in their socio-economic and cultural status by the impact of modernization and globalization, e.g. growing economic competition and insecurity, poverty, etc.

These tendencies lead to intolerance towards ethnic and cultural diversity, to the creation of new social 'insider-outsider' configurations, to political fundamentalism and radicalism, and to formal and institutionalized discrimination against minorities. In extreme cases such economic and ethnic conflicts have led to massacres and to wars of extermination in various kinds of societies, which would have seemed unimaginable in our time. What role can formal education play in this context? How can different types of societies organize education so as to teach not only instrumental knowledge and so-called 'strategic qualifications', but also universal values of human civilization?

If we look at young people as a strategic group for societal development, we should not only consider their education and qualification opportunities. We must also look at their living conditions and their self-reflective and responsible behaviour in a changing world, i.e. in an ambivalent, complex and contradictory world of chances and risks. What new forms, possibilities and strategies can be seen for a brand of education oriented to the attainment of future relevant aims, including global aspects and values such as environmentally adequate economic growth, the spread of liberty, justice and equality, the learning and living of mutual respect, of intercultural tolerance and acceptance, as well as a feeling of responsibility for problems like the demographic explosion, extreme poverty, growing urbanization, etc.?

In answering these questions, we must think about new priorities for developing education systems, i.e. education as socially organized and institutionalized action. Should these priorities be focused on new forms of training and qualification of teachers, for instance? On educational management? On the development of innovative, e.g. 'community' or 'productive', schools, and of curricula oriented towards students' specific life-situations and needs, etc.? What significance should be attached to forms of education that involve decentralization and regionalization strategies, and to subject-integrating projects?

It was once assumed that economic growth, the globalization of markets and communications, as well as the opening of borders, would benefit all people. However, the lack of productive and fulfilling work and unemployment, especially for young people, have led not only to skepticism towards education but also to social disintegration, conflict and migration. These phenomena make it necessary to reflect critically on the actual potentialities of education in a rapidly changing world. Is it still possible to define educational aims so as to give young people guidelines for preparing for, identifying with and socially integrating into national societies, in a world that is becoming more and more complex? A world in which the interdependencies of the market are deepening at the same time as inequality and segregation grow?

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TRENDS IN LEARNING

IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A PASSING GLANCE

Dennie Briggs

Over the next decade, 7 million more children will enter schools in the United States, while the number of 14- to 17-year-olds will increase by 20%. Perhaps now is the time to ask ourselves what changes can we anticipate in education to better equip our children and youth to enter the next millennium.

It is hard to believe that in this affluent country, one out of four children lives in poverty and that one out of every four homeless individuals is under 18. A *New York Times*/CBS poll revealed that half of the teenagers surveyed knew someone who had been shot in the past five years, and that one in five has carried a weapon to school for protection. Against this backdrop we are concerned about test scores, about who goes to college and about what lies in store as far as the job market is concerned.

We have seen startling shifts in who obtains access to higher education. The average American college student is older (24), lives off campus and pays for his or her own education without the aid of parents—mainly through loans and scholarships.

As far as employers are concerned, they show an increasing animosity toward youth generally. When it comes to employability, they prefer a person's attitudes to their academic performance, communication skills to the number of years spent in school and previous work experience to teacher recommendation. Businessmen and industrialists have become disillusioned with what formal education has to offer in terms of reasoning and skills training; more often they turn to consultants and other firms for assistance rather than to the academics. At the same time,

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despite conservative politics, two-thirds of the public favour increasing expenditures for education. The rising costs of education and the uncertainty of funding sources is a constant source of irritation to educational administrators.

Nevertheless, there are exciting ventures occurring in education at all levels. Some experimental methods that once were marginalized, such as peer teaching and conflict resolution training, now have become part of the mainstream. Technology continues to play a leading role in instruction. There are innovations appearing that integrate the mechanical with the human aspects. The movement toward open and alternative schools is impressive. The growing acceptance of the voucher system to finance education allows parents and pupils a wider choice of schools while encouraging innovators to experiment.

Finally, whatever form 'schools' take, any new curriculum must emphasize how children and youth can live and prosper in a peaceful world.

The predicament of youth

Social problems exacerbate the complexities of growing up and finding one's place in society. Children and youth are confronted daily by situations which previous generations did not have to face. Traditionally, inner-city youth had to cope with the myriad consequences of deteriorating infrastructures while rural and suburban areas were havens from social and political turmoil. Today, the problems of poverty, hunger, violence, drug abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, racial tensions and apathy have invaded these safe sanctuaries, so that no geographical area is immune. Policy makers, youth workers, and educators alike are hard-pressed to find practical solutions to the problems to which these transitions contribute. Furthermore, many agencies find themselves in financial difficulties when it comes to implementing solutions.

As for youth problems, crime tops the list as far as the public is concerned. While the overall crime rate has been decreasing, violent crime among youth has been climbing; an increasing number of youth are victims. Politicians, law-makers and parents are bombarded daily with stories of teenage maliciousness. Gang activity, drive-by shootings and destruction of school property have become commonplace in some urban and suburban communities. Rural areas are no longer exempt.

Despite prevailing stop-gap measures—imposing school uniforms, curfews, surveillance devices and lowering the age at which juveniles can be tried as adults (age 13 with mandatory sentences in adult prison at 18 for some offences), there does not seem to be an appreciable drop in the juvenile crime rate. What is more worrisome is that in the next ten years the teenage population in the United States is expected to increase by 23%. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) predicts that if the level of crime committed by teenagers remains the same as it is at the present time, the teenage crime rate itself will double.

Sexuality of course, also ranks high among youth problems. Along with sexual experimentation and the large numbers of teenage pregnancies (the number

remains relatively steady at about 1 million each year in the United States), the AIDS epidemic remains a threat. At the moment, AIDS is the leading cause of death among young adults. Adults' fear of young people contracting AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases has heightened awareness of sexual practices generally. Nevertheless, studies have consistently shown that a large proportion of young people are sexually active. It is not surprising that the popular 'solution' of promoting abstinence is not working. Despite wide-scale efforts at sex education, youths do not well accept the use of contraception.

Although there is some acceptance of different sexual orientations, educators are reluctant to include information concerning differing sexual identities and lifestyles. Gay, lesbian and bisexual youths, however, are 'coming out' with greater frequency, forming their own support and contingency groups.

With regard to substance abuse, there is evidence that the use of some narcotics, such as marijuana, is rising. A long-term study conducted at the University of Michigan, beginning in 1975, showed that there was a steady increase in illicit drug use over these two decades among all levels from the eighth to twelfth grades. By 1994, nearly one-half of all high school seniors had experimented with drugs.

Teenage alcohol abuse has not declined despite the raising of the legal drinking age from 18 to 21. 'Binge drinking' (four or five consecutive drinks) is popular on college campuses. One survey reported that at least 43% of the students contacted had 'binged' at least once in the previous two weeks. The Harvard School of Public Health revealed that only 16% of college students surveyed were non-drinkers. Over one quarter of the men (28%) and 19% of the women reported having been drunk during the previous month.

Adolescents are keenly aware of the public's attempts to maintain a double-standard morality that calls some habits abhorrent (illicit drugs and sex, for example) and others acceptable—even rewarding (such as tobacco, alcohol, and prescription drugs).

Prevention has scarcely touched the surface of what it could and should be doing. It has consisted largely of educational devices to increase young people's awareness about the harmful effects of drugs and alcohol, how to enhance their self-esteem and learn techniques to resist peer pressure.

Adolescent suicide has been rising steadily. Every year increasing numbers of youths end their lives prematurely; the rate is especially high among gay, lesbian and bisexual youth. Although there are sporadic national responses, such as 'hot lines' and support groups, this grave matter is largely 'swept under the rug' by the general public.

As part of the worldwide trend, social unrest in the United States has focused on increasing racial tensions. Tolerance of differences in some regions has narrowed due to the large influx of numerous cultures, religions, and the growth of various liberation movements. Politicians have been quick to capitalize on outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence to enhance their own agendas but have by and large ignored the underlying causes of broader social problems, such as unemployment, economic recession, and a changing morality.

What goes on in school cannot, of course, be divorced from what lies outside—nor should it be. The amount of violence and apathy that exists in the classroom has never been greater. Surveillance devices and security personnel are common in many schools. Attempts at conflict resolution by peers are becoming widespread. Yet there is little national agreement on expanding the curriculum to include such subjects as conflict resolution training, service learning (volunteerism), or social learning.

Enormous expenditures are diverted to sex education and substance abuse education in the guise of preventative measures, amidst opposition by fundamentalist religious and conservative political groups, not to mention concerned parents.

'Prevention' has become a slogan if not a watchword. The rising numbers of young men seen in emergency rooms with gunshot wounds has led the medical profession to declare violence a public health issue.¹ Many prevention programmes, including advocacy, are thinly disguised attempts at behavioural control measures. One point of view is that the proliferation of youth workers in the various public and private sectors serves mainly to create a need for their services. Real prevention lies in creating more vital and relevant infrastructures.² We have scarcely begun to seriously face one of the most crucial issues of our time, namely the redefinition of work as we approach the new millennium.

Encouraging signs

On the positive side, there is evidence of a great deal of social awareness among youth. More high school seniors participated in political demonstrations in 1994, for example, than at the height of the student uprisings of the 1960s (50% versus 16% in 1967). In that same year (1994), two-thirds of them participated in some type of volunteer activity.

In a survey of entering college students in 1994, one-quarter wanted to be involved in community action programmes as part of their education. Studies show an increasing interest in the health professions and a significant decrease in business courses, which to some extent reflects employment prospects. Large numbers of students (at both high school and college levels) have become involved in social issues such as gay rights, reproductive freedom, racial equality and the environment.

The Clinton administration's revival of national service in the form of a domestic peace corps (AmeriCorps) has been as welcomed among young people as it is criticized by conservative politicians. The first request for volunteers brought more than 100,000 applicants for 20,000 positions. Some respondents were no doubt motivated by the prospect of prolonged unemployment. The pay is low and the work arduous; yet it offers young people hands-on opportunities to contribute to society and to learn on the job while accumulating funds which will allow them to continue into formal education.

Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the full implications of the sudden shift in the national ethos from war to peace has yet to be realized. The war metaphor has seeped into our everyday consciousness to the point that it dominated any form of mobilized or concentrated action; hence, the war on poverty, the war on drugs and so on. The election of the first president in decades who had not participated in the military and was active in protesting against the Vietnam war, and the 1994 elections in which less than 25% of the newly elected House of Representatives had served in the military, have offered an important impetus to change this outlook for youth.

Today, young people are acutely aware of the hypocrisy involved when their behaviour is labelled as problematic (sex, pregnancies, drugs, alcohol etc.). At one and the same time the media portrays a particular type of behaviour as desirable while the conservative lobby and institutions promote quite the opposite. The 'just say no' campaign, the panacea of a former administration, has run its course. One teenager remarked: 'We've seen all the posters. So what else is new?' One of the first public opinion polls ever taken of young people revealed that 10- to 16-year-olds believed that television 'encourages disrespect of parents, sex before marriage, fisticuffs over reasoned conflict resolution and deceit over responsibility'.³

Future trends

THE CHANGING WORKPLACE

In the popular youth magazine *Rolling stone*, Robert Reich, the United States Secretary of Labor, described what lies ahead for young people in the workplace. One of the major changes on the horizon, Reich says, is the change from competition and exploitation which has dominated the industrial age to collaboration and flexibility. In the technological era, youth must be prepared to change jobs often, moving not only within organizations but from one firm to another.

Teamwork is an emerging strategy crossing traditional boundaries, including organizations and even nations. People will work in teams, disband on completion of one project and regroup for new ones—a prototype pioneered by space research and Japanese industry.

More goods and services will be customized, requiring a cadre of specialists with new kinds of education and training (such as apprenticeships) rarely offered today. Craftsmanship is being extended to areas such as human services and health care.

With revolutionary changes in business and industry resulting from technology, political stability, and down-sizing, self-operated small businesses and services will increase. Seed money and low interest loans will allow expansion of these activities. Even in the larger corporations, worker participation is growing. United Airlines, for instance, became America's first large, worker-owned enterprise.

THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES

By 1994, an estimated 25 to 30 million people in the United States were connected with Internet, growing at a rate of 2.5 million new users each month. Technology is already giving young people direct access to one another via local computer bulletin boards. Through the Internet and other networks, alliances will emerge to empower youth not only to create their own enterprises and gain access to unlimited information, but to build coalitions influencing politics both through traditional parties and by creating new ones of their own.

But perhaps the most important aspect of new technologies is that they grant young people greater independence from traditional educational and economic structures along with the opportunity to develop their creativity. With direct access to the Library of Congress and state legislatures, as well as numerous data banks, young people can keep abreast of a vast array of information. Widely available technology, such as CD-ROM discs, offer innumerable sources of in-depth information. Those who do not have the necessary hardware can access these technologies at many local libraries making access as simple as owning a library card.

The 'information super-highway' not only allows instant communication but provides a wealth of information that can be put to practical use. For example, information access allows young people to develop new services and operate self-generated businesses. Jeff Cornathan, a 14 year-old ninth grader at Terra Linda High School near San Francisco, already operates 'Terminal Velocity,' his own national bulletin board from which he allows callers to download his files to their computers at no charge. Jeff does accept contributions.⁴

And then there is John McGraw, a 16 year-old college freshman in California, who subsidizes his board for about \$50 per month. His bulletin board specializes in Japanese animation and attracts callers from around the world.⁵ Some students report earning from \$1,000 to \$5,000 per month for a monthly investment of less than \$100. After deciding on an area of interest, young people must then locate a market, learn how and where to advertise, keep accounts, evaluate services and develop new ones. Most of these skills they learn on their own or from fellow 'boarders'. Sadly, secondary schools provide little or no training in these areas.

Innovations in telecommunications have enabled youth to have direct contact with scientists and participate with them in exploration, data collection and interpretation. They no longer have to wait for teachers to give them information piecemeal, and then only when and where it might be available in traditional forms, for example by lecture and textbook.

Young people had direct contact with astronomers recently when the scientists were initiating the new telescope in Hawaii. Not only were they able to share explorations via satellite, but were invited to formulate questions for the scientists to explore, thus becoming colleagues.

From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research Centre near San Francisco, 10- and 11-year-old children have the opportunity to practice commanding the Marsokhod robot (a joint venture between

United States and Russian scientists) by remote control at the Kilauea volcano in Hawaii, over 2,400 miles away. The 300-pound rover beams back pictures on a monitor so that the youth can watch their progress. The scientists hope to send a similar robot to Mars by the year 2001.

And in March 1995, NASA allowed the public to monitor its 15½-day Endeavor space-shuttle flight. Of the 350,000 Internet and World Wide Web users who seized the opportunity, many were children and young people who received pictures, audio tapes and even spoke to the seven astronauts on board.

These kinds of ventures will fundamentally alter the role of teacher and student and the relationship between them. Young people can now become partners or fellow collaborators, sharing both their findings and interpretations with the experts. Such a turnabout will require a radical change in teacher training and new definitions as to who teachers are and what they do.

Technology is lessening the distance between formal education and the home. Learning how to use a personal computer is one example of how parents can become more involved in their children's education while becoming active in learning for their own sake.

At San Francisco's new Thurgood Marshall High School, each student has access to a personal computer, as do each of the teachers. Additionally, the school provides each pupil with a computer and a modem. Students thus do much of their homework on their computers as well as link up with other students; parents can converse with the teachers by electronic mail. The hundreds of computers were donated or recycled from military or governmental agencies. The children come mainly from poor neighbourhoods, where it is unlikely that many would ever have had access to a computer.

Likewise, in nearby Oakland, one school encourages parents to check out a personal computer for a month at a time just as easily as a library book. Parents—and even grandparents—learn to operate them (often taught by their children), forming a new kind of relationship and a new image of youth.

The traditional form of classroom instruction in formal education is moving more towards independent learning. 'Hands-on' learning is initiated by the student with the aid of self-teaching aids (programmed manuals, video tapes, diskettes and cassettes), whereby students learn at their own speed and on their own time.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

This brave new world of ours is demanding new forms of education and training. While a secondary education is revered and a college degree doubles one's earnings, Labor Secretary Reich points out that 30 million of the highest paid people in the United States are not college graduates. Probably the best example is that of college drop-out Bill Gates, who founded the Microsoft computer software giant and became one of the nation's wealthiest individuals while still in his 30s. Peter Jennings, American television's most watched news anchorman, is a high school

drop-out. Such success stories typify the new commercial frontier of technological access to information.

Colleges and universities, while continuing to dominate formal education, are rapidly pricing themselves out of reach for the majority of youth. Furthermore, most universities, clinging to traditional curricula and teaching methods, are not changing fast enough to meet the needs of the workplace or do not hold the interest of young people. Instead, many businesses and industries look more favourably on two year community colleges, tele-courses and other means of self-instruction for their employees. A United States Census Bureau survey found that employers said one-fifth of their workers were not fully proficient in their jobs and expressed 'a lack of confidence in the ability of schools and colleges to prepare young people for the workplace.'⁶

As I have indicated, developments in technology and its application are drastically changing our concepts of learning and where it should occur. As Marshall McLuhan's global village comes of age, we are rapidly moving out of the classroom. We will rely more on instructors in the form of scientists, artists and other experts located at their work site. In addition to technology, new structures and concepts will be required. Learning through internships and apprenticeships, self-generated business ventures, and alternative schools offer the expertise, flexibility and opportunity for changing ways to learn while extending learning to a lifelong pursuit.

Tele-courses, as one type of innovation, enable students to tape sessions for viewing and re-viewing at their leisure. Distance learning means that students do not have to interrupt their wage earning work, thus opening the doors to many people who would not otherwise be able to attend higher or specialized education. A significant number of prisoners, as well as members of the armed forces, are able to receive an education though taking advantage of distance learning. Tele-courses are used alone or supplemented with on-campus instruction during weekends or vacations—a programme pioneered by the United Kingdom's Open University. Many metropolitan areas have television channels totally devoted to education which allow viewers to complete requirements for university degrees.

Learning is not even confined to the home or workplace. In New York, workers can learn while commuting. New York's commuter railway provides one coach with a television monitor broadcasting early morning programmes; again, commuters may subscribe for academic credits.

When addressing the American Psychological Association in 1991, Morton Deutsch outlined his vision of 'Educating for a Peaceful World.' He focused on co-operative learning and listed team work and interdependence (of goals, tasks, resources, and rewards) as essential in teaching children to become less competitive.⁷ He advocated work sessions where children undertake face-to-face learning situations in small heterogeneous groups. There they learn that it is to everyone's advantage that all do well and to their disadvantage if anyone failed. They develop interpersonal and group skills along with individual accountability. Among the learning activities that he advocates is 'constructive controversy training', whereby

students simulate controversial matters and situations, then devise ways to solve them without resorting to strategies which are primarily competitive.

One can foresee how pupils could then role-play situations, hold group critiques, then review alternatives, bringing in examples from their daily lives as material for learning, thus connecting the school with the community. Video-taping the sessions with instant replay would enhance learning and sustain interest.⁸

An example of integrating technology with a course of study for co-operative learning is one originated by Bill Burrall, 1993's 'teacher of the year'. For his unit on society's problems he arranged for his middle-school students to communicate anonymously with inmates in a maximum security penitentiary using e-mail.⁹

One doesn't need to have expensive and complex technology to avail children with the opportunities of becoming involved in social issues. The teacher of a second-grade class in a public school in Springfield, Oregon, had the children survey violence on television. She gave them a simple homework assignment: watch a half hour of children's shows and count the number of incidents of violence, use of weapons and so on. In twelve hours of programming the children counted 649 violent acts—nearly one a minute. One girl reported: 'I didn't know there was that much violence on television—before I didn't even know what violence was.'

From that simple homework assignment the children wrote a 'Declaration of Independence' from violence. They not only vowed not to watch children's programmes that displayed violence, but requested their parents to boycott the companies which sponsored them. Then they presented their declaration to the student body to gain additional support. Now when eight-year-old Jeremiah Allen goes shopping with his grandmother, he takes along a list of the sponsors and together they look for alternatives. Jeremiah said on ABC news: 'I found out that there are other companies that put out the same kind of food and so I don't have trouble anymore.'

Boycotting, while an admirable social action in itself, was a secondary benefit. As the teacher explained, having information that the children had gathered first-hand will enable them to make choices that they would not have been able to do otherwise.

The idea that we can learn from our own experiences, especially by observing ourselves in a different setting, is one that has been around for a long time. Another is that everyone has something to offer in terms of helping others. These two concepts are gradually coming into education and youth development.

These concepts evolved largely from the work of British social psychiatrist Maxwell Jones, in therapeutic communities which he originated during the Second World War. He created a special social structure devoid of the usual restrictions placed on individuals in order to make them conform, thus allowing their true selves to emerge in their relationships with others. In this setting they were constantly faced with their behaviour and its effects on the community, thereby increasing their self-awareness and learning alternative, more constructive ways of relating.

Rather than holding up the teacher/leader as the person who imparted information, he changed that role by introducing a process in which one's skills could be demonstrated in living-learning situations. Thus students could observe the teacher at work (much like in a laboratory), engage in a free discussion and then participate together in common endeavours. The intimacy of the situations and the new structure allowed students to question authority, to suggest alternatives and to collaborate in mutual learning attempts. Learning for both student and teacher was thus accelerated. Jones also promoted learning through crisis as 'teachable moments', whereby those involved could seize the opportunity to look at behavioural aspects at a time when they were more open to examination.¹⁰

The connection between such learning and behaviour is straightforward. Jones wrote that if the school system would give as much attention to learning as a social process as it does to subject matter, many of the problems of later life could be avoided. When I last met with him, I asked him to elaborate on that remark.

Children [he said] should become as adept at solving life's problems as they are at math or language. As they grew up, they wouldn't have accumulated such destructive ways to relate to others and would have different means to handle conflict, to learn from it. Indeed, much of psychiatry and social work might simply disappear.¹¹

The New Careers movement of the 1960s was founded on the belief that everyone has the potential to help. Thousands of 'disadvantaged' people (those who were poor, criminal offenders, addicts, mental patients, welfare recipients, illiterate and so on) were employed in a variety of jobs to help others and given job training and support.

Subsequently, numerous grassroots projects sprung up, many in depressed inner-city areas, in which unemployed residents (some of whom were clients of the social services) were hired to assist others, thus combining rehabilitation with employment. They were given supplementary education which allowed them to move to higher levels of competence and advance professionally through promotional opportunities.¹²

In one project, psychologist J. Douglas Grant took eighteen seasoned offenders and trained them as social change agents while they were still confined. A decade later, ten of them had pursued higher education—three had doctorates. One of them became a university professor, another a bureau chief at the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and a third was a chief in its Youth Development Bureau. The point is that all of these young men had previously been labelled 'failures' in terms of their early attempts at formal education and by their criminal activities.¹³

When I talked with Doug Grant about this project, he said:

Real scholars don't memorize. Real scholars get out and study problems, and that's what is at the heart of this. We got into New Careers development as we wanted to use Max Jones' living-learning principle to learn, but also wanted to get some appreciation of the scientific method—bring it right into their real life and meaning.

Now, this is a very powerful model where you merge education and giving service, because the student can be engaged in a project and we will provide not a lecture, but co-workers and resource people.

Then they define hypotheses. They start talking about what do you expect to happen as a result of the intervention? And then they start talking about how would you observe whether what you would expect to happen, would in fact happen—or not. So you design an appropriate study. And then you carry it out. You get inputs all the time in doing this around your education goal.

Now, there's career development, there's political competence, there's cultural awareness; the kind of thing that's always been present in education: in conceptualizing, in the knowledge of art, literature, history et cetera - some feeling of the richness of your culture and what it's been through to get there, and so on.

And so, I'm very much interested in how far we can go with getting ordinary people to do some anticipating and to sharpen up awareness in terms of what they expect to have happen. And if it's a group, to get them to talk about what their goals are as a group in terms of what they expect to achieve, encouraging them to speak as loosely as they need to get it out. Then to try to identify this in terms of something that's actually observable—something that they would expect to happen if they're on the right track. It's in the way of the scientific method—hypothesis testing.

The implications for liberation of the individual through traditional education and development strategies, while at the same time contributing to widespread social change, are enormous.

Resolving disputes between children has become a matter of increasing importance. Here we see examples of youth being trained as third-party peer facilitators, conciliators, and mediators to work with children in solving individual interpersonal conflicts. Students are selected or volunteer to participate, receive a brief training and then go to work. They show their effectiveness on school playgrounds, in the classroom and in situations outside school with their peers (for example, in teenage gangs).

In Honolulu, Hawaii at Palolo Elementary School, an exemplary mediation programme has been operating since 1987 in a school populated by low income and immigrant children. In this programme, students select classmates they respect—those who are trustworthy, fair, and listen well. The selected children are given six hours to two full days of training and work together in pairs. Each mediator interviews one of the contestants in a dispute and then all come together to work out a solution. The two disputing parties then sign a contract agreeing on ways they will settle their conflict peacefully. This programme has been voluntarily adopted by more than one half of Hawaii's public schools; teachers report that the vast majority of disputes are now handled without intervention by adults. Susan Chang, who trains children state-wide for such programmes, says that 'learning to maintain relationships is as important as learning to read.'¹⁴

Hopefully, conflict resolution along with training in interpersonal relationships will see their way into the curricula at all levels. Those processes are accelerated by service learning—a growing practice with federal and state funding to

encourage both public and private agencies to implement projects linked to formal education.

Feinstein High School in Providence, Rhode Island is the nation's first public high school to be totally dedicated to public service. Students there are actively involved in a wide array of volunteer activities. There are no examinations and no letter grades. Students are called major or master 'explorers' (rather than sophomores or juniors) and evaluate their own progress. Unlike most American high schools, Feinstein has no football team or cheerleaders; it also has no 'gang-bangers' or metal detectors.¹⁵

Schools across the nation are seeing the importance of improving the school-to-work transition. Many children and youth have action learning styles which are neglected in the traditional classroom. They often develop behaviour problems and drop out of formal education at an early age because their learning styles do not match those utilized in the classroom. Children seek out and need opportunities to learn by doing. However, many of the apprenticeship opportunities for youth outside of school focus on vocational trades such as welding or plumbing. Extending the practices of internships and apprenticeship to fields beyond vocational skills and crafts allows more youths to learn the 'real thing' while at the same time generating an income.

Wide-scale changing values and attitudes toward work are also a part of direct experience and can begin at an early age. In April 1993, the Ms Foundation inaugurated a nation-wide 'take daughters to work day'. They urged working mothers (and those without daughters to take someone else's) to give 9 to 15 year-old girls a better notion of what the workplace is like for women and to observe women in roles other than homemaking.¹⁶

Encouraging opportunities for youth to have their own businesses by becoming self-employed at an early age requires developing management skills along with financial independence. The areas are limited only by one's imagination.

Jorge Martinez, a 13 year-old from San Francisco, established his own T-shirt business with a \$50 loan from the National Foundation for Teaching Entrepreneurship (NFTE). NFTE's instructor Margaret March said, 'In dealings with people, to get repeat customers, we show the importance of developing trust.' The Foundation's goal is to train and support as many as 1,000 students annually in their own businesses.

While still a student at the University of California, Sam Sorokin founded an agency to assist students with off-campus housing. He employed classmates and, in 1994, grossed more than \$100,000. He is currently planning similar branches near other university campuses.

Following John Noonan's graduation from Harvard, he established his own domestic peace corps which annually accepts twenty-four youths, then trains and employs them for a variety of community projects. Noonan, only 24 years old, raised over \$400,000 from private foundations to get his operation going, which later became a model for President Clinton's national service corps.

An area where children and youth could make a significant contribution to society is in alternatives to currency. Instead of school activities with simulated banks and money, children and youth could have real opportunities to create local alternative economic systems in which they could participate realistically. There are various schemes which have created time-hours as local currency in exchange for goods and services.¹⁷

In an interview on National Public Radio, self-educated economist Hazel Henderson described a new law in her state of Florida whereby the:

Department of Health and Human Services shall keep a computerized credit bank so that anyone who wants to volunteer to help their neighbor and take care of them when they're sick, or baby sitting, or shelf building, or whatever, can have these credits kept in this credit bank so that when they need services, they can cash in the hours that they've volunteered. We're hoping eventually that it will lead to people building up a real account of their volunteer work, so that we will be able to issue service credit cards which people can use on our local public buses, and for state parks. This is a way of knitting up care and the economy, showing us how much can be done without money which is just green pieces of paper now, and that we all know how to do things to help each other without money. We need ideas like this passed into law so that it can recognize and honor the volunteer economy.¹⁸

There are even arrangements which allow people to pay off their parking fines in service hours at non-profit organizations, such as Project 20 in San Francisco. Bartering activity could be worked out at the local level in any community and would allow children to participate with adults in totally new kinds of mutual assistance efforts.

Alternative schools became popular in the 1960s when social exploration was rampant. Experimentation focused on curricula, size of classroom (many learning activities originated outside schools), teacher's backgrounds and the participation of parents. Many of these schools have since fallen by the wayside but much was learned which has remained in practice in experimental schools, while other components have been incorporated into mainstream education.

For two decades, the St. Paul Open School in Minnesota has been a model for educational innovation. From kindergarten through high school, 500 students focus their learning on such diverse subjects as environmental issues and consumer advocacy. They learn how to study conditions around them and take action. One of their largest accomplishments was to challenge the mighty Proctor and Gamble corporation which was in violation of air pollution laws. The study and litigation engaged the entire student body for over two years—and the students prevailed. One of the students went on to law school to become a highly successful trial lawyer specializing in environmental affairs. The students operate a 'consumer action service' as part of their 'protect your rights and money' class. People from the community bring them real life problems in which they have been taken advantage of by landlords, relatives or merchants. The youth assist their 'clients' in assessing the situation and help them to take the necessary steps to get recompensed. They report a 70% success rate.¹⁹

Currently there is an interest in charter schools, whereby public schools can gain independence from many of the rules and regulations imposed by federal and state governments. Charter schools are free to set up their own curricula and teaching methods. Parents participate in the design and implementation of programmes. By 1993, there were forty-four such charter schools in California, most of them at the primary level and in urban areas.²⁰

In the 1960s, more and more parents had become disillusioned with tradition-bound formal education and the lack of imagination of educators. Some parents began to assume the responsibility for educating their own children. From these beginnings, the American home school movement has grown to over half a million children and youth who are educated solely at home. The celebrated Colfax parents in rural California bought undeveloped acreage and literally built their home from the ground up. They wanted their children to have this experience as part of being educated at home. None of the four children has ever attended formal school, yet three of the four attended Harvard.²¹ Far from a fringe benefit, home schooling creates a new relationship between parent and child where they are learning together.

Although not a new concept, a number of projects were undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s to utilize older children to tutor younger ones in the public schools. Pioneering studies were carried out at the University of Michigan by Peggy and Ronald Lippitt.²² Tutoring was for the most part on a one-to-one basis, while some children taught in pairs or even in clusters of youngsters. Some teachers select the children in their classes who need assistance, but others allow the pupil teachers to canvas the class and locate those children they thought needed extra help with their studies. The most interesting of these projects involved peer teaching on several levels, enabling many of the children to be both tutor and tutee.

In my own experience, a 10 year-old peer teacher devised a 'learning kit' of teaching aids for the two 7-year-olds he was tutoring. He took them on 'learning walks' in the neighbourhood to look for nouns. All went well until one day the enthusiasm wore thin, other interests set in and one went astray. The peer teacher resorted to physical restraint and returned to the classroom remorseful and upset. However, the incident opened up a new phase of social learning for him in which he became aware of extenuating circumstances which all teachers face, as he had to search for ways to learn from them and then to incorporate them into the learning situation.²³

While professional education bodies continue to set standards for accreditation, employers are increasingly recognizing other measures of competence. The resume is rapidly being supplemented by the portfolio which may include audio and video tapes, photographs, slides, computer diskettes and other examples of what the potential employee has accomplished. The practice involves the ingenuity of finding ways to present what one has learned through a spectrum of experience. I have evaluated portfolios of many confined prisoners (who were enrolled via correspondence at an experimental university), to determine what they had learned from previous criminal activity and confinement. Not surprisingly, most of them

had a far better understanding of the basic concepts of criminal justice than the graduate students I was teaching. We negotiated with the prisoners for course work to supplement their experiential learning. Some universities in the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere have a long standing practice of combining classroom with experiences at home and abroad.

Conclusion

We are living in what the Greeks called *χαιρὸς*; Carl Jung wrote, 'the right time for a metamorphosis of the gods.' While Jung was referring specifically to the momentous changes evolving in the psyche, the critical shifts that are occurring in ways of acquiring information and its usage, are just as pivotal in our time. This is the right time, if we but knew how to use it.

I began this paper by highlighting some of the social and economic issues American children and youth face in a society that is undergoing rapid and cataclysmic change. Nonetheless, there are far more reasons to be optimistic about the future than to dwell in gloom. The central role of learning remains the stable component in how society ultimately is shaped. We have seen a plethora of new ideas and trends in education which are being accelerated by technology and a creative discontent with things as they have been. Our antiquated educational systems must change. The questions of what is education, who are the educators, and where education occurs are all undergoing changes that will democratize the elitist practices we have cherished so tenaciously in the industrialized nations and which have been so envied by others.

Formal education has for too long over-emphasized acquiring information as its primary objective while neglecting wisdom and application. The teacher has had the unenviable role of dishing out bits of information sequentially and then being held accountable for students remembering the content. Individual learning styles were rarely recognized and so it was inevitable that teachers became disciplinarians as well. Why young people are destructive towards their schools, teachers, and classmates is as much a commentary on the obsolescence of the institution and its practices as it is on any growth, developmental phenomena or economic condition.

Having said all that, we can acclaim the trends that are quietly occurring on the sidelines. Technology and off-campus learning are allowing students of all ages to acquire more information than ever was previously available in any classroom.

In that sense, much of the teacher's traditional role is redundant. Or as my own students once said to me, 'Now you're free to learn along with us.' That is as it should be. Today, teachers assist young learners with how to use the vast array of information. That involves skills of evaluation, interpretation, and above all, application. Therefore, the roles of teacher and student and the relationships between them are changing to one of colleagues, based upon the sharing of information. At the same time, new role models, heroes, and strategies are emerging in education.

As parents become co-learners and assist children, their relationships with their children are also changing—similarly to those between student and teacher. The reversals that result when children teach parents new skills will bring about not only a new image of youth, but of parents as they take more responsibility (and acquire the skills) for their children's education.

Numerous projects that attempt to alleviate problematic behaviour are based on deficits rather than assets. Thus we spend huge amounts of money 'correcting deviant behaviour.' Perhaps more relevant educational methods will eventually mollify many of these conditions or, as Maxwell Jones suggested, perhaps they will simply go away.

Which leads us to primary prevention. I have witnessed several examples of transformations in schools where peer teaching was implemented on a large scale. Destructive behaviour was modified with the mere expectation of how could a peer teacher mistreat his pupil, or have respect as a teacher in the school, if he or she had the image of a terroriser?

Which in turn ultimately leads to job creation. How do we convert to a learning society? One way is to expand the practice of apprenticeships to the human services along with the creation of entrepreneurship. What seems to underlie all these trends is a movement from educational simulation to the real thing. We have kept children and youth out of direct participation for too long, denying them opportunities to learn by having responsible positions and not rewarding them for their successes.

Instant access to information will ultimately allow young people to become more involved in the democratic process. For example, they can check legislation daily and have influence on its passage. Through greater independence and creative thinking, youth can democratize information itself through informed decision making.

It is when we learn how to use information in perfecting our democracy that not only will many of our social and economic predicaments be mitigated, but we will surge ahead. As consumer advocate Ralph Nader said, 'When hundreds, thousands or even hundreds of thousands of persons organize themselves in forums to debate important public policy issues, they bring together vast amounts of specialized expertise and information creating synergies that are more powerful and useful than the most sophisticated database systems.'

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SEPARATE, UNEQUAL AND DIVERSE?

ON PLURALISM AND INTEGRATION

IN THE GERMAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

Ingo Richter

Introduction

FROM 'PLESSY' TO 'BROWN' AND BACK AGAIN?
EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Plessy, who claimed to be 7/8ths Caucasian and 1/8th African, was arrested because he refused to leave an American railroad carriage intended for whites only. A Louisiana state law dating from 1890 provided for 'separate but equal' railroad carriages for blacks and whites. In 1896, the United States Supreme Court, to which Plessy had appealed, confirmed the Louisiana law and with it the doctrine of separate but equal,¹—a concept which was to remain valid for more than fifty years and be applied in many areas of public life, particularly in schools and colleges. The court held that the mere segregation of the races was not in itself a reason to allege inequality. It further said that if there were natural and social differences between the races, then the Constitution could not remove them simply by placing the races on the same footing. Judge Harlan, in a concurring opinion, spoke out against such a proceeding in his famous sentence: 'Our Constitution is colour-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'

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In the 1950s, black pupils in the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware demanded to be admitted to schools attended by white children. At that time, racial segregation was still practised in schools and colleges. The authorities and courts of these states had refused to admit blacks into the 'white' schools, citing the separate but equal doctrine of 1896. In the years since 'Plessy', the Supreme Court had (in a few cases) admitted black pupils and students to white schools and colleges, saying that the black pupils did not have access to educational facilities which corresponded to those for the whites. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to uphold the doctrine of separate but equal. The cases which came before the court in 1952 were different in that essential aspects of the 'black' schools such as buildings, curricula, graduation certificates, and teachers' salaries were now comparable to those of the 'white' schools. The Court therefore addressed the question of whether the segregation of schools in itself rendered the children's education unequal. Upon examination, the Court found that segregation did indeed perpetuate inequality in education, thus the separate but equal doctrine was abandoned. 'Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal' is the famous sentence from a judgement that held that black children in 'black' schools developed feelings of inferiority that weakened their motivation to learn and led to worse results than those in integrated schools. This judgement in the case 'Brown v. Board of Education'² was the start of the controversy about integration in schools and colleges; a controversy that has been fought out on judicial, political and pedagogical levels and is still going on today.³

Although schools and colleges were now integrated by law, in reality black and white pupils were still to a large extent segregated. Certainly, forty years after the start of the policy of integration it can be said that it has not led to a greater similarity in academic results, as the Court had expected in 1954.⁴ The feeling of the American public regarding the policy of integration is therefore one of widespread resignation. While some people claim that any attempt at integration is useless as intelligence is largely a question of heredity,⁵ others support a multi-cultural policy that emphasizes the differences between cultures and wants to foster them.⁶ Caught between these two fronts, the traditional liberal political circles, formerly the promoters of the doctrine of integration, can hardly be heard.⁷ Depending on their political standpoint, people seem to tolerate, accept, or even emphasize the *de facto* segregation of cultural groups in the field of education and the inequalities between the pupils and students and their achievements; inequalities which exist *de facto* and are continually reproduced. 'Separate but unequal'—but nevertheless self-aware and proud?

Segregation and integration in the history of German education

The milestones in American educational history referred to in the introduction appear irrelevant with regard to the development of education in Germany. With one frightening exception, racial segregation has played no part in the develop-

ment of the German school system, and this exception—the expulsion and extermination of Jewish pupils—is such a special case that a comparison between the histories of these two countries on this subject is simply not possible.

Nevertheless, the history of education in the United States throws up questions central to the principles of education in general: the question of the segregation and/or integration of groups, and the question of the formal or informal criteria and justifications for this. If we look at the history of education in Germany, at the turn of the century there were already such criteria and justifications which produced certain separate types of schools. Thus, the schools and colleges in the German Empire between 1871 and 1919 were not ‘community schools’ comprising pupils and students regardless of their religious affiliation, cultural identity, gender, social background and academic capability, where they were then taught and educated together. On the contrary, schools in the Empire were organized separately according to various criteria:

1. First and most important was the question of religion. The states which made up the German Empire organized their grade schools either as community schools for members of all confessions, or as separate denominational schools for the adherents of the various confessions, or the authorities permitted both types to coexist. However, in the German Empire, approximately 85% of all grade-school pupils attended a denominational school appropriate to their confession.
2. In areas near the borders of the German Empire, distinctions of culture and especially of language played a certain part. There were, for example, Danish, Sorb, Dutch and Belgian schools for the respective minorities in the German Empire. But there were neither Polish nor French schools, although in the eastern areas of Prussia and in the ‘Imperial State’ of Alsace and Lorraine the majority, or at least a large minority, of the inhabitants were of Polish and French orientation, respectively.
3. In addition, the schools were segregated according to gender. There were separate schools for boys and girls; in the Empire, co-education existed only in village schools. ‘Higher education’ was slowly being made accessible to girls; but fewer girls than boys attended high schools, and the number of girls admitted to university was limited—at first officially by law and later in unofficial practice.
4. Admission to high schools, especially to those leading to university together with their so-called preparatory schools, was in practice regulated according to social class. Half of the pupils came from the upper and the upper middle classes, which comprised only 6 to 7% of the total population; for the other half, the high schools in the German Empire already provided ideal opportunities for social advancement.

The Weimar Republic, established after the German revolution of 1918, set out to abolish these distinctions. Article 146, Paragraph 1 of the Weimar Constitution read:

The public school system is to be designed organically. A grade school for all is to lead to intermediate and higher schools. The main criterion for their structuring is to be the diversity of the pupils' future occupations; children are to be admitted to specific schools according to their aptitudes and inclinations, not according to the economic and social situation of their parents or their religious affiliation.

In other words, distinctions of religion and social class were to disappear, unless parents voted for religious segregation (Article 146, Paragraph 2). Special status was maintained for members of cultural minorities and the principle of equal rights for both genders was established, although co-education only became prevalent after the Second World War. In addition, the law for the establishment of community schools for all denominations was not passed, so the status quo was largely maintained in the Weimar Republic (see Germany, 1919, p. 1,383).

The only justification for dividing up pupils after they had attended grade school together was to be 'the diversity of the pupils' future occupations' and their 'aptitudes and inclinations'. The traditional criteria for differentiation (religion, culture, gender and social background) were disapproved of and eliminated—at least by law. Nobody, at least not the people who drafted the constitution, seemed to realize that 'aptitudes and inclinations' and 'the diversity of the pupils' future occupations' could be connected with the discredited criteria of religion, culture, gender and social background.

Even though the National Socialists, who followed the Weimar Republic, strongly influenced the ideology and contents of education, they changed very little of the structure and organization of the education system; by and large things remained as they were. The same is also true of the immediate post-war period. The 1960s and 1970s, however, saw fundamental changes, which will now be summarized. The separation of grade schools by religious affiliation was, with a very few exceptions, abolished; in most places Christian community schools became the rule. There was no longer an immediate necessity to protect cultural minorities. The co-education of boys and girls became the norm. The grade school for all was retained, lasting six years in Berlin and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and four years elsewhere. In the GDR this was followed by a unified intermediate school and—for a few pupils destined to go on to university—by high school. In the Federal Republic there was the tripartite school system of *Gymnasium* (mainly for those intending to study), *Realschule* (usually leading to an apprenticeship), and *Hauptschule* (for the rest). Additionally, there existed in the Federal Republic a separate *Sonderschule* (special school) for educationally, physically or mentally challenged pupils.

The development of the school system in the GDR was directed towards the so-called socialist comprehensive school; on the other hand, in the Federal Republic the ideal was the 'community school' with its religious, cultural and co-educational principles, but with a clear division by academic ability into the various forms of secondary school listed above. Integration therefore became the norm, with the sole exception of the West German secondary school system.

Reasons for the attempts at integration in the German school system

SCHOOL AS A COMMUNITY

The Weimer Constitution promulgated as the supreme principle for the school system that it was to be designed organically. By using the term 'organic' or 'organism', the Constitution was subscribing to the idea that social groups are living creatures or at least are to be regarded as such. The sum of their differing constituent parts all serve one common purpose.⁸ In contrast to this idea stands the differentiation of groups, dividing them up according to religion, culture, gender and social class. The supreme community is the national community, in which distinctions of religion, culture, gender and class are abolished or at least no longer present barriers.⁹

In this way, the school system could be seen as a 'living creature', as a community whose parts were to be 'organically' linked one to another. The school as a community was to prepare the pupils for the national community.

What is most important for the school is neither religion, nor gender, nor social class, nor even the cultural background within German culture but the sense of belonging to the German nation.¹⁰ Community schools for all denominations, the co-education of boys and girls, and the grade school for all were the logical organizational products of this concept of school as a community.

But the school as a community is not a distant historical concept that has fallen into disrepute because the National Socialists misused it to achieve their political goals. Rather, it is still a project for school reform, as Hartmut von Hentig has recently reformulated it.¹¹ According to him, school is a 'place for living and experiencing' which not only deals with the problems the pupils have with life, but a place where they can 'have experiences which are essential for their lives—with all the problems and promises that our society holds out for them.' Hentig's school is a 'place for living' where the pupils can experience the most important 'features of our society'. They can get to know 'the advantages of living in a community and the price they must pay for it'. Above all, they learn through holistic 'experience', through the 'entire person'. School is the 'bridge between the nuclear family . . . and the mass-organized systems of social life'. Nevertheless, school remains school, a place of learning. It is clear that this school can only be a 'comprehensive school', although Hentig would prefer to use a different word. It practically cries out for children of all religions, both genders, many cultures and all social classes to live together, for only in this way can it be a 'place for living and experiencing'. Hentig specifies that his school will accept all the children who live in the area and that if the composition of the local population is one-sided, the formation of the community must be given a helping hand on a pluralistic basis. Hentig has designed this school for democratic, as well as for pedagogical, reasons.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC SCHOOL

The national state developed out of the French Revolution; it was described as the united, indivisible republic, denying all distinctions of religion, class, culture and gender and relegating them to the private sphere. As a French citizen, one could be Catholic or Protestant, farmer or labourer, Breton or Basque; one was, however, first and foremost a citizen of this republic. Accordingly, a school in this republic could only be public, comprehensive, non-religious and national, denying all denominational, cultural and social distinctions. School was conceived of as a 'republican school' because all state-run organizations were to be based on republican principles.

After the revolution of 1918, Germany also became such a republic. What could be more natural than to consider schools as national, public, non-religious and comprehensive institutions? But the revolution did not go that far. The republic agreed on the so-called Weimar school compromises which limited the public and non-religious character of the schools. But the republic was to be a democratic one; this meant that the power of the state was to derive from the people. To achieve this, representative democracies have developed the principle of majority rule for a limited period of time, based on regular elections. But what happens if the majority vote 'the wrong way'? 'Education for democracy' presented itself as the means of permanently ensuring democratic rule on the basis of democratic elections. How could 'education to democracy' be better safeguarded than by organizing the schools themselves in accordance with democratic principles? As John Dewey noted, democratic education can only be guaranteed by integration into a 'school for all'. Only such a school can provide the experiences necessary for life in a democracy.¹² The general American school was similar to the French in that it was non-religious and public. In contrast to the French school, American schools were not state-run, but a local and democratic responsibility—integrated as far as religion, culture and gender were concerned, but racially segregated.

Although the German cities and boroughs could look back on a long tradition of local autonomy with democratic organizational structures and they identified themselves with 'their schools', schools in Germany were never communized in a way comparable to developments in the United States. Public sector schools remained state-run schools. Basically, Article 146, Paragraph 1 of the Weimar Constitution demanded that in a democratic republic, the children were to be educated and taught regardless of their gender and their religious, cultural or social backgrounds. But, as has already been pointed out, this was not the case in practice. During the Weimar Republic and in the immediate post-war years of the Federal Republic, the democratic 'school for all' remained a goal rather than reality. In the GDR, it resulted in the socialist comprehensive school based on communist principles.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a special development took place concerning the constitution of schools in West Germany: the principle of democracy was made pedagogical. Schools were to be made more democratic according to the model of

equal representation, with pupils, parents and teachers being accorded certain rights of co-determination, following the example of the industrial relations code in Germany. The schools were not really to be run and administered by pupils, parents and teachers, it was simply to be a training-ground for democracy—to be learnt in the ‘school democracy’. Hartmut von Hentig reformulated this idea according to the model of the Greek *polis*.

We need an ‘education’ to politics. In our world citizens’ politics, the flexible management of common affairs, has become so difficult that it needs a special, artificial arrangement. I call it the school *polis*. Only when we have experienced and understood the basic laws of a small, easily comprehended community—the laws of the *res publica*, of the *logon didonai*, of democracy, of the duty to make public affairs generally comprehensible, in other words of enlightenment, of trust, of reliability, of sensible behaviour among the citizens, and last but not least of friendliness and solidarity among people generally—only then will we distinguish them and obey them with confidence in the large *polis*.¹³

This *polis* is to be, in contrast to the Greek *polis*, a school for both genders, for all religions, cultures and for every social class.

PROMOTING ACHIEVEMENT

In Article 146, Paragraph 1, the Weimar Constitution laid down that, apart from occupational orientation, the only criterion governing pupils’ admission to the various sectors of the school system was to be ‘aptitude and inclination’. This presupposed the existence of various different secondary schools, ‘organically’ based on a common grade school. Accordingly, in the Weimar Republic and in the first few years of the Federal Republic, grade school pupils were allocated according to their academic achievement at the age of approximately 10 years to the three (or four) types of secondary schools: the *Hauptschule*, the *Realschule*, the *Gymnasium*, as well as the *Sonderschule*. But further experiences with this dividing up according to achievement criteria had shown that this allegedly neutral criterion of achievement was bound up with the pupil’s gender, as well as their religious, social and cultural background. The ‘Catholic farm labourer’s daughter’ stood in contrast to the ‘Protestant son of city officials’. Therefore, the integration of schools was intended to encourage pupils who were achieving less. The motive was similar to that of the United States Supreme Court in its judgement in the ‘Brown’ case: the segregation of black and white children weakens the black children’s incentive to learn and leads to their achieving worse results than in integrated schools. Girls, working-class children, Catholics and foreigners were the ‘blacks’ of the Federal Republic. Integration was intended to encourage them, especially working-class children.

In contrast to the socialist comprehensive school in the GDR, integration in the Federal Republic was to take place in ‘democratic schools based on the principle of achievement’ which were also given the name ‘comprehensive school’ (*Gesamtschule*). Although all children were to be admitted to this comprehensive

school, they were to be taught in separate courses, divided up by subject and achievement. The educationists hoped that a mixture of academically homogeneous and heterogeneous courses would provide the greatest incentive to weaker pupils, while at the same time not inhibiting the development of the more academically talented pupils. In addition, the children's integration into a single 'school for all' was intended to encourage social learning and democratic education in accordance with the pedagogical ideals of 'community' and the 'republic school'.

The ambivalence of this promotion of achievement between integration and segregation becomes particularly clear in the case of the *Sonderschule*. The attitudes of educational policies in the Federal Republic with regard to encouraging pupils with severe learning difficulties or maladjusted children have undergone a 180 degree turnaround. German pedagogical tradition meant that children who could not follow in grade school and who impeded the progress of the other children were sent to the 'special school' (*Hilfsschule*), which thus comprised a negative social elite. Social stigma and discrimination were attached to it. In the course of the educational reforms of the 1960s and 1970s the 'special school' developed into a 'remedial school' for handicapped children, whose upbringing and education were regarded as a special pedagogical task for society. The political maxim was: 'Special support by separate development.' The social and pedagogical progress of a state was measured by the establishment of *Sonderschulen*; the higher the percentage of children who attended such remedial schools, the more progressive were the educational policies of that state.

Between 1960 and 1973 the proportion of children attending *Sonderschulen* in the Federal Republic as a whole rose from 2.2% to 5.3%. Even in 1973 there were differences between the various states. For example, 3.8% of all Bavarian children attended *Sonderschulen*, compared with 7.2% in Schleswig-Holstein. In the 1970s, however, a complete change of course occurred. In 1973, the German Educational Council (*Deutscher Bildungsrat*) put forward a proposal for 'the pedagogical advancement of handicapped children and young people and those threatened by a handicap', which demanded that 'the handicapped and non-handicapped be taught together as far as possible', which would lead to the partial abolition of the *Sonderschule*. The Council's reasons were the following:

The Educational Commission considers this new concept justified primarily because it is one of the foremost duties of every democratic country to integrate the handicapped into society. The Educational Commission believes that this problem, which presents itself to the handicapped and non-handicapped alike, can most easily be solved if the tendency of the school system to select and isolate is overcome and if communal teaching and learning for both the handicapped and the non-handicapped is placed in the foreground; if the handicapped are segregated at school, there is the danger that they will not be integrated as adults.¹⁴

This reasoning derives not so much from the pedagogical aim of the rationally organized promotion of achievement which had led to the *Gesamtschule*, as from the social responsibility of the citizens in a democracy for their handicapped fel-

low-citizens, both as pupils and with a view to their future role in adult society. In the 1980s, this view found almost universal acceptance in pedagogical circles, but not yet, however, in practice.

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

German Basic Constitutional Law (*Grundgesetz*) guarantees equality of access in the school system. Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the *Grundgesetz* says that nobody may be discriminated against because of their gender, religion, language or origins. Indeed, Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the *Grundgesetz* says that all people are equal in the eyes of the law, as well as 'in the eyes of the school'. This paragraph does not, of course, say anything about the organization of schools; this is the responsibility of the state, which must—through whatever form it chooses—guarantee equality of access for all children. Equality of access does not, of course, mean equality of results. That all people are equal in the eyes of the law does not mean that the achievements, abilities and attitudes produced by school are the same. On the contrary, they differ extremely and these differences are not markedly influenced by schools.

This at least was the conclusion in the United States of the so-called Coleman Report 'On equality of educational opportunity' (Mosteller & Moynihan, 1972). The report found that, ten years after the 'Brown' judgement, schools in the United States were still racially segregated, that academic achievement differed widely between the races, and that neither investment in the school system (particularly the per capita expenditure and the equipment of the school buildings) nor the laws and the curricula had eliminated these differences. On the contrary, the pupils' performance was influenced by their family background, the social composition of the classes and the teachers' attitudes. Accordingly, the report recommended that the equality of opportunity should be increased by integration, compensation and professionalization.¹⁵

In Germany, the dazzling term 'equality of opportunity' quickly caught on in every political camp, appearing to fulfil the demand for equality by the 'left', the concept of fairness of the 'right', and the idea of freedom of the politically liberal. But what did this term really mean at that time, in the 1960s? Equality of access to the educational sector had long ago been formally achieved, and did not equality of access automatically mean equality of opportunity? Nobody wanted to see equality of results, only the equal opportunity to achieve equal results. But how could this equal opportunity for all be guaranteed in the face of individual and social differences? Like in the United States, the suggestions included integration (or at least flexibility), compensation (or at least support), and professionalization (or at least improvement in teacher training) in the school system.

In the Federal Republic, characterized in Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the *Grundgesetz* as a social and democratic federal state, all the traditional criteria for the distribution of power and income were disapproved of—especially a person's background, religious denomination, political party, gender, bourgeois education

or money. Even if these considerations may have retained their significance in practice, they can no longer be used to justify one's social status officially. Only a person's academic and/or professional achievements seemed to be accepted as possessing the desired objectivity. As early as 1961, Schelsky described school as the 'mechanism for allocating social opportunities';¹⁶ now this characterization appeared to be becoming reality—on condition that these social opportunities were divided up equally in and by school. This approach could be compared to a race where all the runners, both fast and slow, begin at the same starting line although everybody knows that they will reach the finishing tape at different times. Equality of opportunity was thus, above all, a precondition for attempts at integration; it had little or no effect on the question of how this could be achieved—as the following section will show.

Integration: experiences and results

The history of the educational sector in the Federal Republic is characterized by the policy of integration, which to a large extent abolished the official segregation of pupils by religion, gender, culture and background, both in law and in practice—with the exception of the continued existence of the tripartite secondary school system and the *Sonderschule* (see above). The question remains, however, whether the goals which were to be achieved by these legal and political attempts at integration have been reached. There are numerous investigations and reports which provide detailed information about this question, therefore I will confine myself to only a few assessments.

RELIGION

Whereas in 1931–32, 85% of all grade-school pupils in the German Empire attended denominationally segregated schools, today it is only a small proportion of pupils in two of the sixteen federal states. The various waves of immigrants to the Federal Republic meant that the integration provided for by law was carried out in practice, too. Twenty years ago, the West German Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) finally settled the arguments concerning educational policies about integration with its decisions about the denominational structure of the school system. The states are allowed to establish and maintain denominational schools, but these schools must be governed by the principles of openness and tolerance; the states are allowed to establish community schools, but these schools must give the pupils the opportunity to express their religious convictions, for example in school prayers.¹⁷

As far as the Christian religion is concerned, the goals of integration have been achieved. School is indeed a 'community' for Catholic and Protestant pupils; school is a place where they can experience things together, insofar as school can still provide communal experiences at all. Today Catholic and Protestant parents are members of all democratic parties, and members of all denominations are pre-

sumed to have democratic attitudes. It is no longer possible to talk of differences of achievement between Catholic and Protestant pupils; at least, such differences are not borne out by statistics. Equality of opportunity for Protestant and Catholic children seems to have been achieved in the educational sector. The question remains, however, whether this is really a result of the policy of pedagogical integration or whether the policy of integration is not a result of the widespread secularization of public life in the Federal Republic.

GENDER

In the Federal Republic, the co-education of girls and boys was generally regarded as unproblematic and natural until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the movement towards female emancipation brought the question up again. Experiences with co-education had shown that some of its aims had been achieved, that some had been 'overachieved', and that some had not been achieved at all. Although schools represent places for 'communal life and experience' for both genders, not only had they not prevented the development of traditional male and female roles, they had, in some respects, even fostered it. The democratic equality of men and women, for which the foundation is laid in co-education at school, has never been in doubt in the Federal Republic. One result of this policy of equality is that the number of girls at high school is usually higher than that of boys. In the curricula, however, traditional gender-specific divisions can still be seen; boys choose mathematical and technical subjects, girls choose arts and languages. This division can also be observed at university entry. A gender-specific choice of occupation is still the rule, which favours boys and disadvantages girls. Therefore, even after decades of co-education, there can be no question of a complete equality of opportunity which—apart from equal access to education—also provides for equal opportunities for occupation.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND

The expansion in numbers of high schools and the increase in flexibility have changed their social composition; their social selectivity has not been completely abolished, but it has been greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the proportion of pupils from the lower classes of the German (and especially of the foreign) population attending *Gymnasium* and university is still far smaller than in the total population. Only about 10% of 13 and 14 year-old children of working-class parents go to the *Gymnasium*, compared with 90% of the children of self-employed university graduates. Only 1 to 2% of the children of unskilled workers go to university, compared with 80% of the children of civil servants who graduated from high-school. Eleven percent of the total number of children at school are foreigners; in the *Gymnasium* this proportion is only 5%, whereas in the *Hauptschule* it is four times as high, namely 20%.¹⁸

Educational sociology still operates with class models which are based on the income and education of the parents, but it is generally agreed that such models provide an inadequate reflection of social reality. Integration and expansion have led to schools becoming 'communities' in which differing 'social environments', but not classes, can be seen. The democratic equality of all citizens is accepted as a matter of course; admission to the various types of school is governed solely by the child's proven achievements, not by his/her social background. The results of the school-leavers prove that, despite equality of access, there is no question of equality of results. Therefore, the promise of equality of social opportunity cannot at present be considered to have been fulfilled. This especially applies to the continued isolation of those pupils of *Sonderschulen* categorized as having learning difficulties, most of whom come from the so-called 'social class with no access to education and culture'.

CULTURE

For a long time, the question of separate upbringing and education for cultural minorities did not arise in the Federal Republic, because such minorities did not exist in the West German states. There simply were no longer Flemish, Dutch, Danish, Sorb, Polish, Czech or French minorities as there had been in the time of the Weimar Republic. The issue of cultural minorities only arose in the 1960s, when the massive migration of workers brought (particularly) southern Europeans and Turks into the country. For a long time, the migration of workers did not attract attention because the migrant workers either consciously assimilated with the culture of the majority or—in a process of 'rotation'—returned to their home countries. In the meantime, half of them have lived in Germany for more than ten years and some of them are second generation immigrants.

Even now there are no 'schools for foreigners'; there are temporary, collective, national or multi-cultural classes, providing instruction in the German language and intended to promote integration. Nevertheless, despite the policy of integration, educational policies have not managed to achieve the goals of this integration. Although both Germans and foreigners attend the same schools, schools do not represent a 'community' for them. And a 'democratic republican school' composed of both Germans and foreigners cannot exist, if only because foreigners do not have the right to vote in the Federal Republic—even if European Union nationals are now to be given the right to vote in local elections. With regard to promoting achievement, it can be seen that the proportion of foreigners at high schools is rising, but it cannot be denied that this percentage in no way corresponds to their percentage of the total population. The integration of foreigners into the German school system certainly does not mean that they are given equal chances of access. They are still underrepresented in high schools and essentially do not enjoy equality of opportunity.

To sum up, it can be said that the aims of integration in the educational policies of the Federal Republic have been achieved as far as education to democracy

and perhaps even the creation of communities are concerned, but the policy of integration has not led to improvements in the promotion of achievement and equality of opportunity.

After integration: new tendencies and reasons for segregation

'Integration', the great catchword of the movement towards educational reform in the 1960s and 1970s, has lost a lot of its attraction and persuasiveness. During the 1980s, forces of conservation, alteration and opposition appeared on the scene. These hindered the efforts at integration, established new barriers and priorities, and revealed new tendencies towards segregation in the education sector.

NEW RELIGIONS

At present, denominational schools still exist in two states of the Federal Republic; there are no definite initiatives to integrate them into the general school system. In general, religious instruction in Christian community schools is divided up according to denomination. Experiments with inter-denominational religious instruction are still at an early stage, for example, in Brandenburg. On the one hand, parents either remove their children from religious instruction or do not register them for it at all, because—like most people in the former East German states—they do not have any religious affiliation, or children old enough to decide for themselves do it and choose the so-called 'ethical instruction' as a substitute. On the other hand, there are new religious tendencies, especially in the so-called 'youth religions', which in part express themselves in attempts to found new schools. These include fundamentalist Christian movements, such as the pietistic August-Hermann-Francke movement, and also pantheistic movements which do not favour any particular religion but want to foster the strengthening of the identity in all religions, such as the Scientology movement. Finally, today there are strong Muslim tendencies, as can be seen by the maintenance of the so-called 'Koran schools'. The German Constitution does not allow for schools such as these and other movements within the public school system; consequently, they have to be part of the private sector instead, and there have been legal disputes about whether they are loyal to the Constitution and whether their educational goals are of an equal standard.

THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS

Although the co-education of girls and boys is now the rule everywhere in the public school system (and prevalent in private schools as well), co-education has been criticized for some time now from both conservative and feminist quarters. Conservative critics contend that in co-educational schools girls are trained for a job in public life and not for home and family. Conservatives therefore demand a

'new' (old) form of separate education for girls. Feminist critics point to the continuing disadvantage of girls as compared to boys; they claim that co-education does not teach that the genders are equal, but rather emphasizes the inferiority of girls as compared to boys. It is not only the so-called 'radical feminists' that are demanding either a new form of co-education or a new partial form of separate education for girls. The basic demand is for separate classes in specific subjects, such as the natural sciences. In a few states, for example Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia, experiments have already begun in this direction.

MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION

In Germany, the development of a multi-cultural society is not as far advanced as in the United States. In America, controversy has been raging for some time now—questioning about Western culture forming the school canon, about the language which classes are taught in and about the segregation of schools. On the one hand, there are the proponents of political liberalism who insist that American culture is in itself pluralistic and multi-cultural in its mixture;¹⁹ on the other hand, there are the proponents of ethnic identity and ethnic self-sufficiency who want to see the re-introduction of the doctrine 'separate but equal'.²⁰

In the German school system, the teachings of integration are still predominant and would like to see the concept of multi-cultural education firmly fixed in integrated public schools. Tendencies towards segregation can, however, be seen today at various levels. At some German inner-city *Hauptschulen*, the majority of pupils are by now foreign, although in general they tend to come from a wide variety of countries and are not culturally homogeneous. Some states provide for a limited period of collective, national or multi-cultural classes for pupils who do not speak sufficient German to attend regular classes, but these classes are intended to prepare the pupils for integration (or for 'rotation'?). In some states, the mother tongue of the foreign pupils is taught as a 'foreign language' in public schools. There are initiatives to provide non-Christian religious instruction for children belonging to a non-Christian religion, for example Muslims. The parents of some girls refuse to allow them to take part in co-educational classes, for example in sports or swimming. Efforts are being made to found multi-cultural private schools for foreign children. Koran schools are being maintained and tolerated by the religious communities as non-schools. In other words, there exist numerous developments in a divisive multi-cultural direction, and at present it is virtually impossible to predict what these developments will lead to.

Although the tendencies towards segregation in the German school system have so far been fairly limited, it can nevertheless be seen that the four principles on which the attempts at integration in the 1960s and 1970s were based are no longer as undisputed and natural as they appeared to be at the time. We are no longer so willing to speak of school as a 'community' and as a microcosm of the 'national community'. The 'national community' has been replaced by a 'pluralistic society', which emphasizes the different and partially irreconcilable nature of its

interests. The concept of democracy is understood today as being individualistic and pluralistic, rather than national and unitary. Democracy is seen less as a process that expresses the unified will of the people than it is regarded as a process capable of expressing the diversity of interests and balancing them. The preconditions for the principle of promoting achievement were a unified concept of achievement, and a cultural norm founded on tradition and consensus that formed the basis of the curriculum. Today, however, some people consider a distinctive, independent identity more important than achievements measured by certain standards. But what is most important is the significance of the principle of equality. It would appear that schools are no longer expected to abolish or reduce existing social inequalities by guaranteeing equality of opportunity. The potential equality of results no longer appears to be the aim or the standard by which the quality of a democratically constituted school system is measured. Cultural diversity appears to be taking the place of social equality. Is the maxim now: 'Separate, unequal, and diverse'?²¹

Notes

1. Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537
2. Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483
3. Wilkinson, *From Brown to Bakke*, 1979; Jencks, *Inequality*, 1972; see also Note 4.
4. Summarizing Coleman, *Equality and achievement in education*, 1990.
5. The conclusion of the book by Herrnstein and Murray, *The bell curve*, 1994.
6. The thesis of the book by Sowell, *Race and culture*, 1994.
7. See, however, the attack on multi-cultural policies by A. Schlesinger Jr., *The disuniting of America*, New York, Norton, 1992.
8. This very Germanic theory of the State, based on models in antiquity, was developed at the end of the nineteenth century and quickly spread throughout every academic field. See Otto von Giercke, *Das Wesen menschlicher Verbände*, 1902. Outside Germany this theory is largely unknown.
9. This is why the basic rights which the Weimar Constitution accorded its citizens were placed at the service of the community; for example, property was to serve the 'common good' (Article 153). The fact that the National Socialist leader usurped and abused the concept of community does not affect this.
10. Thus Article 148 of the Weimar Constitution places moral education, civil and civic attitudes, as well as personal and professional efficiency at the service of the 'German people' and the 'reconciliation between the nations'.
11. H. von Hentig, *Die Schule neu denken*, Munich; Vienna, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1993.
12. J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 1916; J. Dewey, *Experience and education*, 1938.
13. Hentig, op. cit., p. 181.
14. Deutscher Bildungsrat, *Zur pädagogischen Förderung behinderter und von Behinderung bedrohter Kinder und Jugendlicher*, Bonn, Bundesdruckerei, 1973, p. 16.
15. For an interpretation of the report and its background, see F. Mosteller and D.P. Moynihan, *On equality of education and opportunity*, New York, Vintage Books, 1972.

16. H. Schelsky, *Anpassung oder Widerstand*, Heidelberg, Quelle & Meyer, 1961.
17. Bundesverfassungsgericht, vol. 41, p. 29, 65, 88; vol. 52, p. 223.
18. Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, *Das Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1994, p. 377, 511 and 643.
19. Schlesinger, op. cit.
20. T. Sowell, *Race and culture*, New York, Basic Books, 1994.
21. The German case shows a universal trend towards globalization on the one hand and regionalization and segregation on the other. This trend was documented in an international conference in Berlin in 1993 on 'Educational decision making in an open society', to be published in 1995 by Fuessel, Richter and Roeder, *Regulating pluralism in education*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.

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THE SOCIAL REJECTION

OF YOUNG PEOPLE

WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS

Françoise Battagliola

Introduction

For a decade and a half, the concept of exclusion¹ has sought to circumscribe the unprecedented social phenomena caused by the radical changes occurring in Western societies since the 1980s. Unlike traditional approaches to poverty, the approach to exclusion is not restricted to consideration of the economic dimension alone: the cultural level, relations with the labour market, the importance of networks of relations, even how identity is experienced, all help to bring about integration or social exclusion. These multi-dimensional approaches also assist in apprehending the diversity of social itineraries and the dynamics through which the processes leading to integration or exclusion are established.

During the transitional phase, young people are especially vulnerable. Youth is not so much defined by belonging to a particular age group as by that period in a person's life which encompasses various stages: the end of school and entry into the labour market, leaving home, forming a couple and having a family. Although all young people do not experience all these stages, they are indicators along the road towards autonomy as an adult, and financial independence is one of the landmarks along this road.

The aim of this article is to highlight the factors likely to jeopardize the transition from youth to adulthood, foremost among which is the lack of school diplo-

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mas that can be redeemed on the labour market and the social rejection of persons without diplomas.

Extended schooling and the insecurity of those with inadequate qualifications


The socio-economic changes that have taken place over the past fifteen years have significantly modified the mode of transition to adulthood and have resulted in a greater risk of insecurity for some young people: those with fewer qualifications or from the working class are the most vulnerable and girls are usually more vulnerable than boys.

A RELATIVE DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SCHOOL-LEAVERS WITH INADEQUATE QUALIFICATIONS


The extension of schooling has been a particularly significant factor. It has helped young people from all social sectors and has been especially marked in the case of girls (see Figures 1 and 2).² Although the educational level of school-leavers has risen, the percentage of those with a very low level of qualification³ still remains fairly important: it decreased from 39% in 1983 to 35% in 1987, reaching 20% in 1992. The differences between the sexes are quite marked and in 1992 24% of boys, but only 15.5% of girls, left school with only this low level of qualification. Furthermore, the percentage of the most disadvantaged, those who left school at the age of sixteen at the end of their compulsory schooling without any diploma, has only decreased slightly: from 14.5% in 1983 to almost 10% in 1992.⁴

FIGURE 1: The proportion of young people between the ages of 15 and 24 enrolled in education, 1982, 1987, 1993

A. Male



B. Female



Source: INSEE, *Enquêtes emploi*.

FIGURE 2: Young people aged 15 to 24 according to the category of activity, 1982, 1987, 1993

A. Male



B. Female



Source: INSEE, *Enquêtes emploi*.

INCREASED DIFFICULTY OF ENTRY INTO THE LABOUR MARKET

Unemployment

As a result of extended schooling, the working population in the 15 to 24 age group is decreasing. The overall proportion of unemployed (within the ILO meaning) in this age group remains stable. The unemployment rate among the working population, on the other hand, has increased significantly, as shown in Table 1. Moreover, in recent years unemployment lasting more than one year has been increasing among the working population: it now affects 19% of men and 21.5% of women from 15 to 24.

TABLE 1: The level of unemployment among young people aged 15 to 24, 1982, 1987, 1993*

	Men	Women	Overall
1982	15.6	25.1	20.2
1987	20.7	28.5	24.5
1993	21.5	28.4	24.6

* Unemployment in the ILO sense, ratio of unemployed to employed in the same age group.

Source: INSEE, *Enquêtes emploi*.

The unemployment rate (among the working population) becomes higher as the level of qualifications decreases (see Table 2). Consequently, there is a trend towards excluding from the labour market young people who left school early with few qualifications. This trend is particularly noticeable in the case of girls. Thirty-three months after leaving school (between 1983 and 1986), 55% of girls without any school certificate had been unemployed for more than a year and 22% had never had a job, compared with 37 and 7% respectively of their male counterparts.⁵ The deterioration in insertion into the employment market has also strongly affected girls with limited qualifications: the *Brevet d'études primaires (BEP)* (Primary school certificate), *Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle (CAP)* (Vocational training certificate). In the services sector, with a high proportion of women, competition is extremely keen between those with qualifications and those without, which leads to a chain reaction of depreciation of certificates.

Deterioration in the market for operational jobs and the role of government measures to support the employment of young people

Between leaving school and getting a permanent job (i.e. a job for an indefinite period at a chosen time), a transitional period is becoming more general, and it comprises government measures to assist the entry of young people into the labour market.

The selective nature of the labour market has become even more marked as a result of the increasingly important role played by qualifications in recruitment, even for jobs that require little or no qualifications. This phenomenon has had a noticeable effect in the services sector, slightly less in the industrial sector. Overall, it is operational jobs as a whole, whether wage-earning or not, that have become

TABLE 2: Unemployed aged 15 to 24 according to the level of qualification in 1993*

Diploma	Men	Women	Overall
Not known, no diploma, primary school certificate (CEP)	34.6	44.4	38.5
Certificate on completion of four years' secondary education (BEPC)	21.6	32.9	26.9
Vocational training qualification (CAP) technical education certificate (BEP) or other diploma at the same level	19.7	28.9	23.5
Baccalaureate, specialized technical qualification or other	17.6	25.6	22.1
First two years of a degree course at university, advanced vocational diploma (BTS), diploma from a university of technology (DUT), paramedical or social diploma	11.7	13.6	12.7
Final two years of a degree course at university or postgraduate course, diploma from high-level university college (<i>Grande école</i>) or engineering diploma	8.6	18.5	14.3
Preliminary studies	6.4	11.5	8.7
Total	21.3	28.4	24.6

* Unemployment in the ILO sense.

Source: INSEE, *Enquêtes emploi*.

FIGURE 3: Measures by the French Government to assist the entry of young people into the labour market

Measures include the following formulae:

- Supported employment in the commercial sector: *stages d'initiation à la vie professionnelle (SIVP)* [job initiation courses], adaptation contracts and qualification contracts.
- Supported employment in the non-commercial sector: *travaux d'utilité collectif (TUC)* [community work], replaced in 1989 by *emploi-solidarité* [employment-solidarity] contracts (CES).
- Work-based training courses.
- Since 1989, the *crédit-formation individualisé jeunes (CFI)* [individual credit-training for young people]. This mechanism is aimed at obtaining qualifications. It seeks to co-ordinate utilization of measures already existing in the context of individual programmes. For the majority, it leads to work-based training.

more scarce: for example, between 1982 and 1990 blue-collar jobs for men decreased by 6%, while those for women decreased by 8%.⁶ The measures to assist the professional insertion of young people were established in an attempt to limit these problems. The extension of the transitional period as a result of these measures is the main reason why young people without qualifications have not been excluded from the world of work to a greater extent. On average 'supported employment' took up ten of the first thirty months of insertion for girls who left school in 1989; half of them benefited from at least one of these measures. In the case of boys, it was mainly those without qualifications who utilized these measures. Boys have benefited to a somewhat greater extent than girls from the slight economic recovery, mainly by taking advantage of the development of precarious employment.⁷

The development of precarious employment and under employment

Precarious employment and under employment are increasing alongside government measures to assist the integration of young people in the world of work: fixed-term contracts, temporary jobs, part-time work made obligatory at the time of recruitment. In the commercial and individual services sectors, the significant number of jobs created (60,000 for men and 210,000 for women between 1982 and 1990) mostly corresponds to the creation of precarious or obligatorily part-time jobs and cannot therefore compensate for the loss of steady full-time jobs.

In 1982, 9% of the working population between the ages of 15 and 29 had some sort of job (fixed-term contract, temporary job, apprenticeship, training course, supported employment in the context of government measures), whereas in 1994 the figure was 19%.⁸

The disintegration of the wage-earning ratio has had a significant effect on young people, particularly those with fewer qualifications and young women. It has meant that precarious jobs and flexibility have become methods for the recruitment and management of labour.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL ORIGIN

The level of qualifications depends to a large extent on social origin. For example, half of young working-class people aged 20 to 35 in 1986 only had a primary school certificate, whereas the figure is less than 20% for young people in more advantaged circumstances (fathers who are managers, directors, shop owners, craftsmen, mothers who have completed their secondary education).⁹ Low-income families with little education are frequently disarmed by the complexity of the school system and not well prepared to guide and support their children's schooling. In addition, housing segregation means that disadvantaged populations are grouped together in a particular area and the result is social stigmatization of these areas and the depreciation of the schools there. In France, the ghetto effect is not as marked as in the United Kingdom or the United States and, although government policy tries to limit its effects (policies to rehabilitate areas and improve schools there), the place of residence removes the opportunity to continue studying subjects that are valued and, consequently, for young people from low-income facilities, the opportunity to forge ahead through schooling.¹⁰

Furthermore, where the level of qualifications is the same, the marketable value of a diploma varies greatly according to social origin: the chance of reaching a middle-ranking or senior management job is around 10% for those without a baccalaureate,¹¹ 8% for girls without a baccalaureate if the father is working class or an employee, while these figures more than double for boys whose fathers are senior managers or in middle-ranking professions and exceed 10% for girls.¹² Young people who have not passed their baccalaureate are even more disadvantaged on the labour market if they are working class and social origin widens the gap among boys even further than among girls.

The level of qualifications does not automatically lead to a job. Behaviour and presentation, as well as the way a person expresses himself or herself, are equally important. These abilities can be learned just as much in the family environment as in school. The importance of the family's web of relationships when a young person is seeking to enter the labour market has also been highlighted.¹³ In the traditional working class in particular it was customary for children to be recruited by the enterprise where one or more members of the family were already working or—particularly in the case of boys—they took over from their fathers in small-scale agricultural enterprises or workshops. The disintegration of part of the industrial fabric, cutbacks in staff in large enterprises, the crisis affecting the creation of small and not very profitable enterprises make these paths towards integration in the world of work obsolete. In addition, the fact that parents have been ousted from jobs as a result of unemployment or early retirement does not allow them to help their children when they are seeking their first job. For example, analysis of the survey on household conditions has shown that unemployment within the family was frequent and that to an increasing extent the parents of young people in an unstable situation were no longer in the labour market; more than half the fathers of unemployed young people living at home were themselves unemployed, not working or retired.¹⁴

The primordial importance of educational assets has the effect of undervaluing other assets that could be used profitably by young people from the working class at a prior stage in the labour market. This is the case for physical assets:¹⁵ strength, endurance, manual know-how. Thus one of the outlets for the reproduction of the traditional working class¹⁶ is being closed off. Some young working class people, those who have not moved upwards through schooling, are rejected: socially undervalued, with neither a place in society nor reference points on which to build their social identity.¹⁷

Precarious jobs and the transition to adulthood

The growing difficulties encountered by young people when seeking stable entry into the labour market has affected the form of transition to adulthood. The impact of professional vulnerability, however, appears to differ greatly according to sex: it has a strong influence on the private itinerary of boys, but little effect on that of girls. Entry into the labour market and family life, as well as the division of work and roles according to sex, are of varying importance for the two sexes and result in different linkages between the professional path and the private itinerary.¹⁸

STAYING AT HOME: IN FACT A MALE PHENOMENON

The difficulty of entering the labour market constitutes an obstacle to an independent lifestyle for men, but has no effect on women leaving home, as can be seen in

Table 3. The largest percentage of men living at home results from a dual phenomenon. Firstly, changes in the timetable for leaving home: this has become distinctly less common before 24 years of age, whereas after 25 years it has become more usual if there are professional problems. The phase of living alone has thus been deferred. Secondly, a large number of men return home after having lived alone. This is the case for one unemployed person out of eight, compared with a very small minority in the rest of the population.¹⁹ On the other hand, very few women return home. After 30 years of age, men who had had an unstable professional life or were unemployed at the time of the survey were three times more likely to be living with their parents than the rest of their generation (21.5% compared with only 7.4%). At the same age, however, almost all the women had left their family home irrespective of their employment situation. Beyond the age when the norm (in the statistical and social senses) is independence, only men who were the most disadvantaged in terms of school diplomas and the most insecure from the professional point of view were still living with their parents.²⁰ This situation highlights a 'soft' form of exclusion, the family being a bulwark against the more radical forms of social marginalization. It is not common to find men in a difficult professional situation living alone; on the contrary, it is young people from more privileged homes, especially those with a steady job, who adopt this lifestyle.²¹

As a corollary to the extended stay with their parents, young men less seldom live in a couple when they encounter professional difficulties (Table 4). Rather than living as a couple, it is creating a family that appears to be the most affected: half of men in precarious employment do not have any children compared with only one-third of other men of the same generation (Table 5). The breakdown according to the number of children shows a significant decrease in the number of fathers of one or two children, although the number of large families is only slightly affected. Some of them decide to reduce the size of their families if they face professional difficulties, more frequently remaining without children or refusing to envisage a second child. The same phenomenon can be seen among women, but to a much less pronounced extent: few women decide to renounce motherhood—they have a first child in the same proportion as more advantaged women—but on the other hand, they more rarely have a second or third child (though it is likely that a number of mothers of large families have in fact never worked).

A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE IMPACT OF PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT ON THE ITINERARIES OF MEN AND WOMEN

In general, only the youngest women show a slight trend towards postponing all the phases in their itineraries, whereas the itinerary of men diverges even more from that of their contemporaries as they get older and accumulate problems.²² These disparities correspond to the different significance placed on employment and family commitments by men and women respectively.

Men fundamentally base their social identity on integration in the world of work and subordinate their family life to obtaining a steady job. The vast majority

TABLE 3: The proportion of people with (or having had) their own accommodation, by sex, generation and employment situation

	Overall number not in education				Precarious employment or unemployed			
Year of birth	62-66	57-61	51-56	Overall	62-66	57-61	51-56	Overall
Male	39.7	76.6	90.2	73.5	30.8	71.3	84.9	55.7
Female	60.3	89.2	90.6	83.5	58.4	88.0	90.6	77.1

Source: Additional analysis of the survey on 'Living conditions'.

TABLE 4: The proportion of persons living (or having lived) as a couple, by sex, generation and employment situation

	Overall number not in education				Precarious employment or unemployed			
Year of birth	62-66	57-61	51-56	Overall	62-66	57-61	51-56	Overall
Male	33.6	70.5	89.1	69.6	29.7	62.4	74.4	50.1
Female	51.7	83.6	90.5	79.7	47.6	82.0	90.2	70.7

Source: Additional analysis of the survey on 'Living conditions'.

TABLE 5: Distribution of people living (or having lived) as a couple according to the number of children, by sex, generation and employment situation

	Overall number not in education				Precarious employment or unemployed			
Year of birth	62-66	57-61	51-56	Overall	62-66	57-61	51-56	Overall
Male								
No children	-	49.0	22.9	32.7	-	63.1	37.2	51.2
One child	-	28.6	26.1	27.1	-	17.1	24.7	20.6
Two children	-	16.9	35.0	28.2	-	9.9	25.4	17.0
Three or more children	-	5.5	16.0	12.0	-	9.9	12.7	11.2
Total	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	100.0
Female								
No children	62.9	36.9	24.5	34.4	66.0	40.7	29.8	43.7
One child	25.3	29.4	23.7	25.9	23.2	27.2	28.3	26.5
Two children	7.3	22.7	34.2	26.3	7.9	23.6	25.7	20.2
Three or more children	4.5	11.0	17.6	13.4	2.9	8.5	16.2	9.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Additional analysis of the survey on 'Living conditions'.

therefore go through the various phases of their itinerary according to a sequence that respects this social norm: leaving school and securing the first job lasting over six months precedes moving into independent accommodation and is then followed by setting up as a couple and, finally, the birth of the first child: 85% of the itineraries of young people in precarious employment follow this sequence, 80% in

the population as a whole. The hypothesis that the professional and family timetable is affected if there are problems related to entry into the labour market cannot therefore be confirmed. On the other hand, men put off leaving their parents' home, some are more permanently excluded from marriage or significantly reduce the size of their families. In addition, the irreversibility of departure from the family home can be called into question if professional problems accumulate or the marriage breaks down. Losing their jobs thus has a significant impact on men's itinerary and also leads to a considerable diminution of the web of relationships other than those with the family.

For women, family commitments are more distinct from entry into the labour market. They have families earlier than men and more frequently do so before getting their first steady job (17% of women compared to 7% of men in the 1957-61 generation). Women facing professional problems are not any different than their more privileged female contemporaries. Living as a couple is thus one route to adulthood for women. Moreover, few women decide to return to their parents if their marriage breaks down. A single parent existence is more likely: there are twice as many women living alone with their children among women whose professional itinerary is uncertain (12% among women aged 30 to 35 years in precarious employment compared to 7% for all women of the same age group). Professional problems may, however, have preceded the breakdown of their marriage rather than be the consequence.

In this context, matrimony helps to reaffirm the differences according to sex. While men themselves are not in a hurry to found a family before they are in a position to maintain it, the 'realism' of young women tends to incite them to choose future spouses who are older than they are, in other words, ahead in their itinerary and, above all, already inserted into the labour market.²³ Men who are still unemployed or who have embarked upon a precarious professional itinerary are excluded by women, who prefer men with a more stable social status, whereas the professional abilities of women hardly have any effect on men's choice. The division of work and roles according to sex thus tends to persist; it even appears to have been strengthened by the employment crisis, which above all affects young people with the fewest educational assets.

Conclusion

YOUNG PEOPLE IN LOW-INCOME CATEGORIES ARE LEAVING SCHOOL LATER

During the 1960s, the French education system underwent radical changes: the corollary to the extension of compulsory schooling until 16 years (1959 law implemented in 1967) was that all students went through the first four years of secondary education (in 1963, colleges that only provided secondary education were set up). During the last three years of secondary education, the number of branches of study has increased (see Figure 3). As underlined by P. Bourdieu and

P. Champagne,²⁴ the early and abrupt elimination of children from culturally disadvantaged backgrounds (when entering secondary school) has been replaced by 'a deferred process of elimination spread out over a period'. While selection previously appeared to be based on meritocratic principles that obfuscated their social basis, today's deferred school-leaving age paradoxically helps to highlight 'the conservative functions of the school that liberates'. Subtle mechanisms for differentiation have been set up within 'democratized' schools through the official diversification of branches of study and the hierarchy implicit in schools themselves. The response of the education system to being opened up to new students with divergent cultural abilities and different attitudes towards school has basically been to multiply the branches of study, reintroducing social hierarchies within the system: general education (above all scientific) remains the royal road; in the case of technical education, the desire to upgrade qualifications by developing professional baccalaureates has helped to depreciate diplomas awarded at the end of shorter education courses (CAP, BEP).²⁵ Young people from backgrounds that have few cultural assets are quite likely to be kept out of prestigious schools and branches of study and be relegated to branches that lead to undervalued diplomas, unless failure is the consequence of the costly investment in education. This leads to collective disillusion proportional to hopes of the possibility of studying raised among families and young people previously excluded from secondary education.

Naturally, the democratic objective of raising the level of education is still fundamental but, in the present state of affairs, the declared target of 80% of an age group at baccalaureate level appears to be 'real eyewash'.²⁶ On the one hand, because very different situations are hidden under the same appellation; and, on the other, because the education/employment relationship now faces a new context in which all those with diplomas will not find a job. A 'miraculous' solution to the lack of jobs for young people will not be found by raising their educational level. As R. Castel notes, 'there is a danger that the result will be to raise the level of qualification of the unemployed rather than to reduce unemployment'.²⁷

SCHOOLS, AREAS AND ENTERPRISES

Faced with the Gordian knot of the potential exclusion of part of the population, particularly young people, the forms of State intervention are changing, moving away from policies implemented with a view to integration towards policies aimed at insertion or entry into the labour market.²⁸ The former are carried out at the national level and their objective is to maintain the overall balance, whereas the latter are at the local level: they target both people and areas, which are the subject of special measures.

For example, in 1981, the problems experienced by schools in improving their performance in respect of students with significant problems led to the creation of priority education areas, chosen on the basis of the students' scholastic problems and the social composition of the areas. They endeavour to develop spe-

cial projects to combat failure at school by bringing together the national education authority, teams of teachers, and local authorities. This measure was reactivated in 1988, combined with policies for the social development of disadvantaged areas.²⁹

With varying results, refocusing on the local level involves precise objectives and as far as possible mobilizes the various actors concerned: authorities, elected officials, social and educational professionals, associations, etc. Several different operations are often combined on one site: priority education area, social development of the district, local council for the prevention of delinquency, local mission for the insertion of young people, etc.

The involvement of enterprises, however, remains problematic. The various measures implemented (employment support, reduction in social contributions so as to lower the cost of labour, etc.) have not yet resulted in any significant creation of jobs. Having noted that enterprises cannot replace the educational system and take on the mass of young people in training, the Tanguy report³⁰ proposes that various forms of partnership between educational establishments and enterprises should be institutionalized, for example, the active involvement of representatives of local enterprises in educational guidance within schools. In return, the enterprise must undertake to offer qualifying jobs to students who have followed this training. The report also recommends that ongoing training should allow students to catch up and be redeployed and that the future of individuals should not be definitively confined within the limitations of their original training.

The danger which the insecurity of one sector of the population poses for social cohesion raises the question of the forms of State regulation. As underlined by R. Castel 'everything seems to indicate that the State oscillates between attempts at redeployment in order to tackle the unprecedented aspects of the current situation and the temptation to leave to other bodies—enterprises, local mobilization, philanthropy saddled with its new flashy style, and even the resources which the orphans of wage-earning society have to deploy themselves—the task of fulfilling its responsibility of guaranteeing that all belong to the same society'.³¹

Because they are likely to experience all types of insecurity at the beginning of their lives, young people are at the forefront. Being deprived of legitimate cultural assets leads to considerable insecurity on the labour market and can result in a process of exclusion that may or may not be reversible, whether in the form of problems related to living independently and creating a family or through the disintegration of webs of relationships.

Notes

1. In France, the concept of exclusion, widely used by the media, has been the subject of considerable criticism because it links together heterogeneous sectors of the population—extending from the unemployed to the homeless—and tends to replace a vision of society as being made up of social groups that are to a greater or lesser extent susceptible to different forms of insecurity by a dichotomous vision: the ‘excluded’ as opposed to the ‘integrated’.
2. C. Baudelot and R. Establet, *Allez les filles!* [Come on girls!], Paris, Seuil publications, 1992, 243 p.
3. Those who have not passed their *brevet* [school certificate] awarded at the end of the first four years of secondary school.
4. France, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), *Bilan emploi-formation* [Employment-training results], Paris, INSEE, 1995, 225 p. (Employment-income results, no. 79-80.); France, Ministry of Education, Evaluation and Forecasting Department, *L'état de l'école* [The school situation], no. 4, 1994, 77 p.
5. Bruand, F., Les débuts dans la vie active: inégalités de sexe? [The commencement of working life: inequality of the sexes?], *Critiques sociales* (Paris, Institut national de la recherche agronomique), no. 5-6, 1994, p. 47-54.
6. Bruand, op. cit.
7. T. Couppié, Le rôle des aides publiques à la sortie de l'école [The role of government support after school], *Bulletin de recherche sur l'emploi et la formation* (Marseilles), no. 80, 1992, 4 p.
8. National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), *Enquête sur l'emploi de 1982* [1982 Employment survey], Paris, INSEE, 1984, 199 p. (Demography, employment, D 95.); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), *Enquête sur l'emploi de 1993* [1993 Employment survey], Paris, INSEE, 1994, 195 p. (Employment-income results, no 59-60.)
9. Analysis of a representative sample of young people born between 1951 and 1966, composed of 4,072 questionnaires by INSEE in 1986-87 as part of the survey on ‘Conditions de vie des ménages, situations défavorisée’ [Living conditions of households, disadvantaged situations]. F. Battagliola, E. Brown, and M. Jaspard, Filles et garçons: de la jeunesse à l'âge adulte [Boys and girls: from youth to adulthood], Paris, Urban sociology centre/National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS); Demographic Institute of Paris-I University; Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 1994, 66 p.
10. See for example: S. Beaud, L'école et le quartier: des parents ouvriers désorientés [School and the area : muddled working class parents], *Critiques sociales* (Paris), no. 5-6, 1994, p. 13-46.
11. The baccalaureate is obtained at the end of secondary school.
12. *L'état de l'école*, op. cit.
13. A. Degenne, et al., Les relations sociales au coeur du marché du travail [Social relations at the heart of the labour market], *Sociétés contemporaines* (Paris), no. 5, 1991, p. 75-97; C. Bonvalet et al., Proches et parents [Close friends and parents], *Population* (Paris), no. 1, 1993, p. 83-110.
14. F. Battagliola, E. Brown and M. Jaspard, *De la jeunesse à l'âge adulte: itinéraires et facteurs de précarisation* [From youth to adulthood: threatening events and influences]. Paris, Urban sociology centre/National Council for Scientific Research

- (CNRS); Demographic Institute of Paris-I University; Caisse nationale des allocations familiales, 1995, 104 p.
15. G. Mauger, Espace des styles de vie déviants des jeunes de milieux populaires [Different lifestyles of young people of the working class], in: C. Baudelot and G. Mauger, *Jeunesses populaires: les générations de la crise* [Working class young people: the crisis generation], Paris, l'Harmattan, 1993, p. 347-84.
 16. As described for example by: R. Hoggart, *La culture du pauvre* [The culture of poverty], Paris, Minuit, 1970, 420 p. (First edition: *The uses of literacy*. London, Chatto & Windus, 1957.)
 17. R. Castel, *Les métamorphoses de la question sociale: une chronique du salariat* [Metamorphoses of the social issue: a tale of wage-earners], Paris, Fayard. 1995, 490 p. For an ethnological approach to the distress of deprived young people in the suburbs, see F. Dubet, *La galère: jeunes en survie* [The torment: how young people survive], Paris, Points actuels, 1993, 497 p. (First edition: Fayard, 1987.)
 18. Battagliola, Brown and Jaspard, op. cit.
 19. This concerns the number of young people who, after having lived independently, were again living with their parents at the time of the survey.
 20. Additional information on the number of young people living with their parents in the survey entitled 'Living conditions'.
 21. It should be borne in mind that the survey concerns 'ordinary households' and therefore young people living in institutions and, even more so, those with no fixed address are not included within its scope. Additional analysis of the number of young people alone is found in the survey entitled 'Living conditions'. These results tally with those of O. Galland. *Vie solitaire et solitude: le cas des jeunes* [Solitary life and solitude: the case of young people], *L'année sociologique* (Paris), vol. 43, 1993, p. 213-33.
 22. See also the study carried out within the framework of the Centre d'étude des revenus et des couts by S. Paugam, J.P. Zoyem and J.M. Charbonnel, *Précarité et risque d'exclusion en France* [Insecurity and the risk of exclusion in France], Paris, La Documentation française, 1993, 168 p. (No. 109.)
 23. M. Bozon, Les femmes et l'écart d'âge entre conjoints: une domination consentie [Women and the age difference between spouses: domination that is accepted]; and Modes d'entrée dans la vie adulte et représentation du conjoint [Ways of entering adulthood and representation of the spouse], *Population* (Paris), no. 3, 1990, p. 565-602.
 24. P. Bourdieu and P. Champagne, Les exclus de l'intérieur [Excluded from the inside], in: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* [Proceedings of social science research], Paris, Minuit, 1992, p. 71-75. (Minuit publications, no. 91-92.)
 25. France, Ministry for Technical Education; L. Tanguy, *Quelle formation pour les ouvriers et les employés en France?* [What education for workers and employees in France?], Paris, La Documentation française, 1991, 143 p.
 26. Ibid.
 27. Castel, op.cit.
 28. Ibid.
 29. France, General Planning Commission, *Exclus et exclusions* [The excluded and exclusion], Paris, La Documentation française, 1993, 224 p. (Report of the technical group chaired by P. Nasse.)
 30. Tanguy, op. cit.
 31. Castel, op. cit.

VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION:

PROMOTING CHANGE AND INFLUENCING

YOUNG PEOPLE'S IDEAS ABOUT

EMPLOYMENT IN MODERN CHINA

Su Songxing

The historical conditions and theoretical background

Profound historical changes have taken place in China since 1979. The younger generation has been facing great challenges from the contemporary world.

These challenges are due in part to the social transformation that has taken place. As a result of the reform, the old ossified and highly centralized planned-economy system was discarded. China became a socialist market economy after experiencing a unique 'double-track' period during which the old and the new systems co-existed. Due to a policy of openness to the world, we have abandoned the traditional concepts of shutting the country off from international contact and have begun to base our work in all areas, including education, on the needs of the world, the future and modernization. China's social transformation has brought about for the people in general, and for young people in particular, an ideological shock at the same time as offering them new opportunities for development.

On the other hand, challenges have arisen within the young people themselves. Lacking both experience of life and employable skills, they often find themselves at a loss when they need to find an occupation in a fast-changing society. The stress, pressure, isolation and anxiety they suffer in such circumstances will not be alleviated until new social norms are fully established and educational guidance can satisfy their needs. The various difficulties they encounter in the process

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of growing up have obliged them to overcome their weak points, and have shown that they must learn the skills of competition and seize all opportunities that occur.

A better understanding of the challenges facing young people in modern China can be achieved by examining the changes in young people's ideas about employment. As we all know, the main task of young people is to study, but the purpose of those studies will eventually relate to the occupation that young people are going to take up in the future or have already begun.

In the Western world, there is a theory in sociology which holds that, in modern societies, one's employment is one of the most important factors affecting one's life. Some scholars, for example, consider that, as a result of the development and popularization of education, links between an individual's position in the world of work and family background have become more and more tenuous (Parsons, 1970); other scholars believe that a person's occupation determines the amount of their personal wealth and income, prestige and position, life-style and even their personality structure (Lu Jianhua, 1988, p. 35); still other scholars hold that different types of occupation represent different life-styles and values as well as income-levels (Ibid., p. 36). The author has no intention of confirming unreservedly the theory that 'the occupation decides everything', but we can see the importance of occupations through these examples. We can also conclude that young people's ideas about employment are nothing but their basic understanding and attitudes with respect to choosing occupations, facing fluctuations in the employment market and adapting to them.

Today, a new trend has emerged concerning changes in young people's ideas about employment. The new trend shows that young people have adapted to rapid economic growth and accepted the challenges of social transformation. This has also been the inevitable outcome of the great efforts made by the government in developing vocational and technical education in China.

Changes in ideas about employment

How, then, have young people's ideas about employment changed in China? Let us look at the degree and nature of the changes with the aid of a historical overview.

THE DEGREE AND NATURE OF CHANGES

The choice of occupations has changed from unified national and social assignments to equitable competition with multiple choices.

Changes first took place in the way Chinese young people chose their future occupations during the high tide of the transformation process. After 1949, the employment system in China was one in which the allocation of labour was centralized. That is to say, once a student graduated from a school, the government would assign him or her to a particular post. Young people thus came to depend on the government for employment. As a result, when the educated young people who had been sent to the mountains and into the countryside during the great cultural

revolution came back to the cities after 1979, thousands of them appeared overnight outside government offices waiting to be assigned jobs. Hence a serious unemployment problem arose in China. Under such circumstances, the government issued guidelines for employment recommending 'combining recommendations by personnel departments, the voluntary involvement in an enterprise of unemployed young people, and self-employment by individuals'. Thus, young people were encouraged to make use of many alternative ways of selecting jobs.

As regards the ways in which young people choose jobs in China, a fundamental breakthrough has been made which, although it appears unimportant at first sight, is in fact very significant indeed. It definitely laid the foundation for the diversification and universal equitable competition in job selection by young people in China today.

In 1982, I participated in a large-scale research project, carried out by the former Institute of Youth Matters of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, on the employment concepts of young people in cities and towns in China. Many young people considered at the time that 'one of the advantages of the socialist system is that the government provides employment opportunities for young people' and they also regarded it as 'right and proper' to rely on their parents for employment. While 88.9% of those investigated said in reply to the question—'Whom should you depend upon for employment?'—that they should depend on the government, only 6 per cent considered that they should rely on themselves (among 2,047 valid replies). It was true that some young people did hope to find employment by passing examinations. But the concept of relying on the government or parents for employment still prevailed among young people. Table 1 shows the ideas held by the young people in Shanghai (representing city-dwellers) and in Leshan Shi (representing small towns) concerning ways and means of finding employment at that time.

TABLE 1: Forms of employment preferred by young people (%)

	Selection through examination	Centralized allocation of labour	Working at the same unit after one's parents' retirement	Launching of an enterprise by a group of young people who get together on their own	Self- employment
Shanghai	23.9	44.7	13.3	5.8	12.3
Leshan Shi	33.0	29.9	1.6	10.0	5.5

More recently, the profound restructuring of the economic system in cities has considerably weakened young people's dependence on the government and their parents in terms of employment, and enhanced their sense of self-reliance. The majority of young people are now taking all the decisions about choosing future employment on their own. In this way they will avoid choosing jobs blindly and they will also learn to understand the need for improving their personal qualifications. This, in return, will contribute to the implementation of the government's new system for employment. I should like to illustrate this point with the

findings of the large-scale investigation into changes in young people's values in modern China carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1988-90 (see Table 2).

TABLE 2: Whom to consult on matters of employment (%)

	1988 (in cities)	1988 (rural areas)	1990
Parents	16.1	13.2	18.4
Intimate friends	4.4	5.5	4.1
Oneself	69.1	66.6	63.8
Teachers	4.3	4.1	5.2
Public opinion	1.9	3.4	1.7
(radio and newspapers in the countryside)			
Sweethearts	2.4	4.4	1.9
Fortune tellers	-	0.6	-

After 1990, market forces began to affect the ways in which young people chose their jobs. From the point of view of the national scene, the economy was more diversified, including State-operated businesses, collective businesses, private businesses and businesses operated with foreign capital alone, as well as those run with both domestic and foreign funds. Large-scale labour exchanges were established which opened up multiple channels of employment for young people. From the point of view of the social scene, the young people's sense of independent and equitable competition concerning employment was further strengthened. According to a project carried out in Beijing in 1990, among those investigated, 69% believed or tended to believe that 'life without competition is too meaningless'.

Another investigation carried out in Shanghai in 1995 revealed that when people in the new area of Pudong wanted to get a job, they would go directly to the labour exchange rather than resort to various social connections, as in the past. Now, 50,000 people are registered at the exchange, of whom 5,000 have found satisfactory jobs. The success rate is 10%, which is the highest in the whole of China.

Yet another investigation showed that in recent years over 80% of college graduates from Shanghai have found employment through the specialist labour exchange. Although two-thirds of those interrogated still found employment through the traditional centralized allocation of labour by the government, the number of those who turned to centralized recruitment agencies easily ranks first among other channels for finding employment. This shows that young people are willing to accept forms of employment offering equality for all. This is the trend of events that is becoming more and more conspicuous to which I referred earlier (see Table 3).

If we make a deeper analysis of 'centralized recruitment', we find that it accounts for 19% of male employment and 13% of female employment, which shows that men are more market-minded than women in choosing jobs.

TABLE 3: How did you find your present employment?

	Centralized allocation of labour by the government	Centralized recruitment	Transfer through negotiation	Replacing one's parents when they retire	Private recruitment	Others
Number in sample	554	135	69	21	4	6
%	65.87	16.05	8.21	2.50	0.48	0.71

FINDING A JOB

The real intentions behind the choice of employment depend upon whether one is entering a State-operated enterprise or seeking diversified development suited to one's own personality.

During the initial stage of the reform, the intention behind the choice of jobs by young people was deeply influenced by the vestiges of the planned economy. Almost all young people took it as their supreme ambition to find employment in a publicly-owned enterprise. In other words, State-run enterprises enjoyed the highest social prestige and social status because they offered higher salaries, better material benefits, more up-to-date technical equipment as well as other conditions.

An investigation was carried out in 1982 in Beijing, Shanghai, Leshan of Sichuan, and Sanhe of Hebei involving 2,500 young people, the findings of which clearly reflected the pursuit of professional status as the driving force in choosing jobs. The data obtained by two different statistical approaches in this research project are very convincing. The eight factors to be considered in choosing jobs are put in order of choice in Table 4.

TABLE 4. The motives of young people in small towns for choosing jobs in 1982 (ratio-E)

	Social status	Full play for one's abilities	Social significance	Technological composition	Personal condition	Salary	Labour intensity	Interpersonal relations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Option I	+ 0.7813	+ 0.5557	+ 0.4793	+ 0.4315	+ 0.4143	+ 0.3005	+ 0.1743	+ 0.1187
Option II	+ 0.4469	+ 0.2957	+ 0.2587	+ 0.2201	+ 0.2172	+ 0.1580	+ 0.0899	+ 0.0592

Substantial changes took place in the job-selection intentions of Chinese young people in the late 1980s. The social status of work became less important to them, while 'the opportunity for giving full play to one's abilities' prevailed over all the other factors considered (see Table 5).

Of the fourteen factors for consideration, 52.2% of the young people in cities choose jobs which were 'in line with their speciality and interests'. According to the same investigation, in the countryside 61.7% of young people chose jobs for that same reason. Thus: (a) both in terms of the young people's first choice and the sum of the three items, that reason comes first; and (b) both young people in cities and those in the rural areas first consider whether or not a job accords with their speciality and interests when choosing employment.

TABLE 5. The main factors considered by young people in cities when choosing jobs in 1988 (any three to be chosen)

	No. 1		No. 2		No. 3	
	Sequence	%	Sequence	%	Sequence	%
In line with one's speciality and interests	1	52.2	4	11.3	7	6.7
High salary	2	12.1	1	22.8	1	13.7
Possibility of realizing one's ambitions	3	10.2	2	15.9	4	10.2
Enlightened leadership	4	7.2	3	14.5	3	10.9
Relaxed and free	5	4.0	5	8.0	10	4.3
Harmonious interpersonal relations	8	1.3	6	6.6	2	12.0
Stability of work	6	2.7	7	4.0	5	9.3
Higher social prestige	7	2.2	7	4.0	10	4.3
Offers both employment and power	6	2.7	10	2.7	11	3.6
Better working conditions	10	0.8	8	3.6	8	6.3
Close to home	9	0.9	11	2.2	9	5.3
More chances for promotion	10	0.8	9	2.9	12	2.8
Better material benefits	11	0.7	11	2.2	6	7.1
Mobility	12	0.3	12	0.6	13	1.7

In 1990, this same investigation obtained some new data revealing that consideration of the possibility of giving full play to one's specialty remained dominant (see Table 6). What was noteworthy was that social status and prestige had become less and less important in the choice of jobs. It is thus safe to say that young people's standards for job selection become established as their sense of independence in job selection becomes stronger and stronger.

TABLE 6. Factors considered by young people in cities when choosing jobs (%)

	Sequence number	%
Stability of work	1	41.0
Possibility of giving full play to one's speciality	2	40.6
In accordance with one's interests	3	35.8
Higher salary	4	35.2
Chances for realizing one's ambitions	5	32.6
Better material benefits	6	23.9
Relaxed and free atmosphere	7	20.8
Greater contribution to society	8	19.8
Better interpersonal relations	9	14.0
Higher social prestige	10	12.6
More chances for promotion	11	6.8


A similar investigation into young people's employment was carried out in Shanghai in 1994. It further proved that young people attached the greatest importance to 'giving full play to their talents' when choosing jobs. Of the four items: 'stability of work', 'salary', 'the full play of one's talents' and 'social status', the young people put 'the full play of one's talents' in first place, while 'social status' came last. In China, over the fifteen years since the reform, a change has taken place in young people's intentions concerning job selection from seeking a post in a

State-run enterprise with higher social status, to looking for a chance to develop their personality. This suggests that young people have a strong desire to realize their own personal potential in the cause of modernization.

JOB MOBILITY

Job mobility here refers mainly to the horizontal transfer of workers from one unit to another. For decades, China's economic system suffered from many disadvantages. It was customary to stick to one's post until retirement rather than transferring again and again according to career interest. Some reasonable requests from young people for job mobility were denied. The lifelong system of employment—to a certain degree just like the arranged marriage in feudal society—discouraged and inhibited young people's initiative. At the beginning of the 1980s, once a young person started work, their professional career was fixed; even though they may not have been satisfied with the job from the very beginning, they could get accustomed to it step by step. The older a person was, the weaker their wish for job mobility. We reached this conclusion from the nationwide investigation conducted in 1982. Figure 1 illustrates the desire for re-employment of young people in cities at different ages.


FIGURE 1: The desire for re-employment of young people in cities at different ages



However, the economic reform soon brought changes to this situation. In 1986, a joint investigation into labour concepts was carried out among young Chinese and Japanese workers. This showed that young people's desire for job mobility was tending to become stronger and that the trend was no longer restricted by age and length of service. Among those investigated who had experience of transfers, 5.8% had worked for less than a year, 8.5% for two years, 67.1% had worked for more than five years, and 20.8% of them for over fifteen years. The reasons for their desire to change jobs related particularly to the matching of their personal skills with employment requirements, remuneration, the opportunity for promotion, interpersonal relations, labour protection, the distance between work and home, etc. Such sweeping changes have taken place in the space of only four years. This is really surprising.

The investigation carried out in 1993 by the Youth Affairs Research Centre of China on the social issues affecting young people during China's socialist modernization also covered the issue of job mobility. In the investigation, 30,000 questionnaires were sent to eleven provinces, municipalities or autonomous regions and 23,500 valid replies were received. Figure 2 reflects one of the findings of this investigation, which is that it is quite common for young people to wish to change their jobs.

FIGURE 2. Young people's ideas concerning job mobility in 1993



However, although young people want job mobility, that does not necessarily mean that their wish can easily be fulfilled. For various reasons, it takes time to change one's employment. According to the investigation, job changes by young people during the years from 1979 to 1993 were as follows: more than five changes—3.4%; three to four changes—6.7%, one to two changes—19.6%; no changes—70.3%. It is worth noting that young people are making efforts to be more mobile and exercise job mobility. In 1994, Shanghai carried out an analysis of the relationship between the duration of young people's employment and 'centralized recruitment'. The result was that those young people whose duration of

employment was below one year or over ten years were in the majority among those who had achieved job mobility through centralized recruitment (see Table 7).

TABLE 7. Analysis of the relationship between duration of employment and 'social recruitment' (sample size/%)

	below 1 year	1-2 years	3-5 years	5-10 years	over 10 years
Number in sample	10	25	38	30	32
%	27.03	18.25	16.03	10.95	20.65

The table shows that job mobility does not depend only on age and length of service. It indicates that job mobility among young people based on individual specialty and interest is motivated by economic gain. Job mobility which puts stress on an individual's life and personal development is flourishing under the market economy.

Job mobility among young people in China today can be summed up as follows: groups of young people from cities are engaging in trade and some of them are trying to enter the upper echelons; a lot of young people from rural areas are pouring into the cities to work as labourers on public projects.

WORK MATCHING ONE'S TRAINING VERSUS INCREASING ONE'S SKILLS

For some time in China, young people who received secondary vocational training thought highly of jobs that were suited to their special training. In 1982, some researchers carried out a project among students at universities of science and engineering to discover their views on employment. Ninety-one per cent of them said that they would like jobs suited to their specialties after graduation. For a long time, young people regarded 'work matching their special training' as the most important justification for their demand for job mobility. But in 1992, another research project among students at universities of science and engineering showed that only 28% wanted jobs suited to their specialties after graduation and regarded this as only the fourth or fifth most important factor in the choice of employment. In the same year, an investigation carried out in a university showed that those who attached no importance to the question of work suited to their specialty made up about 61.5%, while those from colleges of art made up about 68.6%. This is because the specialties offered in schools are not entirely related to the work market and some young people are very concerned to improve their social status, but most young people feel that they have no skills and lack knowledge. In fact, they wish to have better broader skills.

In 1988, a nationwide public opinion poll was carried out in China. One of the questions was: 'What vexes you?'. Among ten factors, young people from both cities and rural areas regarded 'lack of skills' as their first annoyance, those from the cities accounting for 24.88% and those from rural areas 55.37%. Another question was: 'Do your knowledge and ability suit your job?'. The dominant answers were 'not really' or 'not adequately', those from the cities accounting for

40% and those from the rural areas 52.01%. Because of this, the number of young people following various forms of technical training in their spare time is increasing. According to an investigation carried out in Shanghai in 1984, 70.04% of young people in employment were taking various forms of training and were awarded certificates in various specialties. They believe that 'the more they study, the more they master' (see Table 8).

TABLE 8. The main motives of young people in employment who are studying or receiving training (sample size/%)

	To be more competent	To master more skills	To find new jobs	To be upgraded	To follow the general trend	Others	No answers
Number in sample	220	411	91	18	18	13	70
%	26.16	48.87	10.82	2.14	2.14	1.55	8.32

In 1993, an investigation carried out in some areas (e.g. Beijing) showed that 70.8% of young people would like to change their jobs by learning something new. This figure is much higher than in Shanghai (10.8%). In addition, many young staff members are actively studying the knowledge and skills needed by modern industry. For example, in Shanghai, 32.46% of young people are learning foreign languages, 16.77% are learning computer techniques and 13.32% are learning management. This means that young people are anxious to improve their skills, thus indicating the level of their job awareness.

The development of job awareness among young Chinese is a process of continuous centrifugal dissolution and centripetal fusion. Centrifugal dissolution is not simply the transformation from single skills to many; and centripetal fusion is also not simply the transformation from many skills to just one, but the aim is to embody dissolution in fusion and fusion in dissolution.

Young people used to rely on the centralized allocation of work by the government, but now employment has become a matter of multiple choices. It seems that the original centralized system has dissolved, but as a matter of fact, the 'multiple choice' based on equitable competition is a system of a new kind. In the past, the only motivation of young people when choosing jobs was to enter a State-run enterprise owned by the people, but now a trend is emerging whereby young people are willing to choose from different kinds of enterprise in the economy. This also gives the impression that the centralized system has dissolved. But, in fact, the choice to be made among the different possibilities, based on the wish to develop one's own personality, also results in a new kind of system. In the past, almost all people, once they found employment, used to stick to the same jobs for all their lives, but now quite a large number of them seek job mobility and frequent changes of jobs are a common practice. Again, the centralized system seems to have dissolved but frequent job mobility based on the prompting of interest (while occasional job mobility in the past was based on the needs of the revolutionary cause), obviously represents a system of a different kind. In the past, young people put

most stress on the necessity for the job to match their personal ability and skills, but nowadays they try hard to develop themselves in various fields. This seems to suggest that the centralized system is dissolving completely, but since their pursuit of multiple skills or various certificates is in keeping with being a many-talented person and with the comprehensive ability that the achievement of modernization requires of them, how can one say that it is not a kind of system?

To summarize the above analysis, we can say that the trend towards centralization is the essence of the development of young people's ideas about employment in China, that is to say, the dissolution inherent in centralization is only a phenomenon, while the fusion represented in the process of dissolution is the real essence. It is precisely in this process of constant dissolution and fusion that young people develop and mature their ideas about employment.

The development of vocational and technical education

The ideas of Chinese young people about employment today are developing spontaneously under the economic reform. With the promotion of vocational and technical education, this development is gradually becoming rational, achieving a new integration by constant disintegration.

After temporarily following a tortuous course, China's vocational and technical education is again vigorously developing at the same time as the implementation of the policy of reform and opening up to the outside world. In the 1960s, China's general secondary education developed simultaneously with vocational and technical education, although the latter was given slightly more importance than general secondary education. But, under the influence of 'leftist' deviation, vocational and technical education was completely halted. Thus, China's upper secondary education, as a basic system, became a single structure which was based on general education and broke right away from the needs of socio-economic development. Since 1979, China has entered a new age in which building the economy has become a central task. The rapid development of a modern economy and technology has called for new developments in content and in the methods of combining education with production. What is more important is that the whole of education must adapt itself to the development of the national economy. Such 'adaptable education' means that education must change its functioning, reform its structure and vigorously develop vocational and technical education.

In March 1995, the Law on Education of the People's Republic of China was issued. It stipulates that the State is responsible for the systems of vocational education and adult education. People's governments at various levels, administrative departments and businesses and institutions must take measures to develop vocational education in schools or vocational training of various forms. The State encourages co-operation of various kinds between businesses, institutions, social groups, and other social organizations on the one hand, and higher and secondary

vocational schools on the other, regarding teaching, scientific research, technical development and promotion.

We should now like to recall how vocational and technical education has developed in China and promoted the disintegration and integration of the vocational consciousness of Chinese young people.

Firstly, the practice of 'everyone going their own way' after secondary school and speeding up the development of vocational schools mean that young people learn professional technical skills and make it possible for them to find jobs by themselves, and not through the State.

In 1980, after the State Council had approved and issued the 'Report on the Reform of the Secondary Educational Structure', submitted by the Ministry of Education and the State General Administration of Labour, the nationwide reform of the secondary educational structure was formally inaugurated. This involved reducing the importance of the general upper secondary school and establishing vocational schools (classes); reopening and developing special and technical secondary schools; reforming the system of apprenticeship and replacing post-employment learning by pre-employment technical training. The establishment of vocational schools was the single most important result of the reform of the secondary educational structure carried out at the beginning of the 1980s.

The practice of 'everyone going their own way' after junior secondary school means that those who, after receiving the nine-year compulsory education, do not wish to go to university or have little possibility of gaining university entrance will go either to vocational schools, vocational upper secondary schools or technical secondary schools equivalent to upper secondary education, where they can learn the skills needed for employment in industry. The practice of 'everyone going their own way' is developing rapidly throughout the whole country.

Because of the influence of traditional ideas, which tended to look down upon vocational and technical education, and as young people were also greatly dependent on the State assignment of employment, vocational schools met with great difficulties in the early stages of the reform. Many people adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards them. However, after the first year's graduates from the vocational schools had received favourable comments from the employers in 1982, the number of graduates from the second year fell short of demand in 1983.

We have seen that, in the past, young people were unconditionally dependent on State assignments, but now they may choose where they work and the jobs they do on the basis of competitive selection. The development of vocational and technical education has thus facilitated the awakening of young people's awareness of self-assertion and equitable competition in the selection of their occupations.

Secondly, development has involved the exploration of patterns for the running of schools, establishing a system for vocational and technical education, and enabling young people to select their occupations in accordance with their own skills.

Exploring patterns for the running of schools has become an important matter. To enable students 'to co-ordinate' their future employment successfully with

the work market, many schools apply the pattern of joint arrangements with businesses. The businesses see to the recruitment of teachers, the provision of experimental equipment and premises, while the schools are responsible for the actual task of teaching. Practice proves that this pattern actively promotes the efficiency of vocational and technical education and training. Vocational and technical education is gradually infiltrating into general upper secondary schools and universities. For example, some schools follow the pattern of 'everyone going their own way' at the stage of upper secondary education: those who have completed their courses for the second grade of upper secondary school and have difficulty passing the examinations for higher education can go to vocational schools or remain at their original schools to study vocational and technical education courses, as long as they obtain permission from their parents. When they leave school, students not only have an upper secondary school-leaving certificate but also a vocational secondary school-leaving certificate. Some vocational secondary schools have established close contact with universities, and the students who leave those schools can pass directly to higher vocational and technical education. Now, in Shanghai, there are sixteen vocational schools which co-operate with certain related professions from fourteen institutions of higher learning in running schools and in joint developments. These arrangements enable students at different levels to have a proper role to play when they are employed.

The strategic objective of developing vocational and technical education in China (including adult education) is to establish a flexible and advanced vocational and technical education system proceeding from primary level to higher levels. It shall be suited to the level of socio-economic development, closely linked with other forms of education, and its constant strong point is the quality of the work force it produces. Where basic vocational and technical education is concerned, stress is to be laid on pre-employment training, in both urban and rural areas, for pupils leaving junior secondary schools who have failed to enter higher learning. At the same time, more jobs must be created for students from both primary and secondary schools and networks of vocational and technical education combined with general and vocational education must be established. Secondary vocational and technical education still forms the core, attaching particular importance to adaptability for society and the economy. Higher vocational and technical education lays stress on the training of middle-level and high-level personnel who have practical knowledge and technical skills.

In a word, the significance of exploring various patterns for the running of schools and establishing the vocational and technical education system lies in opening up all avenues of employment for young people, providing them with professional skills which suit their specialities and interests, and meeting their multi-level vocational and technical needs so as to create favourable conditions for young people to decide which jobs suit them for developing the various dimensions of their individual characters.

Furthermore, the renewal and adjustment of the various forms of employment is leading to the formation of a new pattern for vocational and technical education, and to an acceleration of job mobility.

The development of the economy is greatly helping to promote the development of vocational and technical education. The rapid changes occurring in the various forms of employment mean that working skills have to be renewed more and more frequently. If we are unable to gain a clear understanding of the situation of occupational change, then vocational and technical education will become an obstacle to economic development.

The establishment of new kinds of employment is extremely important for the post-employment education of young people. It is common knowledge that the vitality of a modern enterprise is to a certain extent dependent on the markets, and its production has to be arranged according to market needs. The development of a modern enterprise is achieved by the renewal and transformation of technology and equipment. Young people already in employment are thus unable to do the same job in the same place forever and must learn new skills to meet the needs of production and to be able to look for a more ideal job. This last consideration has become the 'strongest driving force' in the job mobility of young people. Fifteen years after the reform, the new requirements for post-employment training have advanced China's adult education to a new stage. In 1994, the whole country had a total number of 1,172 higher adult schools of various kinds, including radio/television schools, schools for those in employment, peasant, administrative personnel and correspondence schools, with a total number of 2,352,000 students. There were over 354,000 secondary adult schools with a total number of 50,822,600 students, and 163,400 primary adult schools with a total number of 7,613,400 students. Such figures are unprecedented. The speed of young people's job mobility is causing adult education to flourish.

Lastly, reforming the system of teaching and increasing the vitality of vocational and technical education will enable young people gradually to improve their general ability to meet the needs of the drive towards modernization.

It is evident that the credit system implemented in vocational and technical education is favourable to the training of multi-skilled personnel. It is reported that in Japan, the practice of the credit system in upper secondary schools is appreciated very much by students. With the development of the social economy, young people have thus abandoned their old ideas which used to put undue emphasis on the requirement that 'a job should be suited to one's special training'. They have recognized that the old adage 'learn one trade and you can then do it all' is no longer practicable. They would like to break with the pattern of learning only one specialty so as to be fitted for new kinds of employment and give full play to their wide interests and specialties. Reforming the system of vocational teaching will play an active role in developing multiple abilities in students both before and after they start work.

In a word, vocational and technical education will, through its functions of adapting students to jobs, training qualified personnel and helping them change to

a new firm or gain promotion, facilitate the evolution taking place among the young people of China in the way they choose their jobs or express their wishes in selecting an occupation, and in relation to job mobility, adaptability at work and working attitudes. It will bring about the dissolution and reshaping of job awareness against the vast background of China's social changes at the present time.

Some experiences and concluding thoughts

The processes of dissolution and reshaping taking place among Chinese young people today, promoted by vocational and technical education, are the way in which job awareness is maturing and developing. By studying these processes, we are able to draw the following conclusions.

1. The way to develop a modern outlook in people is through the maturation and development of young people's job awareness. Academic circles have put forward many different criteria concerning the development of a modern outlook, but basically they agree that people today must have a sense of self-reliance, competitiveness, creativity, challenge, co-operation and benefit. All this is included in a mature job awareness. Some scholars hold that the level of education determines how modern a person's outlook is. For example, among people with less education, those who rate as modern account on average for 13%, while among well-educated people, those who rate as modern account for 49%. In addition, generally speaking, those who have mastered several professional skills will have greater self-confidence than those who have none or have mastered just one, and they know that they have the ability to master more skills. The former are usually in a better 'spiritual condition' than the latter. We can therefore infer that vocational and technical education, as an important part of education in general, will make a direct and independent contribution to bringing about the development of a modern outlook in people.
2. The maturity and development of young people's job awareness has revitalized the future development of society. According to traditional theory, education develops once the economy has grown, but today is the first time that we have had the opportunity to foster a new generation for society in the future. The developed countries have already done so and China and other developing countries are hurrying to catch up. In accordance with the law and strategic objectives of socio-economic development, vocational and technical education is thus attempting to develop the rapid training of qualified personnel at different levels and for different occupations. This clearly suggests that the feature of education comes before other things. We may say that vocational and technical education do not only promote the development of young people's job awareness but can also make such development have an accelerating effect. If the society of every epoch has young people who reflect the characteristics of that age, then a society with great prospects is sure to emerge when such young people with mature job awareness participate in social life. We can therefore infer that vocational and technical education has not only brought up a new generation,

but also has poured inexhaustible vitality into developing the society of the future.

3. The maturity and development of young people's job awareness have, in turn, promoted the further development of vocational and technical education. The dissolution and reshaping of young people's job awareness can display either constructive or adverse factors. For example, frequent job mobility which takes gain as a driving force will sometimes lead to a decline of the attitude which attaches importance to the job itself, and what it seeks is 'money first'. Young people ask for the chance to give free rein to their specialties and interests, which will inevitably bear the stamp of 'individualism'. There is a disparity between high job expectations and the personal qualities of young people, which will lead to psychological imbalance. All this requires us to give serious guidance. Consequently, vocational and technical education is being asked to have new subject matter and to set higher standards. It not only has to teach young people professional employment skills, but also has to teach them how to behave themselves. We must seriously study the latter field and put it into practice in the teaching process. We can therefore infer that vocational and technical education, on the basis of facilitating young people's vocational instruction and occupational morality, will be further improved.

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WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO INTEGRATE YOUNG PEOPLE IN A SOCIETY UNDERGOING TRANSFORMATION?

Sergey Aleshenok, Vladimir Chuprov and Julia Zubok

Social integration in the Russian Federation: specific features and problems

In terms of the general theory of socio-cultural systems, social integration reflects the conditions and indexes of cohesion which are required for the existence and functioning of any social organism, and as such it acquires a new significance in contemporary Russian society. The growing crisis of political and social confrontations in all spheres goes against the very notion of social integration, which is based on ordered and sustained relationships within a social structure.¹ At the

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same time, the situation in the Russian Federation shows that the need for social integration grows together with the increasing differentiation and complexity of the system.

The relation between differentiation and integration in the post-Soviet society has assumed quite a unique proportion, being the result of basic transformations of the social structure in a compressed period of time. On the one hand, the new socio-economic orientation has entailed drastic changes in the power structure, forms of property, and ways and styles of life. The destruction of stable social links and the deep crisis in the system have resulted in polarization of all spheres of life in Russian society, which now seems incapable of integrating the younger generation.

On the other hand, the loss of traditional social identities, experienced by practically every Russian today, gives rise to the need for self-determination in relation to the changing social structure, and for establishing new links with emerging multiple groups and communities. Though this loss affects the young Russians to a lesser degree (as their consciousness is more individualized and their set of identities still limited), their successful socialization still depends on the degree of orderliness of dominant and peripheral solidarities.²

Today the young Russians' socialization is taking place against the background of political and economic instability, the decay of contemporary values and norms, and an absence of prospects or clear-cut criteria for development. Under such circumstances the question of the trajectories and criteria of social integration arises. Assuming that the level of young people's integration in a society depends *inter alia* on the level of identification with this particular society, with whom and with what will the young people identify themselves in the disintegrating Russian society?

The orienting points given to the young people by official socialization institutes are accepted as a sure frame of reference only by the force of inertia. They are taken into consideration by the young people less and less in the real process of self-determination. So what appears to be a sign of the young people's social exclusion may prove to be their innovative or more adequate reaction to the social changes in Russia.

Can young people be not only objects of more or less efficient integration strategies, including those in education, but also subjects, capable of accelerating or slowing down or changing the course of the whole process of social integration?

The answer to this question might be positive in modern Russia, as for the first time the relation between the factors of the youth socialization is changing in favour of those universal ones. For the young Russians the process of building up their identity no longer finds reference in the set of social roles proposed either by the family (the penury of the fathers is particularly striking) or by the school (at the moment incapable of indicating adequate guidelines for life). Identity formation is rapidly shifting towards material and cultural consumption, where new roles are emerging and being tried out by the youth. The reference groups inside Russian youth cultures ('tough guys' and 'new Russians') are also oriented towards status

symbols and attributes provided by secondary goods of international mass culture. The recent closed autarchy of the Soviet society has disappeared: in three years imported goods have filled up to 50% of the Russian market (up to 100% in some sectors of youth consumption, e.g. video). Whereas 1 million Russians went abroad annually in the 1980s (mostly as 'organized' tourists to the former socialist countries), in 1994 there were 10 million Russian citizens travelling abroad. A significant part of them were young people going on their own to study or to make small business in trade all over the world. The youth consumer cultures have become an important sphere of social integration, unnoticed by the system of education.

The peculiarity of education as a factor of social integration in Russia is that education itself is now undergoing a process of painful reform. When the education reform started it was assumed that it would proceed on the basis of international experience, in the direction of democracy and pluralism. Turning now to the aspects which reveal education's role in the social integration of Russian youth, we shall be able to judge also the efficiency of the current education reforms.

The other side of the educational reform

The overall education level of the modern young Russians is still higher compared to previous generations, especially in quantitative terms. We say 'still higher' because the new Education Act (1992) and the new Russian Constitution (1993) reduced the period of compulsory education to nine years, and this has already resulted in a decrease in the educational level of the younger generations.

The qualitative characteristics of the young people's educational status are unequal to the actual social requirements: any type of education gives only a limited opportunity for social advancement. According to the data from our wide-scale research on the social status of Russian youth in 1990-94,³ only 25% of young people assume that their professional qualification will depend on their level of education; 10% assume that their career is conditioned by education. Consequently, less than 15% of secondary and vocational school students are firmly determined to continue their education. Nor do the majority of youngsters involved in street business need further education. The number of applicants to universities decreased from 2.04 persons for one place in 1991 to 1.75 in 1993.⁴ This reflects the devaluation of education in young people's consciousness, and today in Russia education seems to be losing its position as a factor integrating young people in economic and social structures.

The wide range of young people's backgrounds inside the system of education became apparent already in the last decades of the Soviet period. In spite of policies aimed at social homogeneity and attempts to equalize the chances of different social groups for higher education, the parental, social and especially educational background became the decisive factor in the choice of post-eight-year schooling.⁵ Now this social determination is more rigid. In our research, only one-third of students in secondary schools, leading to university education, have a worker or

farmer family background, while in vocational schools they constitute almost the whole of the student body.

The inequality of chances for social mobility, based on regional and urban/rural disproportions, becomes particularly striking in university education. Young people in rural areas estimate their chances of achieving university education to be four times lower compared to urban youth. The regional imbalance in the distribution of universities not only remains, but has grown more marked as the increases in travelling costs block interregional mobility. For instance, the European North of Russia has three times fewer universities than the neighbouring Northwest, and not only because of the lower population: the reduced possibilities of access to education manifest themselves in a reduced number of university students per 10,000 of the population (95 in the North compared to 291 in the Northwest). In general this important indicator has been steadily decreasing in Russia in the last few years: from 190 in 1991 to 178 in 1993.⁶

The recent introduction of paid education has become a more significant factor of differentiation and has reduced opportunities of social integration for a large part of the young Russians. Almost half of our respondents felt that education should remain general and free; a quarter of them accepted some mixed and partly paid forms of education; 17% agreed to pay if they have guaranteed opportunities of an adequate income later on.

In 1994 there were about 500 private schools in Russia, 133 of them in Moscow. In 139 private universities and in the majority of the 548 Russian State universities there were paid faculties or courses. Evidently this diversification of Russian education opens new possibilities for introducing new progressive curricula and methods, engaging better experts, and satisfying specific cultural interests of different groups. But the growing trend of replacing free mass education with paid education produces social consequences which are not conducive to integration.

The displacement of free education occurs in many forms: basic services become supplementary and paid; the premises are granted on lease; public education institutes close; and the best teachers quit the underpaid public sector. The meritocratic principles declared at the beginning have already given way to the simple criterion of parents' wealth, and in the present situation of mass impoverishment, the growth of elite forms of education limits access to education for the majority. We estimate the annual quota of young people embraced by secondary education in Russia at 60%, compared to 85% in the 1980s. There is a curtailment of the life dimension, defined by some youth researchers as 'institutionalized modern youth phase',⁷ which in the 1970s and 1980s used to delay entrance into the labour market for the majority of youth.

Such a policy doesn't match the government's declared will to overcome the technical backwardness of the country and provide for democratic transformations. The main feature of modern societies' transition to real democracy is the open character of higher education, which overcomes social barriers and provides equal opportunities for the majority. So far Russia is moving in the opposite direction.

In order to change the trend towards growing exclusion of young people from the education sphere, the macro-proportions and priorities of national development should be altered. For example, the actual level of financing of higher education in Russia is two times lower than it used to be in the USSR at the end of the 1950s. Until different proportions are reached (which should be closer to those in developed modern societies or at least to those in the former USSR), any reform of educational curricula and content in Russia will develop against the background of deteriorating structural indicators, reflecting the inequality of educational opportunities for young people.

Paradoxes of socio-professional integration

The quality of young people's integration in the professional structure is an important indicator of educational efficiency. It depends, first of all, on the level of vocational education. In Russia about 70% of the employed population under 30 years of age received vocational education: 45% graduated from vocational schools and colleges and 25% from universities. In general the potential of the young generation is high. The problem is that this potential remains unexploited because of the recession and the growing gap between education and economic restructuring.

Already in 1990, the employment of only half of the working young people corresponded to their professional preparation, revealing the gap between the Soviet system of vocational education and the national economy's real needs. By 1994 the quota of working young people highly integrated in the professional structure was further reduced by 1.5 times. Almost 30% of the working young people have no vocational training. They are mostly those who entered the labour market directly from secondary school. The new trend is that the majority of them will no longer have any vocational training with which to ensure their earnings in a situation of economic recession. Many of them prefer to enter 'street business', where the earnings are several times higher.

The adolescents who leave school after the nine-year basic education—as it became possible since the Education Act of 1993—have still less opportunities. They find themselves excluded from any further official educational circuits and cannot be employed until they are 16 years old. However, there is always the solution—street business: annually, about 200,000 of these youths are absorbed by the street and criminality. During the last two years, 1.7 million pupils have quit all levels of school.⁸

The start of the market reforms aggravated the socio-professional integration of vulnerable groups of young people, both traditional (the disabled, orphans, youth returning from penal institutions) and new (unemployed, refugees, homeless). Regarding the former, there is a curtailment of public support systems, which lack resources and adequate strategies in the new economic situation. According to data of the Ministry of Social Protection, less than 50% of disabled youth (and according to the data of independent NGOs, less than 20%) have access to vocational training. On the other hand, in 1992 more than half of the graduates from

specialized vocational schools and institutes for disabled persons could not find employment; only 25% of the disabled have jobs that correspond to their professional training (about 12% in rural areas).⁹ As for the new marginal youth groups, the situation differs from category to category: the long-anticipated unemployment, which has not yet become a mass phenomenon, brought about the emergence of a relatively efficient network of youth employment centres. At the same time, neither public nor private organizations, with few exceptions, have the courage to face the problem of homeless adolescents. Their number is estimated from 300,000 to 700,000.¹⁰

The commercialization of the behaviour patterns of Russian youth runs parallel to criminality. Among the motivations to work, the desire prevails among them to earn as much money as possible, regardless of the means, and every fifth young respondent is prepared to resort to violence for this purpose. These motivations are dominant in the sphere of illegal and criminal business, which is now experiencing the 'youth boom'. Crime by young people has far accelerated beyond the general growth of criminality: in 1994, serious crime by minor offenders in Moscow has grown by 53%.¹¹

The modernization of the Russian society is strictly connected with constructing new labour ethics, not just through the effects of the market economy but by means of educational policies. Honest professional work ceased to be a factor of vertical mobility for young people already during the Soviet period; now it has ceased to provide for the basic material needs. Its value for young people is steadily decreasing. In 1994 only 15.4% of young respondents were prepared to work if they were already wealthy enough to stay at home, compared to 23.5% of positive answers in 1990. Forty-two per cent of working youth say they are indifferent to their profession; 6% feel ashamed to speak about it with their friends.

Such a low level of labour ethics among young people, the shift in their orientations from socially meaningful productive work to semi-criminal commercial activities, and the reproduction of a specific asocial type of marginalized worker are explained to a great extent by the absence of positive models of professional careers. Neither vocational education, nor the society have worked out a system of standards that could be points of orientation for a lifelong career.¹² In general the reformed education system has insufficient influence on building up professional identity, indispensable for the successful integration of Russian youths into working life.

Ethnicity: confrontation or integration

The education system was traditionally the most powerful instrument of socio-cultural integration and the de-ethnicization of the younger generations in the USSR. Immediately after the revolution of 1917 the need to introduce the new ideology required the elimination of illiteracy. Anticipating Benedict Anderson's idea of the national State as a product of 'print-capitalism',¹³ the founders of the Soviet State swiftly created the conditions for 'printed socialism' in the national regions of

Russia. Already by the 1930s a widespread net of national schools was set up, with teaching in forty-eight national languages. For forty languages which had no alphabets, new alphabets were created, and there are no reasons for not considering this as a contribution to world culture.

Having accomplished their task of spreading the dominant ideology among non-Russian youth and, given the growing trend towards Russification, the national schools lost their importance. When in the 1970s compulsory ten-year education was introduced, the national schools in each region became an impasse in the education system, as the level of knowledge (especially competence in the Russian language) was not sufficient for entering universities or for further career development. In many national regions of Russia, parents reacted to this by massively transferring their children from national to Russian schools. The national cultures were undermined and the assimilation process proceeded at a much faster pace.¹⁴

By the mid-1980s the ethnic non-Russians accounted for 27.5 million, or 18.5% of the population of the Russian Federation. Half of them put their children in ordinary Russian schools. In many national schools all the subjects (except the native language and literature) were taught in Russian, partly because of the lack of native teachers. According to the last general census (1989), 27.6% of the non-Russian population considered Russian as their native language; 60.4% of them spoke Russian.¹⁵ Sociological data revealed even higher indexes of Russification and bilingualism among non-Russian youth: according to our 1990 research, only 0.7 to 3.4% of the young people belonging to various non-Russian ethnic groups in the Russian Federation did not speak Russian. Native languages have fallen out of the public sphere and, as far as young people were concerned, even out of family and interpersonal communication.

In the 1990s the growth of ethnic identity in all national regions pushed the pendulum in the opposite direction, and once again this process is taking place faster among the young people than the general trend. In 1993 the surveys of the Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Mordovian and Nenets populations showed that, on average, 40% of youth (and 33% of adults) already have perfect command of their native language.¹⁶

The process of ethnic integration is particularly intense in the areas where ethnic groups live close together. In our survey of 1994, 42% of the interviewed Russians, 31% of Ukrainians and 40% of Tatars living in the Russian Federation supported the statement that people of the same ethnic group should live together. The developments which preceded the tragic conflict in the Chechen Republic vividly illustrate how easily national ideas can be transformed into nationalism in a situation of growing political confrontation. With the growth of ethnicization in the administrative and public spheres in national regions, the chances for a better career have become increasingly higher for native young people as compared to the Russians who live there. At the same time, non-Russian youths continue to preserve steady attitudes towards multi-ethnic contacts and mobility: mono-ethnic marriages are supported by only 20% of the respondents in the age group of 19 to

29 years and 15% in the group of 15-18 years. Fifty-six percent of the senior students in national schools would like to have more lessons in the Russian language.¹⁷

To what extent are these orientations of non-Russian youth accepted in the regions with predominantly Russian populations? Despite increasing ethnic tensions and waves of migration away from conflict areas of the former USSR, the majority of the young people, for example, in Saint Petersburg, remain open to multicultural relations: only 25% of students would prefer going to school exclusively with young people of the same nationality; 22% support only mono-ethnic marriages. But the growth of anti-Caucasian attitudes is quite noticeable: already in 1993 in Saint Petersburg, 57% of students demonstrated such prejudice, though the research also showed its situational nature.¹⁸

The education policy aimed at the destruction of ethnic identity affected Russian youth more than other ethnic groups. In terms of social integration, the results of such a policy are controversial. It is evidently negative: the break of inter-generational ethnic ties (only 6% of parents in Russian families follow national tradition and expect the same of their children), as well as a gradual destruction of national historic consciousness, began in Soviet schools and has continued in the course of the hurried 'de-ideologization' of education underway in Russia today. On the other hand, Russian youth are less prone than other age groups to rigid national self-identification which, given the present growth of nationalism, soon tends to develop into xenophobia. According to a 1994 Russian Public Opinion Centre poll, 56% of young people have a strong and permanent awareness of being Russian, compared to 69% of the middle-aged and 72% of aged respondents. Among the values which could consolidate society, young people name 'well-being' and 'entering into the modern world' twice as often as the sample average.¹⁹ About one-third of young people identify themselves with humankind as a whole. The peak of this planetary perception (41%) is among those aged 14 to 18 years old. Such a prefigurative consciousness, open to innovation and finding support in the new humanitarian education programmes, is a prerequisite for the young Russians' integration into the world community.

At the same time, a positive awareness of multiculturalism should be transmitted through the curriculum taught in different types of schools all over the Russian Federation, providing positive images and role models of all ethnic groups of the multicultural Russian society.

Education: from a macro- to a microlevel of integration

Looking at the prospects of the young people's social integration, one has the impression that the process of regionalization of the education system in Russia goes in two opposite directions. There is a movement from the uniform Soviet polytechnic school—which managed to integrate the young people in the whole country from the Baltic Sea to Central Asia—towards the dimension of a region,

town or village and coming closer to the natural features of local life, to the specific needs of territory development, improving thus the opportunities for a more organic integration of youth in the local community. At the same time, a basis is being laid for the development of young people's capacities and possibilities to step into the globalization process which transcends the borders of Russia.

These two trends are evident to different extents in the regional education programmes worked out during 1994-95 in all the regions of the Russian Federation. The dialectics of their combination depend on specific local factors, sometimes on the ambitions of regional elites, and are not insured against provincialization and isolation from the Russian and global dimensions. In some national regions of the Russian Federation, in spite of their historical polyethnicity, mono-ethnic orientations prevailed in the new educational programmes.²⁰

A more organic combination of locally and globally-oriented issues is shown by advanced regional programmes such as 'Education in the capital', adopted in Moscow in June 1994. The system of education in Moscow, aimed at social integration in the multicultural dimension of the city, develops specific educational mechanisms in order to achieve three main goals: reproducing Russian traditions and national forms of life; organizing conditions and preparing young people's self-determination in a situation of interaction of multiple national, professional and other communities and social institutions; building up among the young people the ideology of 'education without frontiers', creating for them preconditions for further education in any part of the world.

Obviously, compared to many other Russian regions which are suffering a heavy depression, Moscow's highly developed cultural, scientific and economic potential makes it easier to create new mechanisms for integrative education. These policies sustain the high national (and still higher capital) standards of the mass school and are accompanied by continuous experiments using new models in numerous innovative education centres. The phenomenon of separation and segregation of different youth groups can be better followed and prevented with a new service of monitoring the population's education needs. It reveals first the socio-cultural goals of the specific social groups (e.g., preserving ethnic cultures and traditions, improving social standards, overcoming marginality, etc.) and then defines their educational needs (teaching the native languages, civil rights, specific professional training, study abroad, etc.).²¹

The growing complexity, decentralization and pluralization of Russian society means that a significant part of the youth integration process falls on the community level. While the State regulative functions and efficiency are weakening, and the process of constitution of the civil society is too slow, education remains one of the few surviving systems which is capable of determining local development. For the first time, a number of regional and community programmes claim and affirm a new function: to promote the whole of social reforms, to involve all the social subjects and specific groups, to initiate and integrate the whole of the social life in a given territory.²² It is primarily around local education issues that civil society is emerging in Russia.²³

Notes

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'SCHOOL REJECT OR EJECT?'

CONTEXTUALIZING 'OUT-OF-SCHOOL YOUTH' IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

*David Everatt*¹

Introduction

The common theme of the papers in this collection is the integration and segregation of young people in a changing world, and the educational implications of this. Before the term *apartheid* was coined, segregation was the official policy of the British and South African rulers. In South Africa, our task is to integrate the former targets of segregation and the segregationists. This is taking place in a country which has undergone enormous changes in the five years since Nelson Mandela was released from prison and the liberation movements were legalized.

In contrast with many countries, the pace of change *inside* South Africa has been more rapid and more visible than the changing world *outside* it. In just five years, the apartheid government has been removed through negotiation and the ballot, the first general election was held in which all South Africans could vote, and a new constitution and bill of rights have replaced the systematic denial of human rights which underpinned apartheid.

In the midst of this frenetic change and the attendant world attention, South Africa remains a 'Third World' society, marked by an under-skilled workforce, inadequate service provision, limited access to amenities, mushrooming informal settlements, high unemployment and high levels of crime.² Slightly under half the

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adult population is functionally illiterate. A quarter of South Africans (including almost half of South African women) never watch television. Globalizing tendencies scarcely register in the lives of many South Africans.

Among youth, the unemployment rate stands at 52%. Only 5% of those with school-leaving certificates find employment in the formal sector. A total of 53% of young Africans live in homes without electricity, while 64% have no running water in their homes. In short: the socio-economic crisis bequeathed to South Africa by *apartheid* impacts with particular severity on the youth.³

The need to create a new society out of the old requires a psychological shift and a new set of national priorities to replace the race-determined goals of the former regime. Both are reflected in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) developed by the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies. The RDP comprised the ANC's platform for fighting the general election and, in its own words, 'is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to mobilize all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future.'⁴

The RDP, in its published form, is 147 pages long, and covers such diverse topics as education, policing and nutrition. Despite this, 'youth development' is given a total of six paragraphs, which cover a page and a half. The RDP has little of substance to say about the youth, beyond citing them as one particularly needy category alongside rural dwellers, women, the disabled and others.⁵

This paper focuses on one segment of the youth, the awkwardly-termed 'out-of-school youth.' The question at issue is whether youth whose schooling was interrupted, or who missed out on schooling during the 1980s, are to be adequately cared for by the RDP or passed over in favour of children of school-going age and adults currently equipped to compete for jobs.

Out-of-school youth are at the centre of a pending national investigation commissioned by the National Youth Development Forum (NYDF), and supported by the new Education Ministry. The study will be conducted by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) and the Education Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. The data given here are drawn from a national youth survey conducted by CASE in 1993 and form the first step towards a detailed understanding and profile of out-of-school youth, which will be presented as a policy and programme-platform to the Education Ministry by the NYDF.

Methodology

In 1992, CASE was commissioned to undertake a national study of South African youth. We were commissioned by the Joint Enrichment Project (JEP), a joint project of the South African Council of Churches and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference.

CASE designed and conducted a multi-faceted research programme comprising an annotated database of relevant local and international material; international fieldwork reports from Europe, Kenya, Uganda and Botswana; policy

position papers covering education, employment-creation, HIV/AIDS and violence; and a national baseline survey. All were presented to and unanimously endorsed by participants at the second National Conference on Marginalized Youth in March 1993, and formed the policy basis of the National Youth Development Forum. This paper is drawn from the national survey.

As a result of poor census data, drawing a sample for the survey was complicated by the problem of unavailability of data regarding the size and regional spread of the target population. With the fieldwork agency we developed an accurate sample frame using a range of data sources. We developed a nationally representative sample which reached men and women from all four racial groups (African, Coloured, Asian and White), covered all parts of South Africa (including the then so-called independent states of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda), as well as urban, rural, metropolitan and informal areas.

These sectors were sampled in appropriate proportions in a strictly random sample. The results of the survey reflect the feelings and experiences of the ten million young people, aged from 16 to 30, from whom the sample was drawn. The sample was derived from population figures drawn up by Research Surveys (the fieldwork house).

TABLE 1. Youth in South Africa (including Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda).

	African	Coloured	Asian	White	Total
Male	4,109,000	502,000	139,000	652,000	5,402,000
Female	4,046,000	510,000	139,000	627,000	5,322,000
Total	8,155,000	1,012,000	278,000	1,279,000	10,724,000

Source: Research surveys

Throughout the study and this paper, 'youth' is taken to represent all young people between the ages of 16 and 30. This fairly broad age span was defined to include young people affected by the 1976 uprisings, as well as those affected by the more widespread uprisings of the mid-1980s. In all, 2,224 respondents of all races were interviewed for up to an hour and a quarter in a face-to-face questionnaire administered in the preferred language of the respondent. The survey instrument was designed by CASE.

'Youth' in a South African context

'Youth', in South Africa, is an inherently political term due to the prominent role played by young people in the resistance movement, and the attendant social science and media coverage which alternately demonized them as the 'lost generation' or lauded them as the 'young lions'.

Black youth—particularly black, male, urban youth—played a key role in the popular mobilization of the mid-1980s which was a turning point in the decades-long struggle against apartheid. However, with the onset of negotiations in the 1990s, the political contribution of black youth as the 'foot-soldiers' of the anti-

apartheid struggle was increasingly seen as unnecessary. Political organizations seemed unable to develop creative means of enlisting the energy and commitment of youth in the new politics of the interregnum. Youth were politically demobilized but were not offered any alternate channels of expression or action.

As a result, when youth were addressed as a sector it was generally in the context of the potential threat they were seen to represent, rather than the complexities and needs of the generation. For example, the funeral of assassinated Communist Party leader Chris Hani saw street battles between police and youth (among others). Within weeks, more than fifteen proposals for organizing youth had been produced by a range of organizations. The proposals included community service corps, enforced physical exercise, and straightforward labour camps for black youth. Despite many newspaper column inches, nothing concrete was done. A few weeks later, as the national focus shifted away from 'youth violence', the proposals disappeared and South Africa's youth returned to the status quo ante—where they have remained.

As such, the youth occupy a politically-charged place in the intellectual arena, which has resulted in more stereotyping than careful analysis. From the liberation movements and their supporters came the image of the 'young lions', a generation of highly politicized young people leading the struggle against the police and army on the township streets. From state organs came the obverse image, popularized by the mainstream media; that of the 'lost generation' who had boycotted and burnt down their schools, destroyed their own future, and were instinctively violent and irretrievably delinquent.⁶

In the 1990s, the 'young lions' have largely disappeared as the youth wings of the liberation movements have been demobilized. As South Africa undergoes its transition to democracy, those who coined the phrase the 'lost generation' now reject it in favour of an argument which sees youth as merely suffering the effects of poverty rather than the distinctive destruction wrought by apartheid.⁷

Because of the high profile of youth in the liberation struggle and the ongoing political contest for their support, defining youth and their needs unavoidably touches on political terrain. This becomes even more pronounced in the context of conservative revisionism.

For example, a recent paper by de Kock and Schutte, part of a national youth study run by the Human Sciences Research Council (a national research institution which serviced government ministries and departments under apartheid), viewed youth not as targets of development programmes but as the agents of revolution. The authors argued that 'the problem' lies with 2% to 5% of well-educated young black South Africans. Their low social position is at odds with their relatively high level of education, and as a result their frustrated expectations have left them 'status-incongruent'.⁸

If a 'youth revolution' is to be avoided, we are told, affirmative action programmes must absorb these 'status-incongruents . . . as speedily as possible.' This is necessary so that they do not organize other youth whose lack of education apparently renders them ignorant of their situation without external agitation. If

such programmes are implemented alongside job creation schemes and the government 'continuously tune[s] down expectations', then 'the possibility of a youth revolution is very slim.'⁹

In contrast to de Kock and Schutte, this paper will argue that all youth—but particularly those who were *unable* to attain high educational levels—need to have educational opportunities afforded to them, not because of a revolutionary potential but because apartheid systematically denied them such opportunities. The new representative government has a duty to rectify the situation.

In the argument adumbrated by de Kock and Schutte, the deliberate damage done to young black South Africans by apartheid is rejected in favour of the proposition that 'even without apartheid it is doubtful if things would have been different today.'¹⁰

The editors of the Human Sciences Research Council youth report, of which de Kock and Schutte's paper is a part, seem to argue a similar point:

it should be pointed out that the so-called 'youth crisis' is not a peculiarly South African, and at that black, phenomenon. Many concerned voices have been raised about white South African youth, while youth, or sections of the youth group, are a 'problem' in many parts of the world.¹¹

For de Kock and Schutte, the basis of this startling perspective rests on a circular argument. Political radicalism and activism are taken as indicators of youth marginalization. 'Radical' views are defined as an acceptance of coercion and violence as legitimate political tools, and in turn, as indicators of marginalization. Radicalism and activism are found to be particularly high for the 2% to 5% of well-educated young Africans. This correlation is taken as evidence that youth marginalization does not exist, since (the authors claim) relatively well educated people cannot be marginalized.¹²

The fact is that the vast majority of black youth grew up under apartheid and thus were systematically deprived of life-chances; in particular, they were denied a decent education. This in turn has left them with few employable skills, compounded today by the poor state of the economy. For the commentators mentioned above, however, youth are not seen as marginalized because their political perspective is not one which sees violence as acceptable. Rather, the 'youth problem' lies with the well-educated minority, which is also true of some First World countries. The conclusion is that apartheid caused no distinctive damage to South African youth, who are neither more nor less a problem than, say, British or Norwegian youth.

Marginalized youth and the progressive challenge

The church-led progressive movement has challenged this vision of youth as untouched by apartheid and merely suffering the same economic or generational ills as youth elsewhere in the world. The concept of 'marginalized youth' was developed to analyze the position of youth as they emerge from decades of

apartheid.¹³ The concept takes as its starting point the fact that marginalization is a process rather than a given state; it affects different individuals and groups differently, over both time and space. Its central tenet is that the effect of a range of factors—psychological, economic, political, social and so on—combine in different ways in different individuals, but can effectively marginalize affected youth from mainstream social and civil life.

Marginalization is based on an understanding of the systematic set of barricades placed in the path of young black South Africans by apartheid. This includes the criminalization of family life through a host of legislative acts including the 'Group Areas Act' which defined the right to reside in particular areas on racial grounds, influx control legislation which sought to eject black South Africans 'surplus' to labour requirements from 'white' areas, and so on.¹⁴

It also includes the highly disadvantaged education system which, in 1991, was still spending four times more on white pupils than on black pupils.¹⁵ This was the result of the policy of Bantu Education, premised on the notion that 'there is no place for [blacks] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.'¹⁶ This in turn was compounded by the vastly inadequate resources and social services in urban black townships and rural areas.¹⁷

Proponents of marginalization also have a particular view of political involvement. For young people in the 1980s, those *not* participating in the mobilization of the period were 'the exception rather than the rule'.¹⁸ In the violently repressive 'states of emergency' imposed on South Africa by the apartheid government in the mid- and late-1980s, to take to the streets and even to use force against the police and army which occupied black townships, are better understood as indicators of social involvement than marginalization.

This model of marginalization was developed by CASE as a central aspect of its research for the JEP. It was based on a twelve-item index, including factors identified by youth in focus groups and by experts in the area.¹⁹ CASE concluded that of the 11 million South Africans of all races aged between 16 and 30, a quarter (2.7 million) were fully engaged in society and functioning well. A further 43% (4.7 million) were described as at risk, meaning that they were signalling signs of concern on a few of the twelve indicators being used.

Beyond them were 27% (2.8 million) of young people who were the 'marginalized youth': they scored high on a large number of indicators and were in urgent need of systematic interventions. Importantly, those interventions should be based on as many as possible of the variables included in the definition of marginalization. For example, one in ten young black South Africans has been a victim of political violence—such as a stabbing, shooting, stoning, train or taxi attack or so on.²⁰ This is particularly true of young people living in big cities or informal settlements. Furthermore, half of all young people know other victims of political violence. Simply providing skills training will not by itself undo the psychological damage derived from such close encounters with violence. A range of social and psychological factors need to be included in educational and/or eco-

nomic youth programmes. Sadly, this holistic approach to development and education is not reflected in the RDP.

Finally, 5% of South African youth, nearly half a million young people, scored high on all or almost all of the twelve indicators; they were described as 'lost': indicating that they were largely beyond the reach of most youth development programmes and best reached through the criminal justice system.

The importance of the CASE analysis was to break through the common practice of treating youth (particularly black youth) as an undifferentiated entity; to highlight the extent to which marginalization was a process which affects youth of all races; and to set the scale for the youth development programmes that are needed to rectify the situation. Programme planners were given an indication of the scope and nature of problems among youth, and could design programmes accordingly. The research findings were endorsed by the Second National Conference on Marginalized Youth and adopted by the NYDF.

Out-of-school youth: dimensions of the phenomenon

Replacing the rhetoric of the 1980s with a detailed youth profile was a crucial breakthrough in the early 1990s. Now, with the ANC-led Government of National Unity in power, the prospects for youth development have improved considerably. Youth comprise a huge demographic group: the South African population is estimated to be 40 million people, a third of whom are below fourteen years of age. Programmes dealing with the unemployed, labour intensive public works, or primary health care all find that youth comprise a significant portion of their target group.


However, those youth have a particular political and social history and are entering 'the new South Africa' with all the baggage from their past. Planners are beginning to find—and will increasingly do so—that youth need to be approached in their own social, psychological and political context, not simply treated as an 'add-on' to pre-designed programmes.

One particular group that programmers are beginning to focus on is out-of-school youth. The education system under apartheid deliberately undereducated black South Africans on the basis of Verwoerd's dictum (see note 16), with the result that educational attainment has a clear racial skew. This is shown in Figure 1. One percent of African youth have no formal education at all; less than 14% have only a primary level education and in South Africa are considered functionally illiterate. Among Coloured youth, 10% have only a primary level education.

For Asian and White youth, however, the situation is very different: all White youth reached secondary level education, as did the vast majority of Asian youth. Looking at the top end of the scale, almost one in five Whites attained a diploma or degree, as did one in ten Asians and one in twenty Africans.

The new education system has to rectify the imbalances of the past. Within this context, out-of-school youth are an important group. This is not a static category: youth may move in and out of school and their reasons for doing so may be

FIGURE 1. Educational attainment among South African youth.



embedded in the schooling system, in particular schools, in the demands of the extra-school environment, and so on. Nonetheless, the data establishes a clear pattern of youth leaving school earlier than they wished to and being unable to resume their studies despite the stated desire to do so.

The danger of socially acceptable answers to questions about why respondents left school prematurely and whether or not they wish to resume studies, is not inconsiderable. As such, a carefully nuanced instrument is needed to measure and understand the phenomenon. However, in the absence of such a tool, we have used the existing survey instrument to develop a rough working model which allows us to estimate the scope of the phenomenon and to describe some of its key aspects. The model combines three items which successively narrow the definition. This starts by including only those youth who are not currently studying at school or university (item A); then includes only those who left school without achieving their desired educational level (item B); and then includes only those who express a desire to study to that level (item C). These are important categories, which deserve some attention.

NON-STUDENTS (A) AND STUDENTS NOT REACHING DESIRED EDUCATIONAL LEVELS (B)

In all, 59% of respondents were not scholars or students at the time of being interviewed. The fact that in a national youth survey, a total of 35% of all respondents were at school and another 8% were studying at tertiary level, reflects the difficulty of educational access for youth in South Africa. There is also a strong racial

skew in the figures: while just over half (55%) of African youth were still in school, this was true of 65% of Whites, 69% of Coloured and 70% of Asian youth. However, the situation is not simply one of racial imbalance. Throughout the survey, the interplay of race and class saw African and Coloured youth on the one hand, and White and Asian youth on the other.²¹ Thus we find that twice as many Whites (15%) were studying at tertiary level as Africans (7%) and Coloureds (7%); one in ten (10%) Asian youth were studying at this level. This is a pattern we shall see repeated below.

An enormous 81% of respondents who were not studying reported that they had left school without achieving the education level they wanted. A racial imbalance is again reflected here: 88% of African respondents and 82% of Coloureds had left school early. This was true of 61% of Asians and only 42% of Whites. Although the differences are slight, it is worth noting that 89% of African youth in formal metropolitan areas, 88% in formal urban areas and 86% in rural areas had not studied as far as they wished.

Across all races, 84% of respondents in rural areas had not studied as far as they originally planned, compared with 79% of youth in formal urban areas and 72% in formal metropolitan areas. We noted that all respondents from informal areas were African, 91% of whom had not studied as far as they wished.

Class background was also relevant when looking at the fact that two-thirds (66%) of youth of all races whose fathers worked in white-collar jobs said they had not studied as far as they wished, while 20% more (86%) of those from blue-collar homes said so. Interestingly, however, responses were identical across the age cohorts of 16 to 20, 21 to 25, and 26 to 30. There was also almost no difference between male and female respondents.

In short, those respondents who were not studying and who had left school earlier than they planned were overwhelmingly African and Coloured, from the two most impoverished areas (informal settlements and rural areas) and from working class families.

DESIRE TO RESUME STUDIES (C)

Looking at the final item, more than two-thirds (69%) of those who had not studied as far as they originally planned stated that they still wanted to study to that level. The data reveal similar patterns to those described above. Where 69% of African and 61% of Coloured youth still want to study, 58% of White and 49% of Asian youth have similar intentions. This presumably stems in part from economic opportunities: the rate of unemployment among African youth stands at 57% and at 47% for Coloured youth. For Asians the figure drops to 17% and for White youth, a tiny 4%.

Resuming studies seems less feasible to rural youth—61% of whom said they wanted to study to the originally planned level—than to other youth. Of the students who prematurely left school, 69% in informal areas, 72% in formal urban and 70% in formal metropolitan areas said they wanted to resume studying.

In this item, gender differences did emerge: more men (72%) than women (63%) said that they wanted to resume studies. With a significant increase in women-headed households and the ongoing burden of childcare being carried by women, this is unsurprising.²² The feasibility of studying also seems to decrease with age: 72% of 16 to 20 year olds still wanted to study, as did 71% of 21 to 25 year olds, while only 62% of 26 to 30 year olds did.

In sum, youth in informal and rural areas are worse off than those in formal urban and metropolitan areas. Although the highest number of youth who prematurely left school come from informal or rural areas, the lowest numbers of those who want to resume studies come from these areas. In addition, fewer women and older respondents want to resume studying.

OUT-OF-SCHOOL YOUTH

These figures hint at the enormous educational backlog currently plaguing South Africa.²³ As noted above, the three items were combined to provide a rough approximation of out-of-school youth. The frequency for each item in the out-of-school youth variable is given in Table 2.

TABLE 2. Constructing the out-of-school youth variable.

	Total sample	Item A	+ Item B	+ Item C
Respondents	2,224	1,311	1,064	731
Percentage	100%	59%	48%	33%

Clearly, a more sensitive definition of out-of-school youth is needed. One refinement offered by the existing survey instrument is to understand why the youth left school and why they are not currently studying despite their expressed desire to do so.

Poverty was overwhelmingly the main reason for leaving school early, cited by 60% of out-of-school youth. This combines two coded answers to an open-ended question, namely 'respondent had to become breadwinner' and 'family short of money'. A further 6% of respondents cited 'family pressure' as the reason for leaving school early. This may refer in part to financial issues.

Importantly, the second main reason for leaving school early among out-of-school youth, cited by 12% of respondents, was pregnancy. The reasons for teenage pregnancy are well known, including inadequate sex education, the difficulties women face trying to refuse male advances, social attitudes towards contraception and so on. However, falling pregnant while at school can also be a conscious choice, in part because motherhood has an elevated status in many communities.

The remaining three main reasons for leaving school early, each cited by 3% of out-of-school youth, were health, lack of interest and politics. These are important results. They remind us of the superficiality of casting youth as a 'lost generation' who boycotted and burnt their schools, and are responsible for their current

situation. Only 3% stated that they left school because of political activism; equally important, only 3% left out of a lack of interest.

The lives of many black youth in South Africa were and are dominated by poverty. Although education is a clearly identified path from poverty, it is also one of the first things to be sacrificed to the need for survival. The ongoing insistence on analyzing youth through a political prism is clearly inadequate.

If this is the case, and so many out-of-school youth still want to study, why are they not doing so? The answers are again dominated by the shortage of money, cited by 62% of out-of-school youth as the main reason for not currently studying despite their desire to do so. A further 12% cited either 'family' or 'marriage' as the reason for not currently studying, while another 9% stated that they lacked time, energy or commitment to see studies through. These difficulties need to be borne in mind by programme planners: out-of-school youth may not be able to resume studies as soon as facilities are made available, because they lead complex adult lives which directly impact on their ability to study.

Almost one in ten (9%) out-of-school youth cite a 'lack of interest' as the reason for not currently studying. Future research into this group will need to carefully examine the reasons for leaving school and for not currently studying, since provision must be tailored to the needs of those who do intend to study again.

The majority of out-of-school youth (as derived from the model we are using here) were forced out of school prematurely and are kept out of school as a result of poverty. The ANC's election promise (which is currently being implemented) to provide free education to children of school-going age is inadequate. The cost of education, including school fees, uniforms, equipment and so on, is only one side of the equation; the other is the economic needs of families which often dictate that children and adolescents need to become breadwinners. As they move into adulthood, the possibility of studying becomes ever less feasible. Creative solutions are needed for youth and their families who face this situation.


Profiling out-of-school youth

We noted earlier that out-of-school youth seemed to lie at a point where race and class combine: this is not simply an 'African' phenomenon, but one that particularly affects African and Coloured youth from more disadvantaged backgrounds; it also affects Asian and White youth, although to a lesser extent.

Youth in South Africa are 82% African, 8% Coloured, 1% Asian and 9% White. 'Out-of-school youth' have a similar profile, but with slightly more Africans (83%) and Coloureds (10%), and fewer Asians (1%) and Whites (5%).

Figure 2 illustrates that one in five (19%) out-of-school youth are to be found in informal settlements, and a quarter (25%) in rural areas. This signals a demographic shift from the sample as a whole, where 13% of youth (all of whom were African) lived in informal areas and a third (32%) lived in rural areas. Migration from rural to metropolitan areas frequently ends in informal areas because of the acute housing shortage in the larger cities.

FIGURE 2. Profiling out-of-school youth.



Not illustrated in the graph is the fact that 59% of out-of-school youth came from families where the father had a blue-collar job. A further 18% of out-of-school youth did not know what job their fathers did. This phenomenon is also more widespread among older respondents, for whom access to the formal school system is obviously more difficult than younger respondents. These are also respondents whose schooling was affected by the uprisings of 1976, as well as the boycotts of 1980/81 and the mid-1980s. It is important to note that a respondent who was 16 when answering this questionnaire was born in 1976, was only 5 years old when the 1980/81 boycotts began, and only 9 or 10 during the uprisings of the mid-1980s. At the other extreme, a 30 year-old respondent was already 14 when the 1976 revolt took place. These very different backgrounds impact the phenomenon of out-of-school youth.


Educational attainment among out-of school youth

The final aspect of out-of-school youth to be studied here is their educational attainment. This directly impacts provision. What we have found thus far is that the demographic profile of out-of-school youth is in many ways similar to the profile of youth as a whole, though with more Africans and Coloureds; and with more respondents from informal areas, from blue-collar backgrounds, with slightly more men than women, and older respondents. Bearing these subgroups in mind, it is reasonable to expect that the phenomenon might be more widespread among those at the lower ends of the educational ladder. In fact, out-of-school youth occur in different proportions at different levels of educational attainment. Moreover, the demographic profile differs at each education level.

Figure 3 profiles educational attainment among out-of-school youth as they occur across the four racial categories. The racial imbalances in the education system in South Africa ensure that the phenomenon of out-of-school youth differs across race groups. More than a fifth (22%) of White out-of-school youth have already reached post-matriculate level and want to resume studies at an advanced level.²⁴ Similarly, more than two-thirds (67%) of Asian youth have reached senior secondary level and wish to go further.

However, among African youth less than 16% of out-of-school youth wish to achieve basic literacy by completing primary school, and another 35% have reached the first two years of high school and wish to study further. Among Coloured youth the situation is similar, with approximately one in ten (11%) wanting to go beyond primary school and 36% wanting to go beyond junior secondary education.

FIGURE 3. Educational attainment among out-of-school youth (all races).



Looking across the race groups it is apparent that out-of-school youth are not primarily those who reached only lower educational levels; they are predominantly those who reached their last two years of high school and wish to complete or continue their studies. Among both White and Asian youth, fully 76% of out-of-school youth have reached senior secondary or higher levels; among Coloureds, 54% have reached this level, while only 49% of African out-of-school youth have reached this educational level. In very broad terms, it seems that two forms of educational provision for out-of-school youth are required: one which services those youth (mainly African and some Coloured) who have attained primary or junior secondary levels, and another to see youth through to their matriculation certificate or university/college entrance.

This simplified description of educational provision for out-of-school youth is immediately complicated by the demographic profile of youth who have reached different education levels. Only eighteen out-of-school youth had no formal education, and although it will not be analyzed in detail here, it is worth noting that all were African.

Among those who had left school at primary level, fully 90% were African and 9% Coloured. Youth in this category were less likely to be found in formal metropolitan (18%) or urban (16%) areas. Rather, they live in informal settlements (26%) and rural areas (40%). Importantly, 60% of out-of-school youth at this level are women; they are also more likely to be older, with 42% aged between 26 and 30. This is an important group. They are functionally illiterate and are signalling the desire to reach a higher education level. Their age suggests that they have been out of the formal education system for some time and educational provision clearly must be tailored to suit their circumstances. Child-care facilities for women who wish to attend school also need to be considered.

Those out-of-school youth who reached junior secondary level are less racially concentrated: 82% are African, 10% Coloured, 1% Asian and 7% White. The areas they live in differ as well: 17% live in informal settlements, 33% in rural areas, 19% live in formal urban areas and 31% in formal metropolitan areas. Slightly more than half (54%) are women. Importantly, the age profile of out-of-school youth at this level is much younger, with 50% aged between 16 and 20 and the remainder evenly divided between the two remaining age groups.

As such, in the two lower educational levels, out-of-school youth are mainly African and to a lesser extent Coloured, are mainly women, and live predominantly in rural or informal areas. This group seems to be comprised of younger respondents who wish to complete high school.

This profile differs yet again among those out-of-school youth who reached senior secondary levels of education—the predominant group across the races. Among this group, 73% are African, 10% Coloured, 3% Asian and 14% White. They live mainly in formal metropolitan areas (36%), followed by rural (31%), formal urban (26%) and informal areas (8%). For the first time, men predominate (55%) over women (45%), reflecting the fact that young women are encouraged to leave education earlier than young men.²⁵ Finally, this group is more evenly spread across the different age cohorts: 30% are aged between 16 and 20, another 41% are aged between 21 and 25, while only 29% are aged between 26 and 30. This last group seems mainly to comprise respondents who failed standards (grade or class) 9 or 10 and wish to get their matriculation certificate.


Conclusion: providing for out-of-school youth—and others?

The challenge facing the new government is clear: to provide appropriately tailored facilities and programmes for youth who left school earlier than they wanted to and who still want to study. As we have seen, this is by no means an homoge-

nous group: they differ across a range of variables at different educational levels and have distinct needs. They also comprise one-third of South Africa's youth. The short-term costs of education provision will have long-term social and economic benefits.

For a government which has to mend the divisions sewn by apartheid, it is equally important to consider those not among the out-of-school youth in the model used here. The third item (C) in the model included only those who stated that they still wanted to study to the level they had originally planned before having to leave school. Those who did not respond positively to this question should also be considered. The possibility of returning to education may simply seem impossible to some youth but this may change if appropriate facilities and courses are provided. Figure 4 compares out-of-school youth with those who stated that they did not wish to resume studies, within each educational level.

FIGURE 4. Comparing out-of-school youth with those who do not wish to study further



It is immediately apparent that the majority of those with no formal education have no desire to study (although there were only eighteen respondents in this cell and such a small cell size means that this statement should be treated with caution). Thereafter, however, as educational attainment increases, so does the desire to re-engage with the education system.

The second challenge for researchers and the government lies in understanding why almost half (46%) of those with primary level education do not desire to study further. Those who simply do not wish or need to study differ from those who cannot conceive of studying. The latter group must be given the chance to return to schooling.

The provision of education for youth who left school earlier than they wanted to should be maximized. In the new, post-apartheid South Africa it is the duty of planners to understand the extent of the damage done by apartheid and to be flexible in the provision of services.

The youth of today comprise a large portion of South Africa's people. They are the first generation to enter adulthood in a free South Africa, but a third of them find their lives constrained by prematurely-ended education. Providing for these youth is one of the key challenges facing the current government.

Notes

1. Thanks to Cathi Albertyn, Wim Hoppers and Jenny Glennie for helpful discussion and comment.
2. See, for example, M. Orkin and R. Jennings, *RDP-relevant selections from the October household survey*. Johannesburg, CASE, 1994. (Mimeo.)
3. See D. Everatt and M. Orkin, *Growing up tough: a national survey of South African youth*, CASE report submitted to the second National Conference on Marginalized Youth, Broederstroom, 1993.
4. African National Congress, *The reconstruction and development programme*, Johannesburg, 1994. All RDP references are drawn from this source.
5. For more detail on youth and the RDP, see D. Everatt, *Youth and the reconstruction and development of the 'new South Africa'*, Johannesburg, CASE, 1994. (Mimeo.)
6. See J. Seekings, 'Heroes or villains?': *youth politics in the 1980s*, Braamfontein, Ravan Press, 1993, chapter 1.
7. See for example C. de Kock and C. Schutte, *The African youth in the present-day South Africa: integration or youth revolution?*; and C. Bester, *The causes and consequences of changed family life of black people in South Africa*. Both were presented to the International Sociological Association, Bielefeld, Germany, 1994.
8. Kock and Schutte, op. cit.
9. Ibid., p. 27-28.
10. Ibid., p. 11.
11. F. van Zyl Slabbert, et al., *Youth in the new South Africa*, Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1995, p. 21.
12. Kock and Schutte, *The African youth*, p. 21: 'political radicalism occurred among those at school and at university who were in fact less of the "lost" generation.'
13. See Everatt and Orkin, op. cit.
14. See M. Ramphela, *Social disintegration in the black community: implications for social transformation* in D. Everatt and E. Sisulu, eds., *Black youth in crisis: facing the future*, Braamfontein, Ravan Press, 1992.
15. K. Truscott and S. Milner, 'Youth, education and the world of work', in: D. Everatt, *Creating a future*, Braamfontein, Ravan Press, p. 40. In 1969 the white:black differential was 1:18.
16. H.F. Verwoerd quoted in E. Roux, *Time longer than rope: a history of the black man's struggle for freedom in South Africa*, Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, p. 395.
17. See R. Hirschowitz, S. Milner and D. Everatt, *Growing up in a violent society*, in: D. Everatt, ed., *Creating a future*, op. cit., p. 67-96.
18. G. Straker, *Faces in the revolution: the psychological effects of violence on township youth in South Africa*, Cape Town, David Philip, 1992, p. 19.
19. For detail on this, see Everatt and Orkin, op. cit.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.
22. See D. Everatt and M. Orkin, 'Families should stay together: intergenerational attitudes among South African youth, *Journal of gerontology* (Cape Town), vol. 3/2, October 1994, p. 43–48.
23. For more detail, see Truscott and Milner, *op. cit.*
24. Youth who have already completed their high school are not considered in detail here.
25. See Everatt and Orkin, *Growing up tough*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

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EXCLUSION AND INTEGRATION

IN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES:

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION

Ahmed Chabchoub and El Mostafa Haddiya

Contemporary society in the Maghreb¹ is relatively homogenous (a single language—Arabic, a single religion—Islam, and only a small number of foreigners). Moreover, the traditional culture still prevalent in this society develops the qualities of solidarity and mutual assistance among ‘individuals’. This is why one does not find the forms of exclusion present today among certain fringes of the population in Western society (immigrants, unemployed, mentally disabled, homeless, etc.). This does not, however, prevent our society from exercising an insidious form of exclusion over some of its members (women, rural populations, young people) that revives certain behaviour nostalgic for traditional values.

Traditional society in the Maghreb² is in fact a stratified society, in other words, it is organized in a pyramid. A. Charfi, a Tunisian expert on Muslim society, describes thus the pyramid-shaped organization of traditional society:

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The divine wisdom which has organized the Universe has arranged society in a pyramid; the summit of this pyramid is occupied by men, followed by women, men slaves, women slaves, children and, lastly, the mad. Men themselves have a hierarchy according to the following order: governors, doctors and then the rest. It does not occur to anyone to call into question this hierarchy (perceived by all as being natural and legitimate) because any such challenge might disturb the social order as a whole.³

Our ancestors, who assimilated this order (mainly as a result of family education and the socialization exercised over them by social models), found this hierarchical social structure absolutely natural and they accepted it all the more readily because all social actors found it had advantages. But what happens to such a situation when education at school, modern education, teaches young people that all citizens are equal and that what was considered natural was only natural because it was willed by those who had an interest in imposing it?

One of the results of this protest will be the feeling among those who are worst off (women, rural populations, young people) that they are being excluded or marginalized. For the more enlightened women and men this will be accompanied by demands for the integration of those excluded. This is the case for feminist movements,⁴ associations to protect the child and government authorities.⁵

We shall analyse these phenomena of exclusion and integration in contemporary society in the Maghreb. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, our society has been assimilating other cultures and has veered from a traditional model to a modern one⁶—not without violence at times. This transition from an endogenous cultural model to an exogenous one leads to upheavals which social actors do not know how to handle, particularly since global society has not provided any transition mechanisms. This is where education can play a regulating role by helping the actors to move gradually from a void to integrality. We shall therefore examine the role which school could, and should, play in our societies in transition: on the one hand, to soften the impact or even oppose the phenomenon of exclusion and, on the other, to encourage the integration of the excluded.

Exclusion and integration of women

Women's integration in society as full citizens is a recent phenomenon even in modern Western society.⁷ So what about our societies in the Maghreb, which are just emerging from a patriarchal model? For example, despite legislation on equality,⁸ Tunisian women continue to be subject to certain forms of exclusion that are particularly dangerous because they are insidious and not explicit. This exclusion can be encountered at various levels and from early childhood: health care, school attendance, work and private life.

HEALTH CARE

The laws of human genetics tell us that, at birth, the number of girls is always lower than the number of boys but that this deficit is rapidly made up during the

first year of life by a higher mortality rate for boys. A balance between boys and girls should therefore be restored from 3 years of age onwards. However, in our patriarchal Maghrebin societies where, for cultural reasons, a boy receives more attention than a girl, the mortality rate for girls during their first year is higher than for boys, and this occurs as from the third month, as shown in Table 1, taken from research recently carried out by Gueddana's team.⁹

TABLE 1: Comparative mortality rate for girls and boys during their first three months

Sex	Age in days					Total
	0-7	8-28	29-90	91-180	181-365	
Male	2,684	983	1,221	687	617	6,129
Female	1,170	1,122	915	1,177	1,078	5,462
Total	3,854	2,105	2,136	1,864	1,695	11,654

This table shows clearly that, as from the ninety-first day, female mortality is almost double that of males (1,177 against 687). The phenomenon continues until the end of the first year. This segregative practice explains in part the pyramid of sexes in Tunisia: 51% boys and 49% girls.

SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

In the Arab world in general, and in the Maghreb in particular, school attendance for girls was the subject of passionate discussion during the Arab Renaissance (end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries). The attitude of traditional doctors (such as sheikh Ben Dhiyf or sheikh Ben Mrad), who were against the education of girls for reasons of secular conformism rather than religion, was opposed to the modernist position of intellectuals educated in the West (for example K. Amine,¹⁰ convinced of equality between women and men and of the need to educate women). French colonial schools accelerated the process by encouraging young Muslim girls to attend Franco-Arab schools and vocational training institutes.

Unlike boys, who were enrolled in colonial schools *en masse*, girls, who were supposed to be the guardians of traditional culture, were often kept away from school for fear that they would be 'corrupted' by it. For obvious reasons, the national school programme (1956) had to make attendance by girls one of the principal axes of development of Maghrebin society. In Tunisia, for example, the rate of school attendance by girls rose from 30% in 1957 to 76% in 1989 and 92% in 1993. In Morocco, the figures rose from 29% in 1961 to 39% in 1989.¹¹

However spectacular the progress, it is not enough, particularly if compared to the performance of boys. In Tunisia, the illiteracy rate among adult women was still 38% in 1989 (as against 26% for men). The rate of primary school attendance by girls did not exceed 84% in 1992 (against 100% for boys). The enrolment of girls in secondary school was only 38% in 1992 (compared with 46% for boys).¹²

Moreover, a recent UNESCO study on the orientation of young girls towards scientific and technical studies showed that Tunisian girls preferred literary and legal studies, which automatically excludes them from decision-making jobs. Let us look at the figures for girls: at the 1993 baccalaureate examination, 54% of the candidates passed in the arts while only 34% took experimental science, 27.9% mathematics and just 5.3% mathematics-technical studies. The same or similar ratios are to be found at university: 53% in arts and the law, 35% in basic sciences and only 21.4% in engineering.¹³

The situation of women in Morocco is not much better. Indeed, 62% of adult women are illiterate; only 46% of girls attend primary school; and 30% secondary school.¹⁴ In this connection, as in Tunisia, girls in Morocco are under-represented in scientific subjects, as can be seen from the percentage figures in Table 2.

TABLE 2. New enrolment in the fifth secondary school year (SY) by subject, 1989-90

	Orientation 4 SY-5 SY		Percentage of girls	
	Both sexes	Boys	Girls	
Total	100	100	100	39.3
Arts	45.5	37.3	57.9	50.1
Sciences	50.5	58.4	38.3	29.9
Industr. tech.	2.3	3.4	0.7	11.4
Commercial tech.	1.5	0.6	3.0	75.8
Agric. tech.	0.2	0.3	-	-

Source: Moroccan Ministry of Education

At university, the situation is almost the same according to figures of the Ministry of Education for 1989-90: 46% in arts and human sciences, 33.5% in medicine, 33.9% in law, economics and social sciences, 30.2% in exact sciences, 15.7% in technical studies and 15.6% in engineering.

This situation can be explained by the education and social and family socialization given to girls: having assimilated that they are inferior to men, they find it quite normal that men should occupy posts requiring leadership and initiative while they carry out the subaltern tasks.

PROFESSIONAL LIFE

The consequence of school attendance by women in the Maghreb has been that they have acquired schooling and university education that allows them to participate more in professional life. But here again, despite the progress made, women in the Maghreb are still the victim of segregative behaviour which, although perhaps not consciously desired, is nonetheless exclusive.

In Tunisia, for example, women represent 23% of the working population. The number of working women can be broken down as follows: 48% workers, 26% agricultural workers and 21% providers of services.¹⁵ Furthermore, women occupy 27.6% of government jobs, with a high proportion at the lower end of the

scale (secretaries, primary school teachers), except in medicine, where they account for 46% of physicians and paramedical posts.¹⁶

A recent study by the *Centre de recherche, de documentation et d'information sur la femme* [Centre for research, documentation and information on women] (CREDIF)¹⁷ showed however that 'as the remuneration, prestige and decision-making power of women increase, women find that they are virtually marginalized or even left out. For example, out of 2,439 government jobs available in 1989 in the public administration (director, deputy director, head of service, etc.) women were only given 135 posts (equivalent to 5.5%) [...] In 1992, only 2.6% of eligible women were given a post of responsibility against 12% for men [...] Even in the magistracy, where 23% of judges are women, they only obtained 70% of civil service posts.'¹⁸

In Morocco, the situation of working women is very similar to that in Tunisia. The working population of women is 3 million, out of a total working population of 9 million, so they represent 33% of the total. They mainly work in the country (43% in rural areas and 16% in urban areas) and in services (mostly household help).

The various spheres of activity are the following: agricultural and industrial workers: 49%; domestic service (maids and household help): 17%; social services: 17%; civil service: only 6%; commerce: 6%; other: 5%. Here again, working women generally occupy subaltern posts because of their lack of qualifications. Forty-two per cent of them are illiterate, 23% only have primary schooling, 27% went to secondary school and 8% have higher education.¹⁹

How can this situation be revitalized? How can women become more integrated in economic and social life? Firstly, this can be achieved by more education of women, particularly rural women (we shall return to this later). On a practical level, it means educating more women to diploma level so as to have more qualified women ready to confront the cruel competition of the labour market. All the statistics show that, in our societies as elsewhere, there is a very close link between women's level of education and their professional status.

Another way to achieve this goal is through legislation to encourage the promotion of women, in other words, to establish the legal equality of both sexes as far as jobs are concerned. Tunisia is the only one of the three Maghreb countries to have adopted legislation to promote women.²⁰ It is no coincidence that Tunisia is relatively advanced compared with the other countries of the Maghreb as far as integration of women in economic and social life is concerned (see statistics above).

PRIVATE LIFE: SINGLE WOMEN

Are women given the right to a private life? Even though Tunisian legislation recognizes this, social practices continue to marginalize single women. Unlike Christian culture (which took Christ, a single man, as a model and therefore sees celibacy as a form of penitence), Islamic culture considers marriage to be an act of

piety²¹ and usually looks upon single people with mistrust. The situation of inferiority in which traditional society places women makes their single status even more despised.

Who will protect this weak creature and see to her needs? How can a single woman legally fulfil her sexual needs when traditional morals forbid any sexual relations outside marriage? How can she fulfil her duty to bear children if she decides not to get married? These are all questions that are asked and concern women more than men; they explain the rarity of single women in traditional society, a status that is limited to women suffering from disabilities (handicaps, ugliness, retardation, etc.).

A woman who has been to school or university, however, has the option of exercising a profession and, consequently, of enjoying a social status that generates rights: these include the right to take her own decisions and make personal choices regarding her own life (late marriage, remaining single, etc.).

In a 1993 survey of single Maghrebin women, the Algerian sociologist Imène Hayef drew the following conclusions:

Tunisian women appear to cope with single status best, whereas almost half the Algerian women considered that their lives as single women were difficult (against 33% in Tunisia and 29% in Morocco) and 8% of them envisaged remaining single (against 20% in Tunisia and Morocco). Moreover, 17% of Tunisian women and 10% of Moroccan women stated that their single status was the result of personal choice, although this attitude only applied to 1.5% of Algerian women. Tunisian and Moroccan women seem to have a more positive view of their single status despite the social problems experienced.²²

Exclusion and integration in rural areas

Maghrebin societies are often reproached for having made development inequitable, of having encouraged the development of cities and urban areas rather than the countryside. In recent years, this has meant mass displacement of the population towards the cities and gradual impoverishment of rural areas. However, if one looks more closely, the rural exodus is a worldwide phenomenon, familiar to Western society throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to our Third World societies since 1960. The liberal development model, based on industrial and service activities, could but develop cities to the detriment of the country.

As an example, the Tunisian urban population rose from 24% in 1960 to 60.6% in 1991. In Morocco, the figures are 29.33% in 1960 and 50.43% in 1993. The countryside in the Maghreb lacks infrastructures, adequate educational and health institutions, means of communication (roads, transport, telephones, etc.). Young people, affected by unemployment as well, feel themselves to be excluded and marginalized.

We shall first of all examine this situation of marginalization of the rural population as far as health care, education and employment are concerned and then

put forward educational solutions to improve the incorporation of the rural population in the development process.

HEALTH CARE

The inequality between cities and the country as far as infrastructure and health coverage are concerned, together with the illiteracy of rural women,²³ mean that babies and children die in greater numbers in the country than in the city.

A Tunisian study by Nabiha Guedanna in 1989 shows (Table 3) that, for one child who dies in the city, two die in the country, particularly during their first year.

TABLE 3. Infant mortality in cities and rural areas during the first year

Age	Urban areas	Rural areas
0-7 days	1.5	2.7
29-90 days	0.8	1.4
0-365 days	0.9	1.2

Source: N. Guedanna, p. 115

In Morocco, in 1962, the infant mortality quotient was 149% and the child mortality quotient (children from 1 to 5 years) was 75%. Since then, these indicators have continually fallen. In 1990, infant mortality was estimated to be 57.4%, 43.5% in cities and 64.8% in the country, and child mortality 20%.²⁴

This difference is due to a number of economic, and also cultural, factors. At the purely material level, if there are fewer physicians in the country and not so many modern facilities as in the city, this is because of the unequal development phenomenon mentioned above. Table 4 provides some indicators on the material situation in cities and rural areas in Tunisia.

TABLE 4. Access to modern facilities in cities and rural areas in Tunisia

Indicator of modern facilities	Urban areas	Rural areas
Access to health care	100%	80%
Number of persons/room	1.2	3.5
Population with running water	100%	54%
Population with sewage facilities	97%	35%

Source: *Rapport sur la situation de l'enfant arabe*, Cairo, Arab Council for Childhood and Development, 1993, p. 98.

The same could be said for Morocco, as shown by the relevant statistical data. According to where one resides, in 1991 there was a dispensary for just over 74,000 inhabitants in the cities; the situation is different in rural areas because of the scattered settlements and lack of equipment for the rural population. One hundred per cent of urban dwellers have running water, compared with only 50% in the country. The same is true for access to health services: 100% in urban areas and 50% in rural areas.²⁵

As far as the education of mothers is concerned, the level is lower in the countryside compared to the cities, as shown in Table 5 concerning Morocco.

TABLE 5. Heads of household in Morocco according to educational level, place of residence and sex (1991)—, in percentages

	Both sexes	Men	Women
<i>Overall</i>			
None	60.2	52.9	90.8
Primary	12.6	14.5	5.0
Secondary	11.6	13.6	3.3
Higher	2.7	3.3	0.1
Other	12.8	15.7	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Urban areas</i>			
None	49.8	39.0	87.1
Primary	15.3	17.6	7.5
Secondary	19.3	23.6	4.8
Higher	5.2	6.7	0.2
Other	10.3	13.2	0.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Rural areas</i>			
None	71.1	66.2	96.2
Primary	9.8	11.4	1.4
Secondary	3.6	4.1	1.0
Higher	-	0.1	-
Other	15.5	18.2	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Enquête sur les niveaux de vie des ménages, 1990-91. In: *Les indicateurs sociaux*. Rabat, Direction de la statistique, 1993, p. 96.

SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

The countryside in the Maghreb, long illiterate, benefited from the school expansion phase in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the rate of school attendance in rural areas is around 90% in some areas of the Maghreb, the drop-out rate is still very high, which augurs a return to illiteracy. The rate of pre-school coverage is relatively low: 8% in Tunisia and 4.5% in Morocco. Regarding primary education, the Ministry of Education's statistics show that, of 100 students enrolled at present, 47 are from rural areas. The most affected in the rural areas are girls. Girls in rural areas are therefore doubly penalized under the system.

Education in the country also faces a much more insidious problem, the qualifications of the teachers. Beginners without qualifications nor educational experience are usually appointed to the most disadvantaged rural schools. They are supervised by educational personnel (inspectors, education counsellors) who are also beginners without adequate qualifications. As a teacher accumulates experience and length of service, he will move nearer to the city, helped by the legislation governing the transfer of teachers. This logic ensures that competent teachers are

always going to finish up in the city, thereby accentuating the marginalization of the country.

In order to remedy this situation, certain political decisions are necessary: increase the salaries of teachers working in rural schools, give these schools decent accommodation, accelerate economic and social development of rural areas (roads, electricity, running water, etc.).

Exclusion of young people and children

In traditional society, children and young people have no social status. The only person who counts is the adult male because he is able to provide economic benefits. But modernity, by inventing concepts such as childhood and adolescence (following on from the concept of the individual) and by introducing them into our society through school and the media, has created a situation of unease. On the one hand, we have a society (barely emerging from a patriarchal model) which globally and in practice refuses to grant children and young people status as individuals²⁶ and, on the other, youth that is aware of its importance in society and is calling for the right to accede fully to society through education, training, and consequently participation in active life so as to contribute towards the development of the community's social life.

Conclusion: education without disparities

The traditional family structure has been greatly affected by change. It is evolving from a large patriarchal, tribal and agnatic family structure to a type of family that is as yet undetermined and very different. The father's role is decisive: he is the head of the family, takes the decisions concerning it, assumes all responsibility for the family. The mother only achieves social status if she 'procreates' and has reached a certain age. Otherwise, in the majority of cases, she is relegated to a passive and ignored role. On the one hand, her role is limited to satisfying man's desire and, on the other, to household tasks.

As far as children are concerned, the itinerary of their psychological development takes place within the same framework and follows the same segregative process.

BOYS' ITINERARY

The early childhood (of boys) is characterized by the intense relationship between mother and child. This close bond is not only materialized in breastfeeding but also in physical proximity (the child is always with his mother). At the age of 5 or 6, all interests and efforts in the family environment focus on the male child in order to encourage the development of one specific characteristic of his personality: virility.

These efforts start at an early age. In some circles in the Maghreb, a boy may accompany his mother to the baths until 5 or 6 years of age. After that, he goes

with his father. From that age onwards, therefore, the child is separated from the women in order to develop his own virility. He is considered to be a man and he only accompanies his sisters to the baths (especially in villages and small towns), even those much older, in order to protect them. He is obliged to do his utmost to demonstrate his virility to the world at large.

GIRLS' ITINERARY

Their future is closely linked to their 'procreation' role. This is a future that is almost impossible to achieve outside marriage and it can only occur if one prior and essential condition is met: virginity.

A young girl is deeply aware of the need to protect her virginity and this constitutes the focus of her education. She lives in an environment that is full of mysteries and secrets, awaiting an event that is essentially related to her body; she therefore avoids boys. She is thus constantly confronted with the status of women in Maghreb society as a whole and rural society in particular. In any event, a girl rapidly learns in such circumstances that it is her own body which will guarantee her success.

This reality is particularly complex at the educational level because it calls for the urgent deployment of large-scale efforts to attenuate or eliminate the disparities and segregation between men, children and young people on the one hand and, on the other, between men and women in both urban and rural areas.

Notes

1. The word 'Maghreb' is used to cover Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
2. By traditional society, we mean 'preindustrial society in which social roles are strongly predetermined by sex, age and the social status of the family'. Traditional society lays down the conduct for all social actors and does not leave any room for personal initiative by 'individuals'.
3. A. Charfi, *Islam et modernité* [Islam and modernity], Tunis, MTE Publications, 1990, p. 228.
4. In Tunisia, there are at present at least two feminist associations: the *Union des femmes de Tunisie* [Union of Tunisian Women] and the *Association des femmes démocrates* [Association of Women Democrats]. In Morocco, there are as many feminist associations as political parties (around fourteen).
5. Government authorities play a role through education programmes.
6. By 'modernity' we mean 'the form of organization of economic, social and political life invented by the West in the seventeenth century (subsequently developed during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries) which is the opposite of the traditional model' (*Encyclopaedia universalis*).
7. As is the right to vote.
8. Tunisia has a very modern family code (Law of 13 August 1957), known as the *Code du statut personnel* [Individual status code]. This law abolished polygamy, fixed the age for marriage and the conditions for divorce, etc., provisions which made women full citizens; this code is unique in the Arab world.

9. N. Gueddana, et al., *Un enfant et deux Tunisie* [One child and two Tunisias], Tunis, Ministry of Health Publications, 1989.
10. Kacem Amine was an Egyptian intellectual at the beginning of the century, a graduate of the Paris law faculty and the author of several pamphlets on the liberation of women, including *La femme moderne* [Modern woman], published in 1901.
11. D. Mahfoud, et al., *Femmes diplômées, pratiques novatrices* [Qualified women, innovative practices], Tunis, IREF, 1994.
12. UNICEF, *The state of the world's children*, 1992, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1992.
13. UNESCO; Tunisia, Ministry of Education and Science, *How to encourage girls to choose a scientific or technological career?*, seminar-workshop, University of Tunis, 9-14 January 1993.
14. UNICEF, op. cit.
15. This situation can be explained to a large extent by the level of education of those concerned: 52% illiterate, 25% primary school level, 19% secondary school and only 3% with higher education (1989 statistics).
16. Centre de recherche, de documentation et d'information sur la femme (CREDIF), *Femmes de Tunisie* [Tunisian women], Tunis, CREDIF, 1994, p. 196 *et seq.*
17. CREDIF is located in rue Abdelaziz ibn Séoud, El Manar, Tunis.
18. CREDIF, op. cit., p. 198 *et seq.*
19. Mahfoud, et al., op. cit., p. 25 *et seq.*
20. Individual Status Code, Labour Code, school orientation law making attendance at school compulsory for children (girls and boys) up to the age of 16, Ministry of Women's Affairs, official and free family planning programme, etc., Centre for Research on Women.
21. The prophet Mohammed had nine wives and always encouraged young people to marry in order to be armed against the temptations of the flesh.
22. Mahfoud, et al., op. cit., p. 164.
23. 'Many studies have shown that, when income is the same, the educational level of the parents, particularly the mother, has a negative correlation to infant mortality' (Guedanna, op. cit., p. 116).
24. *Rapport national: population et développement au Maroc* [National report: population and development in Morocco], Rabat, Ed. Guessous, 1994, p. 16.
25. *Rapport sur la situation de l'enfant arabe* [Report on the situation of the Arab child], Cairo, Arab Council for Childhood and Development, 1990, 146 p.
26. It may be asked how such societies, which have not yet accepted the concept of the individual, can give this status to children, young people and women.

YOUNG PEOPLE IN

THE ARGENTINE EDUCATION SYSTEM:

THEIR INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Guillermina Tiramonti, Inés Dussel and Javier Hermo

As we approach the end of the century, several converging phenomena are generating a social restructuring of such magnitude that many authors believe that we are entering a new age. Those whose analysis is mainly socio-cultural (Lyotard, 1987) speak of a post-modern society arising from the ruins of the philosophy of modernity. Others, emphasizing the changes in the production of goods and services brought about by widespread technological innovations, consider that we are now in post-industrial society (Bell, 1976).

Whatever the observer's standpoint, there is agreement as to the macro-historical character of current changes and the substantive role played by knowledge in creating and directing it. Knowledge has become a key factor in explaining

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countries' differences in growth and economic development, their entry into worldwide markets, their access to employment in a progressively shrinking labour market and their active exercise of the rights of citizens in order to maintain the political and democratic order.

For a society, knowledge implies communication. The huge growth of the mass media and information technology has caused a globalization of markets in which highly diverse cultures can live and find expression side by side.

Societies of this kind are now redefining knowledge, its social representativeness and cultural relevancy, and the values on which they are based.

The traditional role of school in modern times was to integrate youngsters in social life by giving them the same symbolic representation of the world. School put them on an equal footing by erasing differences. The dividing line between inclusion and exclusion indicated not only whether they were enrolled at school but also whether or not they belonged to an educated sector of society.

In Latin America the issue of inclusion/exclusion has also been closely linked to the fact that the countries of this region have evolved as dual societies: on the one hand, a relatively small modern sector integrated in world markets, with ample access to the cultural world of central nations; and, on the other, a large backward population cut off from the world economy. Thus, there have always been important differences between these countries' situations,¹ in particular those of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), classified at one extreme as countries of early modernization, and the Andean and Central American countries, which represent a wide range of intermediate situations.

Into this basic and well-known situation, requiring no detailed description here, an additional factor had been introduced, namely that, in this predominantly neo-liberal era, education has become another adjustment variable. Cuts in expenditure on public education—regarded as not producing any immediate return and therefore as a source of 'loss'—have directly or indirectly led to classifying education as simply a market commodity, with the inevitable consequence that it is accessible only to those who can afford it. This is the result of action by successive Latin American governments which in the 1980s and 1990s gave priority to the internal or external budgetary constraints of cost-reducing policies, drawing no distinction between 'expenditure' and social 'investment'. In conjunction with the chronic inadequacy of social infrastructures in the region, these policies made the situation still worse.

The lack of investment in education over the years has also caused erosion of the prestige that State education once enjoyed in several countries of the region, creating a growing perception of the inadequacy and irrelevance to the community of the education system. Much of society has become convinced that the problems of education are for 'other people' to solve, and that the community as such is powerless to produce a change.

In this process we should also take into account structural elements of the political system which combine to prevent the community from 'taking charge' of problems, since there are no real channels of participation which could convey or

encourage expression of people's concern or proposals. All this has allowed education systems to languish and become inflexible over the years, making curricula even more rigid and out of touch with the social, economic and cultural demands of our times.

As regards social integration through inclusion in the education system, it is obvious that in Latin America, where basic education is not yet provided for all—and still less secondary education—children from the underprivileged sectors of society have less chance of attending school than those from better-off and more educated families. Close study always shows that the middle and upper classes account for a greater proportion of children attending school (primary or elementary) or higher education institutions than do classes with less cultural or financial capital. The ratio is even lower for children living in shanty towns (*villas miseria, cantegrilles, favelas*).

There is thus no denying that staying on at school is closely linked with social integration. 'Staying on' is important because it is at the elementary level that difficulties arise, not only in acceding to that level but also and above all in completing the course. The difficulties are even more obvious in respect to higher education; few have access to it, while many of those who gain access subsequently drop out.

It is evident that access to higher education opens more doors to the control and production of cultural capital, though it is in itself no guarantee of success. This is especially true since there has been a 'devaluation' of educational 'credentials'. This being the case, the cultural wealth and resources of 'relations' and 'contacts' provided by the family become even more important in one's work and social life, and this again is an advantage for those from a better economic, social and cultural background.

Furthermore, there is a tendency among the more privileged social sectors to send their children to private schools. The ratio may vary from one country or region to another. Setting aside any discussion of the quality of teaching in private compared with State schools, there is no doubt that private education confers prestige and establishes contacts which are useful for 'pulling strings' in the future.

Integration in the education system remains, for a large portion of the population today, the only access to literate culture, and thus the only—although no longer guaranteed—way of acquiring the necessary skills for active participation in modern life. However, these new skills are based on converging contributions from different disciplines, different languages and different forms of aesthetic expression; hence, they depend on a variety of cultural inputs, including those from the adolescents themselves.

In the 1980s, concurrently with the advent of democracy, Latin American education systems, including that of Argentina, introduced a series of reforms designed to modify and enrich school education in such a way as to involve schoolchildren in active exchanges with the new culture.

These efforts at regeneration and culture-building in schools take place in a society which has not yet achieved universal enrolment at the primary and elementary levels.

We should, however, bear in mind that Argentina is not typical of the region. It is a country which became modernized at an early date, with a large population of European descent who immigrated in waves at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one. Its education system therefore expanded to a much greater extent, and much earlier, than in other countries, covering a large population and playing an important part in integrating immigrants and achieving high levels of literacy.

The following article examines the extent to which youngsters are included in or excluded from the education system, from both a quantitative and a qualitative standpoint. Quantitatively, we assess the degree of integration in the formal education system. Qualitatively, we look at the inclusion of youth culture in daily school life and the identities shaped by the school.

The quantitative standpoint

Though the 1980s were a decade of economic recession, crisis and high taxation, there was a major increase in the school population (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: Net enrolment ratios by educational levels, 1980–91.

Level	1980 (%)	1991 (%)
Primary	89.6	95.3
Elementary	33.4	53.5
Higher	5.1	10.6

Source: National Census on Population and Housing, INDEC, 1980 and 1991

In the last year of primary education, 86% of children corresponding to that age group were enrolled, as against an overall primary ratio of 95.3%. However, while the percentage of exclusion is at present very low, it should be noted that in absolute figures it is still significant in areas of high population density. Additionally, if the survey were to include all the population rather than the sample group alone, it would be seen that approximately 30% of children never attended school, or did so for only one year, and that of these 90% belonged to underprivileged sectors of the population (Birgin, 1993).

The enrolment growth rate is more conspicuous at the elementary and higher levels of education. At the beginning of the present democratic period an 'enrolment explosion' took place, in a context of combined optimism and political mobilization coinciding with the end of the restrictive policies governing the transition from one level to the next.

At present, the elementary level is divided into two courses and three branches. The courses cover the common core, and the branches lead to technical, commercial or high-school diplomas. Different cumulative measures over the last thirty years have standardized the basic course for the three branches and expanded enrolment capacities. As a result, more than half of the youngsters aged 13 to 17 now attend some kind of secondary school (see Table 2).

TABLE 2: Enrolment ratios by elementary level and province, 1980-91.

Province	1980 (%)	1991 (%)	Province	1980 (%)	1991 (%)
Total for the country	33.4	53.5	Mendoza	36.6	53.4
Federal District	62.5	71.8	Misiones	23.5	54.3
Buenos Aires	39.4	54.1	Neuquén	29.0	54.3
Catamarca	34.3	50.7	Río Negro	30.2	53.4
Córdoba	42.8	57.4	Salta	34.8	55.5
Corrientes	26.2	41.1	San Juan	40.1	54.6
Chaco	23.1	38.4	San Luis	35.0	50.6
Chubut	33.3	56.1	Santa Cruz	39.7	68.8
Entre Ríos	33.4	52.2	Santa Fe	39.6	56.3
Formosa	24.3	46.2	Santiago del Estero	24.3	38.7
Jujuy	35.1	58.2	Tierra del Fuego	37.8	68.9
La Pampa	34.0	54.1	Tucumán	35.7	47.9
La Rioja	35.9	53.4			

Note: Age groups 13-18 years.

Source: National Census on Population and Housing, INDEC, 1980 and 1991.

The expansion of enrolment at the elementary level has been very significant in the last few years. The national average rate climbed ten percentage points, and for some education authorities growth was even greater. This is the case for the Río Negro Province,² with a rise of twenty-three points, and Tierra del Fuego, with a rise of thirty-one. Tierra del Fuego is a special case as, during this decade, the creation of a science park generated a process of economic prosperity which may account for the increased enrolment in secondary schools.

Unfortunately, this increase still varies considerably between regions. The province of Misiones has more than 60% of the sample group not enrolled at elementary school. This number is double the one for the Federal District Capital, and continued to be below the average rate for the 1980 census.

According to the statistics, four out of ten youngsters between 13 and 19 years of age do not attend elementary school. There are grounds for concluding that teenagers belonging to a family of manual or self-employed workers receive no elementary schooling. This exclusion deprives them of a socializing environment which genuinely meets their needs, and condemns them to start adult life at a very early age by joining the world of work (Llomovate, 1991). This early entry of adolescents into the labour market presages that in future many doors will be closed to them, in the economic, cultural and political fields.

As a result of the reduced services provided by public bodies responsible for social assistance, schools in urban areas, already suffering from the recession and its consequent unemployment, have gradually taken over these services, thus becoming welfare institutions more concerned with meeting claims for welfare benefit than fulfilling their teaching function.

Thus the national education system retains much of its ability to differentiate and classify the population by means of a nineteenth century approach that excludes the most disadvantaged social sectors.

Let us now consider what happens to those inside the system.

The qualitative outlook

In Argentina the prevailing curriculum in elementary schools since 1863 has not addressed pupils as individuals. Generally speaking, the official curricula reflected developments in each of the disciplines, rather than an attempt to match the skills taught with everyday social life.

How much of this is still in evidence today? How far has the attempt to reform progressed?

We shall try to answer by analysing curricula and school practices.

THE PRESCRIBED CURRICULUM

While reviewing provincial elementary curricula³ we found that many of them are based on the importance of the adolescent as a learning subject. One source for this reflection is the current psychology of learning (particularly in the context of the structuralism of Piaget), which emphasizes the need for knowledge to be meaningful to the learner. It is remarkable that there is hardly any mention of the cultural crisis of modernity, which calls for a redefinition of the cultural choices dictated by the school and their relationship with the adolescent's living environment, particularly since this environment seems to be increasingly permeated by new languages and values.⁴

One of the first questions to be reconsidered is how adolescents conceptualize. In most of the curricula studied, the psychological basis of learning relates to the unity of learning processes and, in some curricula, emphasis on the integrity of the individual personality reveals traces of religious rather than scientific thinking.

There are exceptions. One provincial curriculum, though devised on familiar if controversial lines, proposes a new cultural pluralism. Referring to a youth sub-culture and exchanges and conflicts between generations, it sees the teacher/pupil relationship (representatives of two generations) as communication and joint participation in the construction of both of their cultures. Learning becomes a constructive interaction of new perceptions of the realities of each, not the transmission of data from one recipient to the other. They are both 'learning subjects'.

As regards the integration of adolescent culture, a specially sensitive indicator is the teaching of language and literature, which traditionally insisted on the 'standard language' and recognized cultural codes, while colloquial and popular variations were rejected.⁵ Innovations of two main kinds have taken place: the adoption of the pupils' language of expression as a starting-point and as a valid form of expression guaranteeing the possibility of access to the standard language; and the inclusion of other non-written or not 'recognized' languages, such as audio-visual technology, comic strips, graffiti, etc. (Santiago & Pironio, 1994).

One provincial programme incorporates both novelties. In language and literature, more specifically under communication and expression, pupils work mainly on the comprehension and production of texts, including the literature of the province, children's literature and non-literary texts. The latter are very important, as they include non-academic texts such as graffiti, underground magazines,

literary supplements, rock lyrics, etc. Through them adolescent culture finds expression and takes its place as a local cultural product.

Adolescent speech is also a subject of study. Language and literature courses include an analysis of different styles, the language used by children, jokes, complimentary remarks to women or girls, graffiti, conversation, etc., as well as journalism, advertising and television usage.

Concurrently with access to the standard language, other innovations include recognition of the heterogeneous nature of the language code and the need to respect the pupils' colloquial speech. Emphasis is laid on the social function of the written language, and parsing, grammar and syntax are learned through comprehension and also by producing texts. The students work with different kinds of material, though these do not specifically include the mass media.

CLASSROOM PRACTICES

In a current FLACSO educational research project on teaching models and styles in general basic education in three Argentine provinces, we have made significant findings on the adolescent's place in the school. Pupils appear to be clearly integrated in the activity of the centres and daily life of the school, but in our view they often act as adults, with adult values and standards. At the same time, the adults usually allow them very little latitude for disagreement or overstepping the bounds, as this is immediately associated with danger. This form of participation in school life has been worked out in common by adults and pupils alike. Elementary schools tend to treat adolescents as children, as is evident from many activities that underestimate their knowledge and abilities. At both levels, the majority of teachers and school heads equate 'minors' with 'inferiors'.

When adults speak about their pupils, they concentrate on the learning of rules, both disciplinary and as regards appearance. Most of the rules of conduct drawn up by principals, teachers and pupils are chiefly concerned with discipline and manners, and these seem to be the crux for establishing relationships and settling conflicts. Likewise, in our informal conversations with students, these rules were the ones most frequently complained about. Most rules lay a greater burden of obligation on pupils than on adults. However, in many schools the idea of one law 'the same for all' is beginning to gain ground.

Defining the ideal pupil in terms of discipline or respect for the rules has several consequences that should be examined. One not very desirable but very perceptible consequence is that it produces citizens who accept uncritically the dictates of authority. This kind of education does not strengthen democracy, defined as both the acceptance of differences and otherness, and the exercise of public control over governments and authorities in order to prevent corruption and the abuse of power in contemporary societies (Donald, 1992). In our opinion, this way of training citizens takes no account of individual responsibility in a situa-

tion where there is a common agreement on a compromise, with a set of rules of the game. All that matters is to obey regulations.

Another important consequence of this perception of the ideal student is that it does not produce a productive relation with knowledge. One of our findings in the field, clearly confirming the correlation of 'discipline' and 'authority' with the acquisition of knowledge, is the use of the pencil more readily than the pen in primary and elementary schools. The question of whether to write in pencil or with a pen came up in many of the classes we visited at both levels. A third-year language and literature class provided us with a clue. A girl asked the teacher if she could answer the questionnaire in pencil rather than in pen and ink. The teacher asked her: 'Why, are you afraid?' The girl said 'yes' and the teacher, smiling, gave her permission to write in pencil. The idea of being 'afraid' is strange in a daily routine class, where there is no question of any kind of test. It seems to be a fear of *mistakes*, or rather a fear of *being seen to make mistakes*, fear of the written proof, of what leaves a trace since it cannot be totally erased. This happened again when pupils in the first and third year copied exercises. Although we repeated in the directions that we had no interest in the means by which they solved the problems, the children rarely chose to leave traces of their 'trials and errors'. They wrote in pencil, and deleted the intermediate steps.

It could be argued that the children's ability to introduce their own opinions and produce knowledge of their own is very much restricted due to prevailing teaching strategies and the children's experience of school, which undermines their self-confidence. Few of the classes observed made provision for pupils to work out their own way of solving problems. Nor was the practice of setting up peer groups for a more thorough study encouraged. Usually, the search for 'truth' by any avenue not pre-established by the teacher or the textbook becomes suspicious. The children also learn this, and tend to disapprove of mistakes and any traces of mistakes. Particularly in secondary schools, they constantly consult each other and circulate answers, not in a search for a collective knowledge but out of curiosity to see who 'guessed' or 'found' the only right answer. This behaviour seems to be present in all classes, irrespective of what the teacher does. In any case, teaching methods confirm pupils in this belief: they are frequently asked to complete a sentence with one word or phrase taken word-for-word from the textbook. The ability required is purely technical: to spot the corresponding words in the textbook. There is no room for a pluralistic vision of knowledge, for different interpretations or even for different forms of expression.

The way adolescence is conceptualized merits a paragraph by itself. In most elementary schools and the last grades of primary school, adolescence is associated with danger and risk. This is illustrated by the prevailing image of peer groups, which tends to restrict group work in classes. For instance, in a seventh-grade class in School 116, the school and the families agree that there will be no group work on special topics so as to avoid contact between the sexes. In an urban secondary school, there are no programmed researches by fifth-year pupils, for the reason that 'they are too young to go to the downtown library; the parents do not want them to go.'

What adolescents 'should be' is based on distrust of what they are. We quote from an exercise proposed by an education counsellor in one of the schools visited:

WHAT I AM AND WHAT I SHOULD BE

Objective: to study the problems of adolescence and suggest guidance for solutions.

A situation is described:

Juan, who is 14 years old, was watching television when his mother, as she was rushing to work, reminded him to: turn the television off and do his homework, take the food out of the refrigerator for his father when he comes back from work and take the washing off the line before he leaves.

Juan, engrossed by television, nodded as his mother left.

Time went by and when the film ended, Juan looked at his watch and gave a start, as he was late for school. He snatched up his books and ran.

That afternoon it rained heavily.

The following activities are proposed:

- Start a debate with the pupils on what they noted about Juan's attitudes.
- Write on the blackboard 'What we adolescents are'.
- After completing a list of attitudes, suggest a new column that reads: 'What we should be'.
- Compare the two columns and propose activities to correct any failings detected, for instance:
 - 'Be attentive in class'
 - 'Comply with the schedule'
 - 'Take home accurate information on what was said in school', etc.

The exercise might have led to a series of very pertinent questions for discussion with the adolescents, such as helping with household chores, the relationship with parents, the relation between in-school and out-of-school culture—all fundamental themes for adolescents in their search to be different from the adult world. Yet the exercise ends with rigid and stereotyped educational activities which are unlikely to enrich discussion of adolescents' problems, and will instead make them stick even more rigidly to their arguments.

In the third grade of a secondary school, we attended a language and literature class (School 123, third year):

TEACHER: What influence can peer groups have?

PUPIL: Positive and negative.

TEACHER: If you are in a group where the others smoke, go out to the amusement arcade and so on, then you are likely to acquire the habit of playing truant. If you are not exposed to it, you don't. So what should be done?

PUPIL: Choose carefully. (*A pupil laughs.*)

TEACHER: If you laugh, you must leave the room. I believe what we are talking about is important. A characteristic of adolescence is to laugh at serious things, and this is a symptom of insecurity.

In our view, this brief exchange captures many of the attitudes shown by a number of teachers when working with adolescents. They cast suspicion on peer groups; they talk about 'bad influences' and reduce the problems of adolescence to simplistic moralizing lessons. The reference to 'acquiring bad habits' could not stand up

to any adult criticism, but when used by the teacher in a classroom context, it becomes received wisdom. In this dialogue, the teacher does not admit that pupils can choose, disagree and/or agree, or develop their own strategies as regards consumption or trends. Everything is fitted into the same mould separating pupils into good and bad, moral and immoral. This will probably elicit equally stereotyped responses from the adolescents: either they accept what the teacher says, or they reject it and adopt an anti-school culture.

The laughter of a youngster, instead of being perceived as a sign of criticism or dissent, is immediately classified as an indication of immaturity or uncertainty. Discipline and teaching methods become built-in psychological assumptions. Adolescents are not taken seriously, but relegated to an inferior position from which they cannot escape except with the passage of time (when at long last they are grown up). Most teachers, and some pupils, build up an association of ideas beginning with computer games and continuing with dancing, entertainment, sex, drugs and AIDS. Thus adolescence is deemed to be a period where life itself is at risk. For instance, some pupils in School 127 justify strict discipline on the grounds that 'unfortunately we are adolescents, and we cannot be free to manage our lives, like grown-ups. Youngsters should be given freedom, but within well-defined limits.' They see adolescence as a 'difficult' age to be lived through, one which is full of dangers and should be subject to permanent adult control.⁶

But adolescents also complain that they are underestimated; and we can confirm many cases where they are treated as if they were young children. A pupil in fifth grade told us:

Today they taught us how to file folders in a shop. I'll show you, so that you can see how ridiculous it is. They told us that files can be in either a vertical or a horizontal position. We spent one hour writing this down. They think we are half-wits. What's worse, we waste time.

The underlying psychology seems to be a version, by stages, of Piaget: conceptualization or abstraction is something reached at the end of adolescence. Accordingly, the type of task most frequently required of pupils is to fill in boxes with sentences or words to be taken from a textbook. The creativity or intellectual activity required is more limited than in a conventional questionnaire (it is not even necessary for pupils to create sentences). For instance, in a guide on Crete (first-year history), one of the activities was 'paint a Cretan vase'. In a second-year language class, pupils were asked to use different colours and to underline words depending on their inflexion or word formation. Again, the emphasis is laid on a technical activity of little complexity that ends up being purely mechanical.

To sum up, despite the regeneration of schools and curricula, the place of adolescents at school is none the less defined primarily from a traditional cultural approach which associates them with inferiority and even classifies them as being at risk. This concept stems both from strategies devised by adults and from the way adolescents are forced to learn at school. This role of the school has serious consequences for their attitude to knowledge and their training as future citizens.

Conclusion

In today's society, the social fabric consists of a multitude of networks in which young people are integrated in accordance with a very great variety of individual attributes or social conditions. Each network includes or excludes in the light of its own criteria and parameters.

The mass media now constitute the network which has the greatest capacity to integrate youngsters in a shared cultural space. They also create a range of circuits which groups users according to cultural preferences, familiar language codes, levels of knowledge, critical ability, age, sex, etc. The tendency to recognize and separate out different cultures is inherent in the mass-media society.

The large-scale technological developments in the production of goods and services have created a labour market that is gradually leading to exclusion, generating a society divided between those who are employed, and thus have access to consumer markets, and those who are not, who go to swell the ranks of those excluded from society. Inside these two groups various situations are to be found. The first group includes those who have access to different forms of employment and consumption; and the second those who have recourse to a variety of survival strategies (self-employment, work on the black market, etc.).

The school, which has hitherto been the central agent in reproducing culture, creating spheres to which people belong culturally, recognizing different identities, and ratifying social structures in an order based on social background, has now in part ceded this social role to market forces.

Yet the exclusion of youngsters from the educational network continues to limit their possibilities of access to the employment and consumer markets, and to literate culture; without schooling they cannot learn computer languages and information technology, decode media messages targeted to their interests, or construct dialogues in the key required by the mass media.

Despite the fact that young people continue to be excluded from school, the present trend in the education system is to include and integrate, contrary to the prevailing trend in the employment and consumer markets today. As these markets are out of step with each other, the result is a growing category of young people who, although educated, are also excluded from the employment market.

The democratizing potential of school lies precisely in its ability to dispense knowledge and know-how, and train youngsters to compete in a progressively shrinking labour market. It also lies in its possibility of giving them the mental equipment to take a critical look at social reality and to become active participants in building an all-embracing social organization which will provide work and culture for all.

This critical faculty, and these skills, are not apparently being developed in Argentine schools, which remain firmly attached to a cultural model of standardization and discipline. Far from facilitating the integration of the great variety of cultures conveyed by the media (Vattimo, 1989) and by the pupils themselves, this model tends to reject them entirely from school.

Another point for consideration is the type of citizen that our schools are producing. It seems to be a low-profile citizen (O'Donnell, 1994) with reduced expectations and a propensity to accept the social order uncritically rather than to devise and construct alternatives; a citizen who is submissive to authority, rather than an individual accountable for the democratic significance of the functioning of social institutions.

For the children of the people, school remains a citadel that has still to be captured. This means more than simply securing a place; it also comprises a demand for change that will make school the sphere for the appropriation of contemporary culture.

Notes

1. Particularly where State education covered vast areas, as was the case with countries in the Southern Cone.
2. Río Negro was precisely a province which carried out an important reform of the curriculum for that level. It seems that the efforts of the provincial government in allocating financial and human resources resulted in major increases in school enrolment (see Braslavsky, et al., 1992).
3. The Argentine Republic is a federal one and responsibility for the actual running of the education system devolves on each provincial state.
4. By this we do not mean that adolescent culture is entirely post-modern, or that teachers are at the opposite end of the spectrum. Far from being monolithic, adolescent culture is shared by various social groups, styles, nationalities and converging circumstances. However, adolescents are certainly more familiar with the new technologies and values than are adults who were brought up in a different culture. In any case, this idea emerges from an extensive debate between specialists, well introduced in Grossberg (1989).
5. Let us look, for instance, at what the province of Buenos Aires proposes for this subject for the second grade:
 1. Oral language: conversation, exposition, narration, objective and subjective description of reality. Reading aloud. Reading drama.
 2. Language and literature: literary text. Styles: the narrative style; different styles. The story, drama.
 3. Written expression: vocabulary. Punctuation and intonation signs. Spelling rules. Narration, description. Dialogue, letters, applications and commercial letters, reports.
 4. Grammar: sentences and clauses. Compound sentences. Irregular verbs in frequent use. Impersonal and defective verbs. Verb classification. Pronouns.
6. This is common to most Argentine elementary schools and is also found in other parts of the world. See the article by Rubiy Takanishi, 'Changing views of adolescence in contemporary society' in the special issue of *Teacher's college record* (New York), no. 3, 1993 on 'Adolescence in the 1990's: risk and opportunity', which discusses this idea of adolescence as a risk group but proposes instead the idea that it is an age of opportunities.

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TRENDS / CASES

MONOCULTURALISM IN TRANSITION:

THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

AND OPPORTUNITIES OF FINNISH

INTERNATIONALIZATION

Glyn Hughes

Introduction

Teacher education students at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland, who are selected for and successfully complete a fifteen-credit package of studies in 'English as a Foreign Language', are entitled to teach English in the Finnish elementary school system (grades 2 to 6). In recent years this package of English courses, known as 'English special studies', has come to reflect the increasingly instrumental role of English, both in the wider world (Phillipson, 1992) and in the Finnish school system itself (Hirvi, 1994). The trend towards English as a medium of instruction has meant a major reassessment of teaching objectives and the inclusion of a more obviously global and multicultural perspective in course content and delivery.

At the same time, a module in 'International education' has established itself at Jyväskylä as an essential and uncontested component of pre-service teacher education (Liikanen, 1993). Given the pressures for rationalization and amalgamation in Finnish higher education, the combining of 'English special studies' and 'International education' seemed an obvious next step. The administrative arrangements for this fusion are well-advanced and from third quarter 1995, some eight to ten students will be selected annually for this new thirty-five credit integrated language teaching and international education programme.

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This article has two main purposes. First, it attempts to see the above mentioned programme developments in the wider context of the social and political changes taking place in Finland. In order to understand these changes more fully from an international perspective, I have sought to make comparisons with other countries that have a longer tradition of implementing a multicultural policy, particularly Canada.¹ Two books have been especially valuable in this respect and form the basis of many of the arguments presented here: Augie Fleras and Jean Elliott's 'The challenge of diversity: multiculturalism in Canada' (Fleras & Elliott, 1992) and Cameron McCarthy's 'Race and curriculum: social inequality and the theories and politics of difference in contemporary research on schooling' (McCarthy, 1990).

The article's second purpose is to present a tentative curriculum framework for developing joint language and international education courses, drawing from Michael Byram's cultural studies and language teaching (Byram, Esarte-Sarries & Taylor, 1990). Despite the fact that the context of my work differs substantially from that assumed in these three key texts, I shall endeavour to apply the insights gained from them in identifying realistic professional opportunities for enhancing intercultural awareness.

In order to reconcile the organizational and societal differences determining my work with the multicultural problematics that characterize the key texts, I propose the mediating concept of internationalization. Internationalization will be discussed as an incipient or nascent form of multiculturalism. Within this conceptual and practical framework, commonalities between Canada and Finland will be more accessible. The notion of internationalization will also facilitate an approach rooted in the key curricular and methodological opportunities of foreign language teaching. Throughout the discussion, the key texts will be used as points of reference to identify potential and actual problems in the process and practice of internationalization. The end result will hopefully be a feasible curriculum framework for promoting internationalization within foreign language teaching. Simultaneously, foreign language teaching will be put at the forefront of those educational forces working for awareness, understanding, tolerance and solidarity in intercultural and interethnic relations.

Finland and internationalization

The term 'internationalization', although recognizable and acceptable English, is used here as a translation of the Finnish word '*kansainvälistyminen*'. Related words in Finnish are '*kansainvälistyä*' (to become internationalized) and '*kansainvälisyys*' (internationalism). The Finnish term is also often used to refer to 'global education' or 'education for international understanding', as in, for example, Liikanen (1993). I use it here to refer to an opening-up process, the lifting of both physical and psychological frontiers. I see internationalization as an incipient, fledgling version of multiculturalism that characterizes traditionally monocultural societies. Where Canada uses multiculturalism as an official policy for managing diversity, Finland

sees internationalization as an informal policy for adjusting to diversity, as a rationalization of global, homogeneity-threatening external influences.

Internationalization has distinct social, political, economic and educational dimensions. In Finland, the word has secured a place both in political discourse and the popular imagination. Just as multiculturalism has had a major multi-dimensional impact in Canada, internationalization is fast becoming the new transitional ideological dynamic in determining the pattern of Finland's future. As a possible metaphor in shaping Finland's identity, internationalization is the subject of intense national debate. There is no consensus on how internationalization will take place, how long the process will last or what an internationalized society will look like once the process is complete. For some the concept encompasses freer access to markets following the political settlement with the European Union; for others it means a greater variety of cheaper food and more diverse personal contacts. Intense doubt characterizes the debate: Will internationalization dilute Finnish identity? Will Finnish cities fall victim to the same racial conflicts that have erupted in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom?

In order to demonstrate the validity of internationalization as a meaningful approach, it is now necessary to consider recent political, economic and social developments in Finland. We begin with a brief profile of the country and then examine manifestations of and contradictions in the process of Finnish internationalization.

A PROFILE OF FINLAND

Finland is a country of some 5 million people situated in Northeast Europe. It shares common borders with Sweden, Norway and Russia. The country has a high standard of living, in part due to the preferential trading agreements with the former USSR which boosted Finland's economy during the 1970s and 1980s. Restructuring and the realities of the recession, however, have impacted the country's economic growth, and youth unemployment is approaching 20%. Finland has a long tradition of social democracy and its history is unmarred by any imperialist or colonialist ventures. Most Finns consider Finland as a classless society and would probably cite tolerance, equality and a sense of social justice as key Finnish values. Some 7% of the population are Swedish-speaking and the country has two official languages. There are also minority groups of Sami (Lapps) and Gypsies. In times of hardship, Finns have traditionally emigrated to Sweden and North America in search of a better life. Apart from resettling thousands of refugees from Karelia during the Second World War, Finland has not had to cope with major influxes of immigrants.

THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

With the break-up and decline of its eastern neighbour, the USSR, Finland was both able and obliged to expand existing European markets for its goods and to

reformulate its own position in the broader scheme of international politics. The economic and political vacuum left by the USSR was conveniently filled by the European Union (EU). In a referendum held in the third quarter of 1994, 57% of those Finns who cast votes were in favour of Finland joining the European Union. In January 1995, the country duly took its place alongside Sweden and Austria as new members of the EU. The economic and political obligations ensuing from membership will signify that Finland has abandoned its traditional stance as a neutral buffer between East and West, and that it has now firmly aligned itself with the future of Western Europe.

Partly as a result of media hype, and undoubtedly supported by corporate vested interests, 'Euro' has become the preferred prefix for any venture that supposedly embodies modernity, progressiveness and economic advantage. While preparing itself for the promised deluge of benefits in 1995, Finland was also adjusting the laws that traditionally restricted foreign competition and ownership of land, property and business enterprises. Foreign nationals who have been resident for a specific period are now entitled to vote in municipal elections.

Education, too, is reflecting incipient internationalization. Student-mobility schemes, such as ERASMUS, TEMPUS, COMETT and LINGUA, provide extensive funding and practical support that will allow an increasing percentage of European students to complete a part of their studies abroad. In 1993/94, for example, some 1,000 Finnish students pursued studies in other EU member states under ERASMUS (Centre for International Mobility, 1995). Such programmes will continue to attract large numbers of applications and by the year 2000 it is envisaged that the studies of 40% of all students will include a period abroad. Foreign-language teaching programmes, traditionally dominated by English, are diversifying with German experiencing an increase in popularity to reflect long-standing historical links and the growing status of Germany as the economic hub of Europe. English will retain its importance in school programmes not only as an international *lingua franca* but also as a medium of instruction for other subjects (Kauranne, 1991; Räsänen & Marsh, 1994). School exchanges, cultural visits and class e-mail projects are also signs of widening educational horizons.

The Euro-mentality has already translated itself into more diversified and individualistic lifestyles. The predilection for package holidays in southern Europe, North America and Asia has been matched by a taste for 'ethnic' foods. Non-Finnish films have always been shown in their original language with Finnish subtitles, but now cable and satellite television networks provide a multiplicity of European channels—allowing avid linguists, for example, to sample their 11 o'clock evening news in Finnish, Swedish, English, Russian, German, French, Italian or Spanish. Foreign newspapers and magazines abound and the number of Finnish translations of foreign books continues to increase (Table 1).

TABLE 1. Translations of books into Finnish from other languages, 1982–90.

Year	English	French	Russian	German	Scandinavian languages	Other	Total
1982	460	38	28	109	183	82	994
1985	522	44	26	96	159	66	1045
1988	859	68	60	117	226	144	1624
1990	942	93	40	132	250	159	1759

Source: *Yearbook of Nordic statistics*. Copenhagen, Nordic Council of Ministers, various years.

As of 31 December 1990, Finland's population of 4.99 million included 26,555 (0.53%) who were not Finnish citizens. This percentage is the lowest of all European countries except Albania and, as Table 2 demonstrates, a small fraction of the foreign population in other Scandinavian countries. The population of the twelve pre-1995 nations of the European Union included 4% of foreign nationals. Germany had 3.5 million aliens (5.7%) with 25% of them from Turkey alone.

TABLE 2. Number of aliens in Scandinavian countries, end of 1990.

Country	Total population	Aliens	Percent
Denmark	5 146 469	160 641	3.12
Finland	4 998 478	26 255	0.53
Norway	4 249 830	143 304	3.38
Sweden	8 590 630	483 704	5.63

Source: *Yearbook of Nordic statistics*. Copenhagen, Nordic Council of Ministers, various years.

The figures in a way reflect the international image of Finland until the 1980s. It was remote, cold and not seen as a land of opportunity. As a neighbour of the USSR, its political neutrality was occasionally misinterpreted, giving rise to the concept of Finlandization. Until recently, emigration rather than immigration has characterized population movements. Immigrant numbers have stabilized around 10,000 (Table 3), although up to 50% of these immigrants may be so-called 'returning migrants'—Finns who emigrated to Sweden or North America in leaner years and who are now returning to Finland for nostalgic reasons or to ensure a Finnish-language education for their children.

TABLE 3. Number of immigrants to Scandinavian countries and Canada, 1985–89.

Year	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden	Canada
1985	31 633	10 465	21 858	33 134	84 302
1988	35 051	9 720	29 964	51 092	161 929
1989	38 391	11 219	25 847	65 866	212 166

Source: *Yearbook of Nordic statistics*. Copenhagen, Nordic Council of Ministers, various years. Canadian Immigration Statistics from *Employment and immigration Canada*. 1986–90, Ottawa, Employment and Immigration.

Despite its self-confessed compassion and humanitarianism, expressed most clearly in a commitment to child welfare and a high level of free social, educational and health services, Finland has not traditionally been seen as a welcoming and

safe, or even permanent, haven for refugees (Hunnisett & Pennanen, 1991). Policy has concentrated on a quota for refugees, who were often selected as a political gesture. Chilean and Vietnamese refugees, for example, were amongst the first to be settled in Finland, although many of the former have since resettled in Spain. As Table 4 indicates, Finland's record in this respect leaves something to be desired and it is only as a result of international pressure, particularly from other Scandinavian countries, that there have been improvements in recent years. There is now a substantial backlog of asylum applications awaiting official processing.

TABLE 4. Asylum applicants and quota refugees in the Scandinavian countries, 1984–90.

Year	Denmark		Finland		Sweden		Norway	
	Asylum	Quota	Asylum	Quota	Asylum	Quota	Asylum	Quota
1984	4 312	154	15	57	12 000	1 210	300	292
1987	2 726	283	46	126	18 114	1 457	8 613	786
1990	5 292	747	2 743	639	24 420	1 455	3 962	973

Source: 1992 yearbook of Nordic statistics. Copenhagen, Nordic Statistical Secretariat, 1992.

The national conscience has also been pricked by events that receive massive media coverage, for example, the plight of people in the former Yugoslavia and the famine in the Horn of Africa. Overseas aid and development assistance have been key themes in consciousness-raising, but here again Finland has lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbours. (Table 5).

TABLE 5. Official assistance to developing countries as a percentage of Gross National Product, 1981–90.

Year	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
1981	0.73	0.27	0.85	0.83
1984	0.85	0.35	1.03	0.80
1987	0.88	0.49	1.09	0.88
1990	0.93	0.64	1.17	0.90

Source: 1992 yearbook of Nordic statistics. Copenhagen, Nordic Statistical Secretariat, 1992.

Refugees to Finland are provided with high-quality and professional reception and integration services, administered by the Finnish Red Cross and local municipalities under the Ministry of Social Services. The municipalities can themselves decide whether they wish to receive refugees. In return for their commitment, they receive a budget grant for the housing and social services provided for refugees and their families. The municipalities are also responsible for arranging education, including Finnish language training and vocational courses. The extent of present provision contrasts sharply with official attitudes of just a few years ago when, for example, Koivukangas wrote: 'The primary objective of Finnish refugee policy is to provide people with the opportunity to return to their own country; . . . only as a third resort should relocation be made to highly developed countries such as Finland' (1989, p. 3; cited in Hunnisett & Pennanen, 1991, p. 217).

Considerations of pragmatic expediency rather than a rebirth of altruism may have motivated the recent changes in refugee policy. Finland's demographic projections (Table 6) suggest an increasingly sharp decline in the country's total population after the year 2000, coupled with a parallel explosion in the number of pensioners. Sweden, on the other hand, would seem to have assured itself of an adequate tax-base to guarantee the continuing provision of social services. The more flexible arrangements for the granting of temporary residence and work permits to Estonians—traditionally seen as close ethnic and linguistic relatives—for work on farms and in hospitals in Finland may also be economically motivated. That such arrangements are now possible may be a signal that labour market segmentation in Finland is moving into a new phase with important implications for the composition of the work force in the future.

TABLE 6. Population projections for Finland and Sweden (in thousands), 1995–2030.

Country	Year	0–14 yrs.	%	15–64 yrs.	%	65+ yrs.	%	Total
Finland	1995	957.8	19.7	3 394.7	66.8	725.9	14.3	5 078.4
	2010	875.5	16.3	3 400.0	66.9	850.6	16.8	5 076.1
	2030	749.5	15.7	2 879.7	60.3	1 142.9	23.9	4 771.9
Sweden	1995	1 672.9	19.0	5 586.7	63.5	1 535.5	17.5	8 795.1
	2010	1 655.2	18.1	5 848.9	63.8	1 663.0	18.1	9 166.7
	2030	1 736.4	18.3	5 832.6	61.4	1 937.9	20.4	9 506.9

Source: 1992 yearbook of Nordic statistics. Copenhagen, Nordic Statistical Secretariat, 1992.

In summary, then, there has clearly been some opening-up of Finland's geographical and administrative frontiers, accompanied by changes in lifestyle. At all levels there has been some serious soul-searching on the approaching reality, benefit and consequences of European and global integration. In a sense, at least with regard to the European Union, internationalization became a popular economic and conceptual signpost that the government interpreted as a mandate to push forward with its European integrationist policies and seek membership of the EU.

Although internationalization, defined as nascent multiculturalism, is proposed as a model that will allow parallels to be drawn between Finland and Canada, the fit is far from perfect. The ideological perspectives that mark the multicultural debate in Canada are inapplicable to Finland at this stage of the internationalizing process. Issues related to employment equity, the prioritization of culture or equality in shaping multicultural policy, and the relative advantages of assimilation and integration are largely out of awareness in Finland. Given the persisting homogeneity of Finnish society, the debate of such issues would be premature. Notions of peaceful coexistence, cultural relativism and interethnic harmony permeate school curricula, but there is (as yet) no pressing urgency or even relevant forum for the discussion of these issues, nor indeed, for many Finns, any empirical experience of them on a day-to-day basis. There are no political moves afoot to enshrine multicultural principles in political legislation, merely adjustments to simplify the processing of asylum and work permit applications. Nothing correspond-

ing to the Canadian debate on redefining citizenship (Kymlicka, 1992) has occurred. No popular symbol, equivalent to the Canadian mosaic or American melting-pot, has been created to encapsulate the new internationalist self-image Finland seeks, although the frequently used images of 'opening windows' and 'building bridges' perhaps betray the unidirectional interpretation of internationalization that is predominant in the thinking of most Finns.

THE AMBIVALENCE OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

In the light of the above, it would be fair to claim that the sincerity of Finnish internationalization has never been put to the test on home territory, or to suggest that this test is only just beginning. A number of developments support this claim. The nation was clearly divided over the issue of EU membership, with the rifts emphasizing traditional north-south and urban-rural animosities. The once overwhelming popular support for EU membership declined as each stage of negotiations was initiated or as each month's jobless statistics were published. The debate produced new political pressure groups reflecting some of the non-synchronization of the issues: environmentalists, fearing the destruction of Europe's last wildernesses, joined with feminists and trade unionists committed to protecting levels of social services; farmers, their livelihood and way of life threatened by the multinational agri-business, took their protests to the steps of the Parliament Building in Helsinki. There was a feeling that, under the veil of European integration, major neo-liberalist, socioeconomic changes were being engineered, reminiscent of the 'conservative restoration' and 'radical intensification of neo-conservative offensives' cited by McCarthy (1990, p. ix). The parallel with recent developments in North America is not difficult to draw.

Despite now being a full member of the EU, Finland may still have some way to go in psychologically adjusting to its new status. There are signs that attitudes towards immigrants and refugees are polarizing. The levels of financial assistance given to refugees are considered overgenerous and the 'letters to the editor' sections of newspapers, both national and local, more often than not include an impassioned appeal by 'an ordinary Finn' or 'patriot' asking for fair and just treatment in the country that his father and grandfather fought for. With rising unemployment, particularly amongst school-leavers, stories of preferential treatment for non-Finns, often of African or Asian origin, are given extensive media coverage.

It would be difficult to demonstrate the existence of systemic racism in Finnish society since the system has been challenged so infrequently. For the average Finn racism is what characterizes South Africa, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Finns are not racists because they try to be friendly towards immigrants. Awareness of the subtlety of new racism, referred to as 'democratic racism' by Henry (1993), is minimal. There have been instances of racially-motivated attacks and discriminatory behaviour, but these have been as yet few in number (Hunnissett & Pennanen, 1991). Young male refugees from Somalia have frequently borne the brunt of citizens' discontent. Russian and Estonian workers,

for their part, are likely to be held responsible for the rise in crime in Finland and, indeed, for many of the social problems that affect the country. Outgroup derogation, as Bar-Tal (1989) warns, is the initial stage of delegitimization.

Finnish ambivalence towards the practical consequences of internationalization mirrors the schizophrenic character of multiculturalism in Canada that was revealed in several of the attitudinal surveys discussed by Fleras and Elliott (1992, p. 119). One explanation for this increasing disparity between official policy and individual attitudes may be found in what Myrdal has termed 'the American dilemma', defined by Graumann and Wintermantel (1989, p. 187) as 'the conflict between the belief in the liberal and egalitarian ideals of a modern Western democracy, on the one hand, and individual or group interests, jealousies, anxieties, impulses, and prejudices with respect to one's own and one's own group's superiority, on the other hand.' There are components of this definition that could be applied to the Finnish situation. I would suggest, however, that in the case of Finland we are witnessing 'the internationalist dilemma'.

Whereas the multiculturalist experiment in Canada is based on the 'yet unproven assumption that national unity and social cohesion can be moulded by integrating differences into a societal framework' (Fleras & Elliott, 1992, p. 2), Finland's internationalization is faced with a similarly unproven and seemingly paradoxical assumption: namely, that a nation can assume the role of both a majority and a minority society simultaneously. This is a key issue and requires further clarification.

As a supposedly enlightened Western democracy, Finland is accepting its obligation to take increasing responsibility for the disadvantaged of this world. Its hospitality, or willingness to perform the role of hosting or dominant society, is reflected in the undeniable expertise and commitment that now underlie the country's refugee settlement and acculturation policies. It is also seen in a new awareness of the human and cultural enrichment that will accrue to Finland as a result. As a host, fulfilling its international obligations, the country also sees itself as a full player on the international stage where it is possible to assert Finnish values and enhance national identity in a conspicuous way. Furthermore, Finland's new citizens will acquire these same majority values in a benign way, confirming the integrity, validity and immutability of Finnish norms.

On the other hand, Finland has entered the European Union as a nation of a mere 5 million people. The borders that have been the cause of so much blood-letting throughout history will be opened up as the free movement of goods, people and services becomes a reality. Will Finland go as an equal and respected partner in a unique political experiment? Will the country's own distinctively Finnish environmental and social awareness have any impact on the decision-making processes of the European parliament? Or is a once proud nation to become the obsequious and dominated servant of remote masters in Brussels? Will anonymous EU directives deprive the country of its territorial and political self-determination? And will this external subjugation be accompanied by more subtle sabotage operating

within Finnish society itself and undermining the essence of 'Finnishness', a word that has increasingly become a patriotic rallying call?

There is, then, a clear dichotomy which is reflected in changing attitudes both to the European Union and to Finland's new immigrants. The rise of new political parties and pressure groups in the aftermath of the EU referendum suggests that the debate is far from over. Finnish identity, primarily expressed through language and culture, is perceived to be at risk. The insidious influence of the English language and a North American lifestyle are loudly bemoaned, but equally eagerly pursued. On the one hand, circumstances now allow the essence of national identity to be made known more widely. On the other, the traditional values and meaningful components of national self-image are seen as intolerably vulnerable to forces operating both from within Finnish society and from without. In a sense, Finland is simultaneously experiencing both sides of the Canadian multicultural problem. Where white, anglo-conformist Canada sees multiculturalism as a threat to quintessentially Canadian values, Finns regard internationalization as a possible prelude to extinction; where visible minority Canada seeks to employ multiculturalism to attain equality of status and cultural recognition, Finns go cap-in-hand to Europe in search of acceptance. Overhanging this dilemma and adding to the schizophrenia is the uncertainty surrounding the future of Finland's eastern neighbour: social unrest, hardship and political changes could mobilize a flood of migrants to the West. The reactions of Finland's indigenous Swedish-speaking and Sami minorities are also an unpredictable element of the unrolling scenario.

Liebkind (1989), in developing a social conflict theoretical model to describe minority identity, suggests that majority and minority identities can be both secure and insecure, both positive and negative. Present-day Finland would certainly typify this painful duality, exemplified perhaps in the Finnish habit of scanning the world's press for flattering references to themselves.

Much of the internationalist debate has now moved from purely economic considerations to questions related to visions of Finnish society and the preservation of traditional values and forms of cultural self-expression. Membership in the EU may well involve economic benefits ultimately promoting individual prosperity, but an increasingly common belief is that it will be at the cost of law (infiltration by organized crime) and order (open racial conflict).

Education for internationalization

The purpose of the previous sections has been to justify the comparison drawn between internationalization and multiculturalism as powerful social dynamics, and to highlight the nature of the dilemmas produced by each in Finland and Canada. Just as Fleras and Elliott (1992, p. 108–9) can claim that 'Canadians are fond of paying lip service to diversity, but frequently withdraw their support when specific programs are proposed that infringe on the status quo', we can point to the ambivalent attitudes of Finns towards the opening-up process. There is genuine and widespread concern over the possible social consequences and personal costs

of both joining the EU and settling larger numbers of immigrants, particularly visible minority refugees (Lander, 1991).

The nature of the Finnish dilemma involves the reconciling of dual roles—dominant and dominated—reflected in the coexistence of preservative/transformational and inward-/outward-looking attitudes. The dilemma can also be seen in terms of simultaneous acculturation processes: Finns assisting immigrants to adjust to life in Finland while themselves adapting to a larger Europe. If, for example, we consider Fleras and Elliott's (1992, p. 56–59) five assumptions that supposedly underpin multiculturalist ideology and apply them to Finland's internationalization, the ambivalence and duality of Finnish preoccupations and concerns becomes clear (Table 7).

TABLE 7. Finland's duality of roles vis-à-vis internationalization.

	Dominant role	Dominated role
Ideological basis for multiculturalism (Fleras & Elliott)	Finland as cultural host Acculturation of minorities	Finland as cultural guest Acculturation to majority
Endorsement of cultural diversity	Minorities as enrichment Diversity as a new Finnish value	Recognition of Finnish contributions to European culture Finland's biculturalism and bilingualism
Equality based on unity within diversity	Acknowledgment of cultural background Equality as an institutional and personal response	Full and equal access to decision making
Cultural relativism	Equality and inherent validity of minority (Sami, Gypsy, immigrant) cultures	Recognition of aspects of Finnishness (for example, communication styles)
Security of identity	Enhancement of minority self-esteem through heritage, language and culture education	Territorial integrity Recognition of Finland's neutrality Promotion and protection of the Finnish language
Active management of diversity	Race relations education Social and economic benefits for minorities Defining of citizenship	Adequate subsidies for Finnish agriculture Subsidies for Finnish literature and arts Defining of European citizenship

Source: Fleras & Elliott, 1992, p. 56–59.

Finnish approaches to education for internationalization (international understanding) also reflect these internal tensions. There is a sincere and visible commitment to implementing the environmental, global and peace education goals that permeate the national and local curricula for elementary (7 to 13 years), secondary (13 to 16), senior secondary (16 to 18), tertiary and adult education (see, for example, Kyllönen, 1984; Kalela, 1982; Allahwerdi, 1979). Textbooks in all

curriculum areas deal explicitly or implicitly with global issues at appropriate levels of sophistication (Finland, 1994). Formal materials are supplemented by particular international events (for example, United Nations Day), thematic weeks, displays, performances, ethnic menus, pen-friend schemes and cultural visits. This approach, with its clearly outward-looking orientation, corresponds to Fleras and Elliott's category of multicultural education as enrichment (1992, p. 190), or to the cultural understanding model of McCarthy (1990, p. 42). The same approach, based on an attenuated contact hypothesis model (Allport, 1954), also characterizes international education in Finnish preservice teacher education (Liikanen, 1993), where the emphasis, at least superficially, appears to be on producing empathetic and nostalgic descriptions of remote—geographically or chronologically—cultures (Plains Indians, Mayan, Palestinians): a kind of cultural voyeurism. McCarthy (1990, p. 46), citing other studies, criticizes such approaches for their monolithic depiction of race and culture. Fleras and Elliott (1992, p. 191) also point out the potential dangers of this simplistic approach. Given the essentially monocultural homogeneity of Finnish society, prevailing values are never under serious threat and minority values, observed fleetingly and incompletely, exist only in the pedagogical equivalent of hyperspace or virtual reality.

This supposedly outward-looking implementation of international education is complemented by an inward-looking approach, which brings the internationalist dilemma into even sharper relief. The compulsory course in international education taken by teacher education students at the University of Jyväskylä has traditionally included a major component which investigates Finnish culture and Finnishness. The course has in fact formed the basis of a wider research project (Liikanen, 1991; Illman et al., 1992; Lerkkanen, 1993). The focus, as reflected in the titles of the research reports, is clearly placed on the important notion of security in ethnic and linguistic identity. With some slight exaggeration, it might appear that there are elements in the course that it would be tempting to classify as a 'cultural deficit' approach: reinforcing an insecure national self-image before tackling the mainstream of European culture. It is difficult to succinctly capture the present mood of Finnish ethnicity in the 1990s. Ideas of 'surrendered identity' or 'compromised identity' come to mind as they go some way towards describing the emphatic commitment in present-day education to reinforcing national identity.

The reasons for an emphasis on security in identity are not hard to find. In attempting a description of the contents of Finnish national identity, Lander (1991, p. 243) points to three major changes in the concept of Finnishness: (a) the shift from a sense of being of Eastern origin to an emphasis on Western ties, particularly with the other Nordic countries; (b) a move from poverty, struggle and survival to prosperity and security; and (c) a relinquishing of marginality and isolation for active neutrality and bridge building. These are the social, political and economic dimensions of self-image and reveal a society undergoing a major metamorphosis. There may again be Canadian parallels. The national self-image also has a human, individual component that Lehtonen (1993, p. 18) captures in his Finnish

autostereotype: industrious, envious, shy, honest, prejudiced, stiff, tough, blunt, selfish and self-satisfied.

The idea that 'confidence in one's cultural tradition is a step forward in fostering positive outgroup attitudes' (Fleras & Elliott, 1992, p. 5) underlies much of what Jyväskylä's undergraduate teachers receive as education for international understanding. The approach, though in itself presumably valid, overlooks fundamental issues of institutional and attitudinal change within Finnish society itself and within the broader structure of the capitalist system. The implications of seeing teacher education as a further normative 'site for the production and reproduction of social identities' (McCarthy, 1990, p. 8) are not considered. The approach also substantially neglects problems of language education despite the ready availability of examples from Sweden (Toukomaa & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1987) and Canada (Cummins & Danesi, 1990) indicating that educational failure is linguistic failure; it even fails to sensitize students to the biases, stereotyping and subliminal racism that still pervade the media.

Language teaching for internationalization

In reviewing the various curriculum models of multicultural education, McCarthy (1990, p. 47) devotes a section to the cultural competence model which is based on the 'fundamental assumption that values of cultural pluralism should have a central place in the school curriculum.' As McCarthy makes plain, the model is interpreted differently by its various proponents, but it contains certain key elements that, incorporated into an appropriate area of curriculum, would appear to offer a solution to the Finnish internationalist dilemma. The following quotations from McCarthy reveal the appropriateness of the model. In each case, Finland's position as dominant or minority culture is deliberately left ambivalent:

teachers [should] help students develop ethnic identities, knowledge about different cultural groups ... and competence in more than one cultural system (p. 48)

By integrating the language and culture of a plurality of ethnic groups into the curriculum, proponents argue that teachers can help to 'build bridges ...' (p. 48)

... such cross-cultural interaction will contribute to reduced antagonism between majority and minority ethnic groups (p. 49)

proponents of models of cross-cultural competence valorize minority cultural heritage and argue for the meaningful inclusion of aspects of minority culture (p. 49)

While acknowledging the deficiencies of the model as an instrument for fundamental social reconstruction or reform in multicultural societies, we should nevertheless recognize its relevance—at the level of the individual—to the particular situation described at the start of this paper, i.e., a fifteen credit package of specialized studies in English for prospective elementary school teachers in a country undergoing internationalization. In the following sections I examine the suitability of English special studies as a context for international education. The relevance of

McCarthy's discussion will perhaps be clearer following an examination of the pioneering work in the field of cultural studies carried out by Michael Byram and his associates (Byram, Esarte-Sarries & Taylor, 1990).

FOREIGN CULTURES AND LANGUAGE TEACHING

Despite the considerable theoretical importance attributed to culture in foreign language learning, Byram suggests that there is as yet no systematic practice of culture teaching. The reason, he claims, is that research has concentrated on the definition of principles and on staking out the field's own boundary markers (exceptions are Buttjes, 1981, and Seelye, 1984). Empirical research has been limited in quantity and scope, which is reflected in teachers' uncertainty about, for example, the selection of suitable cultural materials or the role of grammatical competence in a culture-based classroom. Apart from underlining the individual human and social benefits of an integrated culture-language learning experience, Byram bases his prioritization of culture in foreign language teaching on a number of factors: successful international communication is not the application of purely linguistic skills; many pupils nowadays are unlikely to pursue their language studies beyond compulsory education, i.e., the student profile has changed radically and modern approaches emphasize the need for contextualization by reference to probable use situations. Foreign language teaching is also a key component in preparing young people for life in a multiply-connected society.

The results of what is known as the Durham Project, a large scale investigation of various aspects of foreign language teaching in the United Kingdom, go some way towards filling this empirical gap. The project, initiated in 1985, bore the provisional Economic and Social Research Council title of 'The effect of language teaching on young people's perceptions of other cultures'. The main focus was on secondary-level language teaching and specifically on the cultural component, which consists of 'all that pupils learn or acquire in terms of knowledge, information, attitudes and perceptions with respect to one or more foreign countries and peoples whilst they are participating in language lessons' (Byram, Esarte-Sarries & Taylor, 1990, xi).

The quantitative analysis of ethnocentricity data revealed a preference for Americans over the French and Germans. Their popularity, Byram suggests, derives from assumed ethnic and linguistic commonalities, coupled with greater media exposure. The background variables of gender, school class and age were more significantly associated with pupils' attitudes than were the experiential variables (experience of language learning within the family, having relatives of other linguistic backgrounds, experience of travel in other countries). The data indicated that experience of France did not in itself ameliorate attitudes towards the French, thus underlying the importance of the quality of the foreign contact.

In describing the out-of-school sources of their perceptions and attitudes, primary school pupils often referred to siblings or to the travel experience of siblings. Byram was surprised at the durable and profound effect of chance comments from

relatives or friends, comments which often contained inaccurate or incomplete information. It is against this background that initial French teaching takes place, thus requiring an approach based on the cultural images that children bring with them. In fact, Byram emphasizes that pupils' impressions at all levels are constituted from a network of extramural influences above and beyond the textbook and formal instruction.

In their ten-month monitoring of the culturally-focused activities of the language teaching classroom, Byram and his team used ethnographic approaches and avoided any *a priori* categorization or observation schedules. Their aim was to describe cultural content and to compare teachers in terms of their culture-teaching styles. Using two parameters (verbal-material, and implicit-explicit), Byram identified four types of cultural information. Explicit-verbal information, for example, would be any talk or written text describing France or the French way of life; implicit-material information might take the form of exposure to visuals or realia as part of a language-based exercise.

Follow-up interviews with teachers examined individual approaches to and justifications for including cultural content. The general impression was that such information was presented opportunistically and based very much on individual teachers' personal experiences. This was the approach they actually preferred. Teachers also felt that there was no central core of information they had to communicate. In explaining their commitment to cultural content, teachers generally believed that exposure to French culture would increase pupils' tolerance and widen their horizons, but an equally frequent reason for including background way-of-life information was that it helped to balance lesson content and maintain interest.

The exhaustive textbook analysis included in this part of the survey was highly critical. The perspective is almost invariably that of the tourist-consumer, struggling to survive in an alien (and inferior?) environment where people never work but merely eat, travel and relax. Byram criticizes this approach and also the 'Royal Visit' image of France that is conveyed: everything runs with regal precision and people are 'attractive, smiling and helpful' (Byram, Esarte-Sarries & Taylor, 1990, p. 316). Risager (1990) has argued very strongly in favour of realistic cultural studies that convey an accurate picture of the people and the normality of their interpersonal relations. Cardboard cut-out personalities, devoid of stronger emotions or concerns, reduce credibility and reinforce stereotypes. These 'half-persons' (Risager, 1990, p. 189) are typically middle-class and are portrayed in situations that are objective, neutral and not provocative. Risager attributes some of the blame for these caricatures to cultural relativism which, she claims, has been 'damaging to pedagogical aims of discussion and engagement' (1990, p. 189).

Socialization processes can be actively promoted through cultural information on a foreign nation, providing the image presented is accurate, balanced and comprehensive. This would mean exposure to the positive and negative features of the country from the multiple perspectives of age, sex, region, socioeconomic status and ethnicity. Risager also criticizes the omission of what she calls macro-level

knowledge. National institutions and citizens' day-to-day dealings with them are a fundamental part of the experience of being French, but textbooks frequently exclude this structural dimension and place pupils in situations that may not be part of the French person's experience of French society.


Byram's close analysis of classroom teaching styles leads him to identify four models of cultural studies teaching and learning: the language enjoyment model, language skills model, survival model and academic model. An underlying criterion for assessing the validity of each model is its ability to modify existing cultural schemata and challenge pupils' prevailing views. A successful model of cultural studies will lead to what he terms tertiary socialization:

[Pupils'] response can be to assimilate the new experience to the culturally-specific ways of thinking they already possess—in which case the process is indeed no more than an increase in existing modes of experience. They can however also—with pedagogical aid—adapt their existing ways of thinking, or adopt new ones, to cope with the new experience in a new and more appropriate fashion. (Byram, Esarte-Sarries & Taylor, 1990, p. 374)

The four models fail to meet this criterion and are flawed in other fundamental ways. Byram concludes, rather disappointedly, that his study revealed no significant association between learning French and attitudinal changes towards France. He indirectly blames this lack of success on incorrect models of culture teaching. The result of language teaching 'seems to be no more than an acquisition of separate and largely decontextualized information which does not amount to an understanding of or insight into another people's way of living and thinking' (Byram, Esarte-Sarries & Taylor, 1990, p. 380).

In the final chapter, Byram proposes an ideal model of culture teaching, one which is based on existing practices but which will remain open to theoretical advances. The approach will be ethnographic: rather than depending on ready-made accounts, the student will be equipped with the tools for cultural analysis. There will also be a strong affective component to foreign-language studies, operationalized through carefully integrated study-visits. Curriculum units devoted to linguistic and cultural awareness would figure prominently in such a process-based model. Byram has presented full details of his proposed model in other work (1989). Figure 1 is an attempt to summarize the model. Byram emphasizes the cyclical nature of the model and the interdependence of the four components.

FIGURE 1. Model for the teaching of language and culture.



Source: Byram, 1989.

A MODEL FOR LANGUAGE TEACHING IN INTERNATIONALIZATION


The purpose of the previous section was not merely to review Byram's pioneering work, but to underline the similarities to the cultural competence models discussed by McCarthy. The emphasis on the sustaining of minority (i.e., Finnish) ethnic identity and language, coupled with the notion of bridge-building and widening horizons, is in many ways a perfect description of the underlying goals of Finnish internationalization and some of its current pedagogical equivalents. If these goals can be achieved in conjunction with a positive and fulfilling language-learning experience based on Byram's cyclical, interdependent model, we shall be enriching the entire internationalization process. Foreign language teaching in teacher education will become a vehicle for change, pushing students to challenge existing world views (Risager, 1990) and to re-evaluate their own cultural, social and political heritage.

The following section is a tentative and very preliminary proposal for an integrated language teaching package that could be implemented in the Teacher Education Department of the University of Jyväskylä. The cultural focus of the course would be Canada. This in itself is an interesting reorientation, given the traditional United Kingdom and United States bias of Finnish textbooks. There would also appear to be dimensions of Canadian society and national identity that strike a chord amongst Finns. Furthermore, a perception of Canadian commitment to multiculturalism in the face of inveterate individual and systemic racism (Henry, 1993) would contribute positively to the promotion of internationalization in monoculturalist Finland, even if only by proxy. The distancing and relocation of problematic aspects of internationalization might also facilitate an objective analysis of the underlying issues.

As shown in Figure 2, I have replaced Byram's cyclical model by one consisting of seven interlocking components. The practicalities of timetabling will inevitably mean that the different components will be taught in parallel rather than in sequence, but the idea is that each component will also lay the basis for and feed into its successor. Such an arrangement will better equip the student to reap the maximum benefit from subsequent components. In the following section I briefly describe the model and outline possible contents for each component.

1. *Skill enhancement component*: Existing courses that focus on active language skills will include a higher percentage of authentic Canadian-content materials. Enhanced language skills will feed into a formal lecture and tutorial course on Canada.
2. *Background to Canada component*: Survey lecture, reading and discussion course on relevant aspects of Canadian geography, history, culture, literature, education system, social and political structure and lifestyle. The starting point will be students' existing knowledge of Canada and Finnish connections with Canada (for example, Finnish immigration, Finnish players in the National Hockey League, Canadian news in Finnish newspapers). Use will also be made of data on Canadians' own perceptions of their society and

FIGURE 2: Model for an integrated internationalist approach to language teaching.



national self-image (Hughes, 1993). Differences of gender, class and ethnicity will be reflected in the choice of materials. A study of Canadian multiculturalism, including the Quebec identity, and native issues will generate interest in the global education component and simultaneously provide a focus for the on-site cultural experience.

3. *Canadian cultural experience component*: Full use will be made of existing contacts with the Department of Education, Mount Allison University, New Brunswick, Canada, to continue the student visitation programme initiated in 1991. Student fund-raising encourages co-operative enterprise and group solidarity. Teaching practice in Canadian elementary schools will not only offer insights into another education system but will also provide diverse opportunities for students to act as ambassadors of their own country. Students can also carry out any research for individual or group projects growing out of the survey course (component 2).
4. *Global education component*: Existing courses within this sphere will incorporate a Canadian perspective, especially with regard to racism, native cultures, environmental concern and linguistic identity. Components 2, 3 and 4 will provide the basis for research work. The task of approaching these issues from a Canadian perspective through, for example, the ICONS simulation will provide a more objective—and hopefully more critical—understanding

of Finland's internationalization.² The component could also include an analysis of the media presentation dealing with the key issues.

5. *Research component*: Students will examine existing Finnish school textbooks in specific curriculum areas, for example, geography, biology, history and English. They will analyze the information presented on Canada and compare it with information culled from the preceding course components. This information can be evaluated and then formalized into a curriculum statement.
6. *Curriculum component*: Students identify key stages in the existing English, geography, history and biology curricula at which Canadian-content and global education materials could be integrated. Suitable contents and topics are specified that would fulfil the cognitive and affective goals officially laid down at each stage. Students would focus on one such key stage and produce an appropriate teaching package. Methodological and practical problems related to the cultural content of language teaching can also be dealt with at this stage. LeBlanc, Courtel and Trescases (1990), for example, suggest dealing with local realities first, examining individuals as embodiments of a particular cultural reality and moving from the present to the past. Risager's (1990) approach will act as a second viewpoint in evaluating existing materials.
7. *Materials development component*: Students design and produce a self-contained package of supplementary teaching material dealing with an aspect of Canada. The package could take many forms; for example, an interactive board game on Canada's geography or wildlife; a card game involving general knowledge questions; a tape-slide presentation on native arts; work-station activity sheets; or even Hypercard stacks relating to, say, pre-European Canadian history. Students would then try out their own teaching materials as part of their teaching practice and assess the suitability of the package. They would make any necessary changes to the material and then write explanatory notes for prospective users. The completed package would then be put at the disposal of practising teachers.

Despite the problems of integrating so many different elements into the proposed course, the result, from the students' point of view, will be a new orientation to Canada and Finland, a more critical stance on specific global issues, enhanced language skills, curriculum development experience and, perhaps most importantly, the personal satisfaction of active involvement in structuring and directing the learning process. From the experience of a successful, integrated approach to language teaching they may also derive individual commitment to such an approach.

Conclusion

Alongside the many other criticisms levelled at it, Canada's official multiculturalism has been chided for its social divisiveness (Fleras & Elliott, 1992, p. 132). Paradoxically, though, there is some consensus that multiculturalism has become a

unifying force and an internationally respected facet of the Canadian identity (Reid & Burns, 1992). Whether we attribute this consensus to successful media manipulation or people's susceptibility to new 'isms', there would now seem to be some popular basis for optimism. The Canadian national dream, once embodied in a railway linking East and West, is now expressed in terms of equality and mutual respect amongst people from all corners of the globe. If the often painful moments involved in the transition to multiculturalism have resulted in the creation of such a powerful and far-reaching vision, then we must applaud the first faltering steps of the newcomer Finland in its move towards internationalization. This transition, requiring the reshaping of individual and national Finnish identities, will certainly be as challenging and as seemingly divisive as its fully-fledged multiculturalist equivalent in Canada. The type of curriculum proposal outlined above, which McCarthy would undoubtedly dub 'naively possibilitarian' (1990, p. 12), will hopefully contribute to making that transition more expeditious, more bearable and more sincere.

Notes

1. My thanks are due to Professor June Beynon of the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Canada, for her valuable advice and comments during the preparation of this article.
2. ICONS (International Communication and Negotiation Simulation) is a multi-site computer simulation run by the Department of Political Science at Maryland University. Students at some twenty-five universities in up to fifteen different countries use electronic mail and on-line conferences to discuss and enact policies related to matters of global concern according to a scenario located six months in the future.

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ACHIEVEMENT TARGETS AND FUNDING EQUITY IN THE ZIMBABWE SECONDARY EDUCATION SYSTEM: THE CASE OF HARARE

Glyn Edwards and John Fisher

Introduction

In the past decade or so, great strides have been made in the Zimbabwean education system. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) government moved quickly and decisively after Independence in 1980 towards two major goals: the provision of universal primary education and the provision of secondary education to all eligible students. The progressive attainment of these goals has been a considerable achievement in its own right but, in the aftermath of the hectic years of the 1980s, it should now be possible to evaluate more thoroughly what was

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achieved and where improvement is still needed. In fact, we would argue that the time is ripe for some modification of the secondary school system in order to better achieve one of the Zimbabwean government's fundamental objectives: equity in the provision of education.

We will demonstrate that the present allocation of central government funding to education perpetuates a degree of inequity among schools and therefore, students in Harare. Public authorities are aware of the problem and, in recent years, have undertaken some remedial measures. It is evident, however, that these are only of marginal consequence; they do not directly address the major source of inequity. We will identify this source of inequity in a manner which suggests the basis for remedial action—a reallocation of government funding to secondary education which would offer the prospect of substantial equity and even efficiency gains.

The study begins with a brief overview of the Harare region and the characteristic school types found there, followed by a description of some of the pertinent features of the various types of schools. This is the essential background to the core theme: the development of a formula directed towards increasing equity in the allocation of government funds to schools in Harare. We then examine the implications, by and within school type, of the proposed reallocation of funds, setting these within the context of the wider educational financing debate. Finally, the potential benefits of funding changes are reviewed.

The study area

The secondary school system in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, is hardly typical of the country as a whole. Harare is the industrial and commercial centre of the country, as well as a service centre for the surrounding farming areas. Nevertheless there are a number of reasons why it provides a useful focus for this study.

In 1992, Harare accounted for 14.2% of Zimbabwe's total population, a significant proportion of the population and the region for which the data is most complete. The concentrated population makes for greater ease in data collection and increases its reliability, although migrant and itinerant labour distort the sample. For example, the average household size in Harare was a little over four which falls below the national average of 4.8 (Central Statistical Office, 1992). Confining our study to Harare also means that some of the ambiguities present in the official classification of school types can be more easily overcome than if data for Zimbabwe as a whole were used. The Harare secondary school system provides as glaring examples of inequity as anywhere else in Zimbabwe.

Further, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Education enjoys a higher degree of direct control over schools in the capital than in the country as a whole. This, together with the relative concentration of the population, would enhance the ease and lower the costs of implementing the type of measures we advocate.

School types

The data used was kindly made available by the Ministry of Education and Culture in Harare. Discrepancies between our aggregate figures and official Ministry figures are largely due to the peculiar status of particular schools. The data is for 1991 and includes all but the newly-established schools which lacked certain characteristics relevant to our study—most notably the absence of students currently at ‘O’-level General Certificate of Education standard (‘O’-level GCE).

There are five school types in the Zimbabwean secondary education system and all are to be found in Harare. Under the ‘Unified Teaching System’, the central government pays teacher salaries based on an approved pupil/teacher ratio of approximately twenty-eight to one in 1991. In other respects, the five types of schools can be divided broadly into two categories in terms of the manner in which government funds are allocated. In the first category are the three types in which fixed and variable costs beyond teachers’ salaries have been or are met from the schools’ or parents’ resources. In the second category, the two types of school enjoy a higher level of direct financial support. An appreciable proportion of their costs have been met by central government sources. These latter schools dominate the secondary system in Harare—with fifty-one of the seventy-two schools enrolling 85.8% of all secondary students.

It should also be noted that twenty of the fifty-two schools in Harare are boarding schools and that, generally speaking, school sizes are large with an average of 1,325.9 pupils per school. Students from all school types enter for ‘O’-level GCE examinations. Interestingly, and a factor that enhances the comparative analysis attempted below, the proportion of students in years 3 and 4 attempting five ‘O’-levels is much the same over all school types. More specifically, almost all students completing year 4 will do this. Further distinctive characteristics of each type of school are set out below.

COUNCIL SCHOOLS

The low number of council schools in Harare and therefore in the study provides the most evident contrast with Zimbabwe as a whole. These schools provided the major engine of growth during the rapid educational expansion after 1980; over 75% of the secondary school enrolment increases between 1983 and 1987 occurred in non-government schools—a large proportion of which have been in council schools (Edwards & Tisdell, 1992). Council schools are largely built at the expense and under the aegis of local bodies which are not necessarily a part of local or regional government.

In 1991, there were twelve council schools in Harare with a total enrolment of 7,420. This represented 7.8% of the total number of secondary school students. Eight schools conform to the characteristic council school type found throughout Zimbabwe (low pass rates, low teacher salaries, non-boarding, etc.) but the remaining four are glaringly anomalous. Their inclusion as council schools in the

official data appears as either an error or a reflection of the ambiguities in the status of schools that are not directly funded by the central government.

It is unusual that three of the four were boarding schools. Two were the leading private schools in Harare before Independence and have retained their elite status. Whether homogeneous or multi-racial, drawing students from all regions of Zimbabwe as well as some neighbouring states, they remain able to exact high entry standards and high fees. The three boarding schools (along with one other school) enjoyed much higher government funding than usual for council schools, a point the significance of which is addressed below.

TRUST SCHOOLS

Trust schools are private institutions established under the post-Independence settlement. They share the essential characteristics of the four elite schools included among the council schools. They are also exclusive and expensive.

In 1991, three of the four trust schools in Harare accepted boarders. Trust school enrolment was 2,184, approximately 2.3% of the total enrolment in the province (and less than the trust school proportion of total secondary school enrolments in Zimbabwe). A high proportion of trust school students take 'A'-level GCE courses. As in all schools, the government pays the salaries of teachers up to the agreed ratio of twenty-eight to one. However, as in the elite schools and as shown in Table 1, pupil/teacher ratios are relatively lower in this type of school than elsewhere in the education system. This provides a clear demonstration of the ability of the elite trust schools to employ additional staff from private fee revenue. Additionally, in 1991, trust schools received a per student grant of Z\$15.

MISSION SCHOOLS

These schools represent the oldest educational tradition in Zimbabwe; many of the contemporary political elite have a mission school education. Mission schools are run by voluntary organizations, principally Christian missions. Similar to other schools, the government pays teachers' salaries and provides a small per student grant. Depending on the wealth of their income sources, at least some mission schools are in a position to hire additional teachers beyond the government standard. These schools also benefit from the Mission tradition. While the number of Europeans in religious orders has declined, they have been replaced (to an extent at least) by Africans offering their services on the same altruistic terms.

The five mission schools in Harare had a total enrolment of 3,926 in 1991. This was 4.1% of the secondary school enrolment of the province. Three of the five schools were boarding schools, although it should be noted that because of the unpaid contributions of staff and students alike, boarding costs are significantly lower than in the elite or trust schools.

GOVERNMENT GROUP A SCHOOLS

These governmentally administered schools were inherited from the white regime and are usually located in the less crowded suburbs. Although there was a considerable increase in student numbers after Independence, the group A schools maintained their elite status, offering instruction through 'A'-levels. Although students must pay a fee of about Z\$200, the government pays all maintenance costs in addition to the teachers' salaries.

There were seventeen group A schools in Harare with a combined enrolment of 18,814 in 1991. This amounted to 19.7% of the province's secondary school students, a much higher proportion than elsewhere in Zimbabwe. Eleven of the seventeen schools were boarding schools, admitting promising students at the senior level.

GOVERNMENT GROUP B SCHOOLS

These were the vehicle for the expansion of secondary education in Harare post-Independence and are located in highly populated suburbs such as Mbare and Chitungwiza. Group B schools have the advantage over council schools of being built and maintained at the government's expense.

In 1991, there were 63,123 students enrolled in group B schools. With nearly two-thirds of the secondary school students in the province, group B schools dominate in Harare to a degree not found elsewhere in Zimbabwe. The schools are typically very large, with an average enrolment of 1,856.5 students per school. Many group B schools have in excess of 2,000 pupils and still utilize the double sessions ('hot seating') introduced during the rapid growth after Independence. Few students progress to sitting the 'A'-level examination and none would do so at a group B school. While their funding and size differentiates group B schools from the council schools which dominate the Zimbabwean system as a whole, they share many of the same problems.

Table 1 provides a comparison by school type of some of the significant characteristics of secondary schools in Harare.

Despite the anomalous assortment of schools categorized as council schools, a number of clear features emerge from Table 1. The dominance of the trust schools in terms of academic performance is glaringly evident—with a much higher proportion of students than in any other school type successfully passing five 'O'-level examinations. The reasons for their success are obvious. They enjoy much lower pupil/teacher ratios than any other school type. Further, while average teacher salaries are lower than in group A schools, they are substantially higher than in the other school types. Finally, although the margin is less pronounced here, they enjoy a higher level of central government expenditure in average per student terms than all but the group A schools.

Table 1 also illustrates a major discrepancy between school types in the government sector. Indeed, if our focus was relative efficiency, then the performance of

TABLE 1. Secondary school characteristics by school type, Harare 1991.

School type	Council	Trust	Mission	Group A	Group B
Number of schools	12	4	5	17	34
Number of students	7420	2184	3926	8814	36123
Percentage of students in school type	7.8	2.3	4.1	19.7	66.1
Estimated pupil/teacher ratio	30.7	13.4	24.4	25.5	28.2
Percentage of students who have entered and passed five or more 'O'-levels	30.8	84.4	53.9	26.8	13.8
Average teacher salary (in Z\$)	11 764.20	23 285.50	17 711.70	27 864.40	14 709.20
Average per student expenditure (in Z\$)	582.40	806.80	705.20	1 124.70	609.30
Government expenditure as a percentage of total recurrent expenditure	6.3	2.6	4.0	30.9	59.2
Teacher salary as percentage of total recurrent expenditure	97.3	98.2	97.9	90.2	86.3

Source: Zimbabwe. Ministry of Education and Culture.

the group A schools would have to be of prime concern. With much higher average teacher salaries, and enjoying substantially greater government expenditure in per student terms, these schools exhibit a relatively poor performance at the 'O'-level GCE. Group A schools enrol 19.7% of all students in Harare but receive 30.9% of the total financial allocation from the state. Conversely, group B schools receive 56.2% of the financial allocation for 66.1% of secondary school enrolments. Part of the explanation for the favoured treatment of group A schools arises from their monopoly of the provision of 'A'-level courses in the government sector. These are taken by better-qualified teachers who earn higher salaries. Even so, the discrepancy of financial allocations in the government sector serves to accentuate the basic point we seek to make.

Our primary concern is equity. On this score, the problems of the government group B schools, a substantial majority of those in the sample, are evident in Table 1. The 'O'-level pass rate is less than half that for any other school type. Class sizes are large and average teacher salaries relatively low (although it should be noted that council schools, with the exclusion of the elite four, are worse off in both respects). Finally, the central government contribution is lower in per student terms than for all other types bar the council schools.

A focus on these two types, the private trust and the group B schools, clearly illustrates the relationship between adequate funding and successful performance. The four trust schools in Harare are evidently affluent and able to supplement government allocations with other resources. This correlates with direct observation and with other studies. In one study it is calculated that about four times as much is spent on private students' education as on students in any other school type (Dorsey, Matshazi & Nyagura, 1991, p. 137). The government's commitment to paying teacher salaries accentuates the natural tendency of the more experienced and better-qualified teachers to gravitate towards the wealthier schools.

On the other hand, group B schools serve the most disadvantaged sector of the urban population of Harare. Parental contributions are severely constrained. Pupils in the B schools face much larger classes which are taught by relatively poorly qualified and inexperienced teachers. However, despite the major differences in access to private financing, the government provides a substantially higher level of support, in per student terms, to students in the private schools.

This comparative feature, followed closely by the imbalance in funding between group A and B schools, provides the most obvious illustration of inequity within the secondary school system in Harare. It was sufficiently conspicuous that the government has already taken a form of remedial action—varying the size of grants to non-government schools according to school type. As the most disadvantaged, council schools receive the largest payment, followed by mission schools and then trust schools. However, the insignificance of this step in relation to greater equity is apparent. Grants-in-aid (of about Z\$15) are small in absolute terms and in relation to total government payments to schools. It is the level of teacher salaries which is critical in determining government per student assistance across school types. Further, the variation by school type does not take account of discrepancies within school types; for example, the elite schools receive as much as the poorer council schools.

The real reason for funding inequity, then, lies in the government's commitment to funding teacher salaries when there are large disparities in the qualifications and experience of teachers in different schools. It is evident that real progress towards equity in the system will hardly come from minor (or probably even major) adjustments to grants-in-aid (although such assistance remains a necessity in view of the poor state of facilities in group B and council schools). Rather, what is proposed here is to use examination pass rates as an indicator for disadvantage and to make this, at least temporarily, the basis for governmental allocations towards individual school salary expenditures.

The nature of the relationship between educational expenditure and educational performance, examined globally, is unclear. In the industrialized world, the wisdom of spending increasingly larger amounts on education has been questioned for some time. Thus, in their meta-analysis of research on educational spending and student achievement, Childs and Shakeshaft (1986) suggested that in the United States the relationship between the two variables is in decline. Nevertheless they also point out that 'from a survey of forty-five major studies on this issue . . . nineteen studies reported no relationship, fourteen studies found a positive relationship and twelve studies indicated a positive relationship under certain conditions' (Childs & Shakeshaft, 1986, p. 250).

In the American example, it seems quite likely to us that increases in educational expenditures will not necessarily lead to corresponding increases in educational attainment. A threshold can be reached in rich countries beyond which the returns to additional educational expenditure fall rapidly or are even negative. This is, however, less likely to be true in developing countries where the level of funding is much lower. The evidence for Harare set out in Table 1 lends support to

studies, such as those cited in Childs and Shakeshaft (see also Colclough, 1990 and Nyagura, 1991), that there is a positive relationship in such conditions. Our proposal proceeds on the basis of this assumption.

Our argument is that poor school performance in Harare is linked to the level of funding and that a reallocation of funding would at least go some way to counter such inherent disadvantages as the socio-economic status of the pupils, poor or inadequate facilities and the preponderance of untrained or inexperienced teachers. It is proposed that funding be discriminatory and based on relative performance as measured by the 'O'-level pass rates listed in Table 1. In order to target variable performance within school types most effectively, the method set out below is based on disaggregation at the individual school level.

Methodology

Performance in the 'O'-level examinations allows the formulation of an 'index of disadvantage'. Schools are under- or over-achieving according to a given measure; in this case, the regional average result. Thus schools shown to be under-achieving (*disadvantaged schools*) will have resources diverted to them according to their level of under-achievement. Conversely over-achieving (*advantaged*) schools will lose funding on the basis of the same measure. The formula which will determine government funding to a school in the current year will depend upon the previous year's examination pass rate relative to the average pass rate for that year. In this case

$$\text{index} = \frac{\text{national average pass rate 1991}}{\text{school pass rate 1991}}$$

This is then applied to the per student funding for 1991 to determine the per student funding for 1992

$$\text{Per pupil funding for 1992} = \text{per pupil funding for 1991} \times \text{index}$$

To arrive at the total funding allocated to the individual school, the per student figure is multiplied by the school's enrolment for 1992. That is,

$$\text{Total funding for 1992} = \text{per pupil funding for 1992} \times \text{enrolment 1992}$$

The results of applying the formula to the various school types are set out in Table 2. It is assumed that enrolments are unchanged and that government expenditure is not linked to inflation. One council school has been omitted from the original list. It is classified as a special school and had a zero pass rate in the 1991 'O'-level GCE examinations. The data has been computed by individual school although the results are presented according to school type.

TABLE 2. Changes in government funding of secondary schools in Harare based on funding formula, 1991-92 (in Z\$).

School type	Total funding 1991	Per pupil funding 1991	Total funding 1992	Per pupil funding 1992	Loss or gain	Per pupil loss/gain
Council	124136.5	560.6	5467374.1	743.3	1343237.6	+182.7
Trust	2768773	705.2	1771719.2	451.3	-997053.8	-253.9
Mission	1779174.4	814.6	416469.7	190.7	-1362705	-623.9
Group A	21129484	1123.1	16471773	875.5	-4657711	-247.6
Group B	38089825	603.4	62662162	992.7	24572337	+389.3
Total	67891 393		86789498		1889815	

Source: Zimbabwe. Ministry of Education and Culture data.

These figures may differ slightly from those in Table 1 due to rounding and the omission of a school

Because of the high proportion of disadvantaged schools in Harare, application of this formula would result in an increase in total funding of nearly Z\$19 million, or 27.8% of the 1991 allocation. This is a high figure and, however desirable in itself, probably unacceptable to a government facing severe budgetary constraints (*Africa South of the Sahara*, 1993). However two points can be made in this respect. First, annual increases of around 20% have not been unusual in the recent past; inflation would mean that any real increase in total allocation would be minor (although correspondingly, the gains to disadvantaged schools are reduced). Second, the formula does not necessarily have to be applied rigidly or in its entirety. It is intended primarily as a guidepost to bringing greater equity in public funding arrangements.

As can be seen from Table 3, the major changes by school type are to bring funding to government schools roughly into line with their share of total enrolments while the mission and trust schools enjoy allocations well below proportionate student numbers. However, the previously disadvantaged schools are now favoured. Furthermore, these overall figures conceal wide variations in fortunes and it remains to examine, at a higher level of disaggregation, what the changes in funding according to the formula means for the various types of schools.

TABLE 3: Share of financial resources and enrolment by school type, 1991-92.

School type	Percentage enrolment	Percentage of resources 1991	Percentage of resources 1992
Council	7.8	6.3	6.3
Mission	4.1	4.0	2.0
Trust	2.3	2.6	0.5
Group A	19.7	30.9	19.0
Group B	66.1	56.2	72.2

Source: Table 1 and Table 2

COUNCIL SCHOOLS

Per student allocations within this group now range from Z\$138.50 to a maximum of Z\$1,604.20. As shown in Table 2, council school students would receive, on average, Z\$743.30 annually per student. Despite an overall increase in the funding of council schools, the four elite schools, naturally enough, experience a

fall. The anomalous status of these schools becomes irrelevant under the formula. One elite school loses Z\$766.10 on a per student basis; conversely one characteristic council school gains Z\$1,011.40.

MISSION SCHOOLS

Under the proposed scheme, the mission schools would have to accept a 36% reduction in their allocation. Of the five schools in this group, one enjoys a per student gain of Z\$252.10 while per student losses range from Z\$275.40 to Z\$656.00. The average loss per student would be Z\$253.90 with per student allocations ranging from at Z\$130.50 to Z\$879.50.

The heavy losses suffered by the mission schools, in absolute and proportionate terms (from 4.0% to 2.0% of total expenditure), illustrate a potential weakness of the funding formula. The mission schools enjoy a considerable advantage over most group B and council schools in terms of class size and teacher quality. Nevertheless, as compared to other school types, their reasonable 'O'-level performance entails a considerable penalty. Furthermore, it is possible that these schools could find some difficulty in substituting private funding for lost public financial resources. Their position would have to be monitored carefully.

TRUST SCHOOLS

These schools would lose the most under the new funding arrangements—receiving 76.6% less than their 1991 allocation. They would retain only a minuscule 0.5% of total funding in 1992 figures. All the trust schools would suffer funding cuts, with losses ranging from Z\$398.50 to Z\$898.10 per student. The average allocation would become Z\$190.70 per student. At the same time, it is probable that schools in this group are the most capable of finding alternatives to public funding.

GOVERNMENT GROUP A SCHOOLS

This group has almost as varied fortunes as the nominal council schools. On average they lose quite heavily in funding because, although their 'O'-level results are poor in relation to a relatively generous flow of central government resources, their results are still substantially better than in the group B schools. Thirteen of the schools would experience funding reductions ranging on a per student basis, from Z\$116.00 up to Z\$667.40. On average, students at group A schools lose a per student sum of Z\$247.60, bringing their share of the total financial allocation in Harare closer to their share of total student numbers.

While their position is less clear-cut than for the trust schools, it would appear (given their location) that the A schools are probably in a better position than their B counterparts to meet public cuts. One problem could be their provision of 'A'-level courses but, otherwise, the reallocation of funds in this group is

consistent with equity. As illustrated in Table 1, the proportion of the budget allocated for teacher salaries in these schools is very high.

GOVERNMENT GROUP B SCHOOLS

Surprisingly, five of these schools achieve sufficiently good results in the 'O'-level examination as to warrant losing funds. These losses are mostly minor: Z\$17.40 per student in one case, although one school loses Z\$354 per pupil. Most group B schools receive major gains, amounting in per student terms to Z\$1,329.80 in the most extreme case. The lowest per student allocation would be Z\$429.20 while the highest would be Z\$1,869.60. On average, students would be allocated Z\$992.70 each, a per student gain of Z\$389.30. The group B schools would receive 72.2% of the total financial resources allocated to Harare, somewhat more than their proportion (66.1%) of total enrolments.

Discussion

These changes in funding allocation, some of them quite drastic at the level of the individual school, are the crucial point of the exercise. Zimbabwe's education system has undergone a rapid transformation during the past decade. The increase in enrolments was overwhelmingly concentrated in council and group B schools, which meant that these schools had inadequate resources and were staffed by under-qualified teachers. At one time, two 'O'-levels were accepted as adequate teacher qualification. The minimum has been raised to five but given the present system of government funding of salaries, the danger is that the gross disadvantage of the council and group B schools could become permanently embedded in the secondary system. Our paper provides a modest proposal designed to prevent and perhaps redress this trend.

Our suggested formula is not intended to be immutable or permanent; indeed we would argue that one potential strength lies in its flexibility. It can be applied in different forms and in conjunction with other research or measures designed to achieve the same ends. Thus, although ours included only Harare, it is evident that the formula can be applied, given the availability of data, to other regions or even nationally. Although it would subvert the main point of the exercise, it could even provide the basis for a redistribution among school types. More positively, there is ample scope for the use of the formula in the pursuit of raising the quality of secondary education.

There have been many studies relating to the factors which influence student educational achievement in developing countries. Reviewing such, Fuller (1986) identified features such as teacher training, expenditure on instructional materials, the size of the school library and the social background of teachers as well as expenditure per pupil. Such studies provide a possible basis for new school or Ministry of Education funding policies. The formula itself does not determine the

individual school's utilization of the funding changes. There is ample scope for experimentation.

This is true at least in theory. In practice, there are rigid constraints on the availability of educational resources within Zimbabwe, a function of budgetary and national economic concerns. Given these constraints, we anticipate that the major change would be the employment of more and/or better-qualified teachers in the previously disadvantaged schools. This is both realistic and perhaps the most effective utilization of resources in the interest of efficiency as well as our prime focus of equity.

In Harare, as in Zimbabwe as a whole, it is clear that the majority of secondary schools are under-resourced. The fact that the existing distribution of financial resources is highly inequitable seems particularly unacceptable. Under the existing system of distribution, inequities are only too likely to become entrenched. Countering such inequities would not only be more equitable but possibly be more efficient through its stimulation of a corresponding improvement in educational attainment. The schools most in danger of running into the problem of 'diminishing returns' are not the group B schools or the majority of the council schools. There is considerable potential here for increasing returns to a substantially increased investment. It remains to address possible modifications of the formula in this context.

Presently, the formula results in an overall increase in secondary education funding. Given the budgetary problems of the Zimbabwean government, this would be impossible. Inflation could render any funding increase worthless. More importantly, an obvious objection to the formula is that it appears to penalize success. We would accept such objections as being valid at the margin. Where good results are achieved with relatively modest funding, the formula would require modification. One method, fully effective in the case of the five group B schools which lost funds under the unmodified formula, would be to exclude those schools with above-average results but that have funding which lies within 5 to 10% of the provincial average. Some modification may also be necessary to take account of schools offering 'A'-level GCE courses. It is, of course, possible to apply the formula after form 2 (based on 2 GCE results), after form 4 (based on 'O'-level GCE results) and again after form 6 (based on 'A'-level GCE results). Funding may then be based on performance at each level.

Finally, we would stress again that the formula is not intended as a permanent basis for funding allocations. It is essentially a starting-point enabling a major change in the distribution of resources. To continue applying the formula in its current form over any length of time would be to penalize success and the efficient use of resources. After the initial year of change, funding would need to be reviewed annually and schools which were not performing to expectations (given the funding changes) might be subjected to closer scrutiny. There are a variety of ways in which the present inequities, which pervade the Harare school system, could be redressed. We would accept that, over time, alternatives such as full payments to cover teacher salaries might become preferable. However, as a catalyst for reform,

our formula offers the greatest potential for equity gains without compromising present achievement or entailing an undue increase in government allocations to education.

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**PROFILES OF
FAMOUS EDUCATORS**

MALCOLM ADISESHIAH

(1910-94)

Eric Prabhakar

In the post-colonial period, Adiseshiah was the outspoken proponent for a more lucid understanding of education as a vital factor for socio-economic development. In the immediate post-war years, finding that education was not getting a fair share of national resources and international aid for institution building and growth, and that the newly emerging country leaders were adhering to the paper-thin concept of education that they had inherited, he spoke of the ever-increasing importance of education for nation building. It was the voice of an economist and it was heard. It shaped the thinking of bankers and aid givers, as well as the aid receivers; it changed man's perception of the 'human role in development'—a phrase that he often used and gave renown. Thus, the assessment of Adiseshiah's contribution to education must begin with the imperatives of the economic tenet which he himself stated as follows:

The rate of return on investment in education, although not precisely measurable for the various reasons discussed, is nevertheless among the highest in the public and private sectors and I personally believe it is indeed the highest.¹

The many generations of thinkers in education before him had not specifically addressed education's impact on the issues of poverty, deprivation and inequality. For Plato, education was provided for the elite to perpetrate the status quo by means of selection and stratification. For Rousseau, education was needed to fortify man against corrupt social institutions. In totalitarian societies, the objective of education was to infuse loyalty to the central party. In capitalist countries, educa-

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tion was given to perpetuate a particular spectrum of values, attitudes and beliefs for an open society. It was Adiseshiah the economist who spoke out that education had a role beyond these limited parameters, as a crucial public service for the eradication of poverty and for socio-economic growth. In the key positions he held in UNESCO in the 1950s and 1960s, he became renowned as the expositor of education as a decisive contributor to socio-economic development in the Third World.

A full life

Born in the town of Vellore in South India, the young Malcolm Adiseshiah inherited the intellect of his father, a professor of philosophy. His mother, in contrast, was full of verve and energy. She was the first woman councillor of Vellore Municipality, the founding president of the Vellore Ladies' Club, and altogether a natural leader. These two seemingly dissimilar parental currents merged in a marvelous confluence in Malcolm Adiseshiah. Throughout his life he was immersed in intellectual exchanges and moved with some of the greatest minds of his time. He was surrounded by an abundance of books on economics and education. At the same time, and in the well-ordered manner he set for himself, he carried out his functions with remarkable competence in UNESCO and later, upon returning to India, in the Madras Institute of Development Studies that he founded.

Malcolm Adiseshiah had eight years of university education at Madras, the London School of Economics and Cambridge, and spent ten years teaching economics in Calcutta and Madras before joining UNESCO. That was a time when economics was being shaken off of its traditional moorings by John Maynard Keynes. Fresh from studying under Keynes, Adiseshiah taught the dazzling new macro-economics—the revolutionary economic theory on the causes of prolonged unemployment—to his honours students in Madras Christian College. Significantly, the young professor did not neglect the classical study of the individual consumer and the individual investor interacting in product and service markets, or the determination of price by the interplay of demand and supply, or the factors that make up demand and supply. He taught the importance of the agricultural sector, that economic growth in a country like India centred on agricultural development, and that industrialization cannot be sustained without a break away from subsistence farming. He took great pains, in fact obtained considerable satisfaction, in finding examples in the villages to illustrate these economic theories he expounded in the classroom. He would get into a pair of khaki shorts and set out with his students to the villages around the college and, as he wrote himself: 'where he worked out the economics of hand-pound rice, hand-made paper, hand-loomed textiles, crop rotation and rural credit.'²

The top student of his first group of economics honours wrote the following: 'In this dawn of a new age in economic thought, the infectious enthusiasm and the intellectual vigour that this great teacher invested his teaching with, put halos even around his students.'³

There are 118 files of Adiseshiah's in the UNESCO Archives and a rough estimate shows that they comprise about 48,000 pages. Here, it is sufficient to record briefly two of his major areas of work in UNESCO. First, his pioneering work of launching and developing technical assistance projects in the Third World; and second, his eight-year spell as the Deputy Director-General.

Though a world citizen for twenty-five years, Adiseshiah remained an Indian. At the age of 60 he returned to India with a passionate interest in furthering the socio-economic development of his country. Without the least delay, he founded the Madras Institute of Development Studies (MIDS) and set about his task with rare organizational ability. MIDS soon became a valuable research centre for the state of Tamil Nadu and India.

Adiseshiah was eager to get back to the study of the problems of rural India. During the first years of MIDS, he directed a number of studies on rural Tamil Nadu: the economics of dry farming, land reform, irrigation, rural employment, rural housing. Because of his special concern for the poor and the neglected sections of Indian society, he directed studies on poverty and the supply of wage goods in Tamil Nadu, on income earning trends and social status of the Harijan community in Tamil Nadu, on the living conditions of the scheduled castes and of the scheduled tribes, on small fisherman, and on women's welfare.

It would be appropriate to point out that his role as a teacher, which came into prominence whatever office he held, reached its zenith at MIDS in the last quarter of his life. From this institute he took a series of steps to rectify the rather low quality of economic research studies undertaken, particularly in the formal doctorate programmes in the social sciences. At first he organized a meeting of the senior social scientists in South India and this became an annual feature of MIDS. Then, with the co-operation of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, he organized in 1971 a six-week training programme in research methodology for Ph.D. scholars in economics from all South Indian universities. He followed this with a special training programme for Ph.D. supervisors. These activities resulted in the publication of *A guide to research in economics* which is now a source book in Indian universities. On the programme side of the newly-established MIDS, Adiseshiah as founder-director launched a monthly seminar series to provide a public forum for serious discussions on a variety of socio-economic issues. The seminar threw open the challenge, and the responsibility, of thinking about and understanding a number of current policy-oriented issues. A sense of participation was introduced at a time when the intellectual life of the city of Madras was not particularly active.

MIDS published a monthly newsletter—the *Bulletin*. The monthly seminar paper and the discussions around it appeared in this publication for a wider dissemination. But the *Bulletin* was used as a reference source even more for the 25-page editorial written by Adiseshiah without a break until the end of his life. The editorial was a factual commentary on economic, educational and social factors pertaining to Tamil Nadu, India and the international scene, written meticulously with unflinching dedication every month.

In addition to his work in MIDS, Adiseshiah served as a member of the newly-established Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission in 1972; from 1975 to 1978 he was the Vice-Chancellor of Madras University, and from 1978 to 1984 a member of Parliament. The catalogue of work in the various branches of knowledge which Adiseshiah was immersed in, and his uncommon sense of public service, was extraordinary.

He was a member of the Central Advisory Board of Education, the Indian Council of Social Science Research, the National Council of Teacher Education, and President of the Indian Economic Association. He edited a number of books, notably *Science in the battle against poverty and Towards a learning society*. He authored two books on the socio-economic importance of education: *Let my country awake* (1970) and *It is time to begin* (1972). He had honorary doctorates conferred on him by fifteen universities in India and abroad.

All these activities in India and his assignments in UNESCO, though testifying to the continuing relevance of Adiseshiah's professional activities, have tended nevertheless to obscure the full ideological context in which this work flowed. The full impact of the philosophies he expounded and his contribution to education is yet to be assessed.

Development economics

Adiseshiah concentrated mainly on the position of education as a primary factor of economic and social promotion, and he consistently stressed the positive relationship between education and development. Education was exposed by him to the rigours of economic theory, resulting in changed perceptions of education as a necessary precondition for economic advancement, both by the providers of aid and its receivers. Education was Adiseshiah's obsession and economics his conceptual framework. This emphasis on education as a major factor in overall economic growth resulted in education attaining a priority position in development plans, in the removal of financial barriers, and in greater attention being paid to educational planning. To appreciate this changed perspective for education, it is necessary to examine the roots of Adiseshiah's methodological approach and the economic tools that he brought to bear in his analysis of the development issues he was confronted with in the newly-emerging developing countries.

Economists construct complex and elaborate models to 'simplify' reality. They deliberately repress some of the features of the real world and emphasize others, according to what they feel to be important. They impose on these features an order, a grammar, a symmetry that is actually the brainchild of their discipline and which leads them to their paradigms or referentially to their theories. No wonder then that differences between economic theorists have led, and continue to lead, to new questions and new controversies: the fusing of classical to the neo-classical, the Marxists to the neo-Marxists, the Keynesians to the neo-Keynesians, the Monetarists to the Modernists.

Though well-grounded in economic theory, Adiseshiah did not wish to be a theoretician himself. It is the dynamics of life and society that concerned him. No economic theory had a monopoly on truth for him. He wrote:

The outer shell of welfare has been coated and recoated, the inner kernel has remained intact [...]. It appeared as wealth (Adam Smith, H. Sidgwick), as pleasure or happiness (J. Bentham), as utility (A.C. Pigou), as value and price (D. Ricardo), as money or real income (J.M. Keynes), as ophelemity or the preferred or chosen position (V. Pareto, D. Little), as aesthetic realization (K. Marx), as the or a state of equilibrium (L. Walras, A. Marshall), as the or an optimum (A. Bergson), and finally, as development and growth (W.W. Rostow, A. Lewis, H. Myint).⁴

He also held that there is 'the need to take life and society which are not encompassed within the economists' universe of discourse.'⁵

Adiseshiah was very definitive about his own area of interest. His aim was to help the developing countries, as well as the international community, to appreciate the importance of education as an agent of economic development without which sustained development was not possible. He wished to show the relationship between education, productivity and income. He applied the analytical tools of economics to show that increasing the income of the working poor is the most efficient strategy to follow in the multi-faceted contexts of sustainable development and that it can best be achieved through improved public service provisions, particularly education and health. He placed the individual at the centre of development. He strove to keep development aid from falling into the very serious trap of physical development, to the neglect of human resources development, as was the trend of World Bank funding in the early years of its operations. He saw such funding spilling over to make the rich richer in the Third World at the expense of the poor majority. He saw the growth of inequalities as the greatest danger to developing countries. He wrote:

One view is that poverty which is the main product of inequality is a virtue. This view is usually held by some of those who are well-off in our societies, leading a few of them to voluntarily embrace poverty [...] The poor themselves do not consider their poverty as a virtue, but as an evil they are subjected to [...] If poverty is a virtue, then all should be poor. It is the non-poor who point to the meritorious nature of poverty [...] Inequality then, is ethically evil, socially unjust, and economically non-optimal.⁶

Thus Adiseshiah's view of the growing inequality he saw in the early stages of development embraced a variety of humanitarian factors, and the 'economically non-optimal' aspect of inequality was the economic dimension among them. In 1974, the World Bank and the Sussex Institute of Development Studies jointly published a collection of papers entitled 'Redistribution with growth'. Acknowledging that a trade-off between growth and equity was inevitable, the report explored in detail what sort of uses of redistributed resources would minimize the growth/equity trade-off. The report was meant to provide a theoretical basis for a new approach to development policies. In contrast to that position, Adiseshiah

remained consistent in his view that the correct development strategy for the Third World would not result in furthering inequality. Progress, he believed, must lead to an equitable society and not to the growth of excessive income differences and the emergence of an entrenched privileged minority; in fact, economic growth could only be sustained if it was accompanied by structural changes promoting equity.

When the phase of early industrial growth based on import substitution was slowing down in India, Adiseshiah argued that the demand needed to regenerate industrialization could only be achieved by first raising output and incomes in that sector which still contained the majority of the population and the majority of the poor, namely agriculture. Foundations must be laid, he held, for the steady expansion of demand from the rural sectors. Industry must serve agriculture, providing it with the improved inputs and equipment needed. For him, there was no question of a growth/equity trade-off in a large developing country like India so long as the development process ensured that the available resources were efficiently distributed between various competing sectors.

the optimum requires a progressive improvement in the distribution of goods and services in favour of the poorer and less favoured sector, without jeopardising the allocation of resources, which it need not do, and without diminishing the total resources, the aggregate volume of production, which it should not do.⁷

For Adiseshiah, the typical underdeveloped country simply did not exist. He emphasized, and brought out in pragmatic programmes of action in his mission reports to a hundred countries, that the political and socio-economic circumstances of each underdeveloped country vary, and that the appropriate path of development cannot be determined *a priori* but only in the context of these conditions. Development for him was country-specific. As his career in UNESCO advanced and, after UNESCO, his programme of activities in India grew, he concerned himself more and more with the operational rather than the theoretical issues of economic development. He would say in a lighter vein that he had no time to theorize. Thus, he will not be remembered as a theoretician, an Adam Smith, a Ricardo, Karl Marx, Marshall, Keynes, Rostow, or any such great economists. He did not deviate from his position that one cannot in theory reproduce the whole of reality, but only what one perceived to be certain key aspects of it. Theorizing, for him, entailed a degree of selectivity, while he preferred to deal with the dynamics of life and society.

It is true that the idea of development has displaced previous welfare conceptions and gained general acceptance in the international community. Development is today a United Nations objective. Yet an official doctrine has never been adopted.⁸

If Adiseshiah had an underlying theoretical perspective from which he deduced appropriate development proposals, it was a generally applicable 'basic needs first' approach. The first tenet of the 'basic needs first' paradigm is just what Adiseshiah held most dear all his life, namely that economic development does not include merely economic growth but also progress towards poverty elimination. The pro-

ponents of this approach hold that the optimum can only be attained by the distribution of available resources between various competing uses so that the income of the working poor is raised and employment opportunities expanded. It is growth with structural change.

The 'basic needs first' paradigm does not accept a growth/equity trade-off. Adiseshiah wrote:

In some of the poor countries, therefore, a kind of fatalistic social philosophy is spreading—that the price of economic growth is disparity and that concentration of incomes in a few hands is needed for increasing savings. In actual fact, large and growing income disparities have not stimulated growth. They have on the contrary acted as a powerful disincentive to growth and have channeled investments into luxury goods production, corruption, tax evasion and expatriate capital flows.⁹

He found that the import substitution industrialization strategy followed in India had resulted in economic power converging to a small group of industrial families. Such concentration of capital had resulted mainly in greater income disparities and a larger poverty base. Structural changes were not made in the vast rural areas, and a basis for more self-sustained growth was not laid. Consequently, the concentration of capital resources in the upper income bracket, where the elasticity of demand was low, had resulted in domestic demand constraints, and stagnation followed.

The second tenet of the 'basic needs first' paradigm is that the redistribution of resources in the direction of the poor, particularly in the rural areas, provides greater opportunities for the innate native skills which lie largely dormant in a developing country. It results not only in higher food production but also promotes the development of intermediate goods within the country.

The third proposition of 'basic needs first' is that by raising incomes of the working poor, small-scale savings will grow. Though the unit savings will be small-scale, the base will be large and, Adiseshiah held, the total savings potential will be much greater in the longer run than in the capital concentration paradigm. Furthermore, the participation of the people in the vast rural area in the development process will be secured and that, more than anything else, lays a more effective foundation for sustained growth. He pointed out, often in dramatic terms, that concentration on import substitution and the upper income group had resulted in harmful distortions of savings and investments.

The possibilities of import substitution have been largely exhausted and the countries face a very real danger of producing high-cost, inefficient goods behind their high tariff walls. Protection in these countries today is simply a contribution to high-cost domestic structures. One infamous illustration of this trend is the expenditure by the poor countries of \$2,100 million of their domestic resources in 1965 to manufacture cars and automobile products which had an international valuation of only \$800 million. This one year waste of \$1,300 million, which is more than the World Bank's twenty-three-year total of investments in industry, is a drastic reminder, if reminder there must be [...]¹⁰

The 'basic needs first' paradigm concerns capital dispersal leading to the restructuring of domestic demand, while the paradigm of import-substitution is one of an expanding capitalist nucleus leading to capital concentration. The supporters of the former claim that the consequences that flow from this restructuring are an easing of the two dominant constraints which are brought about by the import-substitution industrialization: the domestic demand constraint and the balance of payments constraint. Regarding the first constraint, the expansion of an homogeneous mass market is more likely to sustain indigenous demand for the promotion of faster long-term growth than the concentration of expanding demand in the upper income bracket. As for the balance of payments position, the growth of agricultural production and expansion of small-scale labour-intensive intermediary goods industry lead to greater efficiency of land use, reduced use of imported machinery and reduced food imports, thereby saving on foreign exchange. These savings are available for large-scale capital-intensive investments when they become essential and also for essential imports. A more effective foundation for sustained growth is thus laid. The proponents of 'basic needs first' theory maintain that growth combined with progressive poverty elimination can be achieved in market economy countries like Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, as well as in countries pursuing a path of centrally-planned development like China.

Adiseshiah grew up in the turbulent pre-independent years in India, when freedom fighters held the notion that imperialism was somehow in league with capitalism. Opposition to imperialism was routinely yoked with hostility to capitalism. Based on these sentiments, socialism appeared in almost every section of the new Constitution of India. The leaders of independent India wanted industrial development programmes to make progress towards socialism, and the State took ownership of as much as one-third of the economy outright. The mixed economy resulted in the fostering of new relationships that enabled family-held cartels to control a large percentage of the private sector. A small number of Indians became wealthy as manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Unwittingly, a new kind of imperialism of a privileged minority was created. No structural changes took place in the rural areas and agriculture remained mostly at the subsistence level. The small-scale enterprises continued to be run by entrepreneurs who had little access to credit and whose growth was further curbed under a web of regulations.

It is to the credit of Adiseshiah that he did not subscribe to the notion that the only moral and economic alternative to imperialism is a socialist arrangement. In his work in UNESCO with the newly emerging countries in the 1950s and 1960s, he never held that socialism was the only option open to them. In any case, UNESCO considered international participation in national politics as undesirable for it would place an intolerable burden on the international organization. As an international civil servant, Adiseshiah did not enter into polemical debates on the various claims of any one political organization over others, but concerned himself with the larger question of development, and with the application of appropriate techniques for sustainable growth and the eradication of poverty.

It is, therefore, wrong to classify all important elements of Adiseshiah's development economics under any one particular system of political organization. An extreme deference in classification can lead to a most unfruitful intellectual rigidity. His non-partisan position manifested itself at various points in his evaluation of operational conditions in the newly-emerging developing countries. His work in UNESCO took him on to a broad canvas where, with innumerable designs and compositions, he depicted the virtuous spiral of growth. Specific theoretical models, concepts and analytical techniques, originally developed as part of a particular socio-economic framework in one context, was lifted by him from one operational perspective and adapted to the purposes of another. He succinctly expressed this apolitical position thus:

This condition (optimum) may be generalised, whatever the political or economic structure under consideration. If it can be achieved by the free play of the market, then that is indicated; if it can be achieved only by public ownership and management, then that would be required. In between there are many alternative forms of intervention which planning techniques must encompass.¹¹

EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

Though not overconcerned with theorizing, Adiseshiah had to make a plausible case for the contribution, which he held as primordial, to economic growth. The basic question was that if allowed to mature during the life of a longer-term loan, would an investment in education contribute more, or at least as much, to the national output as would an equivalent investment in a fertilizer factory or a steel plant? Adiseshiah was not the first economist to concern himself in answering that question. There were economists before him who studied the role of education in economic development. He never claimed that he broke new theoretical ground on the importance of education to economic development and, in fact, he cited S.G. Strumilin who could be given that premier status:

The most dramatic exposure of this variable may be found in a communication addressed to Lenin in 1919 by the Soviet economist, Strumilin, on the eve of the launching of the Soviet Union's first great industrialization programme. Strumilin warned Lenin that the vast hydroelectric power grids he was planning, the huge industrial enterprises about to be initiated, the steel mills, the machine-tool factories and even mechanized farms would not produce what was needed, unless an equivalent amount of investment in education were also provided. Strumilin arrived at this conclusion through studies which showed that, in his country, primary education meant a 79 per cent increase in the output and wages of a labourer; second-level education an increase of as much as 235 per cent; and higher or university education, as much as 320 per cent. It may be noted that this relationship between education, productivity and income was established for the Soviet Union at a time when her economy was still largely underdeveloped and agricultural, much like those of Asia, Africa and Latin America today.¹²

There were other studies in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the United States, and mostly at the microlevel.¹³ Adiseshiah, occupying a key position in the international community during this period, made full use of these studies on the relationship of education to income to provide supporting evidence for his advocacy of policies designed to increase expenditures in both formal and non-formal education. Despite a heavy load of UNESCO work, he found time to carry out some studies of his own: desk research, he called them. For example, using data from the UNESCO Statistical yearbooks, he drew up comparative tables of school enrolment ratios, educational expenditures and growth rates of per capita income for the different regions of the world, over the period 1950–65.

Adiseshiah's desk research on the economic aspects of education in the wider context of national income per capita was the characteristic approach of an educational planner. He perforce had to assume fixed coefficients between educational attainments and income, thus providing fixed coefficients between income and different educational levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. He did not claim that there was a precise econometric measurement of education's contribution to growth rates. He only averred that there were certain norms which could be obtained from the data which provided a 'convenient index for comment on the relationship between educational investment and total national resources.'¹⁴

During his full-time employment with UNESCO in the 1950s and 1960s, Adiseshiah was unable to undertake microlevel studies of the economic effects of education. But as stated earlier, there were many such studies undertaken in that period by economists in universities and research institutions, and he drew on them fully to promote the cause of education. The impressive body of research findings had established that increases in productivity of persons and profitability of firms was brought about by education, by investments in schools and universities, and through adult education, literacy and vocational training programmes. Other researchers, subtracting the contribution of labour and capital to gross national product, came up with a substantial residual factor which they labeled 'the measure of our ignorance'. Despite difficulties in isolating and measuring the various elements thrown together in the residual, they nevertheless proposed that it consisted mostly of educational inputs. A plethora of literature on 'the residual' appeared and Adiseshiah admitted to the fundamental problems of measurement.

the residue is really another term for expressing the unknown, and disguising a confession of our ignorance. It is the grab-bag for all sorts of factors which include, in addition to education, changes in the product mix, training and public health, research and development, economies of scale and structural changes, each of which accounts for parts of the residue. Tools must be developed to break down this residue in terms of the separate contributions of each of these many elements, before the contribution of education to economic development can be isolated and quantified in this way.¹⁵

Furthermore, there was a facile tendency among economists to submerge many human aspects under the general title of education. They used 'education' as an all-embracing factor in which 'learning by doing,' traditional skills in specialized

crafts, and learning from environment by osmosis, became indistinguishable one from another.

Despite these continuing theoretical limitations, Adiseshiah answered the basic question of what socio-economic tactics are best calculated to achieve sustainable development of a traditional rural society. He firmly held that improvement in education and health were the first requisites, for they will expand enormously the size and strength of the economic base.

Despite these difficulties, and in view of the various approaches I have outlined and the impressive body of research findings already accumulated, I believe that we cannot but conclude that education is a key agent in promoting economic development. I believe in fact that no other single factor can break the interlocking vicious circle of low income, low investment, low production and low income which the developing countries face.¹⁶

Adiseshiah chose to be both an economist and educationist, and was ready on that fateful day—14 August 1949—when the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution establishing the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Thus began the new area of planned international assistance to the developing countries. As mentioned earlier, these funds grew into the much larger United Nations Development Programme and Adiseshiah played an outstanding role in getting a good share of these development funds allotted to education. From \$1,075,454 in 1950/51, UNESCO's share grew to \$10,143,861 of Expanded Programme allocations and \$26,073,904 of Special Fund allocations when Adiseshiah left UNESCO in 1970.

Obtaining World Bank funds for education was not such a smooth and swift process. Its Board of Governors were reluctant to get involved in the 'sensitive area of education'. The World Bank officially began operations in 1946, concentrating at first on power and transport sectors and later including agriculture and industry. For nearly twenty years of its functioning, much technology and a great deal of money were thought to combine all the ingredients for overcoming poverty. The importance of education for the absorption of technology and for advancing the productivity of capital was ignored. It was in that circumscribed framework of the World Bank that Adiseshiah provided the official UNESCO interpretation on the direct relationship of education to sustained economic growth. The bankers were finally convinced that education was credit-worthy and that educational projects were bankable. The first lending operations in education were made in 1962—a medium-term credit to Tunisia. Today, the World Bank, which is dominated in its staff composition by economists, with efficiency in terms of value for money inevitably determining decisions, has taken education as a leading sector for its lending programme.

In the developed countries, such as Brazil, India and the United Arab Republic, for example, education promotes development first and foremost by acting on their socio-cultural infrastructure. It influences, changes and moulds their social and cultural institutions. It encourages the individual attitudes of rationality and co-operativeness. It provides a means of reducing the large mass of unemployment and underemployment and of changing land-

tenure systems which do not promote productivity. It multiplies the institutions for spreading knowledge, promoting innovations, widening choices. It influences the local and central structures for self-government. It awakens the mind and the imagination. It kindles hope and awareness and the will and determination to create a different future [...] what I wished to stress was rather that an even more important, direct and in the long pull, decisive contribution of education in such countries is its effect on their socio-cultural infrastructures.¹⁷

Adiseshiah declared in the international forum with forceful clarity that physical growth with its neglect of the human factor is just not productive enough and the initial momentum cannot be maintained. Structural changes necessary for sustainable growth can only be achieved through education. He recognized education not only as an individual consumer good for vocational preparation but also as an instrument for national development and an important capital investment in a nation's future.

WHAT EDUCATION?

It (education) must itself be a factor of social change and technological progress while continuing to transmit a cultural heritage. It must be more and more closely linked to preparation for an employment market where competition is ever more ruthless, training more diversified and specialized skills obsolete before they can be fully mastered. And it must reconcile the rapidly evolving social and economic requirements of society with the awakening aspirations of the individual. At the same time, education must continue to fulfill its age-old role: to build character; to combine and balance scientific and technological knowledge and training, and humanistic, ethical and cultural values; to help the student achieve an idea of purpose, a sense of underlying unity and permanence in the midst of extremities and accelerating change.¹⁸

Adiseshiah thus clearly understood that the concept and aims of education must reflect the values and norms of society. At the same time, he emphasized that education is an intentional enterprise: it involves a programme of learning with the intention that some aims and objectives ought thereby to be achieved. What he did at the level of the social and political macrocosm was to inquire what sort of learning to impart which would be substantial as well as coherent, given its values. He took the values of a particular society and inquired as to what sort of achievements education should provide which would be considered progressive.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Adiseshiah had to deal with a great number of governments with vastly different social and political values, policies and institutions. The Pearson Commission described this period as follows:

After World War II, over sixty new countries gained formal independence within fifteen years. Emancipation from alien rule was accompanied by a growing political consciousness within these countries and by demands for modernization and progress. They entered political independence with a backlog of deep poverty, with little accumulated capital or experience of industrialization, and with a vague understanding of the complexities of rapid

change in their societies and economies [...] Rarely, if ever, has the world faced and absorbed political change on so large a scale in so short a time.¹⁹

In the former British Colonies, such as India, the values of Oxbridge saw the role of education as the preparation of leaders, and certainly not to reduce inequalities. Thus the British had high-quality schools as feeders to universities whose graduates found their way into positions of leadership. The traditional village schools became irrelevant and disappeared, resulting in widespread illiteracy on a massive scale. The French, by contrast, emphasized French culture, the mission civilisatrice. Education in their colonies was, in effect, the process of becoming French in social and cultural terms. For nationals of French-speaking countries, the right to education included the right to be a Frenchman. Indigenous culture became redundant. In other colonial traditions, such as that of the Portuguese, the objectives of education were even narrower, usually based on certain modest economic advances, such as access to the lower-level jobs. Many of these countries achieved independence in the 1960s having no more than ten university graduates.

The aircraft carrying Adiseshiah would arrive and soon it would no longer be possible to have an exclusively British pattern of education in India, or a French influence in Algeria. They would no longer be dependent on Senior Cambridge School Certificates or University of Sorbonne degrees and continue to be condemned to a position of servitude from which there was no escape and from 'brain drain'—for the best graduates never came back. He took with him a worldwide experience in assisting the new nations to change the equation. From the beginning, he helped developing countries to set standards of excellence relevant to their needs. And he worked tirelessly. René Ochs, who was in UNESCO's Technical Assistance Department with Adiseshiah right from its inception in 1950 wrote:

Those were the days when between two round-the-world trips which took him to twenty-five countries in succession—visiting projects in remote areas in a jeep or on mule back, interviewing every expert, visiting schools, attending official functions and signing agreements, explaining procedures and calling ministers at midnight to the gangway of his plane in order to dictate requests to them—he came back exhausted by time-lags, changes of climate and of diet, and sleepless nights, but never admitting to be tired; instead being full of fresh experience, stories, new ideas and new plans. His buoyancy, his resourcefulness and his enthusiasm which swept away all obstacles, galvanized everyone into action. This applied equally to his partners of other agencies and to representatives of governments.²⁰

EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

Adiseshiah often remarked that his greatest responsibility in UNESCO was to cooperate with the ministers of education. He was keenly aware that problems of education were intertwined with political, economic and social questions. And so the best aid that could be rendered was to assist those who were permanently a part of the educational landscape in the Third World countries, the leaders who had the greatest stake in their country's future, so that they be unmistakably in

charge of their own development. He saw his first priority as to generate local perceptions of the vital contribution that education makes to development, then to assist the nationals to set education targets and objectives which were socially needed and culturally harmonious, and to provide expertise to enable them to apply rational planning axioms of maximization of benefit and minimization of cost. On the need for an endogenous approach to educational planning, he wrote:

In fact, guidance as to desirable allocation of resources to education must be sought from the national policy objectives and national development plans or programmes, using the usual economic calculus mainly as a check-point. National planning as the elaboration of objectives and targets and the means of attaining them is generally accepted today in all countries, and it is in the light of such programmes that educational sectoral plans may be drawn up and the desirable allocation determined. A national plan or programme is thus the first desideratum for determining the resources to be allocated for education and for defining its place in the economic development of a country.²¹

Educational planning represented a new phase in international co-operation in the 1960s. With his knowledge of economics, a knowledge background which was constantly renewed and enriched through a personal habit of lifelong study of expository writings uniquely accessible to UNESCO, Adiseshiah was acknowledged as an authority in educational planning and his advice and assistance were widely sought. He decided, when the time came, that the developing countries should pool their new-found expertise to design and adopt regional plans in education. The first of them was organized in Karachi in 1959 when a regional plan for the development of primary education in Asia was adopted. Its success led Adiseshiah to organize the African Regional Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers of Planning at Addis Ababa, another for the Arab States (the Beirut Decision), and also for Latin America (the Santiago Declaration). These ministerial conferences became a central part of UNESCO programme activities and were held every four years in each region.

Endogenous development required training of nationals and Adiseshiah took the leadership for UNESCO to establish the International Institute of Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris in 1963 with the financial and material support of the World Bank, the Ford Foundation and the Government of France. The IIEP provides seminar-type training, intensive training courses at the national level and a unique documentation centre of books, reports, research papers and other widely-circulated publications on educational planning.

'If you go to any Member State, you will find in the Ministry of Education, a planning cell, a planning body, a planning machine, and at the head of it a man or a woman who has been trained by the IIEP.'²²

It was fitting that Adiseshiah, after retirement from UNESCO, should be elected in 1981 as president of the Governing Board of IIEP, the first president from the developing world, and re-elected for a second term of five years from 1986.

Also, MIDS under Adiseshiah's leadership undertook a study commissioned by the Indian Council of Social Science Research on 'Development of Education in Tamil Nadu (1976-1986)'. This study resulted in three publications, all edited by Adiseshiah: *Towards a learning society—a plan for development of education, science and technology in Tamil Nadu for 1976-86*; *Towards a functional learning society—a plan for non-formal education in Tamil Nadu*; and *Backdrop to the learning society—background papers to the education plan for Tamil Nadu*. Together they formed the Tamil Nadu State's perspective plan for education.

ADULT EDUCATION²³

Adiseshiah's convictions animated his actions. He practised what he preached, and his convictions were born out of his logical thinking and analysis. Thus there was a harmonious blend in his thinking and in his actions. His brain assimilated and synthesized an incredible amount of information on the multiple interactions of human beings in an increasingly complex and unequal world and steered him towards education as an instrument, a strategy and a goal capable of providing the solution to the problems such interactions had created. Education in his thinking was an entitlement of every human being. Education would open a new universe of experience to the illiterates, create awareness about their rights, destroy their blind acceptance of their poverty as an inescapable fate, empower them to master their surrounding circumstances, enlighten them about the need to plan their family size, help them acquire new skills to increase their productivity, change their life styles and enable them to become capable citizens of a progressing country. Thus Adiseshiah's message of education was a message of reassurance, a message of confidence. This single theme of education ran through his whole life as a teacher, UNESCO administrator, planner, researcher, critic, institution builder, editor, university vice-chancellor, parliamentarian and humanist. He firmly believed and acted on the premise that education simultaneously promotes both equity and growth. 'Adult education is the necessary condition for the successful attainment and execution of the redistributive development programmes which are aimed at moving towards a more equal and just society [...]', he wrote.²⁴

Adiseshiah worked actively in the field of adult education. It invigorated him with vitality to put what he cherished into practice in rural India.

He viewed rural India as an area teeming with people who, despite their innate wisdom to survive, have much greater productive capacities than are presently being tapped. The problem was massive illiteracy of adults in the rural areas. Given this perspective, it was plain to him that top priority must be improvements in education and health as the first requisites for the expansion of commodity output in agriculture. 'Adult education is the tool for the farmer and the country's rural masses to raise their subsistence standard', he said.²⁵ A massive programme of adult education was of the very greatest importance for him for any truly comprehensive development of the Indian economy.

After returning to India in 1971, besides editing books on adult education in the face of inequalities and, as stated above, the book *Towards a functional learning society*, he played a leading role in the programme area of adult education. He was for two decades the president of the Tamil Nadu Board of Continuing Education and Adult Education, and the State Resource Centre has been named 'Adiseshiah Bhavan' as a tribute to his zeal and intellectual integrity. At the national level, he was the president of the Indian Adult Education Commission and was the chairman of the Standing Committee of the University Grants Commission's Adult Education Committee. At the international level, he served as a long-standing chairman of UNESCO's International Jury for Literacy and was president of the International Council of Adult Education.

Thus Adiseshiah worked for education, that the fear in the minds of the people be replaced with hope for a better life, made possible by enlarging the opportunities and providing productivity all around. It was for him the only rational route to follow. He had fundamental optimism about the prospects of education for development.

ADISESHIAH'S WILL AND TESTAMENT

During a period of more than fifty years, Adiseshiah laboured for the educational advancement of Third World countries, particularly India, with a solicitude, zeal and self-denial that was academically distinguished and intellectually rewarding. On his death, he bequeathed all his property to the Madras Institute of Development Studies which he had nobly founded, and to the creation of a trust for teaching and research in economics. In this continuing awareness of the polyvalence of learning we recognize the mark of the true educator.

Notes

1. M. Adiseshiah, *Let my country awake*, Paris, UNESCO, 1970, p. 65.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
3. C.T. Kurien, E.R. Prabhakar and S. Gopal, eds., *Economy, society and development*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1991, p. 24.
4. Adiseshiah, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
6. M. Adiseshiah, ed., *Adult education faces inequalities*, Madras, Sangam Publishers, 1981, p. 1-3.
7. Adiseshiah, *Let my country awake*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
9. M. Adiseshiah, *It is time to begin*, Paris, UNESCO, 1972, p. 15.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
11. Adiseshiah, *Let my country awake*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

13. The following were studies in the 1950s and 1960s on the relationship of education to income:
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14. Adiseshiah, *Let my country awake*, op. cit., p. 64.
15. Ibid., p. 61.
16. Ibid., p. 64–65.
17. Ibid., p. 66–67.
18. Adiseshiah, *It is time to begin*, op. cit., p. 91–92.
19. L. Pearson, *Partners in development*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969, p. 25.
20. Kurien, Prabhakar and Gopal, eds., op. cit., p. 33.
21. Adiseshiah, *Let my country awake*, op. cit., p. 73.
22. Speech by M. Adiseshiah. International Institute of Educational Planning, twenty-fifth anniversary celebration, 1988, p. 10.
23. 'Till recently, UNESCO had two programmes, one called Adult Education and the other called Fundamental, later Community and more recently Literacy Education. It is only now that the two programmes have been merged into a single Adult Education programme'. Adiseshiah, ed., *Adult education faces inequalities*, op. cit., p. 11.
24. Ibid., p. 10–11.
25. Adiseshiah, *Let my country awake*, op. cit., p. 57.

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